Judgment :- 1. "Manohar Clinic" belonging to the petitioner was originally classified as a consumer of electrical energy, appropriate to class I(c) of the Electricity Board's Tariff. Some time after an X-ray unit was installed in the clinic, the Officers of the Board re-classified it as Class IV(a). It appears that the petitioner filed some complaint before the Chief Electrical Inspector, and the matter was being got examined through the Electrical Inspector, Calicut. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed OS. 641/79 before the Munsiff's Court of Kozhikode for a declaration that the demand for payment of electrical charges, with retrospective effect, on the basis of the reclassification, was illegal and of no effect. In I.A. No. 1302 of 1980 the petitioner wanted the court to appoint the Electrical Inspector, Calicut as a Commissioner in the suit for reporting about correct classification and the tariff applicable to his electrical connection, as also about the "voltage, connected load, horse power etc." The application was opposed by the Officials of the Electricity Board, but the court apparently thought that the dispute involved something in respect of which a report from an expert would be useful. "Evidence should not be shut out", said the Court, and the I.A.was accordingly allowed. 2. The Electrical Inspector submitted his report to the court on 24-7-82, stating that though the parties had failed to make available some documents which would have been of assistance in making the required report, despite notice, a few relevant papers had in the meanwhile been obtained in connection with the enquiry ordered by the Chief Electrical Inspector, and that he was in a position to report on their basis that the connection was correctly classified as IV(a). According to the Inspector, Class I (c) was appropriate to small consumers with a connected load not exceeding "3 H.P. corresponding to 3K.VA"; but the X-ray unit in the petitioner's hospital had a transformer, an accessory to the unit, whose rated capacity itself was 20 KVA. 3. The report was thus against the petitioner. It is not clear whether any objection was filed to this report or whether the Commissioner was examined; but on 16-8-82 the petitioner filed another I. A. 2592/82 praying that the Inspector's report be set aside and that an experienced Advocate be appointed as a new Commissioner to report on the same matters. The report was thus against the petitioner. It is not clear whether any objection was filed to this report or whether the Commissioner was examined; but on 16-8-82 the petitioner filed another I. A. 2592/82 praying that the Inspector's report be set aside and that an experienced Advocate be appointed as a new Commissioner to report on the same matters. The court below dismissed the said I.A. by order dated 17-9-82, and hence the present revision. 4. The I. A. was dismissed, so far I could see, for four reasons: (i) in Hydrose v. Govindankutty (1981 KLT 360) this Court had held that 0.26 R.10(3) was insufficient to clothe the court with power to set aside the report of a Commissioner appointed under R.9; the Court could only call for a further report from the same commissioner, or at the most, appoint a fresh commissioner whose report would also form part of the evidence in the case, under R.10(2), There was therefore no question of granting the request for setting aside the Inspector's report. And there was no request at all to remit the report to him for further enquiry; (ii) on the merits also, there were no grounds to set aside the report because despite grant of sufficient opportunities by the Inspector, and even directions from the Court, the plaintiff had failed to submit all the necessary records; (iii)there was no reason to assume that an Advocate Commissioner would be able to submit a better report on the subject, than the Electrical Inspector, and (iv) the points the petitioner wanted to prove could be proved by other evidence. 5. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the view taken in Hydrose (by me) has not met with the approval of a subsequent Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in Swami Premananda v. Swami Yogananda 1985 KLT. 144: (1985 KLJ. 225), and that that itself will be sufficient ground to set aside the order of the Munsiff herein. I cannot agree, because even if reason No. (i) were to fail, the order could well be supported by reasons Nos. (ii) to (iv). 144: (1985 KLJ. 225), and that that itself will be sufficient ground to set aside the order of the Munsiff herein. I cannot agree, because even if reason No. (i) were to fail, the order could well be supported by reasons Nos. (ii) to (iv). The learned Munsiff, as already noticed, was careful enough to observe: "Even on merits there are no sufficient grounds to set aside the report If there is any defect in the report, the petitioner should have prayed to remit the same for rectification of those mistakes." The question was about the connected load of the petitioner's installation and the classification to be made on that basis, in terms of the Tariff; and the Inspector bad found that even the transformer forming an accessory to the X-ray unit alone, had a rated capacity of 20 KVA. It does not appear that the petitioner bad any case that