JUDGMENT T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. - The petitioner is a Forest Contractor. He had entered into an agreement Ext. P-2 with Government in relation to the right to collect and remove logs and tops and firewood from an area of 126 Hectares of forest land within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Forest Officer, Nilambur. The area was divided into three strips. One of the terms in the agreement was that extraction, any conveyance, from one strip was to be over before work could commence in the next strip. The petitioner operated the first strip and according to him the extraction work was completed on 15th November, 1980. There was, however, dispute regarding the rates payable for the goods to be removed. This led to a writ petition OP No. 3952/1980 This Court required the petitioner to pay certain amounts and to execute a bond for the balance. The petitioner subsequently completed all the operations in the first strip and operated on the second strip. Here again there was dispute. According to the petitioner, he completed the work in the second strip by 5th May, 1981, and thereafter, he was entitled to operate on the third strip. On 30th May, 1981 the petitioner was called upon to pay an amount of Rs. 2,38,848.52 being the estimated price of the materials to be extracted from the third strip. This was complied with. But the petitioner was not allowed to operate the third strip; on the other hand, he was asked not to enter the third strip at all. According to the petitioner, there had been illegal collections made by the respondents in relation to the operation of the contract, and the extraction and removal of the logs and tops and fire-wood. The disputed collections came under four heads, namely, (1) Rs. 38,732.40 being the amount collected by virtue of some differences relating to the first strip, (2) Rs. 2,38,848.52 being the amount collected for the value of the timber in the third strip, which the petitioner was not allowed to operate, (3) Rs. 78,557.72 which the petitioner alleged had been collected in excess in relation to firewood and (4) an amount of Rs. 25,000 collected as penalty. The petitioner sought refund of all these amounts, but did not get the same, whereupon he filed OP No. 4895/1981 for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing return of these amounts. 78,557.72 which the petitioner alleged had been collected in excess in relation to firewood and (4) an amount of Rs. 25,000 collected as penalty. The petitioner sought refund of all these amounts, but did not get the same, whereupon he filed OP No. 4895/1981 for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing return of these amounts. The said Original Petition was disposed of by the judgment Ext. P-5 After adverting to the contentions of the parties, this court felt that the matters in controversy involve questions of fact which could not be gone into in proceedings under Art. 226. This Court took note of cl. 25 in the agreement Ext. P-2 which runs in these terms :- "25. In case of any dispute between the Divisional Forest Officer and the contractor on any matter arising out of this contract, such dispute will be referred to the Conservator of Forests. Northern Circle, Kozhikode whose decision thereon shall be final". This Court was of the opinion that it was expedient, in the nature of the disputes, to invoke this arbitration clause - a course to which both parties agreed. The Original Petition was therefore disposed of with a direction to the Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle, Kozhikode to decide the disputes arising between the parties. The Conservator entered on the reference and accordingly rendered his decision by his proceedings Ext. P-6. Thereunder he rejected the contentions of the petitioner on the various claims made by him as devoid of any merit. Ext. P-6 is challenged in this Original Petition, with a further prayer for direction to the respondents to refund the amounts alleged to have been wrongly collected from the petitioner. Clause 25 of Ext. P-2, the contract between the parties, provides for reference of the disputes between the parties to arbitration by the Chief Conservator of Forests, Northern Circle, Kozhikode. It is declared that his decision shall be final. This is the usual type of arbitration clause which appears in regular commercial contracts with the only difference that the arbitrator herein namely the Chief Conservator of Forests, is an official of Government. It is his decision that is challenged. The petitioner will not be entitled to any relief by way of refund of the amounts collected from him without quashing Ext. P-6 or without getting rid of the finality attaching to Ext. P-6 as per cl. It is his decision that is challenged. The petitioner will not be entitled to any relief by way of refund of the amounts collected from him without quashing Ext. P-6 or without getting rid of the finality attaching to Ext. P-6 as per cl. 25 of the contract Ext. P-2. The arbitrator provided by Ext. P-2 is nothing other than a private arbitrator appointed under an arbitration clause in a contract. Though the said arbitrator is an official of the Government, he is nevertheless, only an arbitrator appointed by the parties to the dispute. He is not exercising any public function or statutory duty in deciding on the dispute referred to him, even though one of the parties to the dispute is Government. In such cases, where an arbitrator acts pursuant to an arbitration clause in a contract, no writ will lie to quash his award. The parties are bound by the terms of their contract, and finality attaches to the award of the arbitrator, subject to such remedies as are available to them under the Arbitration Act to have it set 'aside. No writ will lie to quash the award, or to direct something to be done in relation to the same. In Lee v. The Showmen's Guild of Great Britain ((1952) 2 QB p. 329), Denning, L.J. stated that the remedy of certiorari does not lie to domestic tribunals. The question of issuing prerogative writs in relation to contractual arbitrations directly arose for consideration in Regina vs. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians (Disputes Committee) Ex-Parte Neate. ((1953) 1 QB 704) That was a case where an infant bound himself by an indenture to serve for five years, as an apprentice to a Dental Surgeon, to learn the craft of dental mechanics. The agreement provided that all questions or differences that may arise between the parties shall be referred to the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians. On such a dispute being referred to the said Council, its decision was challenged with prayer for a writ of a certiorari. Lord Goddard C.J. speaking for the court observed as follows :- "I have never heard of certiorari or prohibition going to an arbitrator .......... On such a dispute being referred to the said Council, its decision was challenged with prayer for a writ of a certiorari. Lord Goddard C.J. speaking for the court observed as follows :- "I have never heard of certiorari or prohibition going to an arbitrator .......... never during the many centuries that have passed since reports of the decisions of English courts first began is there any trace of an arbitrator being controlled by this court either by writ of prohibition or certiorari ........... But the bodies to which in modern times the remedies of these prerogative writs have been applied have all been statutory bodies on whom Parliament has conferred statutory powers and duties which, when exercised, may lead to the detriment of subjects who may have to submit to their jurisdiction. Where a statute, for instance, gives power for the compulsory acquisition of land, and an arbitrator is set up by Parliament to assess the compensation, or where, as in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners. Ex-Parte Lyndon Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. ((1924) 1 KB 171) the tribunal were a body on whom a great many powers had been conferred by Act of Parliament, it is essential that the courts should be able to control the exercise of their jurisdiction strictly within the limits which Parliament has conferred upon them. But that is quite a different thing from saying that an arbitrator can be controlled by this court by means of an order of certiorari or prohibition because, although the arbitrator is going to settle the dispute between the parties, in one sense he is the antithesis of a court. A person goes to arbitration because he does not want to go to the court. Therefore, he sets up his own private judge to decide the case, but the arbitrator is not deciding it as a judge, he is deciding it as an arbitrator, and procedural rights and all matters relating to procedure are to be found in the Arbitration Act, 1940. ......... There is no instance of which I know in the books where certiorari or prohibition has gone to any arbitrator except a statutory arbitrator, and a statutory arbitrator is a person to whom by statute the parties must resort". ......... There is no instance of which I know in the books where certiorari or prohibition has gone to any arbitrator except a statutory arbitrator, and a statutory arbitrator is a person to whom by statute the parties must resort". A contractual arbitrator was therefore held to be outside the realms of prerogative writs, and these traditional writs were not available to quash the award of such an arbitrator. In the subsequent decision in Regina v. Industrial Court Ex-Parte ASSET ((1965) 1 QB 377), Lord Parker, C.J., speaking for the court observed that, on general principles, mandamus cannot go to a private arbitrator'. The remedy of the parties in such cases, if there is thought to be an excess of jurisdiction, is to proceed in appropriate cases for injunction, or to get a declaration that he had no jurisdiction, or to have it set aside after the award is passed. The position as enunciated above, is no different, even if the arbitrator in question is a public functionary, or a statutory tribunal, so long as it exercises its role as an arbitrator pursuant to contract between the parties. This fact, by itself, will not make the award or the proceedings open to the issue of writ of certiorari, - prohibition or mandamus. This Court had also occasion to consider this question, of exercise of powers under Art. 226 in such circumstances. M. S. Menon, J. (as he then was) in Krishnan v. Divisional Inspector of Schools ((1957) KLJ), ruled that an order passed on the basis of a consensual jurisdiction was not amenable to review or correction under Art. 226. It has been held by Velu Pillai, J. in A.T.K.M. Employees' Association v. Musaliar Industries (P.) Ltd., ((1960) KLJ 1456) that no writ of certiorari or prohibition can be issued against an ordinary arbitrator who is not a statutory arbitrator. The position of the Chief Conservator of Forest in this case, when he passed the award Ext. P-6, was that of a private arbitrator acting as such pursuant to contract between the parties. The fact that he is a government official does not make any difference, inasmuch as, his role as a private arbitrator, acting pursuant to the contract, is not in any manner altered by that circumstance. As pointed out earlier, no relief can be granted to the petitioner except by quashing Ext. P-6. Cl. 25 of Ext. The fact that he is a government official does not make any difference, inasmuch as, his role as a private arbitrator, acting pursuant to the contract, is not in any manner altered by that circumstance. As pointed out earlier, no relief can be granted to the petitioner except by quashing Ext. P-6. Cl. 25 of Ext. P-2 agreement makes the award final. Unless this finality is set aside in due process of law, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. That can be done if at all only in proceedings before the appropriate forum under the Arbitration Act and not by resort to Art. 226. Though the petitioner has not specifically sought the issue of a writ to quash Ext. P-6, he is not entitled to relief so long as Ext. P-6 remains operative. The Original Petition therefore fails, and it is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.