M. N. ROY, J. ( 1 ) AN order of requisition of the land and buildings with furnitures In R. S. Plot No. 396, Mouza-Chandhaghar. J. L. No. 44, P. S. Barasat 24-Parganas (hereinafter referred to as the said premises) as issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), was challenged in this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the owners of the said premises, who are M/s. Himal Enterprises (Private) Ltd. a Company incorporated under the Sikkim Companies Act and also by one of their Directors Mrs. Sova Shresthe. The writ petitioners are the Respondents in this Appeal and the Civil Order No. 4112 (W) 1986, in which the requisition under the said Act were challenged on being disposed of in favour of the petitioners therein, this Appeal was presented by the Respondent State of West Bengal and their authorities, on July, 198g. ( 2 ) THE petitioners in the writ petition claimed that the Company as mentioned above, at all material times was and still is the owner of the said premises and they acquired the same by purchase on January 16, 1976 from the erstwhile owners. It was also their case that after such purchase the Company, i. e. , the petitioner No. 1 in the writ proceedings, spent a huge sum of money for the purpose of renovation, with the object that their Directors could stay therein. According to the petitioners, there was and has been a brick built one storied building (Bungalow) containing a total area of 24 cottahas (. 39 acres) and it was also their case that very recently the Bungalow in question, was thoroughly repaired and renovated on spending a considerable amount, apart from that, they have also claimed to have spent large sums of money for having necessary furnitures and fixtures and other decorative items and they at all material times web and still are kept in the Bungalow in question. It was also the case of the petitioners that they have further got a telephone connection installed in the Bungalow and the said telephone connection, at the time of requisition of the said premises, was operative. It was also the case of the petitioners that they have further got a telephone connection installed in the Bungalow and the said telephone connection, at the time of requisition of the said premises, was operative. The petitioners have further stated that after such acquiring of the said premises, they have paid all taxes, rates, electric charges and charges for telephone connection, regularly. ( 3 ) IT was also the case of the petitioners that on March 3, 1986, when one of the Directors of the petitioner No. 1, was present at the said premises but were at Calcutta, some persons claiming themselves to be the representatives of the office of the Collector, North 24-Parganas, came at the office of the petitioner No. 1, at 13, Lowdown Street, Calcutta at about 5. 30 p. m. and handed over a purported order which was said to have been issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act. The order was dated March 1, 1986 and the number of the same was 5/86. The requisition order will be hearafter referred to as the said order and by the said the Deputy Secretary of the Government of West Bengal requisitioned the said premises, claiming the same to be needed for a public purpose. The said order has been disclosed as Annexure "a" to the writ petition and on a reference to the same it would appear that the land and buildings with furniture in R. S. Plot No. 396 having an area of more or less 0. 35 acres of Mouza Chandhaghar, J. L. No. 44, P. S. Barasat, District-24 Parganas was sought to be requisitioned and the same was sought to be served on Mr. B. K. Sherestha with a request to deliver possession of the said premises to the representative, one Shri J. Mukherjee, Head Surveyor, who was stated to be the representative of the Office of the Collector concerned, on March 3, 1986 at 4-45 p. m. ( 4 ) THE petitioners have claimed and contended that in the said order there was no actual specification of the purposes for which the said premises were required by the Government and in the absence of any specific particulars, with regard to the purposes for which the said premises was being requisitioned, the said order was wholly bad, illegal and should be set-aside. ( 5 ) IT was also the categorical case of the petitioners that the Company, i. e. , the petitioner No. 1, was the owner of the said premises and as such, the said order should have been served on the said owner and not on Mr. B. K. Shrestha and the service in the instant case having not been made on the owner but on Mr. B. K. Shrestha, the same was irregular and improper under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, which clearly indicates that an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be served on the landlord and where the same relates to premises let out to a tenant, also to the tenant. Since the said premises, according to the petitioners, was owned by the petitioner No. 1 Company, the said notice should have been served on them and the service of the said notice on Mr. B. K. Shrestha who was neither the landlord nor a tenant and as such, claimed to be wholly bad, illegal, invalid and that being the position, it was claimed no action whatsover should have been taken on the basis of the same. ( 6 ) THE petitioners have further pointed out that from the said order itself it would clear that the forwarding note was issued on March 3, 1986 and as such, the same could not in any circumstances to be served prior to that date. They have also pointed out that in the said order the Collector concerned requested