JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---The applicant-accused is the proprietor of M/s. Ganesh Dairy, 616, South Kasba, Solapur. The complainant-Food Inspector took a sample of buffalo milk from him on 17th May, 1981 at about 9.00 a.m. The said sample was sent to Public Analyst whose report dated 19th June, 1981 revealed that the milk was adulterated. The Food Inspector obtained the consent of the appropriate authority to prosecute the accused and prosecuted him on 22nd April, 1982 in the Court of the learned trial Magistrate. At the trial he was found guilty of an offence of food adulteration and was convicted for offences punishable under section 16 read with sections 7(i) and 2(ia)(a)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months, by a judgement and order recorded by the learned trial Magistrate on 15th November, 1985, in Regular Criminal Case No. 56 of 1982. 2. Being aggrieved, the accused filed Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 1983 which was dismissed by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, by his judgment and order dated 5th December, 1985 and hence the accused approached this Court invoking revisional powers. 3. Mr. Ganatra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, urged that the sanction to prosecute the accused obtained by the prosecution under section 20 of the Act was not in accordance with law and, therefore, the conviction recorded against the accused and the sentence imposed upon him is bad in law and the same should be set aside and the accused be acquitted. Mr. Suryavanshi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has hardly any answer to counter Mr. Ganatra's contention. 4. Section 20 of the Act reads as under :--- "20(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under section 14 or section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written contention of, the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint." Thus, according to this provision of law, no prosecution under the Act could lie unless a written consent from the State Government or a person authorised in that behalf, to prosecute an accused was obtained. In this case, the Joint Commissioner, Pune Division, Food and Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Pune passed an order granting sanction to prosecute the accused on 11th September, 1981. It reads as under : "ORDER In exercise of the powers vested in me under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, read with Government order Urban Development, Public Health Department No. FDA/1079/2943/PH-A/Dt. 21st October, 1980 I. P.K. Kochar, Joint Commissioner, (Pune Division) Food and Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Pune. have gone through Public Analyst Report No. 920 dt. 19-6-81 in respect of food article "BUFFALO MILK" and relevant case papers and have come to conclusion that this is a fit case for prosecution under section 7, sub-section (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In exercise of the powers as above, I hereby give my consent for the prosecution of Shri Gahininath Bhimrao Patekar, C/o. Ganesh Dairy, residing at H. No. 616, South Kasaba Peth, Solapur, for an offence alleged to have been committed by him as regards stocking for sale and selling of food article under reference on or about 17-5-81 in contravention of section 7(i) punishable under section 16 of the said Act. The sample of the food article under reference was taken under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by Food Inspector, Solapur, Shri P.G. Mhalas from the above said person on 17-5-81. DATE : 11/9/81. Sd/- (P.K. Kochar) Joint Commissioner, Pune Divn. Food and, Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Pune." 5. Mr. Ganatra's submission is that this order merely shows that the sanctioning authority went through the Public Analyst Report and the relevant case papers before coming to a conclusion that this was a fit case for prosecuting the accused under section 7(i) read with section 16 of the Act and that the sanction order does not demonstrate that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case before granting the sanction. Mr. Mr. Ganatra also submitted that the definition of the word "adulterated" under section 2(ia) of the Act provides as many as 13 clauses specifying as to in what different ways a food article can be said to be adulterated and that the sanction order does not set out as to under which clause of this definition the article of food in question was found to be adulterated. The sanction order also does not show as to what was the exact nature of adulteration, Mr. Ganatra further submitted. In other words, the argument is that the sanction order suffers from infirmities it being omnibus, vague and lacking in material particulars with regard to the nature of the offence, which is indicative of the fact that there was total non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. 