JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - The tenant in a suit for eviction has directed this petition against the decree for eviction and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation. He has lost in both the Court below. 2. The only ground on which the plaintiff opposite party claimed eviction was that the tenant-petitioner had converted the user of the tenement. The plaintiff's plea was that the accommodation in question was a garrage and had been let out to the tenant-petitioner for the purpose of keeping car therein but contrary to this the petitioner had started using the same as a godown for storing Urea. In substance the relief for eviction was claimed under Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 3. The petitioner did not dispute the fact that the accommodation in question was in the shape of a garrage but he denied the plaintiff's allegation that the said garrage had been let out for the purpose of keeping car. According to him the garrage had been let out for storage of Urea and from the very beginning it had been used for the said purpose. In order to substantiate his plea, he placed on record the licence issued to him for storage of Urea in the disputed accommodation. 4. In view of the pleadings of the parties the material question that arose for determination before the Court below was whether the garrage in question had been let out for the purpose of keeping car only. 5. The plaintiff was not the owner of the disputed accommodation at the time it was let out to the petitioner. At that time the owner was Sri Chitendra Nath Sanyal. The best person to give evidence on the controversy was Sri Sanyal but he was not examined by the plaintiff. Instead the plaintiff obtained a letter from him in which he denied that the accommodation had been let out for storing Urea. This letter was proved by the plaintiff's husband who entered the witness-box by stating that the letter had been signed by Sri Sanyal in his presence. In Sri Sanyal was alive at the time the suit was pending in Trial Court when the evidence was recorded, the primary evidence of letting would have been the statement of Sri Sanyal. This letter was proved by the plaintiff's husband who entered the witness-box by stating that the letter had been signed by Sri Sanyal in his presence. In Sri Sanyal was alive at the time the suit was pending in Trial Court when the evidence was recorded, the primary evidence of letting would have been the statement of Sri Sanyal. In the absence of Sri Sanyal from the witness-box, there is no admissible evidence on the basis which the decree for eviction can be sustained. 6. The learned Counsel for the landlay strenuously submitted that the letter of Sri Sanyal was primary evidence and it could not be rejected on the ground that it was secondary evidence. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel. The letter relied upon by the landlady was not an admissible evidence on the basis of which a decree for eviction could be sustained or passed. 7. It was also the submission of the learned Counsel for the landlady that in view of the fact that the accommodation in question was in the shape of garrage, the presumption was that it will be used for the purpose of keeping a car and when the tenant pleaded a different user of the accommodation, the burden lay upon him to prove that the accommodation had been let out for a different purpose. It was submitted that when a building is used for a purpose contrary to the purpose for which the building was constructed, it was obligatory on the part of the tenant to obtain permission from the landlady or landlord in writing. Clause (d) under which the suit was filed read as follows :- "(d) that the tenant has without the consent in writing of the landlord used it for a purpose other than the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the building or otherwise done any Act which is inconsistent with sue use,.....................". This clause does not speak of the nature of the building. It only speaks of the I purpose for which the tenancy was created. In order to avail of this clause, that the landlord will have to establish through positive evidence that the tenant was admitted to the tenancy of the building for a specific purpose and the said building was being used for a different purpose. It only speaks of the I purpose for which the tenancy was created. In order to avail of this clause, that the landlord will have to establish through positive evidence that the tenant was admitted to the tenancy of the building for a specific purpose and the said building was being used for a different purpose. Unless the purpose of original letting out is established, this clause cannot be availed of to claim eviction of the tenant. 8. The Second part of the clause which has been reproduced herein above speaks of the tenant otherwise doing an Act which is inconsistent "with such use". Such use does not refer to the use for which the building had been constructed. It has reference to the use for which the building had been let out. 9. Against the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court the petitioner had preferred a revision before the learned District Judge, Lucknow, who dismissed the same on the ground that it did not raise any question of law. The learned District Judge obviously did not consider the fact that there was no admissible evidence on record on the basis of which decree of eviction could be passed in favour of the landlady. 