Mr. B. K. Shrestha to deliver possession of the said premises on March 3, 1986 at 4-45 p. m. and it would also be evident from the records of the case and the facts as disclosed that the representative of the Office of the Collector came to the office at 13, Lowdown Street, Calcutta at about 5-30 p. m. , to serve the said order. As such, the said order was claimed to have been served long after the period as mentioned therein and so the entire action was further claimed to be mala fide. The service of the notice at 5-30 p. m. on Mr. B. K. Shrestha has of course been denied by the answering Respondents and the particulars of such denial would appear from the statements as would be indicated hereafter. The service of the notice at 5-30 p. m. on Mr. B. K. Shrestha has of course been denied by the answering Respondents and the particulars of such denial would appear from the statements as would be indicated hereafter. ( 7 ) IT was the further case of the petitioners that on March 3, 1986, at about 3-30 p. m. , some persons also claiming themselves as the representatives of the Office of the Collector concerned, along with a number of police authorities went to the said premises and took forceable possession of the same by ousting the darwan and his family members and other employees of the petitioners Company. It has also been alleged that those persons with the help of police authorities ousted the darwan from his premises along with his family members including children and after taking forceable possession of the said premises, locked the same. It has been stated that at the time of taking such forceable possession, there were furniture, fixtures and other valuable articles of the petitioners in the said premises. It has been alleged by the petitioners that the action of the authorities concerned would establish that they were out to take possession of the said premises by any means whatsover. They have pointed out that the notice in question, was dated March 3, 1986 and the authorities concerned decided to take possession of the same on that date at 4-45. p. m. The fact that such decision to take possession of the said premises, even without giving any time to the owners to vacate the same and also to remove their furtiture, fixtures and other valuable articles, was contrary to Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act, which requires that the Collector may, by notice in writing, order the persons in occupation of the premises to vacate the same within a period of 10 days from the date of the service of the notice and in the instant case it would be clear from the records, that no such time was given to the petitioners to vacate the said premises and such being the position, the entire action was also illegal, mala fide arbitrary and absolutely without any jurisdiction and authority of law. The petitioners have also pointed out that although the total area of the land of the said premises is. 39 acres and not. The petitioners have also pointed out that although the total area of the land of the said premises is. 39 acres and not. 35 acreas as mentioned in the said notice and that would ample evidence that there was no application of mind prior to the issue of the same and such fact would also be evident from the fact that the real owner, i. e. , the Company petitioner No. 1, was not served, but Mr. B. K. Shrestha who was not the actual owner, was served as the owner of the said premises. ( 8 ) THE petitioners have further stated that the right to held and enjoy property is a cherished right and since the said order in the instant case, has deprived the actual owner of the said premises, such right, the same cannot stand and must be set-aside and that too. When no notice of hearing whatsover was served upon the owners of the said premises, it was further claimed that the said order as issued under the said Act could not be given effect to and the same should be deemed to be improper as the operation of the said Act which is temporary one, has not been duly extended. No notice having been duly served on the owners of the said premises, the requisition in question, as stated earlier, was claimed to be wholly illegal, invalid and inoperative and as such no action could be taken on the basis thereof. It was further restated by the petitioners that the time to vacate the said premises in terms of Section 4 (1) (a) of the said Act, not having been duly given, the said notice was inoperative and was in clear violations of the provisions of the said Act. It has been claimed that the time to vacate a premises is required to be given mandatorily and without compliance with such requirements, the possession of any premises cannot be taken. Particulars of invalidity of the said notice, for non service on the real owner, i. e. , the Company have also been indicated earlier. ( 9 ) THE affidavit-in-opposition to the writ application was dated April 16, 1986 and the same was filed through Shri Sudhinda Nath Mukherjee, Additional Land Acquisition Officer, North 24-Parganas. He has alleged that the petitioner No. 2 Mrs. ( 9 ) THE affidavit-in-opposition to the writ application was dated April 16, 1986 and the same was filed through Shri Sudhinda Nath Mukherjee, Additional Land Acquisition Officer, North 24-Parganas. He has alleged that the petitioner No. 2 Mrs. Sova Shrestha has not duly disclosed the names of the other Directors. It was big case that the record of rights in respect of the lands and the said premises were and are still standing in the name of Girendra Chandra Bandhapadhaya of 31-C, Shastitala Road, Calcutta-11 and the same premises, was earlier used for the purposes of the accommodation of Barasat-II Block Officer at a total monthly rent of Rs. 125/ and since the names of the Directors of the petitioner No. 1 have not been disclosed, the petition should be held to be defective. He has also stated that the total land of the R. S. Khatian No. 133 is only 0. 