JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - These two petitions are by tenant of shop No. 4 situate near Railway Level Crossing at Nishatganj, Lucknow, of which Smt. Jeet Kaur is the landlady Smt. Jeet Kaur will hereinafter be referred to as the 'landlady' and the petitioner Assan Das will hereinafter be referred to as the 'tenant'. Both the petitions arise from proceedings for eviction under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), for short Act. 2. On 10-10-1975 the landlady filed the aforesaid application claiming release of the shop in question on the ground that it was required for setting up her son Amar Jeet Singh in business. It was stated that the said son had failed at the Intermediate examination conducted by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad, and he did not intend to study further and was keen on establishing himself in business. It was also stated that the said son had aptitude for business but was carrying on studies in uttar helplessness because no accommodation was available to settle him in business. The nature of business which the said son proposed to settle himself in was stated to be of general merchandise. In the application it was tried to be pointed out that the tenant did not stand in need of the shop in question as he had got employment with M/S Beauty Palace, Janpath Market, Hazratganj, Lucknow. It was also stated that the tenant was carrying on business initially under the name and style of Poonam Cloth House but afterwards be sub-let the shop and tailoring business was being done under the name and style of Stylish Tailor. During the pendency of the application, the application under Section 21 was amended and paragraph 7A was added wherein it was stated that the tenant had again sublet the shop in question to one Asha Nand who had purchased about five new sewing machines and kept the same in the shop in question. It was-stated that Asha Nand had another shop at Pandariba, Lucknow, near Baidya Nath Aurvedic Medicine shop where he carried on the business of readymade garments and suitcases. It was-stated that Asha Nand had another shop at Pandariba, Lucknow, near Baidya Nath Aurvedic Medicine shop where he carried on the business of readymade garments and suitcases. Asha Nand was alleged to have employed Mushtaqim alias chhotey son Hafiz of Nai Basti, Lucknow, for the purpose of running the tailoring business who was paying 25 per cent of the income to Asha Nand. The exclusive control and management of the tailoring business was alleged to be with Asha Nand. The landlady gave the undertaking not to let out the shop in question to any one of the same was got vacated from the tenant. She expressed her willingness to pay reasonable compensation to the tenant. 3. In his written-statement the tenant denied the landlady's plea of bona fide requirement of the shop for her son. He pleaded that the landlady's son was a minor and was studying in Kanya Kunj College and that the other sons of the landlady were well established and her husband was employed on handsome salary. It was also stated that the landlady had Rs. 650,00 per month as monthly income from the four shops. The total earning of the landlady's husband and her other sons was stated to be Rs. 5000.00 per month The landlady herself was alleged to be having a big poultry farm and it was pleaded that her son Amar Jeet could easily be absorbed in the said poultry farm. The landlady's allegation of subletting and taking up employment with M/S Beauty Palace was denied. It was tried to be asserted that the application was the result of the landlady's mala fides. One of the grounds of mala fides was the desire of the landlady to enhance the rent. In this context it was pointed out that earlier too there had been litigation between the landlady and the tenant but the landlady failed therein and thereafter the present application had been filed. Subsequently paragraph 12A was added to the written-statement in which it was stated that during the pendency of the proceedings the landlady's son Amar Jeet had completed his higher education and had settled in service and was posted outside Lucknow and was getting handsome salary. On this basis it was asserted that the purpose for which the application under Section 21 was moved had been frustrated. 4. On this basis it was asserted that the purpose for which the application under Section 21 was moved had been frustrated. 4. In support of their respective pleas the parties filed affidavits and documentary evidence. From the evidence on record it appears that the land lady had filed suit No. 2078 of 1973 against the tenant for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment from the shop in question, in this suit an ex parte decree was passed in favour of the landlady. This ex pane decree was later set aside and on deposit of rent etc., by the tenant under Section 20 (4) of the Act, the relief for ejectment was disallowed. Thereafter on 10-10-1975 the application, which has given rise to the present petitions was filed. The Prescribed Authority through its order dated 13-4-1976 allowed the landlady's application and directing the eviction of the tenant, allowed the latter six weeks time to vacate the shop in question. The Prescribed Authority also awarded to the tenant a sum of Rs. 4800 as compensation. Against this order of the Prescribed Authority to tenant preferred appeal. During the pendency of this appeal the landlady filed another suit for ejectment which was registered as suit No. 380 of 1977. In this suit the ejectment was claimed on the ground that the tenant was a defaulter in payment of rent and he had sublet the