Judgment :- 1. I see no error of jurisdiction in the order impugned in this Civil Revision Petition. 2. The petitioner is the 1st defendant (judgment-debtor) in a suit for specific performance. The suit was decreed and the court below directed the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff when he deposits the balance sale consideration. The balance sale consideration was about Rs. 12,500/-. The plaintiff filed an. execution petition and wanted the execution court to execute the decree. In the execution application, the plaintiff said that he is entitled to get from the 1st defendant an amount of Rs. 15,927.75 as costs and interest and so, the plaintiff is not bound to deposit any amount as balance of sale consideration, and the amount that is due to the plaintiff from the 1st defendant can be adjusted towards the balance sale consideration. 3. The 1st defendant contended that the decree is not executable. In fact, the counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the decree is illegal. This contention was raised on the ground thai the decree has not been made by the trial court in accordance with 0.20 R.12A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The counsel submitted that R.12A of O.20, C.P.C., mandates that a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of property should specify the period within which the payment shall be made. 4. True, in this decree, no specific period is mentioned. The question is whether the non-mentioning of a specific period in the decree would render the decree invalid, illegal or in-executable. I have no hesitation to hold that it will not render the decree illegal, invalid or in executable. It may be an irregularity which may not affect the substance of the decree. When a suitor comes before court and, after a long fight, obtains a decree, he should not be told that the decree he has obtained has got certain irregularities for which be is not responsible but he has to take the consequence or it. If such an attitude is taken, it is unrealistic and unjust. The prime devoir of the court is to reader justice, not to find technicalities and inconsequential irregularities to prevent justice being done to the suitor. 5. I always try to bear in mind in the judging process the conceptual scope and the practical content of justice. If such an attitude is taken, it is unrealistic and unjust. The prime devoir of the court is to reader justice, not to find technicalities and inconsequential irregularities to prevent justice being done to the suitor. 5. I always try to bear in mind in the judging process the conceptual scope and the practical content of justice. Justice is linked with, not only linked with but even also identified with a definite attitude of the mind, "a willingness to be fair and a readiness to give recognition to the claims and concerns of others." It is unmistakably clear and plain that the mere cultivation of a mental attitude of fairness and concern for others is not in itself sufficient to bring about a just decision. The "good will to do justice" should be implemented by practical measures. Even before the opt-quoted definition of justice found a pride of place in the corpus juris civil is as "justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to everyone that to which he is entitled"; Cicero had described justice as "the disposition of the human mind to render to every one his due." The very same idea has been a little improved upon when St. Thomas Aquinas told us that justice is "a habit whereby a man renders to each his due by a constant and perpetual will." 6. Emil Brunner, a Swiss Theologian, injustice and social order' put the formula dovetailing the mental and institutional components of justice thus: "Who or whatever renders to every man his due, that person or thing is just an attitude, an institution, a law, a relationship in which every man is given his due is justice. 7. The cheerful consent to render every one his due is the most important and valid ingredient of the concept of justice. In its absence, justice is devoid of its charisma. 8. In any view of the matter, the execution court cannot say that the decree is void and it will not execute the decree. In this case, the execution court has found that the decree is executable and this court exercising its power under S.115, C.P.C., will never say that what the execution court has held is without jurisdiction. 9. 8. In any view of the matter, the execution court cannot say that the decree is void and it will not execute the decree. In this case, the execution court has found that the decree is executable and this court exercising its power under S.115, C.P.C., will never say that what the execution court has held is without jurisdiction. 9. The counsel for the petitioner next contended that as per the decree the plaintiff ought to have deposited the balance amount and he has no right to claim a let off. The admitted fact is that the petitioner judgment debtor has to pay costs amounting to a sum more than what is due to him from the plaintiff at balance of sale consideration. Here also, the petitioner relies on some technicality and he submits that 0.21 R.19, C. P. C., has no application since the 1st defendant has not obtained any decree for recovery of any amount from the plaintiff. Apart from the technicalities involved is this question, if we approach the problem in a rational and commonsense manner, it is really an unreasonable and pedantic proposal to insist the plaintiff to deposit the balance amount and request the court to direct the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the costs decreed in the suit. 10. 