33 decimal and has further stated that the petitioners have not disclosed whether their names have been mutated or not in respect of the said premises. He has stated that he has not been able to find out such mutation in the records of the Collector concerned. It was further case that after taking possession of the said premises, an inventory was prepared in the presence of an Executive Magistrate and his categorical case was also that the said notice was served on and received by one Shri T. K. Vichanathan at 4-45 p. m. on March 3, 1986 and not at 5-40 p. m. as alleged. He has further stated that at the time" of pre-requisition inspection, it came to the knowledge of the authorities that Mr. B. K. Shrestha was the owner of the said premises and according to him the petitioner No. 2 is the wife of the said Mr. Shrestha. On being asked, it was found that the deponent was not present at the time of the concerned pre-requisition inspection. He of course denied the submissions that the said notice was a motivated or mala fide one and according to him, possession of the said premises was taken at about 4-30 p. m. on March 3, 1986 by the Collector, North 24-Parganas and it took upto 4-30 p. m. to make the inventory, which has been disclosed. He of course denied the submissions that the said notice was a motivated or mala fide one and according to him, possession of the said premises was taken at about 4-30 p. m. on March 3, 1986 by the Collector, North 24-Parganas and it took upto 4-30 p. m. to make the inventory, which has been disclosed. According to him, the fact of taking over possession and handing over the same to the representative of the Collector concerned was also completed by that time and he has further stated that the darwan who was in the said premises had left the same after handed over the keys to the Head Surveyor. ( 10 ) IT has been stated by the said deponent that at the time of pre-requisition inspection it was found that except the darwan who was staying at the out house, no person was in occupation of the said premises and as such, the requisition in this case according to him, was made in accordance with law. He has further stated that from the writ petition also, it would be apparent that no one was residing in the premises at the time of the requisition. It was his specific case that Plot No. 396 having an area of 0. 35 acres, have been taken possession of under the order and he has also indicated that there was no substance in the submissions of the petitioners on the invalidity of the said notice for not having the extension of the said Act extended as said has been extended upto March 31, 1986 by the Amending Act IV of 1986. ( 11 ) IT was the further case of the deponent that the said premises has been requisitioned for the public purpose as would be apparent from the said notice itself viz. for confidential-office-cum-residence of the District Magistrate of the newly formed North 24-Parganas District, which came into existence on March 1, 1986. ( 11 ) IT was the further case of the deponent that the said premises has been requisitioned for the public purpose as would be apparent from the said notice itself viz. for confidential-office-cum-residence of the District Magistrate of the newly formed North 24-Parganas District, which came into existence on March 1, 1986. It has been stated that from September 1985 efforts were made for suitable premises at Barasat town for office and residential accommodation for officers, whose continuous presence and stay in the District Headquarters would be required for administration of the newly formed District and such being the position, the said order was admittedly issued for the interest of public service, which would mean and include a purpose which can be claimed to be a public purpose, it was the further case of the deponent that as such object of having necessary accommodation could not be achieved, the said order was passed on March 1, 1986 and that too for the purposes as mentioned above. He has also stated that as the District officers were very much busy on March 1, 1986, which was Saturday, for opening of the District, the notice was served on March 3, 1986, after complying with all the formalities, apart from the above, the deponent has stated that the verification of the writ petition was not proper. ( 12 ) THE writ proceeding was disposed of on April 18, 1986 by Suhas Chandra Sen, J. and by His judgment and order, the lull particulars whereof would be indicated hereafter, the learned Judge had disposed of the proceedings, as indicated earlier, in favour of the writ petitioners. ( 13 ) BEFORE the learned Judge, on behalf of the petitioners, the point of non service of the said notice upon the owner, i e. , the Company was urged and it was further urged that the public purpose for which the said premises was requisitioned was not specifically stated in the notice. The answering Respondents, before the learned Trial Judge of course claimed that such mentioning of the specific purposes in the notice in question, was not necessary and the precise nature of the public purpose can be stated in the affidavit. The said point, the learned Trial Judge has not decided since he felt that it was not necessary