JUDGMENT S.D. AGARWALA, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of a proceeding under Section 16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. 'DELAY defeats justice' is often said; but what great disaster delay can cause to a family, is apparent from the facts of the present case. The landlord after moving an application under Section 16 of the Act died, paralytic, yearning to live in his only house in the last days. Thereafter his wife who was a heart patient also died and now the children are pursuing the application under Section 16 of the Act. They have not till now got possession of the house in dispute as they are pitted against a powerful person like the petitioner, Naubat Ram Sharma, who is the former Chairman of the Zila Parishad, Moradabad and came into unauthorised occupation of the house. Sri Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi was the original owner and landlord of the premises known as 'Kothi' situate in Civil Lines, Moradabad. This Kothi Was in possession of Sri S. K. Mittal, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, Moradabad, who was transferred from Moradabad to Lucknow. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad, by an order dated 13th May, 1975, notified the vacancy of the house in dispute because of the transfer of Sri Mittal. Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi made an application for release of the premises on 17th of May, 1975, under Section 16 (1) (b) of the Act. It appears that as soon as Naubat Ram Sharma, the petitioner, came to know that Sri S. K. Mittal has been transferred from Moradabad, he made an application for allotment of the house in dispute in his favour. On 22nd July, 1975 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad, rejected the release application of Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi and on the same day allotted the house in favour of the petitioner. Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi filed two appeals, namely, Appeal No. 238 of 1975 and Appeal No. 239 of 1975 before the District Judge challenging the order rejecting his release application and the allotment order made in favour of the petitioner. 3. IN the above mentioned appeal Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi moved an application for stay of the operation of the allotment order. The Additional District Judge granted an ad interim stay order. 3. IN the above mentioned appeal Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi moved an application for stay of the operation of the allotment order. The Additional District Judge granted an ad interim stay order. The said stay order was filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer; but, inspite of the said stay order the petitioner took possession of the house. During the pendency of these appeals Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi died. IN his place consequently the widow of Sri Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi, namely, Smt. Sarasawati Devi, was substituted and she continued to prosecute both the appeals. 4. ON 6th of May, 1976, the IV Additional District Judge, Moradabad, allowed both the appeals. The allotment order in favour of the petitioner was quashed and the matter was remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for a fresh decision in accordance with law. In the appellate order it was specifically directed by the appellate Court that the parties will be entitled to be relegated to the position at which they were before the passing of the order by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In view of this direction given by the appellate Court the widow of Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi, namely, Smt. Saraswati Devi, moved an application under Section 18 (3) of the Act and prayed that since the order of allotment has been rescended therefore the possession should be restored back before the commencement of the further proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in pursuance of the remand order passed by the appellate court. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected this application under Section 18 (3) on 21st of September, 1976. A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble K. N. Singh, J. and Hon'ble O. P. Rana, J. allowed the petition on 23rd January, 1979, quashed the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 21st September, 1976, and directed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to evict the petitioner, Naubat Ram Sharma under Section 18 (3) of the Act. 5. THE petitioner filed Special Leave Petition No. 770 of 1979 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the decision given by this Court on 23rd January, 1979 and obtained an ex parte stay order staying the disposssssion of the petitioner from the house in dispute, though the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad, were permitted to continue. 5. THE petitioner filed Special Leave Petition No. 770 of 1979 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the decision given by this Court on 23rd January, 1979 and obtained an ex parte stay order staying the disposssssion of the petitioner from the house in dispute, though the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Moradabad, were permitted to continue. This stay order was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 26th of February, 1979. As I have already stated above the appellate Court by an order dated 5th of May, 1976, had remanded the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for deciding the release application afresh. On 23rd April, 1979, the Rent Control and" Eviction Officer again dismissed the release application and allotted the premises to the petitioner. In view of this order the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the Special Leave Petition No. 1770 of 1979 with the following order:- "In view of the order dated 23-4-79 by which the premises have been allotted to the petitioner, the petition does not survive and is allowed to be withdrawn. It will, however, be open to Respondent 1, Smt. Saraswati Devi to pursue her remedies such as she may have against the order of allotment and the order rejecting her release application." 6. AGAINST the order dated 23rd April, 1979, passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting the release application and allotting the premises to the petitioner, revision was filed by Smt. Saraswati Devi, being Civil Revision No. 188 of 1979. During the pendency of the civil revision on 17th of June, 1980, Smt. Saraswati Devi also died. After the death of Smt. Saraswati Devi the sons and daughters of Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi, who are respondents no. 2 to 8 in this petition, were substituted and they pursued the revision. The revision came up for hearing before the XI Additional District Judge, Moradabad, who by his judgment dated 14th of August, 1985, allowed the revision, and set aside the order dated 23rd of April, 1979. He, further, allowed the release application and cancelled the allotment order passed in favour of the petitioner. The order dated 14th of August, 1985, was challenged in the present petition. He, further, allowed the release application and cancelled the allotment order passed in favour of the petitioner. The order dated 14th of August, 1985, was challenged in the present petition. This petition came up for admission before Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J. By an order dated 16th July, 1986, Hon'ble Anshuman Singh, J. dismissed the petition in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Husain v. 