Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the dismissal of the appellant's O.P. No. 7183 of 1984 by the learned single Judge. The appellant was holding the post of Armed Reserve Police Constable. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for the alleged misconduct committed by him. The charge against him was that he induced a girl from the Railway Station at Alwaye, took her to the premises of Sub Treasury at Alwaye and raped her. The enquiry was held by an authority nominated by the disciplinary authority which came to the conclusion that the charge is proved, and an order of dismissal came to be passed. That was set aside by the appellate authority, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, on the ground that the prosecution is pending against the appellant in a criminal Court in respect of the same allegations of rape and that therefore the authorities were not entitled to pass final orders in the disciplinary proceedings having regard to the bar contained in R.10(a) of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries. Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958, for short the Rules. Disciplinary proceedings were thus kept pending, awaiting the decision by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court acquitted the appellant by judgment Ext. P8 dated 13-9-1977. The appellant was charged alone with three others and all of them came to be acquitted of the charge of rape. The Assistant Sessions Judge who acquitted the accused including the appellant on a consideration of the evidence produced in that case came to the conclusion that the girl must have consented to the sexual intercourse at the premises of the Sub Treasury at Alwaye. After the termination of the criminal proceedings, the disciplinary authority after considering the materials produced during the course of the enquiry and the contentions of the appellant made an order Ext. P13 dated 3rd March 1980 removing the appellant from service with effect from the date on which he was kept under suspension, viz. 12-6-76, after having come to the conclusion that the appellant has committed misconduct amounting to moral turpitude. That order was challenged by the appellant by way of appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police who passed the order Ext. PI4 dated 24-12-1980 affirming the decision of the disciplinary authority. The matter was then taken up by the appellant to the State Government, which dismissed the review petition of the appellant by Ext. P16 dated 9-3-1984. That order was challenged by the appellant by way of appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police who passed the order Ext. PI4 dated 24-12-1980 affirming the decision of the disciplinary authority. The matter was then taken up by the appellant to the State Government, which dismissed the review petition of the appellant by Ext. P16 dated 9-3-1984. The appellant challenged the orders. Exts. P13, P14 and P16 in OP.No. 7183 of 1984-P. The learned single judge dismissed the Original Petition. Hence this appeal. 2. The principal contention of Sri. Aravindakshan Pillai, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that no disciplinary proceedings could have been taken against the appellant in respect of the allegations which are the subject matter of prosecution, the said prosecution having ended in acquittal in his favour. It was submitted that the matter stands concluded by the Division Bench ruling of this Court reported in 1982 KLT. 608 between D.I.G. of Police v. Sankaran. He contended that R.10 of the Rules which was in force at the relevant point of time fully supports the case of the appellant. For the sake of convenience, we extract R.10 as follows: "10. Departmental Inquiry regarding matters before a Court: (a) Final orders in a departmental inquiry, which is subjudice shall be issued only after the matter has been disposed of is Court. (b) If the question of departmental action arises against the conduct of an officer, who has already been tried in a Criminal Court on the facts which form the basis of the charge against him the following rules shall be observed: (i) If on a full consideration of the same facts, a criminal court has arrived at a definite decision, which is neither reversed nor modified in appeal, the department shall not take any further proceedings on the basis that the proceedings in Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. (ii) If, however, certain facts which call for departmental action are not relevant to the charge before the Criminal Court and as such, were 'not placed before the Court, there shall be no objection to departmental action being taken on such facts". (ii) If, however, certain facts which call for departmental action are not relevant to the charge before the Criminal Court and as such, were 'not placed before the Court, there shall be no objection to departmental action being taken on such facts". It was contended that R.10(b) (i) as interpreted by this Court in the aforesaid decision fully supports his contention that the acquittal by the Criminal Court of the appellant on the charge of rape precludes the authorities from taking disciplinary action under the Rules. The learned single judge has distinguished the said judgment and held that it is not applicable to the facts of the present case. He has pointed out that in the aforesaid case it is after the acquittal by the Criminal Court that the departmental proceedings in respect of the same allegations were initiated. The Division Bench held that the initiation of the proceedings after the acquittal by the Criminal Court in respect of the same allegations is not