for him to go into such question in the facts of the case. The said point, the learned Trial Judge has not decided since he felt that it was not necessary for him to go into such question in the facts of the case. In fact, he has pointed out that the only question would be whether a prior notice was given under Section 4 of the said Act. He has recorded that on this point the petitioners urged that at least ten days notice should have been given and such compliance not having been there, the said notice should be quashed. The learned Trial Judge has recorded that the said premises was taken over within a few hours of the concerned service of notice and because of such shortness of time, the petitioners could not even remove their furniture. The Respondents before him submitted that the said premises was requisitioned under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act which does not require any time to be given and the prescribed period of ten days notice is not necessary in case of requisition of vacant premises. On construction and interpretation of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 and Section 4 of the said Act and according to the learned Trial Judge, when there is no conflict between the Sections 3 and 4, he has come to the conclusion that after an order has been passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 3, further action may be necessary to be taken in connection with the requisition of premises before possession is taken and the person in occupation of the premises will have to be given a notice to vacate within a period of 10 days and the landlord or tenant as the case may be, will have to be required to remove the articles or furnitures belonging to them within a period of 15 days, which period may be extended upto 2 months. The learned Trial Judge has observed that admittedly, in this case, no notice has been served under Section 4 (1) (a) or Section 4 (1 ). Before him the answering Respondents and the said premises was vacant one and such being the position, there was no question of service of notice to vacate, before possession of the same was taken. The learned Trial Judge has observed that admittedly, in this case, no notice has been served under Section 4 (1) (a) or Section 4 (1 ). Before him the answering Respondents and the said premises was vacant one and such being the position, there was no question of service of notice to vacate, before possession of the same was taken. ( 14 ) ON the basis of the observations in the case of State of West Bengal v. Pulin Krishna Roy, and also those in the case of Sudhirabala Roy v. State of West Bengal, 1981 (1) C. L. J. 29, the learned Trial Judge has observed that the points as indicated hereinbefore, were of no merit and he was further of the view that notice, under Section 4 (1) (a) and Section 4 (1) (aa) of the said Act were mandatory and required to be appropriately served, before possession could be lawfully taken. ( 15 ) WHILE on the question of the argument that the said premises was unoccupied and therefore notice under Section 4 was not needed to be served, the learned Trial Judge has observed that such point has also no basis, more particularly when the said premises was a furnished one, there was a darwan in charge of the same and as such, he has also observed that it cannot be said that the premises was not occupied merely because of the owners of the same was not in actual physical possession of the same at the time of the service of the said notice. The learned Trial Judge has also indicated that the said premises was fully furnished and the darwan was in actual physical possession of the same, but unfortunately the Respondents have taken physical possession of the said premises with all the articles and furnitures and the darwan has been physically thrown out of occupation and such act or actions, in the opinion of the learned Trial Judge was a high-handed one and not warranted by the statute. In short, the learned Trial Judge has observed that the Respondents before him and acted in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the said Act. In short, the learned Trial Judge has observed that the Respondents before him and acted in clear violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 4 of the said Act. He could not also agree with the submissions of the answering Respondents that the notice under Section 4 (1) (a) was not necessary because at the time when the said premises was requisitioned under Section 3, the owner was not in actual physical possession of the same and only a caretaker was in charge of the said premises, The terms of Section 4 (1) (a) of the sum Act and more particularly winch includes "the person in occupation of the premises" according to the learned Trial Judge would mean who is in possession either actually or physically or symbolically and according to him, occupation would not mean actual residence. He has also pointed out that a person may keep up and maintain a house property, where he may reside from time to time and the property cannot be said to De not in occupation if he temporarily resides elsewhere and the learned Trial Judge has further observed that such construction if, given that would lead to a dagerous consequences. The said Section, the learned Trial Judge has pointed out has not used the language "in actual occupation" or "in actual physical possession" and as such, according to him, there would be no necessity to give the word "occupation" a restricted meaning and such word in Section 4 (1) (a), he has stated, cannot mean any uninterrupted or