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital, 1985 AWC 1001 . The actual order passed by this Court was as follows: "Heard Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned counsel who is appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon on behalf of the respondents at considerable length. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Talib Husain v. Ist Additional District Judge, Nainital, reported in 1985 AWC 1001 this petition is dismissed. However in view of the facts of this case, it is expedient and necessary in the interest of justice that the petitioner may be allowed three weeks time to vacate the premises in dispute. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within twenty-four hours." 7. THE petitioner challenged the order passed by Anshuman Singh, J. in the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 2570 of 1986. After notice to the parties the appeal was disposed of by the following order : "Special leave granted. Heard both the parties. Mr. S. N. Kacker, appearing on behalf of the respondents makes concession that the matter may be heard on merits by the High Court and his client will not take any point before the High Court or this Court that appellants are not entitled to be heard on merits in view of the Full Bench Judgment of the High Court of Allahabad. In that view, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court dated 16th July, 1986 and remand the matter back to the High Court to be heard on merits. We are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the High Court's judgment. Since the matter is pending for a long time, it is desirable that it should be heard and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, and if possible within six months from date. We are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the High Court's judgment. Since the matter is pending for a long time, it is desirable that it should be heard and disposed of as expeditiously as possible, and if possible within six months from date. Until the High Court hears the matter or passes any order, status quo will be maintained. THE appeal is accordingly disposed of." 8. IN view of the above order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court the petition has again come up before me for hearing on merits. I have heard Shri Vijay Bahuguna for the petitioner and Shri Rajesh Tandon for the respondents. Both learned counsel have argued the petition very ably. 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that the finding recorded by the revisional Court, that the need of the respondent landlords is bonafide, is a finding vitiated in law, as it is based on irrelevant considerations. His submission is that all the heirs of Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi, the original landlord, are working outside Moradabad and, as such, the question of their need for the accommodation in dispute does not arise at all and since there can be no need, the question of holding that the need is bonafide does not arise. 10. IN order to appreciate the submission made by the learned counsel, it is necessary for me to examine the law applicable to the present case. It is not disputed that, in the present case, the application for release was made under section 16 of the Act and not under section 21. The application for release under section 16 of the Act is maintainable where the property is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant while when an application under section 21 of the Act is made, there is an existing tenant in the property. IN view of this distinction, different considerations arise while disposing of an application under sections 16 and 21 of the Act. IN view of this distinction, different considerations arise while disposing of an application under sections 16 and 21 of the Act. A release application under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act can be allowed by the District Magistrate if he is satisfied that the building or any part thereof or any land appurtenant thereto is bona fide required, either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, both for residential purposes or for other purposes. IN the Rules, so far as the application under section 16 of the Act is concerned, no guidelines have been given. The only fact on which the District Magistrate has to be satisfied is that the building is bonafide required. In so far as the applications under section 21 of the Act are concerned, two provisions are relevant. One provision is the fourth Proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act which provides that the Prescribed Authority shall take into consideration the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and, for that purposes, shall have regard to such other factors as may be prescribed. The second relevant provision, consequently, is Rule 16 which lays down the guidelines for deciding an application under section 21 of the Act. 11. IT would, consequently, be seen that so far as the applications under section 16 of the Act are concerned, there has to be no comparison of the hardship between the landlord and anybody else. The case of the landlord alone has to be considered while granting a release application. On the other hand, while considering the release application under section 21 of the Act, the case, both of the landlord and the tenant has to be considered. 12. IN Rent Control and Eviction Officer v. Dr. M. M. Laloraya, 1972 AWR 415, a Division Bench of this Court while considering the analogous provisions of the 1947 Act held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to enter into the sufficiency of the needs of the landlord while considering the application for release. This view has been followed in Jai Prakash Vashistha v. The District Judge, Meerut, 1982 ARC 257. This view has been followed in Jai Prakash Vashistha v. The District Judge, Meerut, 1982 ARC 257. In Brij Kishore Gupta v. The District Judge, Dehradun, 1985 (2) ARC 424, it has been held by a learned Single Judge of this Court as follows:- "Law is well settled that while considering the release application of the landlord under section 16 of the Act, the Authority concerned has only to look into the bonafide requirement of the landlord alone. The authority at that juncture has not to take into consideration the interest of any other prospective allottee." 