JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The order passed by the Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 306 of 1986 on 27-2-1987 injuncting the defendant No. 1-the Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, from accepting fresh tenders up to 31-3-1987 and issuing a further mandate commanding him to place orders with the present respondent No. 1, is challenged in this revision. 2. The factual position is more or less admitted as far as the controversy is concerned. The Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Nagpur, invited tenders for the supply of Soji, Shira, Udits as well as Salty by the notice dated 4-3-1986. The plaintiff-Best Bread Company, submitted its tender. There were other tenderers also including the defendant No. 3 the present petitioner. The tender of the plaintiff came to be accepted and a contract came to be finalised on 30th June, 1986. The work under the contract was to commence from 7th July, 1986. However, by its letter, addressed on 4th July, 1986, to the plaintiff, the contract was suspended until further orders. Ultimately, by its letter dated 8-9-1986, the contract came to be cancelled. On the cancellation of this contract, the plaintiff instituted a suit before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Nagpur vide Civil Suit No. 1984/86. To this suit, the Divisional Social Welfare Officer, Nagpur and the Collector, Nagpur, were added as the co-defendants. The plaintiff has claimed a declaration that he continues to be a contractor for the supply of Udit for centres at Nagpur as per the terms and conditions of the contract executed on 30th June, 1986 for the period from July, 1986 to 31st March, 1987. He also claimed that the implementation of the contract be enforced as it is binding on both the parties. He has claimed a prohibitory or injunction restraining the defendants from inviting fresh tenders for supply of salty and sweet Udits to the children under G.C.D.S. project to the Nutrition Centres at Nagpur. 3. During the pendency of the suit, an application for temporary injunction come to be filed under Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is alleged in the application that the cancellation of his contract without assigning any reason is illegal. 3. During the pendency of the suit, an application for temporary injunction come to be filed under Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is alleged in the application that the cancellation of his contract without assigning any reason is illegal. It is also claimed that due to illegal termination of the contract, irreparable injury is likely to be caused to him which could not be compensated in terms of money. A temporary injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from inviting and finalising the tenders on 11-11-1986 and directing him to implement the agreement in question till, the disposal of the suit was claimed. 4. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their reply to the application for temporary injunction. They denied that the action of the Government in cancelling the contract was illegal. It was their contention that under the fresh terms of the contract, the Government had the power to cancel the same and they have exercised this power. The cancellation, according to them, is thus quite legal. It is also their contention that the Government had to take this action on the recommendations of the Committee appointed by the State Government. Their action in no way be called either illegal or arbitrary. 5. During the pendency of this suit, the institution styled as, "Bhartiya Magas Vargiya Zopadpatti Mahila Sarwangin Vikas Sanghatans, Nagpur", filed an application before the trial Court for joining them as a party and permitting them to participate in the proceedings. The trial Court allowed, them to join. They, however, did not file their reply to the application for temporary injunction. They supported the contentions of the defendant No. 1 and 2 and made their submissions based on law. 6. The trial Court, on hearing both the parties, came to the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out by the plaintiffs. It was also held that the Government had the authority under the contract itself to cancel the contract. The learned Judge held that the work under the contract itself was to commerce from 7th July, 1986. As the contract itself was suspended before the date of commencement, there could be no question of any injury-not to speak of any irreparable injury. On these findings, the application for temporary injunction came to be rejected. However, by the same order, the Sanghatna was permitted to be joined as co-defendant. 7. As the contract itself was suspended before the date of commencement, there could be no question of any injury-not to speak of any irreparable injury. On these findings, the application for temporary injunction came to be rejected. However, by the same order, the Sanghatna was permitted to be joined as co-defendant. 7. Feeling dissatisfied with the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred appeal which was finally heard by the 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur. The point which was strenuously canvassed before the learned Additional District Judge was that, the so-called termination of the contract was not only arbitrary, but even illegal-departing from all the canons of justice. It was also contended that there could be no termination of contract without hearing the party and without assigning any reason. The sum and substance of what had been contended before the learned Additional District Judge, Nagpur, was that the very action of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in cancelling the contract being void, the contract should be presumed to be in continuance when once this obstruction is removed. It appears that the learned 5th Additional District Judge agreed with the contention of the appellant. He came to the conclusion that the very action in terminating the contract by the Government on 8-9-1986 was illegal. He, therefore, allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the trial Court and issued an injunction as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. 