continuous occupation of a property. Such beign the position and since there has been no dispute that the property was fully furnished and no notice under Section 4 (1) (a) has given to the petitioners to remove their articles and furnitures, the learned Trial Judge has stated that there has been a failure of the mandatory provisions of the said Act and there is also no explanation given by the Respondents, as to why such mandatory provisions were given a go by. With those observations and since the mandatory provisions of Section 4, of the said Act were not applied, the learned Trial Judge disposed of the proceedings with an order directing the Respondents to make and hand over and/or restore the possession of the said premises to the petitioners with all the fittings, furnitures and fixtures and other valuable articles. With those observations and since the mandatory provisions of Section 4, of the said Act were not applied, the learned Trial Judge disposed of the proceedings with an order directing the Respondents to make and hand over and/or restore the possession of the said premises to the petitioners with all the fittings, furnitures and fixtures and other valuable articles. ( 16 ) FROM such determination, the present Appeal, as mentioned, hereinbefore, was presented on April 18, 1986. ( 17 ) MR. Banerjee, appearing in support of the appeal, made inter alia amongst others, the submissions as were made by his clients viz the Respondents in the writ proceedings before the learned Single Judge, with reference to certain decided cases, the particulars whereof are indicated hereafter. ( 18 ) BEFORE indicating the submissions as made, we think, we should indicate the Sections of the said Act and the provisions of the Rules viz West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control Rules, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) as framed under the said Act, to which reference was made by the parties. There is no doubt that the operation of the said Act has been extended upto March 31, 1987 by West Bengal Act IV of 1986. Mr. Banerjee referred to the Sections of the said Act and the Rules as quoted herein below. There is no doubt that the operation of the said Act has been extended upto March 31, 1987 by West Bengal Act IV of 1986. Mr. Banerjee referred to the Sections of the said Act and the Rules as quoted herein below. Section 2 (c) : "landlord" means any person who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were left to a tenant and includes a legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (of the landlord) ; section 2 (d) : "persons interested" means any person claiming an interest in compensation payable on account of requisition of any premises under this Act; section 2 (e) : "premises" means any building or part of a building or any hut or part of a hut and includes the garden, grounds and out-houses (if any) apertaining to such building or part of a building or (part of a hut and also includes a room or rooms in an hotel, boarding house or lodging house ; section 2 (f) : "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act; section 2 (ff) : "public purpose" includes providing residential accommodation for employees of the State Government where the provision of such accommodation is, in the opinion of the State Government, necessary in the interest of public service; section 2 (g) : -- -- -- -- -- --Section 3 (1) : Whenever it appears to the State Government that any premises in any locality are needed or are likely to be needed for any public purpose, it may, by order in writing, requisition such premises (either with or without any or all of the furniture, if any, in such premises) : provided that no premises exclusively used for the purpose of religious worship shall be requisitioned under this section. (2) An order under Sub-section (1) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the landlord, and where it relates to premises let out to a tenant, also on such tenant. (2) An order under Sub-section (1) shall be served in such manner as may be prescribed on the landlord, and where it relates to premises let out to a tenant, also on such tenant. (3) The State Government may, with a view to requisitioning any premises under Sub-section (1), by order : (a) require any persons to furnish to such authority as may be specified in the order, such information in his possession relating to the premises as may be so specified ; (b) direct that until the expiry of such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in the order, the landlord, the tenant or any other person in occupation of the premises shall not let out the premises without the permission of the State Government or such other authority as may be specified in the order. (4) An order passed under Sub-section, (1) shall be final and whenever such order has been passed, the State Government shall direct the Collector to take such further action as is necessary in connection with the requisitioning of the premises in accordance with the provisions of this Act (and to take possession of the premises requisitioned ). (4) An order passed under Sub-section, (1) shall be final and whenever such order has been passed, the State Government shall direct the Collector to take such further action as is necessary in connection with the requisitioning of the premises in accordance with the provisions of this Act (and to take possession of the premises requisitioned ). (5) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- (6) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --4 (1) Where any premises are