accommodation in question. It was asserted that the tenant had wound up his cloth business and had taken up employment at a shop in Janpath Market, Hazratganj, Lucknow. The appeal directed against the Prescribed Authority's order dated 13-4-1976 was allowed by the learned District Judge by his judgment and order dated 1-2-1978 and the case was remanded to the Prescribed Authority for recording finding on the question of comparative hardship. In this manner simultaneously two proceedings for eviction became pending against the tenant one the application under Section 21, and the other Suit No. 380 of 1977. The suit was ultimately decreed on 29-3-1978 on the plea of subletting. The petitioner preferred revision before the learned District Judge who allowed the same and rejected the landlady's plea of subletting. The landlady approached this Court through Civil Revision No. 28 of 1979 which was rejected. After remand the Prescribed Authority decided the application on 24-2-1983, Annexure 2. The suit was ultimately decreed on 29-3-1978 on the plea of subletting. The petitioner preferred revision before the learned District Judge who allowed the same and rejected the landlady's plea of subletting. The landlady approached this Court through Civil Revision No. 28 of 1979 which was rejected. After remand the Prescribed Authority decided the application on 24-2-1983, Annexure 2. The Prescribed Authority upheld the landlady's claim that the shop was required for settling her son in business. The Prescribed Authority also came to the conclusion that the tenant had no flourishing business and the same could be shifted elsewhere. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority the tenant again preferred appeal before the learned District Judge, Lucknow, which was transferred for disposal to the learned IVth Additional District Judge who by his order dated 14-3-1986 dismissed the same. 5. While the proceeding for eviction remained pending in the manner indicated herein above, landlady's son Amar Jeet got employment with Rallies India Ltd., During the Pendency of the appeal he resigned from Rallies India and an affidavit to that effect was filed before the Appellate Court. It was also brought on record that Amar Jeet had been relieved of his assignment in Rallies India in July, 1984. Amar Jeet Singh thereafter left for the United States of America in 1984 and it was stated at the time of arguments that till date he had not returned to the country. On behalf of the tenant affidavit of Sardar Harbhajan Singh was brought on the record before the Appellate Court in which the deponent of the affidavit stated the Amar Jeet had settled in America and there was no chance of his coming back to India. The deponent of the affidavit Harbhajan Singh was stated to be an intimate friend of the family of the landlady. Another affidavit of Sardar Swarn Singh appears to have been brought on record where in it was stated that Amar Jeet's wife had also left for America in November, 1985. On behalf of the tenant an application was moved on 20-2-1986 for summoning the record from the Income-tax Department to show the purpose for which Amar Jeet's wife Paramjeet Kaur had gone to America. This application was rejected. On behalf of the tenant an application was moved on 20-2-1986 for summoning the record from the Income-tax Department to show the purpose for which Amar Jeet's wife Paramjeet Kaur had gone to America. This application was rejected. In respect of the affidavit of Sardar Harbhajan Singh it was pleaded by the landlady that the same was by fictitious person as Harbhajan Singh did not know English in which the affidavit had been drafted. An application was made on behalf of the landlady for production of Harbhajan Singh before the court. It appears that the appeal was fixed before the court below on 11-3-1986 when an application was made on behalf of the tenant for adjournment of the case as his counsel was out of two. The Appellate Authority rejected the application and thereafter the appeal was disposed of by judgment an order dated 14-3-1986. 6. After the appeal had been disposed of in her favour, the landlady pressed for execution of the eviction order. On 20-3-1986 the tenant applied to the Prescribed Authority for staying the delivery of possession to the landlady for fifteen days in order to enable him to bring stay order from this Court. This application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority through its order dated 22-3-1986. Apprehending eviction from the shop in question without being able to approach this Court, the tenant filed Writ Petition No. 1934 of 1986 on 24-3-1986. The obvious purpose of filing this petition was to have breathing time to file writ petition against the order of the learned Additional District Judge. In the writ petition notice was issued to the landlady to show cause against admission. An interim order was also passed to the effect that the tenant shall not be evicted from the shop in question. Thereafter the connected Writ Petition No. 3202 of 1986 was filed on 16-5-1986. It appears that the later writ petition was filed before Hon'ble D.S. Bajpai, J. On the same day the earlier writ petition No. 1934 of 1986 was listed in the Court of Hon'ble D.N. Jha, J. On the request of the learned Counsel for the landlady the fresh petition was sent to court of Hon'ble D.N. Jha, J., who directed the two petitions to be connected together. He allowed time for exchange of counter and rejoinder affidavits. He allowed time for exchange of counter and rejoinder affidavits. The writ petitions were directed to be listed in the week commencing on 21-7-1986. No formal order of admission was passed in either of the two petitions. The parties have exchanged counter and rejoinder affidavits and the two petitions are being disposed of on the basis of material on record. 7. Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions of the parties counsel the learned Additional District Judge has observed that a peculiar feature of the case was that the tenant Assan Das has not appeared in the court in a single date which was apparent from the fact that the, order-sheet did not bear his signature. He further observed that the sub-tenant Krishna Chandra Kriplani, who is prolonging the litigation with the help of Sri S.S.D. Varma Advocate was attending and doing pairvy in the case all along. This Krishna Chandra Kriplani was started to have received copies of papers also from the landlady's counsel. Some mere observations have been made about Sri S.S.D. Varma Advocate but it is not necessary to refer to them here. 8. The learned Additional District Judge formulated the following four points for determination : 1. Whether U.P. Act No. No, 13 of 1972 is applicable to the shop in dispute, if not its effect ? 2. Whether the applicant bona fide requires the shop in question for her son Sardar Amarjeet Singh ? 3. Whether the appellant/opposite party will suffer greater hardship if the application is allowed ? 4. Whether the amount of compensation is to be paid to the appellant for evicting the shop in question ? 9. Under the first point the learned Additional District Judge held that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is applicable. The question has ceased to be of importance at this stage as the finding under issue No. 1 was not assailed before me by the learned Counsel for the tenant. 10. Under point No. 2 the learned Additional District Judge recorded the finding that the landlady required the accommodation for settling her son Amarjeet Singh in business. This is the hotly contested finding. The learned Additional District Judge also observed that the shop in question had been left out to Rajeo Kirplani and, therefore, there was no question of awarding any compensation to the tenant. This is the hotly contested finding. The learned Additional District Judge also observed that the shop in question had been left out to Rajeo Kirplani and, therefore, there was no question of awarding any compensation to the tenant. Accordingly the appellate court set aside the Prescribed Authority's order so far as it awarded compensation to the tenant. On the question of comparative hardship, the court below appears to have taken the view that Assan Das was unable to pay the rent and, therefore, he had sublet the accommodation, After making these observations the learned Additional District Judge has proceeded to observed that during the prolonged litigation extending over eleven years the tenant has not been able to point out that any shop belonging to the landlady had fallen vacant which she could occupy and this shows that the of the landlady was pressing and genuine. I have read the findings under points 3 and 4 again and again but I have not been able to find any observation by the learned Additional District Judge that on a comparison of hardships the landlady will suffer greater hardship by rejection of her application than the tenant would suffer by the application being allowed. I may assume that the learned Additional District Judge was of the opinion that since the tenant had sublet the accommodation, he would not suffer any hardship the material question that therefore, assumes importance is whether the finding of subletting is legally sustainable and could be recorded in the present proceedings. 11. The learned Counsel for the tenant has strenuously urged that the question of subletting is foreign to an application under Section 21 (1). According to him subletting is altogether a distinct ground to claim eviction and is mentioned in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. In this context he is also pointed out that in a suit for eviction in which the parties had opportunity to cross-examine each other's witnesses, the landlady's plea of subletting was negatived. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that in the present proceeding in which findings were to be recorded on the basis of the statements made on affidavits it was not only inappropriate for the court below to record finding on the landlady's plea of subletting but it was legally impermissible. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that in the present proceeding in which findings were to be recorded on the basis of the statements made on affidavits it was not only inappropriate for the court below to record finding on the landlady's plea of subletting but it was legally impermissible. Under clause (a) of sub-section (I) of Section 21 an application) of the landlord or landlady can be allowed only on the finding that "the building is bona fide required..........by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for the purposes of any profession, trade or calling. .............." This clause does not contemplate eviction on any other ground except bona fide requirement for the purposes mentioned in the clause. The learned counsel for tenant is, therefore, justified in submitting that an application under Section 21 (1) (a) cannot be allowed on the finding that the tenant has sublet the accommodation. 