JUDGMENT Dr. GF. Couto, J. - The appellant herein bas been charged of an offence under section 436 I.P.C. on the ground that on 21st March, 1986 at about midnight, be set fire to the dwelling house of the complainant Seeta Tukaram Gadkar causing her a loss of about Rs. 5.000/-. 2. The prosecution case has been that the appellant has been living with the complainant Seeta for a few years, although he was not married to her. About one and half years prior to the incident, Seeta stopped her illicit relations with the appellant and caused him to leave her house. This gave cause to strained relations and from time to time, the appellant was going to the house of Seeta and assaulting her. On the day of the incident, at about 6 p.m., the appellant saw Seeta in the house of P.W. 7 Vaman Morajkar and soon after she left the house of P.W. 7 he followed her. Once she reached her residence at Raja, the appellant assaulted her and threatened to set fire to the house. On the same night, at about midnight, the house of the complainant was set on fire and the accused was seen on the spot. 3. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, his case being that he is innocent and that the complainant has deliberately set fire to her own house in order to cause him to return to live with her. It is further his case that he and Seeta had been living as husband and wife for 10 to 12 years and one and half years prior to the incident, they had started to live separately because Seeta had an affair with another man. 4. The learned trial Judge by his judgment dated 15th July, 1986, held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under section 436 I.P.C. and in his judgment which was continued and delivered on 18th July, 1980, sentenced the appellant to undergo one year of R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default, to undergo a further period of three months of R.I. It against this conviction and sentence that the present appeal was filed. 5. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the incident and the prosecution case rested exclusively on circumstantial evidence. 1,000/- and in default, to undergo a further period of three months of R.I. It against this conviction and sentence that the present appeal was filed. 5. Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the incident and the prosecution case rested exclusively on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, it will be useful to make a reference to the law laid down in that respect by the Supreme Court in Hanumant Govind Narqundkar Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh1. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in cases where the evidence is of circumstantial nature, the circumstance from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Further, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis, but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The same view was reiterated in Abdul Ghani v. State of U.P.2 It was observed that for the purpose of sustaining a conviction in cases of circumstantial evidence, the circumstance established on the record according to the law of evidence must be consistent only with the guilt of the accused and. wholly inconsistent with his innocence. The chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be complete and leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with his innocence. 6. Bearing in mind the above position of the law it is necessary to see whether in the case at hand the prosecution has proved circumstances, which are consistent only with the guilt of the accused and exclude his innocence. 6. Bearing in mind the above position of the law it is necessary to see whether in the case at hand the prosecution has proved circumstances, which are consistent only with the guilt of the accused and exclude his innocence. The prosecution has mainly relied on the following circumstances: (a) that the appellant and complainant were having illicit relations and had been living for some years as husband and wife; (b) that about one and half years prior to the incident of setting fire, the relations between the appellant and the complainant were strained and, as a result of it, the appellant left the house of the complainant and started living separately; (c) that inspite of this the appellant used to occasionally go to the house of the complainant and on such occasions to have guarrels followed by assaults on the person of the complainant; (d) that the appellant had been threatening to teach the complainant a lesson by setting fire to her house; (e) that on the day of the incident, he was in the house of Vaman Morajkar, P.W. 7 and that the complainant went to the house of the said Vaman on a condo lence visit. On such occasion, the appellant saw the complainant and soon after she left the house of Morajkar the followed her on cycle saying that he would teach a lesson to the complainant and he would set fire to her hut; (f) that the appellant was seen near the house of the complainant on the same evening even before the complainant had reached her place. He inquired with the neighbours whether she bad come back; (g) that after the complainant returned the appellant entered her house, assaulted and abused her and further threatened to set fire to the house. Thereafter, he left the house; (h) that he returned to Seraulim and to the house of P.W. 7 where he had a light meal. After that be left on his cycle; (i) that at about midnight, the witness Shobha saw that the house of the complainant was on fire and she shouted for help and also called the complaint by her name. The complainant was at that time, in the house of the witness Parvati, who is a neighbour; and (j) that when the complainant and Shobha came out they saw the house being gutted by fire and the appellant nearby. The complainant was at that time, in the house of the witness Parvati, who is a neighbour; and (j) that when the complainant and Shobha came out they saw the house being gutted by fire and the appellant nearby. The night was a moonlit night and, in addition, the complainant flashed a torch on the appellant. 