JUDGMENT - SAWANT P.B., J.:-These are two appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). They are being heard together because they involve a common question of law which will be disposed of first. The other question which is exclusive to F.A. No. 785 of 1986 will be answered thereafter. The common question of law is whether the Claims Tribunal appointed under section 110 of the Act has jurisdiction to award compensation in excess of that claimed in the application for compensation. In order to appreciate the point, it is necessary to refer to the relevant facts in both the cases. 2. In First Appeal No. 718 of 1986, the accident in question occurred at 11 p.m. on 12-1-1980 at Kannamwar Nagar No. 1 which involved a B.E.S.T. bus bearing No. MBL 5572 belonging to the opposite party, the Muncipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. The victim was one Shantaram Kisan Hire, a 36 years old man who was an instructor in a driving school and was at the relevant time earning a salary of Rs. 800/- per month. According to the applicant who are the parents, the widow and minor children of the deceased, at the relevant time the B.E.S.T. bus was being driven at high speed and it knocked down the victim who was crossing the road. He was taken to Rajawadi Hospital in an unconscious condition and thereafter transferred to the Nair Hospital on 16-1-1980 at about 2 p.m., but expired there at about 4 p.m. on the day. In the application, the applicants claimed compensation of Rs. 75,000/-. The Tribunal held that the accident had occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus and therefore, the opposite party-Corporation was liable to pay compensation. In calculating the compensation, the Tribunal held that the deceased was contributing at least Rs. 500/- per month to the household expenses and that he would have worked at least for 20 to 25 years more. The total amount of dependency was therefore calculated by applying the multiplier of 15 years having regard to the uncertainties of the life and also to the fact that the compensation would be paid in lumpsum. Thus calculated, the amount came to Rs. 90,000/-. To this amount the Tribunal added Rs. 5,000/- on account of the loss of expectancy of life and Rs. Thus calculated, the amount came to Rs. 90,000/-. To this amount the Tribunal added Rs. 5,000/- on account of the loss of expectancy of life and Rs. 10,000/- on account of loss of consortium. Thus the Tribunal worked out the total amount payable to the applicants at Rs. 1,05,000/- as just compensation. The Tribunal further held that although the claimants had claimed only Rs. 75,000/- as compensation, it did not restrict the power of the Tribunal to award just compensation even if it was more than what was claimed. According to the Tribunal what the applicants are expected to do while filing the application is to mention an estimated amount and that amount does not restrict its power to determine what is the just compensation. The Tribunal accordingly directed the opposite party-Corporation to pay the compensation of Rs. 1,05,000/- together with interest at 12 % per annum from the date of the applicant till realisation and also the costs of the application and further directed the applicants to pay the Court fees or the difference of Rs. 30,000/- between the claim and the awarded amount. The Tribunal also gave necessary directions for investment of a part of the amount for the benefit of the minor applicants Nos. 4 to 7. 3. In First Appeal No. 785 of 1986, the accident occurred on 29-5-1978 at about 20-45 p.m. at Vikhroli, Bombay on account of a rash and negligent driving by the driver of bus No. MHC-8756 belonging to the appellant the opposite party No. 1 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation which was driven by the opposite party No. 2. The applicant who was the victim of the said accident had sustained certain physical injuries in the same. According to him he was a passenger in the bus and when the bus was at Vikroli near the electric pole SW/122 on the western track of the Eastern Express Highway, it dashed against motor lorry No.MRS-9276 which was parked on the extreme left side of the road. As a result of accident, the left side of the State Transport bus was damaged and broken for the length from the driver's cabin to the three front benches. The applicant at the relevant time was sitting on the second bench near the left window and along with other passengers sustained severe injuries. As a result of accident, the left side of the State Transport bus was damaged and broken for the length from the driver's cabin to the three front benches. The applicant at the relevant time was sitting on the second bench near the left window and along with other passengers sustained severe injuries. All the injured were on the same day removed for treatment to the Sion Hospital and on the next day the applicant was removed to Masina Hospital. Along with the treatment as an indoor patient in the hospital he took treatment of an Orthopaedic Surgeon Dr. Hormasjee for a long period. The applicant therefore estimated his compensation at Rs. 1,00,000 and applied for payment of the same. The Tribunal held that there was a rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the bus and held the opposite party-Corporation liable to pay the compensation. While calculating the compensation, the Tribunal took into consideration the fact that on account of the accident, the applicant had to undergo treatment for about one and a half to two years and