0.21 R.19, C. P.C., provides that when an application is made to a court for the execution of a decree under which two parties are entitled to recover sums of money from each other, a set off can be worked out in execution itself. The phraseology used in 0.21 R.19, C. P. C., is "under which two parties are entitled to recover sums of money from each other". In this case, it may be argued that under the decree the defendant is not entitled to recover any sum of money from the plaintiff and as such, O.21 R.19, C. P. C., is not applicable. The fact that 0.21 R.19, C. P. C., is not applicable is not the end of the matter. I would say that the court always does possess a general or inherent power to allow a set off where justice demands so, even if the court cannot do so applying the provisions of 0.21 R.18 or 19. When court's inherent power is saved, it implicits that that power is exercisable by the courts which execute the decrees. I would say that the court always does possess a general or inherent power to allow a set off where justice demands so, even if the court cannot do so applying the provisions of 0.21 R.18 or 19. When court's inherent power is saved, it implicits that that power is exercisable by the courts which execute the decrees. So, in the matter of execution also, the court has got inherent power to meet the ends of justice. If what is provided under 0.21 R.18 and 19, C. P. C., can be termed as legal set off, that does not exclude the application of the principle of equitable set off if circumstances do require the court to apply that principle. I need not say that equitable set off is bated on the principle of equity, justice and good conscience. 11. If we trace the history of equitable set off, it is not difficult to find the roots in the well-known saying of Lord Elden. His Lordship said: "This Court (that is, the Court of Chancery as a court of equity) was in possession of it (i.e. the doctrine of set off), as grounded upon principles of equity, long before the law interfered. It it true, where the court does not find a natural equity, going beyond the statute (of set off), the construction is the same in equity as at law. But that does not affect the general doctrine upon natural equity. So, as to mutual debts and credits, courts of equity must make the same construction as the law. But, both in law and in equity, that statute, enabling a party to prove the balance of the account, upon mutual credit, has gone much farther than the party could have gone before, either in law or in equity, as to set off". It is only natural equity that cross-demands which have been adjudicated and crystallised in a decree should compensate each other by deducting less sum from the greater and that the difference is the only sum which can be justly due. Statute law may prescribe certain forms and restrictions in the matter of set off. In fact, R.19 of 0.21, C. P. C., by its wording mandated that both the parties should have an entitlement to recover sums of money from each other by virtue of a decree or decrees. 12. Statute law may prescribe certain forms and restrictions in the matter of set off. In fact, R.19 of 0.21, C. P. C., by its wording mandated that both the parties should have an entitlement to recover sums of money from each other by virtue of a decree or decrees. 12. In this case, of course, there is no decree in favour of the defendant to recover any sum of money from the plaintiff. But, in reality, the plaintiff it bound to pay for the effective enforcement of the decree an amount to the defendant and that that direction in the decree gives the defendant an entitlement to recover some money when the decree is put in execution. Understanding the decree in this perspective, it can be said that there is a natural equity between the parties to compensate the cross demands of each other. It there were mutual debts unconnected, certainly, the law interdicts that they should not be set off, but each must be sued upon. Plainly speaking, equity generally follows the law as regards the set off also, but it is with limitations and restrictions. If there is no connection between the demands, there is no scope for applying the equitable principles. But, if there is connection between the demands, equitable principles should be applied and the court allows set off under peculiar circumstances of the case. In short, by the saving power under S.151, C. P. C., the court will extend the doctrine of set off and claims in the nature of set off beyond the law in all cases where peculiar equities intervene between the parties and justice demands such an approach from the court. There can be so many situations where justice demands the application of the principles of equitable set off as to admit of no comprehensive enumeration. 13. The specific provision of O.21 R.18 and 19, C.P C., would, in no circumstance, take away the parties' right to set off which they had independent of the Code. If precedents are required for the proposition that the power to grant an equitable set off is available to execution court, I shall quote B. Seshaiah v. B. Veerabhadrayya (AIR 1972 A.P. 134 FB). This decision has relied on several other decisions namely, Mt Monibai v. Jethanand (AIR 1938 Sind 31), Badri Nath v. Moti Ram (AIR 1939 Lab. 85), Adwaita Chandra Saha v. Chittagong Co. This decision has relied on several other decisions namely, Mt Monibai v. Jethanand (AIR 1938 Sind 31), Badri Nath v. Moti Ram (AIR 1939 Lab. 85), Adwaita Chandra Saha v. Chittagong Co. (AIR 1925 Cal. 102), Ram Rao v. Verkataramanachar (AIR 1931 Mys. 20), Chinnammal v. Chidambara Kothanar (AIR 1936 Mad. 626) end Bank of Dacca Ltd. v. Gouri Gopal Saha (AIR 1936 Cal. 409). The Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court bag been followed by the Madras High Court in the decision reported in P. Venkatavaradan v. Lakshmi Ammal (AIR 1982 Mad. 5). I have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff - decree holder has get the right to claim an equitable set offend the execution court has rightly allowed it. It can never be interfered with, exercising the power under S.115, C.P.C. In the result, I have to hold that what the execution court has done is perfectly legal and valid. The Civil Revision Petition is only to be dismissed and I do so. There will be no order as to costs.