this part of the report was inaccurate, and so long as this basic fact or factor was not in dispute, bis inferences or conclusions could have been tested by producing the Tariff and examining him, or by adducing other evidence. There was no material at all before the court to think that under the circumstances, an Advocate Commissioner could have done anything more. 6. The revision could and should be dismissed in the above view: and I see nothing in Swami Premananda (1985 KLT. 144:1985 KLJ 225) to suggest that the report of a Commission once submitted before a court should be set aside and a new commission appointed, for the mere asking. On the other hand, almost all the decisions relied on by their Lordships of the Division Bench seem to have taken the opposite view. The question dealt with by the Bench was whether the mere circumstance that the trial court bad chosen to get a second commission report was sufficient reason to set aside or ignore the first, and the answer given was that it was not. It was said: "We have no hesitation to hold that the court below acted illegally and totally in excess of jurisdiction in mechanically setting aside the first Commissioner's report for the sole reason that a second Commissioner's report was ordered and obtained by the court. The passage seen extracted in paragraph (8) of the judgment from Chahdan Mull v. Chimon Lal (AIR. The passage seen extracted in paragraph (8) of the judgment from Chahdan Mull v. Chimon Lal (AIR. 1940 P.C. 3) also shows that the intention was to emphasise the need for being extremely circumspect, in interfering with the report of a Commissioner. 7. Before parting with the case, however, I think I should point out that the Division Bench (in Swami Premananda) has not referred at all to my decision in Hydrose (1981 KLT. 360) and indicated how and why the reasoning therein could be over-looked or differed from. Judicial discipline requires me to follow the D. B.; and that is what I have already done, by ignoring the reasoning of the court below based on Hydrose but holding that its conclusion could be justified on the rest of the reasoning. But that does not mean that I should desist from expressing my humble opinion that some relevant aspects of the question had not been brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Division Bench, before the decision was rendered. 8. Premananda (1985 KLT. 144:1985 KLJ. 225) was a case arising under 0.26 R.11 and 12, dealing with commissions to examine accounts, while Hydrose (1981 KLT. 360; bad arisen under 0.26 R.9 and 10, dealing with Commissions for local inspection. R.10(2) provides that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit (even without examining the Commissioner), though it is permissible to examine him in open court "touching on any matters referred to him or mentioned in his report ". Sub-rule (3) of R.10 further provides that where the court is dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, it may direct such further enquiry to be made as it shall think fit. R.12(2) also provides for treating the proceedings and the report of the Commissioner as evidence in the suit and empowers the court, where it is dissatisfied with these, to direct further enquiry. Even ignoring the difference that R.10(3) refers to dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the Commissioner, and R.12(2), to dissatisfaction with the proceedings and report of the Commissioner, two things seem to be important from the standpoint of statutory construction: (i) both the rules insist that the report of the commissioner "shall be evidence in the suit and (ii) both speak of only "farther enquiry". Now, if the mandate, of the statute is that the report of the Commissioner shall he treated as evidence in the suit, how can any court set it aside or wipe it out unless it is authorised to do that also, by the statute? As already noticed, R.10 and 12 do not authorise the court to set aside a commission report which it is required to treat as evidence: the rules only permit the ordering of "further enquiry" where the report already received is unsatisfactory. A power to order further enquiry into a matter is entirely different from a power to set aside or wipe out that which has already become part of the evidence in the suit as a result of the initial enquiry and the mandate of the statute. 9. It is not as if those who framed the Code were unaware of the distinction between the approaches in R.10 and 12 of 0.26 on the one hand, and in R.14, on the other. While the Commissioners contemplated in the first two rules are those appointed during the trial of a suit, the Commissioner in R.14 is one appointed after the passing of a preliminary decree in a partition suit, though, technically, it may be said that the passing of a preliminary decree does not have the effect of terminating the suit. That is perhaps why, unlike R.10 and 12, R.14 does not insist that the report of the Commissioner shall automatically form part of the evidence in the suit; and that also may be the reason why R.14 confers specific power on the court to confirm, vary or set aside a commission report and also to issue a new commission. At any rate, while R.14 specifically contemplates the setting aside of a commission report and the appointment of a new commissioner, R.10 and 12 only speak of ordering "further enquiry". The difference in language is not minor; and unless one is prepared to totally ignore the importance of language in construing statutory provisions, it is difficult to say that the power conferred under R.10 and 12 is similar to the one under R.14. 