7. In order to prove these circumstances, the prosecution examined nine witnesses. However, it is not necessary to go through the evidence of all these witnesses, for it suffices to advert to the evidence of the complainant, of the witness Shobha and the witness Vaman Morajkar, as well as of the witness Panch Raya Naik. The complainant Seeta narrated that she was married, but' about five to six years prior to the incident, her bus band bad left her and thereafter, she had been living with the appellant. On the day of the incident, she left for Seraulim on a condolence visit to Vaman Morjakar, who happens to be a son of her husband's sister. When she went there, she saw the appellant in the house of Vaman, she left the house and when she retuned to Manora she saw the cycle of the accused in the neighborhood. She was informed that the accused bad been asking the neighbours whether she had returned. Soon after, the accused entered the house and assaulted her with kicks on the abdomen, abused her with bad words and further threatened to set the house on fire. She did not sleep in her house but went to sleep in the house of Visbram, the husband of the witness Parvati. At about midnight, she heard Shobha Redkar calling her and saying that her house was on fire. She ran out of the house, saw her house burning and also the accused running towards the Margao side. There was moonlight and in addition, she flashed a torch on the accused. She said that she suffered damages to the tune of Rs. 5000/-. In the cross-examination, it was not even put to the witness that the appellant had not threatened her to set the house on fire, as well as that be had been assaulting her on the evening of the incident. She said that she suffered damages to the tune of Rs. 5000/-. In the cross-examination, it was not even put to the witness that the appellant had not threatened her to set the house on fire, as well as that be had been assaulting her on the evening of the incident. In her turn, Shobha Redkar stated that at about 7 p.m., she had seen the appellant quarrelling with the complainant, abusing her with bad words and threatening to set the house on fire. She further stated that at about midnight, she aw a fire outside her house and towards the house of the complainant. She came out and seeing that the house of the complainant Seeta was on fire, she shouted for help by calling the name of the complainant. She also saw the accused running away towards Margao. In cross-examination, she further stated that at about 6 p.m. the accused had abused her because she asked what he was doing in the place. She also stated that she recognized the appellant when the house was on fire. Curiously enough, the appellant has not suggested to the witness that be bas not given threats to the complainant to set her house on fire, nor he suggested that he did not assault her on that occasion. Now. P.W. 7, Vaman Morajkar corroborated that the complainant had come to his house to pay a condolence visit and on that occasion, the appellant was in his house. He further stated that soon after the complainant left the house, the accused left the house on his cycle saying that he would teach a lesson to Seeta by setting her house on fire. He also stated that after sometime at about 8 p.m. the accused returned to his house, had a light meal and again left, the house. Then, he came back to the house of Yaman at about 4 to 4.30 a.m. and asked, for some water. This evidence was not at all shaken in cross-examination and therefore is to be accepted. The evidence of the Panch witness Raya Naik proves that the house of the complainant was destroyed by fire. 8. The above evidence clearly links the appellant with the destruction of the house of the complainant by fire. This evidence was not at all shaken in cross-examination and therefore is to be accepted. The evidence of the Panch witness Raya Naik proves that the house of the complainant was destroyed by fire. 8. The above evidence clearly links the appellant with the destruction of the house of the complainant by fire. In fact, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that there were illicit relations between the complainant and the appellant and that they had been living as husband and wife for a period of few years. About one and a half year prior to the incident, however, the relations between the appellant and the complainant got strained and as a result of that, the appellant left the house where he was living with the complainant. Despite this, the appellant from time to time accused to come to the house of the complainant and on such occasions he used to abuse, assault and threaten her. It is the case of the appellant that his separation from the complainant was motivated by another illicit affair that the complainant started with another man. Whatever are the reasons, the fact remains that the relations of the appellant and the complainant were strained in the last about one and a half year prior to the incident and these strained relations gave cause to abuses, assaults and threats. Then, the prosecution established that many times the appellant has threatened to teach a lesson to the complainant by setting fire to her house. Finally, on the very day of the incident, the appellant left the house of Vaman Morajkar soon after the complainant left it. Before leaving the house of the said Vaman, the appellant stated that he would teach a lesson to the complainant and be would set fire to her house. Then, he proceeded to Manora to the residence of the complainant Seeta. He assaulted and abused her and in addition, made threats that he would set fire to the house. Finally, on the same night, at about midnight the house was set on fire and the appellant was seen close to the house. All these facts go to show that due to the strained relations, perhaps, out of jealousy and bitterness, the appellant had decided to teach a lesson to the complainant and this lesson was by setting fire to the house. All these facts go to show that due to the strained relations, perhaps, out of jealousy and bitterness, the appellant had decided to teach a lesson to the complainant and this lesson was by setting fire to the house. It is clear that the appellant had already made up his mind to destroy the house by fire, since each and every time, he was threating to teach a lesson by setting fire to the complainant's house. Therefore, in my view, the circumstances, which the prosecution proved against the appellant, are only consistent with his guilt and are inconsistent with his innocence. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant was fully justified. It is true that Miss Dourado, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant under the Legal Aid Scheme, relying on the decision of the Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 9/86 decided on 12th September, 1986 contended that on similar facts this Court has held that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to justify the conviction. I am afraid that the said submission of the learned counsel is not well founded. The decision in the said Criminal Appeal No. 9/86 is based exclusively on the facts and circumstances of that case, which were not establishing the guilt of the appellant. The learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Abdul Ghani's cases (supra) and applying the principles laid down therein, recorded a finding that in that case the circumstances proved by the prosecution were not only consistent with the guilt of the accused, nor they were excluding his innocence. This being so, it is obvious that the said decision is an authority only for the case before the Court and cannot be applied to other cases. 9. The result is that this appeal therefore fails and is, consequently, dismissed. 1. AIR 1952 SC 343 . 2. AIR 1913 SC 264.