13. ON an analysis of section 16 of the Act as well as the authorities, mentioned above, it is clear that the District Magistrate, while considering an application for release under section 16 of the Act, has to consider only whether the building sought to be released is bonafide required by the landlord or not. He has also not to consider as to whether the accommodation already in occupation of the landlord was sufficient for his needs or not. Every owner of a building has a right to occupy his own building and, as such, the Legislature contemplated that when the building is vacant or is likely to fall vacant and the landlord requires the said building for his bonafide need, then the said building should be released to the landlord. This is the sole consideration which has to weigh with the District Magistrate when he takes up the release applications under section 16 of the Act for consideration. 14. IN instant case, the release application was filed as far back as on 17th May, 1975, Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi was then alive, who was the original owner and landlord of the premises. He left his widow Smt. Saraswati Devi and children. The widow Smt. Saraswati Devi also died during the pendency of this litigation. The present respondent nos. 2 to 8 are the sons and daughters of Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi, who are the joint owners of the property. IN the release application, it was categorically stated by Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi that not only the property is required by him and his wife, but it is also required by bis sons and daughters. It was further stated that the property in which he alongwith his family was residing in Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad, was a very small accommodation consisting of only two rooms. It was further stated that the property in which he alongwith his family was residing in Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad, was a very small accommodation consisting of only two rooms. It is not disputed that after the death of the mother and the father of respondent nos 2 to 8, respondent nos. 2 to 8 are prosecuting the release application originally moved by their father Rameshwar Prasad Rastogi. The revisional court, after examining the evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the respondent nos. 2 to 8 bonafide required the accommodation in dispute. The revisional court has clearly held that the release application has been filed by the landlord of the house, situate in Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad, which is in occupation of respondent nos. 2 to 8 and further that the house is required by respondent nos. 2 to 8 so that they may be able to assemble together and utilise the building in dispute as the family property. IN my opinion, the finding recorded by the revisional court cannot be said to be based on irrelevant considerations. The joint and undivided family is the normal condition of Hindu Society. All the members of the family are brought up by the parents imparting the concept that they should live together and should so conduct themselves that they and their children meet each other, live together so that the family ties continue to bind themselves. In fact the basic idea is always to have one family dwelling house which should normally be the nucleus of all activities. This concept even finds expression to a certain extent in section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act where limitations have been placed on the right of female heirs to claim partition of a dwelling house. 15. JUDICIAL notice can be taken of the fact that persons posted outside their home town often require at the time of transfer or at the time of marriage and for holding other family functions a common dwelling house. It is necessary to send the children for education to the home town in order to avoid disturbance in studies affecting their career. It is necessary to send the children for education to the home town in order to avoid disturbance in studies affecting their career. In any case after retirement a person invariably requires a permanent home for living which in most of the cases is the family dwelling house where male members of the family are in the Defence Services and they are posted at non-family stations then accommodation is required for the residence of their wives and children. Similarly where a female member is married to a person in defence services she requires accommodation for herself and children for residence when her husband is posted at a non-family station. It cannot therefore be said that merely because the members of the family are posted outside they do not require their own building and they can never have bonafide need of their building in home town. 16. IN so far as the house in occupation of respondent nos. 2 to 8 is concerned, a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed in this Court along with which a judgment dated 7th February, 1987, has been attached by virtue of which the release application filed by the landlords of the house situate in Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad, has been allowed. The result would be that the respondents will now be evicted from the house in Mohalla Jilal, Moradabad, where their father, mother and now they are residing. This house now will not be available to the respondent nos. 2 to 8 for their occupation. As it is, it is too short an accommodation for respondent nos. 2 to 8. In view of the above I am of the opinion that the finding recorded in regard to bonafide need cannot be said to be based on irrelevant considerations. 17. IT is also necessary for me to mention that the finding recorded by the Revisional Court, that the need of the landlord is bonafide, is clearly a finding of fact. In P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court can interfere with the decision of the lower court if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. In P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court can interfere with the decision of the lower court if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the High Court cannot re-assess the value of the evidence and interfere with the finding of fact merely because it thinks that the appreciation of evidence by the lower court is wrong, and the lower court should have reached a different conclusion of fact from which it did. In other words, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the lower appellate Court. This case was also in regard to the dispute between the landlord and the tenant and it was held that the landlord bonafide required the accommodation in dispute. 18. I do not find that the revisional court has committed any mistake of law or that there is any miscarriage of justice. In the circumstances, the finding of fact recorded by the revisional court cannot be interfered with. In the result, the petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The District Magistrate is directed to forthwith evict the petitioner under section 18 (3) of the Act and put respondents 2 to 8 in possession of the premises in dispute. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.