10. After the oral arguments were over, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party submitted a written note of arguments in which great stress has been laid on the fact that in the rent receipts issued to the petitioner the premises in question was described as "depleted car garrage". In my opinion nothing turns upon this description of the accommodation. This description only shows that the tenement had become damaged. Under Section 20 (2)(b)a landlord is entitled to claim eviction of his tenant on the ground of "substantial damage to the building" but this was not the provision under which eviction was claimed in the present case. Further, under this clause eviction can be claimed only when the substantial damage has been caused by the tenant or at his instance wilfully. Damages caused by mere user of the building for the purpose for which either there was no prohibition or there was express permission, cannot be said to be wilful. It is not necessary to pursue the ingredients of Section 20 (2)(b) further, because the allegations made in the plaint do not attract it. Damages caused by mere user of the building for the purpose for which either there was no prohibition or there was express permission, cannot be said to be wilful. It is not necessary to pursue the ingredients of Section 20 (2)(b) further, because the allegations made in the plaint do not attract it. The relevant allegations are contained in paragraph 3 which reads as follows :- "That the defendant was admitted to the tenancy of the said garrage for keeping car. The defendant without the consent in writing of the plaintiff has started storing therein Urea bags for business purposes. This act of the defendant is quite inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the said garrage." Another relevant paragraph of the plaint is 5 which read thus :- "That by storing the Urea bags in the car garrage the defendant has been wilfully causing damage to the same, so much so due to chemical reaction of the fertiliser namely Urea, the walls floor and the iron doors have considerably and substantially been damaged, causing a less more than Rs. 10,000 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff reserves her right to take suitable action for recovery of damages separately." In this paragraph the alleged damage to the garrage is, of course, stated to have been caused wilfully but from the latter part of the paragraph it is apparent that, even according to the plaintiff, the damage has been caused on account of the particular use of the garrage viz., storage of Urea. 11. In view of the above, decree for eviction could not be passed under clause (b) because the pleadings did not attract that clause and it could not be passed under clause (d) because the ingredients thereof had not been established by any admissible evidence. 12. Another point which has been greatly stressed in the written note is that in view of the admitted nature of the building, the burden was on the defendant to prove that it had been permitted to use the building for a purpose different from the one for which the building had been constructed. In this connection it is pointed out that on behalf of the defendant-petitioner Sanjay Agarwal was produced in the witness-box and he admitted that the tenancy was not created in his presence. In this connection it is pointed out that on behalf of the defendant-petitioner Sanjay Agarwal was produced in the witness-box and he admitted that the tenancy was not created in his presence. It may be assumed that there is no evidence from the side of the petitioner that the tenancy was created for storing Urea in the garrage. Is it sufficient to decree the opposite-party's suit ? In order to pass decree for eviction under clause (d) the Court will have to record these findings of facts- (1) the garrage was let out for the parking of car only ; (2) now, instead of being used for parking car, it is being used for storing Urea bags. The second facts flows from the first. Therefore, if there is no admissible evidence on the first fact, there will be no occasion for the Court to record finding on the second fact. A factual finding cannot be recorded by a court of law by way of inference. On this basis of lack of evidence from the side of defendant, a positive finding to the effect that the building was let out for keeping car cannot be recorded. The burden of proof could not, therefore, be placed on the tenant-petitioner. 13. Supreme Court decisions have been cited to press the point that since the learned District Judge was affirming the judgment of the Trial Court, it was not necessary for him to pass a reasoned order. When the judgment of the trial court itself cannot be sustained, there is no question of sustaining the judgment of the learned District Judge. 14. In view of the above neither the judgment of the Trial Court nor of the learned Incharge District Judge can be sustained. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the judgments and decrees dated 21-4-1986, Annexure 8 and dated 16-7-1986, Annexure 9, passed respectively by the learned Additional Judge Small Causes Court, Lucknow and Incharge District Judge, Lucknow, are hereby quashed so far as they relate to eviction from the accommodation in dispute. The judgment and decree so far as they relate to recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation are not disturbed. Thus the suit shall stand decreed only for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation There shall be no order as to costs throughout.