inspite of the lengthy treatment he had not improved. Even after the treatment, he continued to get pain in his waist and joints was unable to bear the jerks. He cannot run or get up or stand without taking the of his hands against the ground. He also cannot enter a bus without support. He cannot even walk without the help of a stick. The injury in the pelvis region had also affected his capacity to urinate and pass stools. He cannot freely pass urine. Sometimes it gets obstructed and sometimes he passes it unawares. He is also unable to control the passing of his stools. He gets fever and gets tired and exhausted. The injuries sustained by the applicant were the fracture of pelvis with dislocation of Sero Iliac joints and diastacis of sympysis fubia and C.L.Ws. on the left forearm, lower lip and left leg. The Tribunal granted Rs. 26,612/- as medical expenses on the basis of the documents produced and Rs. 3,000/- for special diet of fruits, milk, coconut water, etc. which he took while he was an indoor patient. The Tribunal further granted Rs. 15,000/- for the injuries and pain and sufferings attendant thereupon and Rs. 5,000/- each for compensation for the loss of expectancy and amenities of life. 3,000/- for special diet of fruits, milk, coconut water, etc. which he took while he was an indoor patient. The Tribunal further granted Rs. 15,000/- for the injuries and pain and sufferings attendant thereupon and Rs. 5,000/- each for compensation for the loss of expectancy and amenities of life. The Tribunal also accepted the evidence of the applicant that he was earning about Rs. Rs. 9,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- per year as he was manufacturing cloth on power looms and supervising his factory. The Tribunal further held that since he would be unable to attend to the work of power looms, he had lost his income for all future years. At the time of the accident, the applicant was aged 60 years. The Tribunal took the multiplier of 10 years and worked out the compensation on account of the loss of income at Rs. 90,000/. Accordingly the Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,44,612/-. On the same reasoning, which is found in the earlier case, the Tribunal justified the amount of Rs. 44,612/- in excess of the amount claimed in the application. 4. The relevant provisions of the Act which are necessary to be considered while answering the question are sections 110-A, 110-AA, 110-B, 110-C, 110-CC and 110-CCC and Rules 291 (read with Form Comp. A) to 310 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), made under the Act. Section 110 under which the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal is constituted gives power to the Tribunal to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both. In case of a claim for compensation for damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000/-, the claimant is given an option to refer his claim to a Civil Court for adjudication, and in case such a reference is made the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. In case of a claim for compensation for damage to property exceeding Rs. 2,000/-, the claimant is given an option to refer his claim to a Civil Court for adjudication, and in case such a reference is made the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to such claim. Section 110-A specifies the persons who can make application for compensation and they are (a) the person who has sustained the injury, (b) the owner of the property; (c) all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased and (d) any agent duly authorised by the injured person or by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. Sub-section (2) of the said section states that the application shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and Rule 29(1) of the Rules prescribes the form which is Form Comp. A of the First Schedule. The proviso to sub-section (2) also requires the applicant to state separately if any claim for no fault compensation under section 92-A is made in the application. Sub-section (3) prescribes limitation of time for making the application for compensation which is six months from the occurrence of the accident. However, the proviso to the sub-section gives power to the Tribunal to entertain the application even after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Section 110-AA gives an option to the claimant to make an application for compensation either under the Act or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under both the Acts, but prohibits the making of applications under both the Acts. This rights of course without prejudice to the right for claiming no fault compensation under Chapter VII-A of the Act. Section 110-B makes a provision for making an award by the Tribunal and states that on receipt of the claimant's application, the Tribunal shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. (Emphasis supplied). Section 110-C prescribes the procedure and powers of the Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied). Section 110-C prescribes the procedure and powers of the Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of the said section states that in holding an inquiry under section 110-B, the Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) confers enabling powers on the Tribunal for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and for compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, and those powers are the powers of a Civil Court. For that purpose the Tribunal is to