P.C. JAIN, J.—By this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to quash the Award dated list October, 1986, Annex. 17, passed by the learned Labour Court, whereby the order of termination terminating the services of Bhanwar Singh, respondent No. 2, dated 13th August, 1983, Annex. 10, was set-aside and he was reinstated with back wages. 2. Put briefly, the facts of the case are that respondent No. 2 Bhanwar Singh was employed as a probationer in the Mayo College, Ajmer as Class IV employee to fill the post of Chaukidar vide order No. 1049 dated 11th December, 1981 for a period of two years w. e. f. 1st January, 1982 Prior to this, Bhanwar Singh was kept on trial for a period of six months in place of his father. The case of the petitioner is that as Bhanwar Singh was not found suitable to be kept in the employment on permanent basis. Due to his unsatisfactory work his services were terminated vide office order dated 13th August, 1983 with effect from 30th September, 1983, i. e. his services were terminated before the expiry of the probationary period. Aggrieved by the order of termination Bhanwar Singh raised an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer, Ajmer. As no settlement could be arrived at, the Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report to the Government The Government referred the case for adjudication to the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court Bhanwar Singh filed his statement of claim contending that his services were illegally terminated. He further submitted that his work was satisfactory and that his services were terminated without any inquiry. Bhanwar Singh also contended that he was not given any notice and compensation in terms of Sec. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (for short the Act). The case before the Labour Court was resisted on behalf of the petitioner and it has averred that the reference was bad in law as services of Bhanwar Singh were terminated as per the service conditions of Probationer and in terminating the services no illegality was committed which could give rise to an industrial dispute between Bhanwar Singh and the petitioner. It was also reiterated that the services of Bhanwar Singh were terminated because his work during the probationary period was not satisfactory. Before the Labour Court. It was also reiterated that the services of Bhanwar Singh were terminated because his work during the probationary period was not satisfactory. Before the Labour Court. Bhanwar Singh examined himself and on behalf of Mayo College, Ajmer, besides the Principal, who is the petitioner in this writ petition, three more witnesses were examined. The Labour Court after considering the entire matter by its Award dated 21st October, 1986, Annex. 17, held that the termination of the services of Bhanwar Singh was illegal and unjust and he was directed to be reinstated with full back wages. Aggrieved by the Award dated 21st October, 1986, passed by the Labour Court, the petitioner has challenged the Award and the order of reference, Annex. I, through this writ petition. 3. The main ground urged by Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the case of Bhanwar Singh is covered by the exception to clause (bb) of Sec. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, inasmuch as there was a stipulation in the service rules for Class III and IV staff of the Mayo College that the services of such employees could be terminated during the probationary period without assigning any reason, with one months notice. The petitioner, in the instant case, had served a notice, Annex. 10, which was for more than one month, by which the services of the petitioner, were terminated w. e. f. 30th September, 1983. 4. It was contended that the reference was made on 4th December, 1984 and the amendment in the definition of retrenchment in Sec. 2(00) was made by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, w. e. f. 18/8/84. 5. Thus, the reference having been made after the amendment in the law, the reference was incompetent, and the termination order was unjustified. Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has also urged that the circumstances as disclosed by the petitioner in the evidence were such that the petitioner has lost faith and confidence in Bhanwar Singh. The petitioner in his affidavit enumerated a number of circumstances indicating that the work of Bhanwar Singh was not satisfactory. He was warned and advised to work sincerely. Number of teachers had complained in writing about Bhanwar Singhs bad behaviour with them and their families. The petitioner in his affidavit enumerated a number of circumstances indicating that the work of Bhanwar Singh was not satisfactory. He was warned and advised to work sincerely. Number of teachers had complained in writing about Bhanwar Singhs bad behaviour with them and their families. It was also disclosed in the affidavit that Bhanwar Singh was a non-serious and quarrelsome person, and on number of occasions Bhanwar Singh was found sleeping while on duty when he was posted as Chowkidar. 6. Shri B.L. Samdaria learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that the services of Bhanwar Singh were illegally terminated without following the mandatory procedure laid down in Sec. 25F of the Act. The submission of Shri Sharma is that Annex. 10 by itself proves that compensation in terms of Sec. 25F of the Act was not offered for payment to the petitioner while terminating his services. Shri Prem Krishan Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has further submitted that the termination order became effective on 30th September, 198 3 as per Annex. JO, dated 13th August, 1983. The said amendment made by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, by which a new clause (bb) was added to Sec. 2(00) is not at all attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Shri Prem Krishna Sharma has further urged that the order of termination is not an order of discharge simplicitor, but it is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal from service on the ground of misconduct. He further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of discharge is stigmatic and it cannot be sustained. The attendant circumstances, as disclosed in the affidavit of the Principal, show the ulterior purpose for passing a colourable order; in order to get rid of respondent No. 2. 7. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the termination order was violative of Sec. 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in as much as the workman, Bhanwar Singh, was not offered payment of retrenchment compensation at the time of terminating his services. The learned Labour Court recorded a finding that the termination order was violative of Sec. 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in as much as the workman, Bhanwar Singh, was not offered payment of retrenchment compensation at the time of terminating his services. From the impugned Award it is evident that before the Labour Court the representative of the management admitted that while terminating the services of the petitioner compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act was not made. However, the order of termination was supported on two grounds; Firstly on the ground that his behaviour with the college authorities was very bad and that his work was not satisfactory and that there were number of complaints against him. It was stated before the Labour Court that he proved headache for the management and the services of Bhanwar Singh were terminated as the management lost faith and confidence in him. Secondly the order was sustained on the ground that his services were terminated in terms of clause (bb) of Sec. 2(00) of the Act. 8. As regards the first ground, the finding of the Labour Court is that no charge-sheet was given to the petitioner and that there are no circumstances which could prove that the management had lost faith in Bhanwar Singh. Since it is a finding of fact we would not like to disturb the same in the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Kamal Kishore Laksh Vs. The Management of M/s. Pan American Work Airways lac. (1) the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider as to whether the termination of the services of an employee on the ground that the management had lost faith in the employee amounts to stigma or not and, after considering the law on this point, the Supreme Court observed that loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and, therefore, the allegation of loss of confidence amounted to stigma. The Labour Court has found that the order of separation grounded upon loss of confidence has not been justified by the petitioner and we confirm the finding. The termination order is thus, justified. In view of such finding the employee is irretrievably entitled to rein-statement. 9. The Labour Court has found that the order of separation grounded upon loss of confidence has not been justified by the petitioner and we confirm the finding. The termination order is thus, justified. In view of such finding the employee is irretrievably entitled to rein-statement. 9. Now, coming to the second aspect of the matter, we may observe that when the termination order is stigmatic it cannot be supported on the ground of retrenchment. However, our view is that even the termination order as retrenchment is bad in law, admittedly, the formalities as are envisaged under Sec. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were not complied with. Consequently, the order of termination is Void and illegal and it is not an order of termination in the eye of law. Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that termination of services of respondent No. 2 is justified on account of clause (bb), which has been added to Sec. 2(00) of the Act by reason of the amendment made by Act No. 49 of 1984. The contention of Shri Manoj Sharma is that the amendment made in Sec. 2(00) is retrospective in its nature and since there was a clause in the rules and regulations governing the service conditions of the employee, the services of a probationer could be terminated during the probationary period at any time without assigning any reason with one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof. 10. In view of the submission made by Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, we are, therefore, required to decide as to whether clause (bb) added to Sec. 2(00) by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, has retrospective effect or not? 11. In Workmen V. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (2), the Supreme Court considered Sec. 11 A, which was introduced in the year 1971 and observed that Sec. 11A has no retrospective effect. It was observed by the Supreme Court that Sec. 11A does not apply to the disputes which had been referred prior to 15th December, 1971 and the section applied only to the disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after 15th December, 1971. In Bharat Singh Vs. It was observed by the Supreme Court that Sec. 11A does not apply to the disputes which had been referred prior to 15th December, 1971 and the section applied only to the disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after 15th December, 1971. In Bharat Singh Vs. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosia Centre, (3j, the Supreme Court considered the effect of Section, 17-B inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 and which received the assent of the President on 21st August, 1984, and observed that the section was intended to benefit the workman in certain cases and, therefore, it would be doing injustice to the section to say it would not apply to awards passed just a day or two before the section came into force. In Rustom & Horasby (I) Ltd. Vs. T.B. Kadam (4) the Supreme Court observed that Sec. 2A has no retrospective effect and while doing so, held as under :- "When the section uses the words where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman it does not deal with the question as to when that was done; it refers to a situation of a state of affairs. In other words where there is a discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service otherwise, the dispute relating to such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service becomes an industrial dispute. It is an objection to this to say that this interpretation would lead to a situation where the disputes would be reopened after the lapse of many years and referred for adjudication under S, 10. The question of creation of new right by S-2-A is also not very relevant. Even before the introduction of S. 2A a dispute relating to an individual workman could become an industrial dispute by its being sponsored by a labour union or a group of workmen. Any reference under S. 10 would be made only sometime after the dispute itself has arisen. The only relevant factor for consideration in making a reference under S. 10 is whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the date the reference was made in the present case, an industrial dispute as defined under S. 2A did exist." 