8. It is this order that has been challenged before me. The respective Counsel representing their respective clients, have argued the matters at length. Before we proceed further in entering into the merits, let it be very clear that the Court before whom the remedy was canvassed for, were the courts of ordinary jurisdiction under the Common Law. This Court is also treating this revision under its ordinary scope under the Common Law as envisaged under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Suffice it to say that there is no question of exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction as far as the present matter is concerned. It is an admitted position that the contract between the plaintiff on one hand and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the other was finalised on 30-6-l986. The work under the contract was to commence with effect from 7-7-1986. It is an admitted position that the contract between the plaintiff on one hand and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the other was finalised on 30-6-l986. The work under the contract was to commence with effect from 7-7-1986. On 4-7-1986, the plaintiff was informed that the contract was suspended for the time being and on 8-9-1986 the plaintiff was ultimately informed that contract is cancelled. However, this position has remained uncontroverted. The finalisation of the contract being an admitted fact, it would be futile exercise in entering into the question of discrimination contemplated under Article 14 of the Constitution. No doubt, tremendous case law has been developed on this point, regarding the powers of the public authority and the way in which these powers are to be exercised. It being the admitted position in this case, that there was no departure of the norms while accepting the tenders, the point of discrimination at this stage never crept in, nor has that point been agitated. What was agitated before me was that the public authority was exceeding its limits of functioning or it did not conform to the norms while terminating the contract on 8-9-1986. 1 was extensively taken through (Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India)l, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 and particularly paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment which contain the observations of the Supreme Court regarding the powers that the public authorities and the Government have and the exercise of those powers and manner of exercising these powers. The gist of the whole discussion can be found in the following observations :--- "It must therefore be, taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet Will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norms and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down unless, it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." 9. Similar proposition appears to have been laid down in (Gujrat State Financial Corpn. v. Mls. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd.)2, A.I.R 1983 S.C. 848. The principles laid down are no doubt salutary. But as far as the present controversy is concerned, it being the admitted position that there was a finalised contract and the contract was subsequently unilaterally cancelled by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the above principles can hardly assist in the present litigation. It was at one stage put before me that when a government was a party to a contract, the ordinary proposition governing the contract as envisaged by the Contract Act do not apply. In fact the Contract Act in dispute was put on the Statute Book. There is no prohibition for cancellation of the contract. Section 39 of the Contract Act recognises the cancellation or termination of the contract by a contracting party. The termination of the contract by a party is not unknown to law. The position which prevails under the Statute which governs the ordinary contracts is one that there is a right of cancellation of contract. Mr. Bhangde, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 at this stage even said that he is not disputing the authority of the contracting party to cancel the contract. What he urged was the way in which the contract has been cancelled. At this stage, Mr. Bobde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to (Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 and this case according to him represents all the points raised by Mr. Bhangde. The reproduction of the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment Would be beneficial for the proper appreciation. Bobde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to (Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 and this case according to him represents all the points raised by Mr. Bhangde. The reproduction of the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment Would be beneficial for the proper appreciation. The Supreme Court observed : "It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment Chemicals Ltd.'s case A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 266 (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State Act purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in, exercise of its constitutional powers. But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligation of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which' is apart from contract." 10. The observations of the Supreme Court in the latter part of the above reproduced rebuts the argument of Mr. Bhangde that whenever the Government Is a party to the contract, the common law governing the contract does not prevail and it is only the Constitutional provisions, which prevail. As a matter of fact, the argument Is rather amusing, particularly when a Statute which remains a valid Statute, is said to be not operative. As is well-known, it is only the Contract Act which governs the, rights and liabilities of the parties. The Constitution does not make any provision for the contract. Mr. Bhangde strenuously urged before me that. As a matter of fact, the argument Is rather amusing, particularly when a Statute which remains a valid Statute, is said to be not operative. As is well-known, it is only the Contract Act which governs the, rights and liabilities of the parties. The Constitution does not make any provision for the contract. Mr. Bhangde strenuously urged before me that. In view of the pronouncement in Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C, 1628, the old law prevailing then need not be looked into and even the contractual obligation are to be decided in pursuance of whatever, has been observed in that decision. I find myself unable to agree with these contentions. It was at one stage vehemently argued by him that the law laid down in Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 has become absolute in view of the pronouncement in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 (cited supra). In fact A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 (cited supra) has been referred to in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571 (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath)4, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 (cited supra) has not been overruled so far and it remains a good law. Even the Supreme Court in paragraph 107 of their judgment in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571 (on page 1616) (cited supra) have referred to this case. What they pointed out is that the case they were dealing with was in respect of a service contract governed by statutory rules, whereas a point involved in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 (supra) was purely arising out of a contract. It is no use saying that the law laid down in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1496 (supra) is no longer good law in view of the pronouncement in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 (cited supra). Moreover, these two rulings are from two different spheres. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 was dealing with the powers of the public authority before the finalisation of the contract and it is not disputed even before me that a public authority is governed by the restrictions contained under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. What we are considering in the present case is not the action of the Government. We are considering the Government purely as a contracting party. If a contract permits either recession or termination or repudiation, we need not go to other law. 11. What we are considering in the present case is not the action of the Government. We are considering the Government purely as a contracting party. If a contract permits either recession or termination or repudiation, we need not go to other law. 11. Coming to the present problem, we have on record the conditions governing the tenders I may refer to two such conditions. Condition No. 5 prescribes a priority to be given to Female Social organisations coming from undeveloped area in case they fulfil other conditions. Condition No. 9 reserves a right to cancel the contract without assigning any reasons. These are two conditions out of 10 attached to the tender. What was urged before me at this stage is that the contract was finalised subject to these conditions and the contracting parties accepted the existence of the condition regarding the right of a party to cancel the contract unilaterally. At one stage, it was urged by Mr. Bhangde that the present petitioners did not fulfil all the conditions of this tender, particularly when they had quoted the higher price than that of the plaintiff. However, this is not the condition accompanying the tenders. The condition was about the qualifications, eligibility, the fulfilment of some sanitary conditions etc. There is nothing to show that the petitioner alone was fulfilling all these conditions. What can be said at this stage is that, both the parties viz. defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on one hand and the present petitioner on the other hand, accepted the condition that either party was at liberty to cancel the contract. Mr. Bhangde did say at one stage that the defendants had the authority to cancel the contract. But what he strenuously canvassed before me was that the way in which the contract has been cancelled is not only arbitrary, but completely illegal. For this, he urged before me that there was no notice given to him before cancelling the contract. It was also his contention that the reasons for cancellation of the contract were not made known to him. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that there were some complaints against the plaintiff and for examining those complaints, the Government appointed one Committee of responsible persons. That Committee examined the complaint and they recommended to the Government that the contract of the plaintiff should be cancelled. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that there were some complaints against the plaintiff and for examining those complaints, the Government appointed one Committee of responsible persons. That Committee examined the complaint and they recommended to the Government that the contract of the plaintiff should be cancelled. It was their contention that only on recommendations of the Committee, the contract came to be cancelled. With these arguments coming from both the sides, one thing is clear viz. that there is some dispute regarding the validity of the action, though there is no dispute regarding the action of the Government. The power to cancel the contract having been conceded, no finding of the Court can be asked at this stage whether the power has been properly or improperly or illegally exercised. This finding will come in due course after the trial. For the present, what we have to see is, whether the contract is in subsistence or whether one of the parties to the contract has kept this contract as non-existent. As far as the defendants are concerned, they have without any reservation cancelled this contract and they are not treating this contract subsisting. 12. In these circumstances, the rights of the aggrieved party would be governed by the Specific Relief Act. At the most, the plaintiff can say at this stage that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have committed the breach of the contract and they are liable for the breach. What is the liabilities springing from this breach is a matter governed by the specific provisions of the Specific Relief Act. Whether specific performance can be asked for and whether it can be granted, will depend upon the nature of the contract. Prima facie, at this stage, if we go through the plaint itself, it is clear that no specific performance of the contract has been claimed. The plaintiff has come to the Court with a case to remove the hurdle in the way and that hurdle, according to him, was the order of cancellation issued by the State Government. Having conceded at this stage of arguments that the Government had the Powers to cancel the contract, the remedy available to the party was either to seek specific performance or in the alternative to seek for damages. No relief regarding the specific performance of contract has been sought. Mr. Having