possible, having regard to the bar contained in R.10(b) (i) of the Rules. But this is not a case where disciplinary proceedings were initiated after the acquittal of the appellant by the Criminal Court, as disciplinary proceedings were initiated before the criminal law was set into motion. Clause (a) of R.19 is attracted to the facts of the present case which states that final orders in a departmental enquiry which is subjudice shall be issued only after the matter has been disposed of in Court. It makes it clear that what is prevented or precluded is the passing of the final orders in departmental enquiry, which has already been initiated if the same is also the subject matter of a case in a criminal court. In other words, after the Criminal Court disposes of the matter the departmental enquiry can proceed and appropriate orders can be made in the disciplinary proceedings without reference to what has happened in the Criminal Court. With respect, we are inclined to agree with this view taken by the learned single Judge. What really came to be considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision is the case which attracted Clause (b) of R.10 and not Clause (a) of R.10. With respect, we are inclined to agree with this view taken by the learned single Judge. What really came to be considered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid decision is the case which attracted Clause (b) of R.10 and not Clause (a) of R.10. As already stated, that was a case in which departmental proceedings were sought to be commenced for the first time after the acquittal of the person concerned by the Criminal Court. What Clause (b) (i) of R.10 provides is that no disciplinary proceedings should be taken on the basis that the proceedings in the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous, if on a full consideration of the same facts the Criminal Court has arrived at a definite conclusion which has become final and conclusive. The clear effect of Clause (b) (i) of R.10 is to preclude initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the final decision is rendered by the Criminal Court, in respect of the same allegations which were tried in a Criminal Court resulting in a definite decision being rendered on the same. It appears to us that two points clearly emerge from a reading of R.10 (1): Firstly that what is precluded is only initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the decision of the Criminal Court in respect of the same allegations and secondly on the basis that the proceedings of the Criminal Court were misconceived or the judgment was erroneous. The decision in 1982 KLT 608 is one which attracted R.10 (a) of the Rules and not R.10 (b), and cannot therefore be pressed into service. So far as Rule 10(b) is concerned, it becomes clear that it only precludes the initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the decision of the Criminal Court and does not preclude continuation of the disciplinary proceedings initiated before the Criminal Court took cognizance of the offence in respect of the same allegations. Hence we do not find it possible to disagree with the view taken by the learned single judge, in this behalf. 3. We would like to add one more reason to the ultimate conclusion by the learned single judge, on the interpretation of R.10(b)(i) of the Rules. What is precluded is taking further action by the Department on the basis that the proceedings in the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. 3. We would like to add one more reason to the ultimate conclusion by the learned single judge, on the interpretation of R.10(b)(i) of the Rules. What is precluded is taking further action by the Department on the basis that the proceedings in the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. Thus it becomes clear that the Department is not precluded from taking further proceedings consistent with the judgment of the Criminal Court. What is precluded is to proceed on the basis that the proceedings of the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment is erroneous. R.10 (b)(i) does not provide that no departmental proceedings can be taken merely because the allegations were the subject matter of proceedings before a Criminal Court. It is expressly stated that no such proceedings can be taken on the basis that the criminal court proceedings were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. In other words, on grounds other than those provided in R.10(b)(i), the Department can take proceedings. One such instance of this nature is where departmental proceedings are taken accepting the findings of the Criminal Court and not on the basis that the said proceedings are misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. 4. So far as the facts of this case are concerned, it appears to us that none of the authorities have proceeded on the basis that the proceedings in the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. There is not a whisper about this in any of the orders. On the contrary the order of the disciplinary authority which stands affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities makes it clear that they have rendered the decision consistent with the judgment of the Criminal Court. The findings of the Criminal Court are: (1) that the appellant is not guilty of rape as the sexual intercourse with the girl was with her consent, (2) that the appellant had sexual intercourse with the girl in the public premises of the Sub Treasury at Alwaye, and (3) that the appellant was a police officer whose duty it was to maintain proper conduct. Para.11 to 13 of the order of the disciplinary authority, the Commissioner of Police, which is in Malayalam, the translation of which has been provided for by the learned High Court Government Pleader, may for the sake of convenience be extracted as follows: "11. Para.11 to 13 of the order of the disciplinary authority, the Commissioner of Police, which is in Malayalam, the translation of which has been provided for by the learned High Court Government Pleader, may for the sake of convenience be extracted as follows: "11. On the basis of these facts (stated earlier) though the allegation of rape is not proved, the conduct of Sri. Aleyas in having illegal sexual intercourse with Karthiyani in the Alwaye Sub Treasury premises on 27-5-1976 cannot but be regarded as improper and immoral and unbecoming of a police officer. 