12. However, I am unable to accept his submission that it is impermissible to raise the plea of subletting in an application under Section 21 (1) (a). An Application under Section 21 (1) (a) cannot be allowed merely on the finding of bona fide requirement. After recording the finding of bona fide requirement the Prescribed Authority is required, under the 4th Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 to take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from refusal thereof. In view of this provision the order of eviction shall be passed only after the Prescribed Authority, after recording finding of bona fide requirement in favour of the landlord, further records the finding that the hardship to the landlord would be greater if his application was rejected than the hardship that would be suffered by the tenant from grant of the application. Obviously the tenant will suffer no hardship if he is either not residing in the building or he is not doing any business therein or he has illegally sublet the building to some one else. At this stage the plea of subletting may be relevant But in my opinion such a plea should be taken into consideration only when the evidence of subletting is absolutely clear and unassailable. At this stage the plea of subletting may be relevant But in my opinion such a plea should be taken into consideration only when the evidence of subletting is absolutely clear and unassailable. After all subletting is not easy to prove. Even in a regular suit where parties get opportunity to cross-examine each other's witnesses, it become difficult to establish subletting. Cases under Section 21 are decided on the basis of affidavits. Subletting cannot be inferred from the mere presence of a person, other than the tenant, at the shop or from the mere absence of the tenant from the shop for an particular period of time. For all these reasons the plea of subletting even for the purpose of comparing hardships should be considered in proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) in very exceptional cases. 13. In the present case, as noticed hereinbefore, the landlady filed Small Cause Court Suit No. 380 of 1977 against the tenant claiming ejectment on the ground of subletting, which was accepted by the Trial Court but was not accepted by the revisional Court. In such a situation, in my opinion, the learned District Judge should not have taken into account the landlady's plea of subletting while comparing the hardships of the parties. Since the comparison of hardship is based primarily on the finding of subletting, the said comparison suffers from legal infirmity which vitiates the order of eviction also. 14. It is true that learned Additional District Judge has mixed up the two issues but the finding on the question of bona fide requirement is clear and specific. Initially the court below proceeded to consider the question of sub-tenancy and upheld the landlady's plea. Thereafter he took up the landlady's plea that the accommodation in question was required for settling Amarjeet Singh in business. Taking up this plea he dealt with the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant that despite his failure in the intermediate Examination he proceeded with his studies and did B. Sc, and thereafter joined M.A. in History and later took up employment with Kallies India Ltd., The court below has observed that the present case remained pending for eleven years and all this period Amerjeet Singh could not be expected to sit idle. In my opinion no exception can be taken to these findings of the learned Addl. District Judge. In my opinion no exception can be taken to these findings of the learned Addl. District Judge. The same argument would be valid for Amarjeet Singh's visit to America. It appears that some of his near relations are already in that country. Finding that the shop was not immediately available, Amarjeet Singh could go abroad so as to returned when the shop was available or even earlier. 15. Learned Counsel for the tenant submitted that he was prepared to give an undertaking that the tenant would vacate the accommodation within a reasonable time if Amarjeet Singh returned to India. The bona fide of the landlady were sought to be tested undertaking. It is not necessary to consider the tenant's undertaking because there is ample safeguard in the Act itself against eviction on false grounds. Section 24 of the Act provides that where a landlord, after obtaining possession of an accommodation under Section 21 or Section 22 by setting up a particular requirement, does not put the accommodation to use in accordance with the pleaded requirement, the Prescribed Authority on the application move by the ousted tenant can put the tenant in possession of the accommodation on original terms and conditions of tenancy. The provision is sufficient safeguard against suprious claim of bona fide requirement. 16. In view of the above, the finding on the bona fide requirement of the landlady is confirmed while the finding on comparative hardship is set aside, The consequence is that the order of eviction passed against the tenant petitioner is also set aside. 17. Writ Petition No. 1934 of 1986 has served its purpose and is liable to be dismissed as infructuous and is hereby dismissed as such. 18. Writ petition No. 3202 of 1986 is allowed and the impugned order dated 14-3-1986, Annexure 1, is hereby quashed. The learned IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, shall readmit Rent Appeal No. 11 of 1983 lo its original number and decide it afresh in the light of the observations made herein above, treating the finding of bona fide requirement as final. There shall be no order as to costs. He shall also take into account the tenant's plea raised for the first time in this Court, that in any case, the landlady's requirement can be sufficiently met by releasing only a portion of the shop in her favour, instead of the entire shop.