JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J. - This first appeal from order under Order 43 Rule 1 (u) is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15.5.1986 passed by the IV Additional District Judge, Hardoi in Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1986 by which the lower appellate court set aside the judgment and decree dated 28.1.1986 passed by the trial court consigning the suit to record on the ground that since notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as, the Act) had been issued and adjudication of the right in the said suit was to be made by consolidation courts and the suit had to abate and had to be decided by the consolidation courts. 2. The appellants put forward a case that having obtained a licence from the Prescribed Authority and permission of the Consolidation Officer concerned, started a brick kiln on plot nos. 621, 623 and 624 of village Kukuhi, Pargana and Tahsil Sandila in the district of Hardoi in the name of Ganga Int Udyog whereupon the respondents 1 to 6 filed a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the appellants to run the brick kiln on the said plots as it was likely to damage their groves. Along with the suit the respondents 1 to 4 moved an application under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for issue of a temporary injunction to the same effect. It is alleged by the appellants herein that respondents 5 and 6 having withdrawn from the suit they were arrayed as proforma defendants. The appellants, it appears, denied the claim of the respondents that there was a grove on the land in suit as there were only some scattered trees of different variety which could not classify the land in dispute as a grove in accordance with law. During the pendency of the suit a notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued whereupon the appellants made an application under Section 5 of the Act praying for direction that the suit stood abated. The trial court abated the suit under the provisions of Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act and directed the case to be consigned to record. The trial court abated the suit under the provisions of Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act and directed the case to be consigned to record. Against this order the plaintiffrespondents came in appeal before the lower appellate court and the appeal was allowed with costs by the order of the learned Additional District Judge dated 15.5.1986 with directions to remand the case to the trial court for expeditious hearing and disposal on merits. The learned lower appellate court recorded a finding that prima facie the matter in dispute was to be decided by a court having civil jurisdiction and that appreciation of law and facts by the learned Munsif holding that the suit abated under Section 5 (2)(a) of the Act was erroneous inasmuch as it was hot covered by the eventualities contemplated in the said section. 3, I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the courts below. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants has been primarily that the question being about determination of the nature of the land in suit being a grove or not can only be determined by the consolidation authorities and as such the order passed by the lower appellate court does not properly interpret the provisions of Section 5 of the Act and unless the nature of the land was determined the respondents 1 to 4 could not get any relief. The learned counsel contended that it being a determination of the land in suit the civil court has no jurisdiction to determine the nature of the: land in dispute. Section 5 of the Act reads as under: 5, Effect of notification wilder Section 4 (2) (1) ........................ (a) (b)....................... (c) . The learned counsel contended that it being a determination of the land in suit the civil court has no jurisdiction to determine the nature of the: land in dispute. Section 5 of the Act reads as under: 5, Effect of notification wilder Section 4 (2) (1) ........................ (a) (b)....................... (c) . (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under sub section (2) of Section 4 the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification, relates namely (a) every proceeding for the Correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of fights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference of revision, shall on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. Provided further that on the issue of a notification under Subsection (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part, as the case may be, shall stand vacated; (b) .. Explanation. . 4. In fact, the case of the plaintiffs, as borne out from the record, was that plaintiffs 1 to 3 and ? resided in village Kukuhi while plaintiff no. 6 resided in village Lekha is close to the village Kukuhi and plaintiff no. 5 was a resident of Railway Station, Balamau, It is averred that plaintiffs 1 to 3 had Qalmi Mango Grove in plot Nos. 579 and 590 while plaintiff no. 4 had Qalmi Mango Grove in plot no, 669, 672, 691/4 and 692; plaintiff no. 5 had Qalmi Mango Grove in plot no. 618 and 619 while plaintiff no. 6 had QAIR ai Mango Grove in plot No. 609, all situated in village Kukuhi, Pargana and Tahsil Sandila, in the district of Hardoi and that the plaintiffs were bhumidhars of the said groves and were in possession of the same. 5 had Qalmi Mango Grove in plot no. 618 and 619 while plaintiff no. 6 had QAIR ai Mango Grove in plot No. 609, all situated in village Kukuhi, Pargana and Tahsil Sandila, in the district of Hardoi and that the plaintiffs were bhumidhars of the said groves and were in possession of the same. The defendants, it is alleged, put up a brickkiln on plot nos. 621, 623 and 624 after obtaining a licence in the year 1985 in the name of Ganga Int Udyog from the SubDivisional Officer concerned concealing material facts and since the brick kiln in dispute was less than two furlongs away from the inhabitation of village Kukuhi as also from the dispensary situate there and the groves of the plaintiffs being close to the brick kiln, being 2 to 3 furlongs away the brick kiln could not be granted licence and could not function there. In his been categorically asserted in the plaint that with the operation of the brick kiln the groves of the plaintiffs as also others would be adversely affected and the disease known as black tips would not only damage the mango crops but damage the mango trees itself and despite pursuation of the plaintiffs the defendants proceeded to dig up the land for installing the brick kiln. On these facts the application for temporary injunction was filed along with the suit whereupon objections were filed by the defendants and before any action could be taken thereon an application, 16 Ga, was presented before the court indicating that a notification under Section 4 of the Act had been issued and village Kukuhi had been notified therein and that the suit as such was liable to be abated since the nature of the land in suit was to be decided and this could be done only by consolidation courts. An objection was filed thereto by the plaintiffs, inter alia, stating that it was not a case of declaration of rights or interest in the land in dispute and neither was a declaration or adjudication sought pertaining to any other right in regard to which proceedings could or ought to be taken under the Act and, as