requisitioned under this Act the Collector may be notice in writing-- (a) order the (person in occupation of the premises, if any, to vacate the premises within a period of ten days from the service of the notice ; (aa) order the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, to remove the articles belonging to him, if any, and, where the premises are requisitioned without any furniture therein, such furniture, within a period of fifteen days from the service of the notice : provided that the Collector may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period up to two months ; (b) order the landlord to execute such repaire as may be specified in the notice within such time as may be specified therein ; (c) if a landlord fails to execute any repairs in pursuance of an order under Clause (b) the Collector may cause the repairs specified in the order to be executed at the expence of the landlord and the cost thereof may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be deducted from the compensation payable. (2) Where any person fails to comply with an order under Clause (aa) of Sub-section (1) directing any furniture or other articles to be removed, the Collector may cause such furniture or other articles to be removed and to be stored or sold by public auction in such manner as the Collector may think fit at the cost and risk of such person : provided that no furniture or other articles shall be sold by public auction in pursuance of the provisions of this Sub-section without the previous sanction of the State Government or such other authority as may be empowered in this behalf by the State Government. Section 6.-- -- -- -- -- -- --6. Section 6.-- -- -- -- -- -- --6. When (any premises have been requisitioned under Sub-section (1) of Section 3, the State Government) (may use or deal with them, for such public purpose and in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient)Rule 3. (1) Save as provided in Sub-rule (2), an order under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (3) of Section 3 shall be served by tendering and delivering a copy thereof to the person on whom the order as to be served. (2) Where-- (a) the person to whom a copy of the order to be served is tendered under Sub-rule (1) refuses to accept delivery thereof, the order may be served by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door or such conspicuous part of the premises in which such person ordinarily resides or carries on business or by sending the same by registered post with acknowledgement due or in any other manner as enumerated in Clause (b) of this sub-rule. (b) the person on whom the order is to be served cannot be found or is not readily traceable and the order cannot be otherwise served without undue delay, the order may be served on any adult male member of the family of such person residing with him, and, if no such adult male member can be found or if such member refuses to accept delivery thereof, the order may be served by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the house in which the person therein named ordinarily dwells or carries on business or by publishing the order in the Calcutta Gazette, and if practicable by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises to which it relates or by fixing a copy thereof on the notice board in the office of the Collector and if practicable also on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises to which it relates, as the Collector may deem fit in the circumstances of the case or (c) the ownership of the premises is in dispute, the order may be served by publishing it in the Calcutta Gazette, and by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises to which it relates or by fixing a copy thereof on notice board in the office of the Collector, and if practicable also on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the premises to which it relates, as the Collector may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 4. The notices referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 10 shall be in Form III appended to these rules and shall be served in the same manner mutatis mutandis as is provided in Rule 3 for the service of orders under Section 3, and after placing the above provisions, Mr. 4. The notices referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 10 shall be in Form III appended to these rules and shall be served in the same manner mutatis mutandis as is provided in Rule 3 for the service of orders under Section 3, and after placing the above provisions, Mr. Banerjee placed the notification in question and pointed out that in this proceeding, we are to find out first, if the service of the notification, was good and sufficient and according to him, the provisions of Section 3 (2) of the said Act were neither condition precedent nor mandatory, It was his further submission that the formation of opinion regarding the existence of "public purpose" is neither justiciable nor specific "public purpose" is required to be mentioned in the order under Section 8 (1) of the said Act and such an order, when passed, made or issued, will be final under Section 3 (4) of the said Act. ( 19 ) IN support of his submissions that a notification, when made or; issued will be final and the formation of opinion with regard to the "public purpose" will be final and not justiceable and furthermore, the notice need not specify the public purpose, Mr. Banerjee, firstly referred to the case of A. C. Mohamed and Anr. v. Sailendra Nath Mitra, where a Division Bench of this Court has indicated that the