10. The word "further" means "additional" or "going beyond what exists"; and when R.10 and 12 refer to further enquiry, what is evidently intended is to collect and bring on record something in addition to what has already been brought in earlier. 10. The word "further" means "additional" or "going beyond what exists"; and when R.10 and 12 refer to further enquiry, what is evidently intended is to collect and bring on record something in addition to what has already been brought in earlier. The intention could not have been to wipe the slate clean and start afresh. 11. In Swami Premananda, the discussion on the scope of R.12 (considered as similar to R.10) starts with the observation that the matter had become fairly clear even "110 years ago" by the decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan (1875) XIII W. R.93 That decision was rendered at a time when what was in force was the Code of 1859. S.180 of Act 8/1859 dealt with "Commission for local investigation" and though it provided for the treating of the report of the Commission as evidence in the suit, and also for examination of the Commission under certain circumstances, it had not made any provision as to what was to be done when the report was found to be unsatisfactory. In other words, there was no provision corresponding to R.10(3) of 0.26. Appointment of commissions "to investigate and adjust accounts" (corresponding to Rules II and 12 of 0.26 of the present Code) was the subject - matter of S.181, and the last part of the Section was in the following terms: "The proceedings of the commission shall be received in evidence in the case, unless the court may have reason to be dissatisfied with them, in which case the court shall make such further enquiry as may be requisite, and shall pass such ultimate judgment or order as may appear to it to be right and proper in the circumstances of the case." And there was no provision at all in the 1859 Code for issue of Commissions. in partition matters (like the one in O.26 R.14). The decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan was one dealing with the report of a Commissioner appointed under S.180, for local investigation; it was not concerned even with the ,'further enquiry" in S.181. The very general remark that a second enquiry could not be ordered without absolutely quashing and annulling the proceedings of the first, was therefore not an interpretation of the provisions of S.181; it was at the most an attempt to edition against misuse of power under S.180, as a measure of practice. The very general remark that a second enquiry could not be ordered without absolutely quashing and annulling the proceedings of the first, was therefore not an interpretation of the provisions of S.181; it was at the most an attempt to edition against misuse of power under S.180, as a measure of practice. Can such remarks about practice be authority for the construction of a provision introduced into the statute years later? That was perhaps why P. B. Mukherji J. (as he then was), who could not easily be assumed to have been unaware of the decision in Syud Azim Ali Khan, bad struck an entirely different oof (as regards annulling, quashing, setting aside or wiping out) in B.C. Ghose v. T. P. Ghose & Ors. (70 CWN. 266). As a measure of construing R.10(3) bis Lordship was not in favour of the view that a second commissioner could not be appointed at all, without setting aside the report of the first Commissioner. 12. It may perhaps be useful to notice that S.181 of the 1859 Code bad conferred some discretion on the Court not to treat the Commissioner's proceedings as evidence, if it was dissatisfied about the proceedings: the language of R.10(3) and 12(2) of 0.26 of the present Code is different. 13. Another decision relied on in Swami Premananda is the one reported in Lakshmi v. Ouseph Mariyam (42 TLR. 429). That had only followed the view taken in Syud Azim Ali Khan, and a few decisions of the Madras High Court which too had deprecated the practice of issuing successive commissions on the same matter and for the same purpose, at ruinous costs for the parties. However, even the said decisions had noticed (vide for example Ambi v. Kunhi Kavama (AIR. 1929 Mad 661) the difference in phraseology between R.10(3) and 14(3) and held that what could be done under the former was only to direct further enquiries by the same commission, and not the issuance of a new commission. It was however observed that in extreme cases where the report of a Commissioner was found to be wholly unsatisfactory, the court could "discard the whole record and start afresh". As I had had occasion to point out in Hydrose (1981 KLT. 360) this latter remark did little justice to the distinction between R.10(3) and 14(3) which their Lordships themselves had earlier highlighted. As I had had occasion to point out in Hydrose (1981 KLT. 360) this latter remark did little justice to the distinction between R.10(3) and 14(3) which their Lordships themselves had earlier highlighted. And if you go through the subsequent decisions of the Madras High Court on the subject, you will find that it was this "discarding" and "starting afresh" which, in course of time, was converted into the inviolable rule without any support from the statute that a second commission could not issue, unless the first is "wiped out"! 