such, the suit could not stand abated. They assert that the suit was filed to protect the groves of the plaintiffs and the mango crop therein. They assert that the suit was filed to protect the groves of the plaintiffs and the mango crop therein. The trial court was of the view that since a finding had to be recorded whether it was a groveland, which was a question involving the nature of the land and, therefore, the suit had to be abated under Section 5(2) (a) of the Act. 5. The learned lower appellate court by a well reasoned and detailed judgment has given cogent reasons to record a finding to the effect that on the facts as disclosed in the plaint no case for abatement of the suit was made out under Section 5 (2) of the Act. Along with the plaint a site plan was filed indicating the grove within that land. An Advocate Commissioner was also directed to go on the spot to inspect the site and submit his report. The defendants did not file any written statement contesting the plaint allegations though documentary evidence was filed by the parties and objections preferred against the injunction application. The learned Additional District Judge rightly found that the only ground on which the trial court directed abatement of the suit was that in case the consolidation courts declare that the disputed land did not come within the definition of a grove it could be allotted to some person other than the plaintiffs and, as such, the decision given by a civil court would be rendered infructuous and inoperative. The lower appellate court held that prima facie the plaintiffs did not seek any relief about correction of revenue records and that they also did not claim any relief for declaration of rights and title in the land in dispute. The view of the lower appellate court was that the matter in issue could very well be decided under the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act since only an injunction was prayed for against the defendants restraining them from in any way damaging the plaintiffs' grove or the crops therein by making brick kiln operational on the plots mentioned. According to the Khasra extracts filed by the plaintiffs their names are entered as grove holders as also some trees standing on a portion of the land in dispute while on some other portion some cultivation has also been shown. According to the Khasra extracts filed by the plaintiffs their names are entered as grove holders as also some trees standing on a portion of the land in dispute while on some other portion some cultivation has also been shown. This is further strengthened by the fact that the defendants have admitted that fruit bearing trees do exist on the disputed plots. The plea, however, is that all the trees are not fruit bearing trees and whatever trees stand are scattered and cannot be called a grove. This is also stated that by operation of the brickkiln the plaintiffs would not suffer any loss or injury. It is thus abundantly clear as stated hereinabove that the defendants have not challenged that the disputed land belong to the plaintiffs and they are vested with rights to enjoy the same which is undisputed. The only dispute that survives for consideration is as to whether the trees standing on the plots would construe a grove or not and only on this consideration the trial court, it appears, directed the suit to abate and the dispute adjudicated by the consolidation authorities. In this view of the matter even assuming that the trees so standing do not come within the purview of a grove, as taken by the learned lower appellate court, it has to be decided as to whether the suit could abate under Section 5 (2)(a) of the Act under these circumstances. There is no doubt that the Act nowhere provides issue of a temporary or permanent injunction by the consolidation courts to restrain the defendants from damaging the trees coming within the character of a grove and, therefore, the only forum where the plaintiffs can get relief is by filing a suit before the competent court of jurisdiction. The reasoning given by the court below that even if the defendants start digging the land and install a brick kiln and some harm or damage is caused to the grove by the trees or the crops therein the land or the trees could be allotted to the chak of somebody cannot be a ground for abating the suit and the argument on the face of it appears to be hollow and misconceived. Such an illegal action on the part of the defendants in digging the land for installing a brick kiln cannot be allowed to remain unassailed and this is cognizable by the civil courts. 6. The trial court has relied upon a case Ram Niranjan and another v. Bhawani Prasad and others (1974 RD page 25) wherein it has been held that a grove was also within the purview of consolidation operations and only for the purposes of allotment it will be out of the jurisdiction of consolidation courts. In the case relied upon along with determination of the nature of the land the right of ownership was also in dispute and there was no suit simplicitor for grant of an injunction to restrain the defendants from damaging the grove as in the case in hand and as such it has been rightly distinguished by the lower appellate court. Another case relied upon by the learned trial court to uphold this contention is Prabhu Dayal v. Gaon Sabha, (1965 All LJ 426) in which a declaration of right was claimed by the plaintiffs, even though was not directly sought but for which it could not otherwise be granted. Contesting and divergent claims of rights between the parties have no doubt to be adjudicated in a consolidation court but in the instant case the title and right of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute has nowhere been assailed since the defendants never claimed or asserted that they were owners of the land, the grove or the trees standing on the land. Needless to say that neither there is any assertion by the defendants nor any documentary evidence to suggest it. As such the finding recorded by the court below that the suit of the plaintiffs was neither for correction of the papers nor for declaration of right and title of the parties nor for adjudication or declaration of any other right which could be made only in consolidation proceedings, does not surfer from any infirmity and is hereby affirmed. 7. In the result the first appeal from order is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned Additional district Judge dated 15 5.1986 in Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1986 are affirmed. As a consequence the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 28.1.1986 in Regular Suit No. 404 of 1985 are hereby set aside. 7. In the result the first appeal from order is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the learned Additional district Judge dated 15 5.1986 in Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1986 are affirmed. As a consequence the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 28.1.1986 in Regular Suit No. 404 of 1985 are hereby set aside. The plaintiff respondents 1 to 4 herein are, in the circumstances, entitled to their costs from the defendant/appellants. The interim order of this Court dated 23rd May, 1986 stands hereby vacated. It is clarified that it will be open for the prescribed authority to take any action for grant or refusal to grant licence for operating brick kiln or otherwise take any action in the matter in accordance with law. (Appeal dismissed)