6. I find lot of substance and force in the submission of Mr. Ganatra as the law on this point is now well settled by this Court and the Supreme Court as pointed out by him. Thus, it was held by this Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Shantilal Jamnadas Thakkar)1, (1979)1 FAC 210 that the operative part of the sanction showed that the sanctioning authority had given sanction for an omnibus prosecution of the accused under section 7 without mentioning the relevant sub-sections spelling out specific offences under the said section. In the said case, this Court was disposing of two revision applications and the above observation was made while dealing with Criminal Revision Application No. 36 of 1976 in para 3 of the judgment wherein the entire sanction order was incorporated and like in the present case it was mentioned there in the sanction order that the sanctioning authority had gone through the relevant case papers and the report of the Public Analyst and had come to the conclusion that it was a fit case for prosecution under section 7(v) of the Act. Such a sanction order was held to be invalid by Sawant, J. In (Nizamuddin Siddkbhai Tigala v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1985(2) FAC 88 Puranik, J., relied upon the case of Shantilal Jamnadas Thakkar and held that a look at the sanction to prosecute produced on record at Exh. Such a sanction order was held to be invalid by Sawant, J. In (Nizamuddin Siddkbhai Tigala v. State of Maharashtra)2, 1985(2) FAC 88 Puranik, J., relied upon the case of Shantilal Jamnadas Thakkar and held that a look at the sanction to prosecute produced on record at Exh. 39 showed that the sanctioning authority had perused the relevant papers and had given the consent for prosecution of the applicant-accused for offences alleged to have been committed in contravention of section 7 punishable under section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and that the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to the record placed before it and before according sanction find out as to what was the nature of the offence committed by the accused. It was also observed that it was expected of the sanctioning authority to mention while consenting for prosecution the one or two of the various types of adulteration as described in section 2(ia)(a) to (m). And recently in the (Administrator of the City of Nagpur v. Hari and another)3, 1986(1) FAC 100 Deo, J., was of the view that it was not sufficient to say that the sanctioning authority had perused the relevant papers and that it must point out particulars on the basis of which the prosecution rested. Therefore, the law on this aspect of the matter is that the sanction order should not be vague and omnibus and the sanctioning authority must point out the relevant particulars on the basis of which the prosecution was based. It is not enough to fill up the blanks in the proforma of the sanction order, as it appears to have been done in this case, which demonstrates total non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. It is really unfortunate and a matter of great concern that the sanctioning authorities in our State are completely oblivious of the law laid down by this Court as back as in the year 1979, resulting in acquittal of numerous white collar criminals committing heinous crimes of mass murders by adulterating articles of food. 7. It is really unfortunate and a matter of great concern that the sanctioning authorities in our State are completely oblivious of the law laid down by this Court as back as in the year 1979, resulting in acquittal of numerous white collar criminals committing heinous crimes of mass murders by adulterating articles of food. 7. The Supreme Court in (State of Bombay (now Gujarat) v. Parsottam Kanaiyalal)4, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1 had held : "To read by implication that before granting a written consent, the authority competent to initiate a prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prima facie case exists for the alleged offender being put up before a Court appears reasonable.........." In a recent ruling in (A.K. Roy and another v. State of Punjab and others)5, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2160 the Supreme Court while dealing with section 20(1) of the Act held : "......he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, according to the latest law down by the Supreme Court what is required of a sanctioning authority is not only to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case to be satisfied that prima facie case existed but also to record reasons as to why launching of prosecution against an offender is necessary in the public interest. So far as our case is concerned, neither the reasons are recorded for granting the sanction nor it is pointed out that the launching of the prosecution was in the public interest. 8. This being the position in law, the inevitable conclusion is that the sanctioning authority in the instant case had not applied its mind while granting sanction to prosecute the accused and, therefore, the sanction cannot be said to be in accordance with the law. Hence, the prosecution launched against the accused on invalid sanction in violation of the provisions of section 20 of the Act is bad in law. Therefore, the prosecution fails and the conviction recorded against the accused and the sentence imposed on him will have to be set aside. In the result, the revision application succeeds. Hence, the prosecution launched against the accused on invalid sanction in violation of the provisions of section 20 of the Act is bad in law. Therefore, the prosecution fails and the conviction recorded against the accused and the sentence imposed on him will have to be set aside. In the result, the revision application succeeds. The conviction recorded against the accused and the sentence imposed upon him by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, 2nd Court, Solapur and confirmed by the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, for offences punishable under sections 7(i) and 2(ia)(a)(m) read with section 16 of the Act is set aside. The accused is acquitted. His bail bond stands cancelled. Fine if paid by him shall be refunded. Rule is accordingly made absolute. Rule made absolute. -----