conceded at this stage of arguments that the Government had the Powers to cancel the contract, the remedy available to the party was either to seek specific performance or in the alternative to seek for damages. No relief regarding the specific performance of contract has been sought. Mr. Bhangdo urged before me that he need not claim a specific performance of contract, because the contract having been admitted and the action of the Government in cancelling the contract being ultra vires and ab initio void, he need not claim a specific performance of contract. His argument was that, once this obstacle created by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is removed by this way the stream will flow as it was flowing. It is rather difficult to accept this argument. Mr. Bhangde argued at this stage that the action of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is ultra vires and ab initio void. What is meant by the terms "ultra vires" is quite different. Normally that action is ultra vires where person in authority taking that action has no powers to take action. In the present case, it is conceded that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had power to cancel the contract. It cannot, therefore, be said that the action is ultra vires. Whether the action is ab initio void is also a point which should be left to be decided at this stage of the trial. Because there are conflicting claims and counter claims as far as the validity of the cancellation is concerned. It is the case of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 that the ultimate cancellation is based on a report submitted by an Expert Committee which has been appointed by the Government for this specific purpose. It may be that no show cause notice was issued to the plaintiff before this ultimate action was taken. Looking to the terms of the tender as they stand particularly in giving preference to the women organisation and looking to the contentions raised by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that their action is based on a report of the Expert Committee, it would be well-nigh difficult at this stage to hold that the action is void ab initio. The action may at the most be bad or wrong, but there is some reason to believe that the action is bona fide at this stage. 1 and 2 that their action is based on a report of the Expert Committee, it would be well-nigh difficult at this stage to hold that the action is void ab initio. The action may at the most be bad or wrong, but there is some reason to believe that the action is bona fide at this stage. We need not go further as far as this point is concerned because the observations made here may have an adverse effect as far as the further decision of the suit is concerned. 13. The sum and substance of what has been said so far is that, there has been a finalised contract. There was no question of arbitrary exercise of the power when the contract was entered into and finalised. The contract has been unilaterally revoked or terminated. There is the power given to the party under the contract itself to terminate the contract. The only question which would prevail is whether this power was properly exercised or not. Even assuming for the present that the power was not properly exercised, the question which would cropped in is whether an injunction as sought in this case would be required in the interest of justice. As is well-known the Court has to be satisfied that, (1) the party has made out a prima facie case, (2) if the helping hand of this Court is not stretched, the other party is likely to suffer irreparable injury and (3) that the balance of convenience lies with the party who seeks the remedy. As far as the first point is concerned, there is hardly anything to say in the matter, particularly when a right of the party to cancel his contract is accepted. As far as the second point is concerned, the nature of the contract itself would show that it is a contract of commercial nature. A product has a fixed price. The quantity of the product has also been specified. No expert mathematician would be needed to make out that the loss can be compensated in money. It is interesting to note at this stage, that no case has been made out that for the purposes of this contract any infrastructure was called for or any infrastructure has been created with huge investments. That could have been one of the points in support of irreparable loss or damage. It is interesting to note at this stage, that no case has been made out that for the purposes of this contract any infrastructure was called for or any infrastructure has been created with huge investments. That could have been one of the points in support of irreparable loss or damage. But as that case has not been made out, we need not go into that aspect of the case. Suffice it to say that this is a contract where an injured party could reasonably be compensated in terms of money. That remedy is still open to the party if it wants to peruse the same. In view of these circumstances, there is hardly any cause for a temporary injunction. The order passed by the lower Appellate Court, according to me, is not proper. Mr. Bhangde urged before me that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be slow in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. It was also alleged that when the trial Court has made only a stop-gap arrangement which would prevail during the pendency of the suit, this Court should not disturb the same. Being conscious of the power under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court can justifiably go into the legality or material irregularity as far as the proceedings are concerned. As is apparent from the order passed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, he has virtually recorded a finding that the cancellation is void ab initio. This has in fact finally decided the suit itself. This he could not justifiably do at this interim stage. There is yet to be a trial. Issues are to be struck, parties are yet to lead their respective evidence. This amounts to misjudge the ultimate result and this according to me would be a proper case where the revisional Court should exercise its jurisdiction. 14. In the result, the revision succeeds. The order passed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Nagpur on 27-1-1987 is hereby set aside. Injunction application is dismissed throughout. Rule is made absolute in terms. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----