be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 110-CC empowers the Tribunal to grant simple interest at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in that behalf. Section 110-CCC empowers the Tribunal to grant compensation if it is satisfied that the policy of insurance is void on the ground that it was obtained by representation of fact which was false or any party or insurer has put forward a false or vexatious claim or defence. It is also necessary in this connection to refer to section 110-F which provides that where any Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Tribunal. This also means that the areas for which no Tribunal is constituted the Civil Court will continue to adjudicate the claims according to the general law. 5. We may now have a look at the Rules. Rule 291 lays down the procedure for claiming compensation and prescribes as stated earlier Form Comp. A in which the particulars specified therein are to be mentioned. Item 21 in the form is headed "amount of compensation claimed" and does not require the applicant to state the amounts claimed under different sub-heads such as dependency benefit, medical expenses, paid and suffering etc. It is sufficient if the total amount claimed is stated there. Item 22 which is the last of the items mentioned in the form, permits the applicant to give any other information that may be necessary or helpful in the disposal of the claim. It is sufficient if the total amount claimed is stated there. Item 22 which is the last of the items mentioned in the form, permits the applicant to give any other information that may be necessary or helpful in the disposal of the claim. It is necessary to emphasise that neither Rule 291 nor the said Form require that any justification for the amount or amounts claimed should be stated in the application. A mere statement of the amount is a sufficient compliance with the Rule and the Form. Although, both Rules 291 and 291-A require certain documents to be sent along with he application, none of them refers to a document justifying the quantum of compensation claimed. Rule 292 prescribes fees to be paid along with the application and they vary according to the amount claimed. The Rule also permits the Tribunal to exempt the party from payment of fees which are to be reimbursed later if the claimant succeeds. Rules 293 to 310 lay down the procedure to be adopted by the Tribunal after the application is filed and for the purposes of the inquiry to be held by the Tribunal. Rule 293 permits the Tribunal to summon the assistance of experts while Rule 294 gives power to the Tribunal to exercise all or any of the powers vested in the Civil Court under certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 viz. sections 30, 32, 34, 35, 35(a). 75(a) and (c), 76, 77, 94, 95, 132, 133, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151 and 153. It further states that the Tribunal constituted for Greater Bombay, where the amount of compensation awarded by it does not exceed Rs. 50,000/- shall have all powers of the City Civil Court an where such amount exceeds Rs. 50,000/- it shall have all powers of the High Court for the purpose of execution of the award as if the award is a decree for payment of money made in a suit by the City Civil Court or the High Court as the case may be. The Tribunal constituted for any area outside Greater Bombay shall have all the powers of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division for the purpose of execution of any award for compensation made by it as if the award is a decree for payment of money made in a suit. The Tribunal constituted for any area outside Greater Bombay shall have all the powers of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division for the purpose of execution of any award for compensation made by it as if the award is a decree for payment of money made in a suit. Sub-rule (2) gives the Tribunal all or any of the powers of the Civil Court as may be necessary in any case for discharging its functions under the Act and the Rules. Rule 295 provides for examination of the applicant on receipt of the application under Rule 291 and the Tribunal is given powers under Rule 296 to dismiss the application summarily for reasons to be recorded, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that there are not sufficient grounds for proceeding with the application. If however the Tribunal does not reject the application, the Tribunal has to send a notice to the opposite party on an application in writing made to it for the purpose. However, if the claim is for no fault compensation under section 92-A of the Act, the Tribunal issue notice even without an application from the claimant. On the appearance of the opposite party, the Tribunal permits the party to file written statement. If the opposite party contests the claim, the Tribunal may, and if no written statement has been filed shall, examine him upon the claim and reduce the result of the examination into writing under Rule 298. Rule 299 then gives power to the Tribunal to frame issues after considering the written statement as well as the result of the examination of the parties and of any local inspection made under Rule 302 and thereafter proceeds to record evidence under Rule 300. The evidence is to be recorded in a brief memorandum as directed by Rule 301. Rule 302 provides for local inspection and Rule 303 vests the Tribunal with the power of summary examination of the person likely to be available during the local inspection. The evidence is to be