P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Criminal Application is to quash the show cause notice dated 16-12-1986 the Order of the first respondent dated 18-4-1987 and the Order of the second respondent dated 11-6-1987 which are Annexures A `b and E respectively The short facts of this case are that the petitioner herein was externed from the City of Surat and Surat Rural and from the Districts of Bharuch and Bulsar for engaging in the commission of offence involving force and violence punishable under Chapter XII XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code. A show cause notice dated 16-12-1986 was issued alleging:1. THAT he is involved in 9 cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act which are pending trial in the Court. 2. that he possess deadly weapons like knife and with the same be play mischief with girls beat for looting things and money and committed offence under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code and the details of which are as under; (1)HE looted Rs. 400. 00 Rs. 500. 00 from the cash box by placing a knife on the abdomen of the witness on the cold drink shop in Randher Soni Faliya on 6-3-1986 at 6-00 Oclock in the evening. (2) On 30-3-1986 at 6-00 Oclock in the evening Palanpur Road Near Canal while he was dragging girl to the field with a view to rape her by catching her hand he gave threat to a washerman to murder him who intervened to save her. (3) On 14-4-1986 at 11-00 hours in the afternoon near Ramnagar bus-stand he stopped one bicycle rider who was carrying bidi-cigarettes at the point of knife he had taken away his wrist watch and a golden ring of half tola. (4) On 20-4-1986 at 6-00 Oclock in the morning his persons were passing near Hanuman Tekra taking bundles of illicit liquor which was seen by the lorrywala of eatables he gave threat to him by showing knife that if he gives information then he will be done to death and his roof will be burnt. (5) On 4-5-1986 at 5-00 Oclock in the evening at the corner of Palanpur village he stopped one electrical work mazdoor and he took away Rs. 200. 00 by showing a knife to him. (5) On 4-5-1986 at 5-00 Oclock in the evening at the corner of Palanpur village he stopped one electrical work mazdoor and he took away Rs. 200. 00 by showing a knife to him. (6) On 30-5-1986 at 7-00 Oclock in the evening Near Bapunagar Four Roads while he was trying to drag a girl into the Rickshaw by catching her hand he gave threat to murder a person passing through the said place who tried to save the girl by showing knife to him. ( 2 ) IT is alleged in the notice that the Petitioner was involved in Anti-Social Activities and no witnesses are forthcoming to depose against the Petitioner out of fear for the life and property. The Externing Authority after considering the explanation given by the petitioner and also the oral and documentary evidence produced before him came to the conclusion that the petitioner has committed the offences mentioned in the show cause notice. After satisfying himself that the petitioner is a dangerous and head strong person the externing authority externed the petitioner from the area falling under the jurisdiction of the Surat City Police Commissioner Surat Rural Bharuch and Bulsar districts. The Externing Authority has also observed that if the petitioner is not externed from the nearby districts there in a reasonable apprehension of the petitioner doing the aforesaid acts by continuing his activities from the aforesaid nearby district through his associates and agents by taking advantage of the present instruments of speedy transportations. Aggrieved by the said order of the Externing Authority the petitioner herein preferred an appeal to the Government under Sec. 60 of the Bombay Police Act. The Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the ground No. 1 of the show cause notice is irrelevant and focussed its attention only on the ground No. 2 of the show cause notice and the 6 incidents mentioned in the ground No. 2. The Appellate Authority after satisfying itself from the record observed that except for the first all other 5 incidents are essentially worthy of belief on the basis of the materials. With his finding the Appellate Authority confirmed the Externment Order passed by the Externing Authority but restricted the order of externment only to the Surat district. Aggrieved by the said orders the petitioner has preferred the abovesaid Special Criminal Application. Mr. With his finding the Appellate Authority confirmed the Externment Order passed by the Externing Authority but restricted the order of externment only to the Surat district. Aggrieved by the said orders the petitioner has preferred the abovesaid Special Criminal Application. Mr. Kapadia the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner mainly contended that the-Externing Authority has taken into consideration irrelevant and non-existing grounds in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner is a dangerous and head strong person and as such he is to be externed from the area mentioned in the Externment Order. This according to Mr. Kapadia vitiates the whole Externment Order since the Externing Authority has mechanically and without application of his mind passed such Externment Order and as such the same has to be quashed. Mr. Divetia the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondents after citing certain decisions contended that even though the first ground taken into consideration by the Externing Authority is irrelevant the Externing Authority is correct in externing the petitioner since the other ground i. e. ground No. 2 and the 5 incidents mentioned therein are sufficient to pass such an order of externment. It is the further contention of Mr. Divetia that the Appellate Authority has correctly eschewed the first allegation in the Externment Order and has confirmed the Externment Order with a modification that the petitioner will be externed only from the district of Surat. ( 3 ) WE have carefully gone through the records in this case. It is clear from the Affidavit-in-reply filed by the first respondent herein that out of the 9 prohibition cases mentioned as allegation No. 1 Serial Nos. 2 4 5 6 and 7 ended in acquittal and Serial Nos. 1 3 8 and 9 are still pending before the trial Court. It is also clear from the Affidavit-in-reply that the acquittal of certain prohibition cases were before the order in externment was passed. Inspite of that the Externing Authority has stated in his order that all the 9 cases mentioned in the show cause notice are pending trial. The Externing Authority in a cavalier manner even without verifying the details and particulars regarding the 9 prohibition cases has mechanically observed that those cases are pending trial. Further for an order of externment the Externing Authority need not take into consideration prohibition offences. The Externing Authority in a cavalier manner even without verifying the details and particulars regarding the 9 prohibition cases has mechanically observed that those cases are pending trial. Further for an order of externment the Externing Authority need not take into consideration prohibition offences. That is why the Appellate Authority has correctly held that ground No. 2 mentioned in the show cause notice and in the Externment Order is an irrelevant material. Thus we are able to see that the Externing Authority has not only taken the irrelevant material along with the other materials but was also under the impression that 9 prohibition cases mentioned in that irrelevant ground No. 1 are pending in trial while as a matter of fact 5 of