14. The last part of S.181 (of the 1859 Code) had perhaps indicated what a Court was ultimately expected to do when the report submitted by a Commission was found to be unsatisfactory: it could direct further enquiries to be held, and then proceed to pass 'such ultimate judgment or order" as was right and proper "in the circumstances of the case." This was apparently why the Patna and Other High Courts have been taking the view that a commission report is but one piece of evidence in a case, that there could, in appropriate cases, be other pieces also, and that all such pieces of evidence are to be evaluated at the time when the Court is to pass "ultimata judgment" in the suit. 15. A question was raised at the hearing as to what could be done when the local investigation report submitted by a Commissioner is found to be absolutely useless, if it were to be held that a new commission would be possible only in partition matters, under R.14 (3), Decisions of the Patna, Calcutta, Punjab and Orissa High Courts indicate that where the result of an on-the-spot enquiry is essential, a second commission could be appointed, in these rare cases where such a step is found necessary, without setting aside the first report. Velu Pillai J. of this Court was also of this view. In Hydrose, I too had observed, for what it was worth, that even though a power to issue a second commission could not be found in R.10 (3) such power "could be traced to the well-known principle that the power to issue a commission is not exhausted with the first exercise thereof ". In Hydrose, I too had observed, for what it was worth, that even though a power to issue a second commission could not be found in R.10 (3) such power "could be traced to the well-known principle that the power to issue a commission is not exhausted with the first exercise thereof ". R.9 of 0.26 empowers a court to issue a commission for local investigation when it deems it to be requisite for elucidating a matter in dispute; and this conferment of power, read in the light of S.14 of the General Clauses Act, enables it to issue a second commission, if the elucidation obtained as result of the first report turns out to be unsatisfactory. The question then is not whether a second commission could be appointed at all; it is whether the report of the first could or should be set aside before another could be thought of, and whether such a principle emerges from a construction of R.10(3). 16. In 8Mb Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad (AIR. 1937 Pat. 670) Courtney Terrel C. J. bad adverted to the situation where, if the trial court were granted the power to set aside the report of the first commission, the appellate court would be prevented from looking into it, despite the provisions of S.105(1) of the Code, and the matter must evidently become more complicated, when the setting aside is upheld by the High Court in a revision filed before it under S.115. In fact, a more or less similar situation had arisen in Swami Premananda, and their Lordships of the Division Bench had to adopt if I may so with respect, the peculiar approach of suggesting that even the decision of the High Court (in CRP. No. 41 of 1975 involved in that case) was wholly without jurisdiction. 17. No doubt, the Madras, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Courts have been taking the view that without setting aside the first commission report, no second commission can issue. The source of all these authorities appear to be a very early decision of the Madras High Court making some observation about the "practice" of the Munsiffs of Malabar, issuing one commission after another, or even simultaneous commissions without applying their mind to the needs of the situations or the nature of their power under the relevant rule. No one can approve of such a procedure. No one can approve of such a procedure. As I had pointed out in Hydrose, to recognise a power in the court to issue a second commission, without setting aside the report of the first, is "not to hand over to the alcoholic the key of the distillery", but only "to distinguish a matter of practice from a matter of law" As Lord Reid has said, one should have regard to common sense, legal principle and public policy "in that order", in regions like the present; and "the first two criteria are unlikely to leave much scope for the application of the third". In other words one should not place matters of policy or practice at the forefront, and relegate to the background the reach and range of the language of a statute, while construing it. It is only necessary to add that even after noticing Swami Premananda a later decision of this Court in Sivaraman v. Narayanan (1986 KLT. 578) had observed that it would not be appropriate to hold that under no circumstances could a court issue a second commission, without setting aside the report of the first. Revision dismissed. No costs.