recorded in a brief memorandum as directed by Rule 301. Rule 302 provides for local inspection and Rule 303 vests the Tribunal with the power of summary examination of the person likely to be available during the local inspection. Under Rule 304, the Tribunal has to maintain a brief diary of its proceedings and under Rule 306 the Tribunal while passing orders, has to record concisely in a judgment the finding on each of the issues and the reasons for such finding and to make an award specifying the amount of compensation to be paid by the insurer and also the person or persons to whom the compensation shall be paid. Rules 306-A, 306-B, 306-C and 306-D deal with the procedure to be followed where no fault compensation under section 92-A of the Act is claimed. Rules 307 and 307-A deal with summoning of witnesses and issue of process for the witnesses. Rule 308 provides that the Tribunal may in its discretion allow any party to appear before it through a legal practitioner. Rule 309 provides for receipt to be obtained upon payment of compensation whereas Rule 310 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in holding inquiries, and makes certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal so far as they may apply. For out purpose, what is necessary to note is that while Rules 7 and 17 of Order VI of the Code have been expressly made applicable to the pleadings before the Tribunal, Rule 17 of Order VII has not so been made applicable. The last portion of sub-clause (b) of Rule 310 however states in general terms that insofar as the Act and the Rules make no provision or make insufficient provision, the relevant provisions of the Code shall so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. (Emphasis ours). 6. In addition to the aforesaid provisions, it is necessary to take note of some other provisions of the Act, viz. those contained in Chapter VII-A which provide for liability without fault and in section 109-A which provide for compensation in cases of hit and run accidents. (Emphasis ours). 6. In addition to the aforesaid provisions, it is necessary to take note of some other provisions of the Act, viz. those contained in Chapter VII-A which provide for liability without fault and in section 109-A which provide for compensation in cases of hit and run accidents. It has to be noted that the provisions for no fault compensation contained in Chapter VII-A apply also in relation to any claim for compensation in respect of death or permanent disability of any person under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1923, resulting from an accident of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) of section 92-A and the provisions of the said Chapter have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force. 7. A survey of the aforesaid provisions shows that they do not require a claimant to specify the grounds on which the compensation is claimed. All that is required to state is that the accident in question was occasioned by a motor vehicle. The provisions also do not give any guidelines to the Tribunal with regard to the basis on which the compensation should be calculated and awarded. Beyond stating in section 110-B that the Tribunal shall, after holding an inquiry into the claim, determine the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just, the Act has no further light to shed on the subject. It is therefore, legitimate to hold that the law to be applied by the Tribunal in awarding compensation is the usual law of tort. This conclusion is inescapable also on account of the historical development of the law on the subject. The law of tort is a product of the common law. Under the common law, no compensation was required to be paid if death occurred on the spot. The claimant could claim compensation for injuries suffered by him and for the disablement resultant on it if he survived. This inequitous position was sought to be remedied by enacting the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which for the first time made a provision for compensation on account of the death of the victim. Under that Act, the benefit of the compensation can however be claimed only by the wife, husband, parents and child of the deceased. This inequitous position was sought to be remedied by enacting the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which for the first time made a provision for compensation on account of the death of the victim. Under that Act, the benefit of the compensation can however be claimed only by the wife, husband, parents and child of the deceased. There is some indication given in that Act of the measure of damages which can be awarded by the Court. It is laid down there that in every such case, the Court may give such damages as it may think proportioned to the loss resulting from such death to the claimant concerned. In addition to this, the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased can also claim any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by the accident (Emphasis ours). Section 3 of that Act also enjoins upon the applicant to give full particulars of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought to be recovered. In contrast the provisions of the present Act do not require that particulars of the claim or of the nature of the claim should be given. The provisions of that Act are relevant event today because whereas the present Act is applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal, where the Tribunals are not constituted, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain applications for claiming compensation for fatal accidents and they may be governed by the provisions of that Act. 8. What is further necessary to note is that what gives a cause of action for preferring an application for claim for compensation is the accident by motor vehicle or vehicles and not a particular monetary loss occasioned by such accident. While the compensation in all no-fault claims cases is fixed and uniform, in fault-claims cases the losses may vary from case to case. The particular losses are merely the consequence of the accident which is the cause of action. This being so, the amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further, the amount of compensation claimed cannot always be calculated precisely. In many cases it can best be a fair estimate. There is also a time limit of six months 28 of Bom.LI of 1959. This being so, the amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further, the amount of compensation claimed cannot always be calculated precisely. In many cases it can best be a fair estimate. There is also a time limit of six months 28 of Bom.LI of 1959. In section 28 of the principal Act, in sub-section (2), in Clause (a), for the brackets and words "(filing of the application for claim can be stated or specified in the application. The amount or amounts or the heads under which they are claimed may arise after the application is filed and even till the date it is decided. It is, therefore, necessary in all such cases to keep the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on grounds not stated earlier or for more amounts under heads already specified in the application. That is why probably the Legislature thought it fit not to insist upon the particulars of the claim in the application and also to give wide powers to the Tribunal in the matter of granting compensation by providing that the Tribunal may determine the amount which appears to it to be just. That is why again, that while the provisions of Rules 7 and 17 of Order VI of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable, except Rule 10 of Order VII, no other provision of the said order has been in terms applied to the application for compensation made under the Act. The other provisions apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal only so far as they may be made applicable. The word "claim" in the expression "new ground of claim" in Rule 7 of Order VI obviously refers to cause of action; as stated earlier in the proceedings before the Tribunal, the cause of action is accident. The provision made for amendment of the claims application by making Rule 17 of the said Order applicable be speaks of the awareness of the legislature of the eventualities for such amendment. There are cogent reasons to give ample liberty both to the claimant as well as to the Tribunal in the matter of claiming and granting compensation as they are occasioned by the very nature of the claim. Else, it would occasion avoidable delays and difficulties in the trial of the applications for claim. There are cogent reasons to give ample liberty both to the claimant as well as to the Tribunal in the matter of claiming and granting compensation as they are occasioned by the very nature of the claim. Else, it would occasion avoidable delays and difficulties in the trial of the applications for claim. As has been emphasised earlier, the amount of compensation being the consequence of the accident which is the cause of action and since that amount would keep varying or fluctuating even till the date of the decision of the application, enough leeway is necessary in the matter of both claiming and granting compensation. The variation if any is not on account of the variation in the cause of action but on account of the modification or addition of the particular or particulars of the consequences of the accident. These modifications do not go to the root of the application for claim and no prejudice is caused to the opposite party on account of such variation except in the matter of the quantum of the amount claimed. In all cases the quantum is to be justified by the claimat by leading necessary evidence. The opposite party will at all times have an opportunity to contest the modified amount claimed. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that in most of the cases, the claimant can at best give only an estimate of the compensation at the time he files his application for claim. It is neither fair nor realistic to insist that he shall not claim more than what is claimed by him at the initial stage or that in spite of the evidence on record, the Tribunal shall not grant more than what is claimed in the application. Therefore, to hold that under no circumstances the claimant should be awarded compensation which is in excess of the amount claimed originally in the application, is neither reasonable nor just. This is particularly so when the legislature has in unmistakable terms given ample powers to the Tribunal to award compensation as it thinks just. It is also necessary to emphasise that the Act itself nowhere lays down that the Tribunal will not grant amount in excess of the amount claimed in the application. This is particularly so when the legislature has in unmistakable terms given ample powers to the Tribunal to award compensation as it thinks just. It is also necessary to emphasise that the Act itself nowhere lays down that the Tribunal will not grant amount in excess of the amount claimed in the application. It may be that while it