decision of the Government that the premises are wanted for public purposes is final. If the order made is a colourable exercise of the power given by the Act, the Court has jurisdiction to set aside the order. All that the Court can do is to see that the power which it claimed to exercise is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the Legislature and to see that the power is exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the Courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense, or any other aspect of the transaction. Mr. Apart from that, the Courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense, or any other aspect of the transaction. Mr. Banerjee secondly referred to the determinations in the case of Pandit Srinivas Khedwal v. The State of West Bengal, 93 C. L. J. 106, where another Division Bench of this Court, apart from observing that the burden of proving whether an order of requisition in mala fide or not rests on the party alleging it, has also observed that since existence of a public purpose depends entirely on the satisfaction of the Government and is not justiciable, mere omission to specify the public purpose in the requisition order does not necessarily make the order invalid, more so when the party may obtain the necessary information by appropriate means. A mere statement in the order that the premises are needed or are likely to be needed for a public purpose is sufficient. Then and thirdly, reliance was placed by Mr. Banerjee to the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Chayarani Mukherjee v. Asst. Secretary. Land and Land Revenue Department, Requisition Bench, State of West Bengal and Ors. , 68 C. L. J. 826 which has observed amongst others that on a purely textural interpretation Section 3 of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary) Provisions Act, 1947 may mean that the subjective satisfaction of the State Government as to the existence of the public purpose is final and not justiciable. On the other hand, in the background of constitutional guarantee that a law cannot provide for acquisition or requisition save for a public purpose, the section must be construed to mean that the opinion of the government is final as to the need only, but it is not final as to the existence of the public purpose. Any law which makes the subjective satisfaction of the Government with regard to the existence of the public purpose final would indirectly enable the Government to make requisition for private purpose and would be violative of the constitutional guarantee. ( 20 ) ON a reference to the said order, Mr. Banerjee indicated that the said premises along with furnitures was requisitioned and he also indicated that a list of furniture were duly inventorised. ( 20 ) ON a reference to the said order, Mr. Banerjee indicated that the said premises along with furnitures was requisitioned and he also indicated that a list of furniture were duly inventorised. He further contended that since the said premises was not in actual use and the same along with furnitures and fittings was requisitioned to there was no need for serving a notice under Section 4 (1) (a) of the said Act or no useful purpose would be served by such since Section 4 of the said Act according to Mr. Banerjee was really a follow up action after the notification under Section 3 and as stated earlier such action was not necessary in the facts of this case. In support of such submissions Mr. Banerjee referred to the case of Administratix in the Estate of late N. C. Goenka v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , 1976 (2) C. L. J. 162, where it has been indicated amongst others that the provision of Section 4 of the Act are in the nature of follow actions which are to be taken after the requisition order is made. The case under consideration has also observed that although Section 3 of the said Act speaks of requisition of premises "with or without any furniture", it is not necessary to state that in the order of requisition itself. It may be done in a subsequent stage. In fact, on the basis of the above observations, the bona fide of the order of requisition or the purpose behind the same was sought to be established during the course of hearing of this appeal. ( 21 ) A point arose whether the requisition in question, was due, valid and proper, since ten days time as required under Section 4 (1) (a) of the said Act or the notice in terms of Section 4 (1) (aa) was not given to the petitioners or the person in occupation, to remove the belongings in the said premises and to vacate the same. Mr. Banerjee contended that the said premises was not occupied at the relevant time, so there was no need or any necessity to afford such opportunity to the petitioners and further contended, on the basis of the determinations in the case of Sultan Ahmed and Ors. v. Dutt Working for Gain as Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and Ors. v. Dutt Working for Gain as Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and Ors. , (1963) C. L. J. 150 that the opportunity within ten days as required to be given or may be given anytime within ten days. In fact, the case as cited above has determined that the words "within a period of 10 days" in Section 4 of the said Act mean that the State can call upon the persons in occupation of the premises to vacate at any time within a period of 10 days. The case as indicated above also supported the submissions of Mr. Banerjee on the finality of a requisition order and has further laid down that a requisition order can be set aside if the same