those cases have ended in an acquittal even before the order of externment was passed. ( 4 ) IN the abovesaid circumstances we have to consider whether the Externment Order can be sustained owing to the fact that the Externing Authority has taken into consideration the irrelevant grounds and has also wrongly stated that all the prohibition cases were pending trial inspite of the fact that 5 of such prohibition cases ended in an acquittal much earlier to the passing of the Externment Order. ( 5 ) A Division Bench of our High Court in Mamad Kala v. State 14 GLR 384 has held that the function under Sec. 56 of the Bombay Police Act is an administrative one and not a quasi-judicial function. When such an administrative function has been entrusted to an authority the subjective satisfaction of the particular authority who passed the Externment Order after hearing the evidence and argument alone will have relevance for judging the correctness or otherwise of such an order. The argument of Mr. Divetia the learned Public Prosecutor to the effect that the Appellate Authority has applied its mind and correctly eschewed the ground No. 1 cannot in our opinion -cure the defect committed by the Externing Authority. Since the Externing Authority who is the Deputy Commissioner of Police in this case has mechanically applied his mind without properly forming his subjective satisfaction on relevant materials we are of the view that the order of externment itself is vitiated in Ashokbhai Zinabhai Rana v. State of Gujarat and Anr. Since the Externing Authority who is the Deputy Commissioner of Police in this case has mechanically applied his mind without properly forming his subjective satisfaction on relevant materials we are of the view that the order of externment itself is vitiated in Ashokbhai Zinabhai Rana v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1987 (2) GLR 719 : 1987 (1) GLH 293 a Bench of our High Court has held that the power of the Appellate Authority as per Sec. 60 is limited either to confirm very or cancel or set aside the order appealed against and hence the original order has to stand and that it is open to the Appellate Authority either to alter its original order embellish it or preserve it by keeping its identity intact. This observation clearly shows that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Externing Authority alone is the basis on which the legality or otherwise of the Externment Order should stand and not judging it from the order of the Appellate Authority. This position can be very well supported by the observation made in the decision reported in Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 179 . In this decision the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 observed as follows:" The first contention raised by the learned counsel raises however a some what important point which requires careful consideration. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the power to issue a detention order under Sec. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act depends entirely upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority specified in that section. The sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based provided they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the legislative provision cannot be challenged in a Court of law except on the ground of mala fides. Vide the State of Bombay v Atma Ram AIR 1951 Supreme Court 157 (A ). A Court of law is not even competent to esquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under Sec. 7 of the Act what has happened however in this case is somewhat peculiar. A Court of law is not even competent to esquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu under Sec. 7 of the Act what has happened however in this case is somewhat peculiar. The Government itself in its communication dated the 13th of March 1953 has plainly admitted that one of the grounds upon which the original order of detention was passed is unsubstantial or non-existent and cannot be made a ground of detention. The question is whether in such circumstances the original order made under Sec. 3 (1) (a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer in our opinion can only be in the negative. The detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner We can neither decide whether these grounds are good or bad nor can we attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was made. To say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. In such cases we think the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole. This principle which was recognised by the Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. Emperor AIR 1943 FC 72 (B) seems to us to be quite sound and applicable to the facts of this case. ( 6 ) APPLYING the above said decision we have to consider only the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner of Police who is the Externing Authority in this case. ( 6 ) APPLYING the above said decision we have to consider only the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner of Police who is the Externing Authority in this case. The above said decision is also an authority for the proposition that if one of the grounds mentioned in the original order is unsubstantial or non-existent to say that the other ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. Thus if we come to the conclusion that the Externing Authority has mechanically applied its mind without properly forming its subjective satisfaction and that it has taken irrelevant and non-existent ground for forming such satisfaction the order of externment should be considered as vitiated. The decisions cited by Mr. Divetia which are reported in AIR 1957 SC 1353 and Swarn Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 232 deal with cases of Civil nature and the observation therein is that where an order is based on several grounds some of which are irrelevant even if there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of relevant and existing ground that order cannot be sustained but where however the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing ground and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing grounds could not have affected the ultimate decision or authority order has to be sustained. We do not think this decision will have any application to the facts of the present case more especially in the light of the principles enunciated in Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 179 . ( 7 ) CONSIDERING all these aspects of the case we are definitely of the opinion the Externing Authority has mechanically applied its mind taking into consideration irrelevant and extraneous facts in forming its subjective satisfaction for the purpose of externing the petitioner. When especially liberty of a person is involved a strict scrutiny of such externment order is necessary and the order which has been passed in a cavalier manner without proper application of mind cannot be the basis for passing the order of externment. When especially liberty of a person is involved a strict scrutiny of such externment order is necessary and the order which has been passed in a cavalier manner without proper application of mind cannot be the basis for passing the order of externment. ( 8 ) IN view of the discussions made in paragraphs supra we are of the view that the order of externment on the facts and circumstances of the present case cannot be sustained. Hence the Rule issued in Special Criminal Application is made absolute by setting aside the order of externment passed by the respondent herein. Rule made absolute. .