12. The only relevant factor for consideration in making a reference under S. 10 is whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the date the reference was made in the present case, an industrial dispute as defined under S. 2A did exist." 12. Thus, there are aforesaid three judgments of the Supreme Court in which the question arose for giving effect to certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Supreme Court laid down certain principles when a particular provision of the Act, which has been introduced by an amendment should be given prospective or retrospective effect. The principles may be enumerated as follows:- (a) If the amendment has the effect of altering the law abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal in this regard for the first time, then the new section would not have the retrospective effect. It was on account of this principle that the Supreme Court in Workmen Vs. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (supra) held that Section 11A does not apply to the disputes which had been referred prior to 15th December, 1971 and it was held that section applies to the disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after 15th December, 1971. Every legislation is prima facie prospective. (b) It is well settled principle that retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right. Undoubtedly, the Legislature is competent to pass a statute so as to give retrospective effect either clearly expressing such intention or by a necessary and distinct intendment. (c) It may be taken as a general rule that the procedural law has always been held to operate retrospectively as no party has a vested right in procedure. (d) A definition section is generally held to be prospective. In Rustom & Hornsby(I) Ltd Vs. T. B. Kadam (supra) the Supreme Court has had the occasion to consider this aspect. It was argued that the order of dismissal was made on January 7, 1984 and as Section. 2A of the Act came into force on December 1, 1 85, the reference is bad. It was argued that it will amount to giving retrospective effect to the provisions of section 2A, but the Supreme Court did not accept this contention, as Sec. 2A is a definition section. 2A of the Act came into force on December 1, 1 85, the reference is bad. It was argued that it will amount to giving retrospective effect to the provisions of section 2A, but the Supreme Court did not accept this contention, as Sec. 2A is a definition section. Further it was held that the test for the validity of reference u/s. 10 is whether there was in existence a dispute on the day the reference was made and it was observed that in the circumstances there was no question of giving retrospective effect to the section. Though, in Bharat Singhs case, the Supreme Court observed that it gave section 2A a retrospective construction. (e) For considering whether introduction of a new section or amendment made in the statute shall have retrospective effect or not, the back-ground in which the amended section has been introduced is to be viewed and its effect should be considered. If the objects and reasons spell out that the purpose of amendment is to remove the hardship caused to the workmen on account of existing state of law, then keeping in view the object and consistent progressive social philosophy of laws, the benefit of the section should not be denied to the workmen as it was done in the case of Bharat Singh (supra). 13. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases if we consider the new clause (bb) as added to Sec- 2 (00) by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, we will discover that no retrospective effect can be given to new clause(bb) as it is the part of the definition clause. 14. Further, it is not with respect to procedural law, but it is a provision whereby some powers are conferred on the employer which is destructive of the protection so far available to the employee prior to 18th August, 1984, the date when the new clause (bb) was inserted in the matter of terminating the contract of employment. Prior to the amendment made in the definition of retrenchment by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, retrenchment has been understood to mean termination of services for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, unless it falls within the exception provided in the definition 2(00). Prior to the amendment made in the definition of retrenchment by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984, retrenchment has been understood to mean termination of services for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, unless it falls within the exception provided in the definition 2(00). As a result of this amendment contractual termination will not constitute retrenchment, because now by virtue of new clause (bb) one more exception has been provided in the definition of retrenchment. The new clause provides as follows:- "(bb) Termination of the service of the workman as a result of the nonrenewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or." Thus, in our opinion, no retrospective effect can be given to the new clause(bb) which was added to Sec. 2(00) by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984. 15. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, the services of Bhanwar Singh were terminated on 30th September, 1983. Admittedly at the time when the services of the employee were terminated, the said amendment did not see the light of the day. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that no retrospective effect can be given to Clause(bb) added to Sec. 2(00) of the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984. 16. In the premises aforesaid, there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.