12. I consider that since in the offence of rape there is sexual intercourse, the procedure followed in the charge of rape is sufficient for deciding whether there was sexual intercourse. It is not necessary to frame fresh charge or to conduct fresh enquiry for this purpose. Therefore taking into consideration the memo of charges against Sri. Aleyas, the statements of witnesses in the enquiry held thereon alone and the statement in the judgment of the Court that Sri. Aleyas had sexual intercourse with Karthiyani, I come to this conclusion. I do not consider that the adoption of such a procedure is against the principles of natural justice. On the other band, if a fresh charge is given and enquiry is conducted, it will only delay the matter unnecessarily. 13. Hence I come to the conclusion that it has been proved that Sri. Aleyas has committed the misconduct amounting to moral turpitude: On that finding be is removed from service with effect from the date of suspension (12-6-1976)". It is clear from the order of the disciplinary authority that he does not proceed on the basis that the proceedings of the Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgment was erroneous. Whereas the Criminal Court has come to the conclusion that the appellant is not guilty of rape, the disciplinary authority does not come to a contrary conclusion that the appellant is guilty of rape. The Criminal Court has held that the appellant bad sexual intercourse with the girl though with consent in the public premises of the Sub Treasury, Alwaye. That finding has been accepted by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the evidence and the materials produced before him. The Criminal Court has held that the appellant bad sexual intercourse with the girl though with consent in the public premises of the Sub Treasury, Alwaye. That finding has been accepted by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the evidence and the materials produced before him. Though the charge levelled against the appellant was one of rape, as that involved sexual intercourse, the disciplinary authority felt that it was not necessary to modify the charge and convert it into one from rape to having sexual intercourse with a girl in public premises. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the disciplinary authority has not proceeded on the basis that the proceedings of the Criminal Court are misconceived or that the judgment is erroneous. What R.10(b) precludes the department is taking of disciplinary proceedings on the basis that the proceedings in Criminal Court were misconceived or that the judgement was erroneous. On the contrary in this case the disciplinary authority has proceeded on the basis of the decision rendered by the Criminal Court is not erroneous. The disciplinary authority has found the appellant guilty not of commission of the offence of rape, but of a conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The conduct of the appellant has been found to be unbecoming not because he committed rape, but because he had sexual intercourse with a girl in public premises of the Sub Treasury at Alwaye, involving moral turpitude. On the facts of the case, such an inference was reasonably possible. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the bar contained in R.10 is not attracted to the facts of the present case, Hence the impugned orders, Exts. P13, P14 and P16 are not liable for interference at our hands. 5. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that Accused No. 4 in the Criminal Court who was similarly acquitted and similarly proceeded against in disciplinary proceedings has subsequently been reinstated in service. It was submitted that there is no justification for meting out a different treatment so far as the appellant is concerned. All the facts bearing on the decision in regard to Accused No. 4 are not before us. It however transpires from the judgment of the Criminal Court that Accused No.4 was not identified by the prosecutrix at the identification parade whereas the appellant was duly identified. All the facts bearing on the decision in regard to Accused No. 4 are not before us. It however transpires from the judgment of the Criminal Court that Accused No.4 was not identified by the prosecutrix at the identification parade whereas the appellant was duly identified. Assuming for the sake of arguments that the Government or the authority were wrong in exonerating accused No. 4 in the Criminal Court, that does not mean that the appellant should also be wrongly exonerated. Hence it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that accused No. 4 having been taken back to duty the appellant should also be taken back. It is also necessary to point out that independent disciplinary proceedings were held against the appellant and accused No. 4. For the reasons stated above, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.