does so the Tribunal has to give a notice or intimation or an opportunity to the opposite party to meet the excess claim. But that is a matter relating to the procedure to be followed in such cases and is not an inhibition on the powers of the Tribunal to grant what it thinks is just even if it is in excess of what is claimed. It is in the light of this statutory position on the subject that we may now examine some of the authorities which were cited before us. 9. In (Kumar Mohamed Rafique v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay)1, 1986 A.C.J. 55 the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party, while dealing with the conon raised on behalf of the opposite party that it was not open for the Court to increase the amount of special damages from Rs. 15,300/- which were claimed in the original application, to Rs. 35,486.90 which we had proposed to do we had observed that it was not necessary that a claimant should claim amounts under particular heads. On the facts and circumstances of that case, it was found that the expenses of Rs. 15,300/- were incurred till the date the application for claim was filed and the further expense of Rs. 21,526.91 was incurred during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. An observation was therefore, made in the following language to justify the grant of the amount higher than what was claimed: "So long as the total amount granted by us does not exceed the total amount of compensation claimed in the original application, we see no reason to reject the claim on the hypertechnical ground urged by Mrs. Agarwal. "Relying on the said observation, it is contended here that by the said observation we have laid down a proposition of law that in no case the compensation should be awarded in excess of the total amount claimed in the application. Agarwal. "Relying on the said observation, it is contended here that by the said observation we have laid down a proposition of law that in no case the compensation should be awarded in excess of the total amount claimed in the application. We are afraid that this contention misses the context of the said observations. The additional expenses in that case were incurred while the appeal was pending in this Court. There was no occasion for the applicant to make the claim for the additional amount when he filed his application and therefore, there was no occasion for the opposite party to meet the contentions based on the said additional expenses. When the matter reached hearing before us, we had recorded evidence in this Court on certain issues and one of the issues related to the said additional expenditure. The Tribunal had awarded compensation which was less than what was even originally claimed and it was in that context that we had observed that the Appeal Court viz. this Court was not fettered by the hyper-technical ground urged by the opposite party that the amount claimed under the particular head could not exceed the amount which was originally specified in the application. To refute the technicality we had given an additional ground viz. that in any case the total amount awarded by us in appeal did not exceed the total amount originally claimed. (Emphasis supplied). It is therefore, neither proper nor reasonable to construe the said observations to make out a proposition of law that in no case the amount awarded could exceed the amount claimed. This position is made clear by a decision of another Division Bench in (Sharifunnisa v. Rasappa Ramchandra Date)2, 1986 A.C.J. 792 to which again one of us was a party. In that case, although the claim in the application was restricted to Rs. 1,00,000/-, this Court had granted a sum of Rs. 1,15,200/- and had specifically observed that the claimants would be entitled to the said higher amount in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the basis of the calculations made by the Tribunal itself. In that case, although the claim in the application was restricted to Rs. 1,00,000/-, this Court had granted a sum of Rs. 1,15,200/- and had specifically observed that the claimants would be entitled to the said higher amount in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the basis of the calculations made by the Tribunal itself. We are, therefore, more than satisfied that the earlier decision does not come in our way in holding, that the claimant would be entitled to, and the Tribunal would be justified in proper cases in awarding, compensation in excess of the amount that it claimed in the original application. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in a decision reported in (Mrs. Kela Devi v. Ram Chand)3, A.I.R. 1986 Delhi 52 has held that although in the original application the compensation claimed is only Rs. 50,000/-, the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 1,51,144/- because the original claim was made in 1967 and in the meanwhile there was a raise in the pay scales by the Pay Commission which raise would have benefited the deceased and therefore, also the claimants who were his dependants. In (Sheikhupura Transport Co. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd.)4, A.I.R 1971 S.C. 1624 the Court has in terms held that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. If this is so then it will be unreasonable to expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages or compensation that it would be entitled to. It is for the Tribunal equipped with the expertise in deciding such cases to estimate properly the compensation that a claimant would be entitled to in appropriate cases. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a decision reported in (Jai Singh v. N.A. Subramaniam)5, A.I.R 1982 P. H. 407 has held that under the Act the Tribunal has wide powers and these powers include the power to allow amendment of the claims application at any time whether such an application is made within the period of limitation or after the expiry of the period of limitation. The Court has further observed that while dealing with the question of amendment on an application made within the period of limitation, the Tribunal should ordinarily allow the amendment which is necessary for the purpose of deciding the claims application but where an application is made after the expiry of the period of limitation the Tribunal must require the party asking for amendment to show sufficient cause and in the event of it being satisfied that sufficient cause exists, the Tribunal would be well within its jurisdiction to allow the amendment after the period of limitation. 10. A survey of the aforesaid authorities strengthens the proposition that we seek to lay down viz. that there are no fetters on the powers of the Tribunal to award compensation in excess of that which is claimed in the application. 11. The only question that requires to be considered is of the procedure that should be followed by the Tribunal before awarding higher compensation. We are of the view that in all such cases a proper notice or intimation should be given to the opposite party so that the opposite party has an opportunity to contest the claim even by leading evidence, if necessary. Ordinarily the Tribunal should take a written application from the claimant. This application need not necessarily be in the form of an amendment to the original application. Since as stated earlier the amount of compensation claimed or the specific heading under which it is claimed is no more than in the nature of the particulars of the claim, a variation in the same does not change the cause of action, which is the accident. It only furnishes additional material for assessing the claim. The additional claim should as far as possible be taken in writing which should also indicate the reasons why the additional claim is made. Where it is not possible to take the additional claim in writing the reasons for the same should be recorded. As copy of such written application should be served on the opposite party to give it an adequate notice of the excess amount claimed and to contest it if it so desires. Where the application is not taken in writing, the Tribunal should make a note of it in its diary and give notice of the claim similarly to the other side. Where the application is not taken in writing, the Tribunal should make a note of it in its diary and give notice of the claim similarly to the other side. It may also happen in certain cases that on account of ignorance or otherwise, a party may not apply for higher compensation. If however, the Tribunal feels at any stage that the party is entitled to higher compensation, the Tribunal should ask the claimant concerned to make an application for the same in writing and a copy of the application should be served on the opposite party to enable it to contest the claim for higher amount. It these safeguards are followed, the powers conferred on the Tribunal for awarding compensation higher than that claimed in the original application would not be abused as is feared. The procedure which we have laid down above would be applicable hereafter and the decisions of the Tribunal given earlier would not be rendered invalid only on account of the fact that the aforesaid procedure was not followed before awarding the compensation. 12. This leaves us with a contention which is exclusive to F.A. No. 785 of 1986. Shri Hegde for the appellant contended that the Tribunal has taken the longevity of the claimant as 70 which is quite excessive. Normally, the life expectancy is no more than 65 and hence the loss of income calculated is higher. In the first instance, it is not correct to contend that the life expectancy in all cases should be taken as 65 years. It varies from case to case depending upon the evidence on record. In the present case although the age of the claimant at the time of the accident was 60 years, he has survived till date when he is about 68. This, it must be remembered is in spite of the near fatal accident and with irreparable damage to the normal functioning of the body. It only means that in the present case the longevity of the claimant otherwise would be much more than 70 years. This should also dispose of Shri Hegde's second contention that the Tribunal should have taken lesser multiplier since the claimant was receiving the amount in lumpsum. As the facts reveal, the multiplier is in fact less than that warranted by the full life which the claimant would have otherwise lived. 13. This should also dispose of Shri Hegde's second contention that the Tribunal should have taken lesser multiplier since the claimant was receiving the amount in lumpsum. As the facts reveal, the multiplier is in fact less than that warranted by the full life which the claimant would have otherwise lived. 13. The result therefore, dered by the Supreme Court. Hence the applications for leave are rejected. Time to deposit the balance of the amount in both cases is extended by four weeks. The respondent-claimants in both the appeals will be entitled to withdraw the amounts which are already deposited in this Court in the respective matter. Appeals dismissed. -----