A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IS there any right to carry on business or trade in unregulated manner and cause nuisance to the public and also become a health hazard to the society at large ? If no can the petitioners claim any right to be heard before they are asked to discontinue or prevent the nuisance ? This in substance is the question which needs to be examined in this group of petitions. In these four petitions in all 165 petitioners who are conducting the business of dyeing and printing works at different places in the City of Rajkot challenge the notice issued by the respondent-Municipal Commissioner which is produced at annexure-A to the petitions. The notice is issued under sec. 376-A of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 In this notice it is stated that at the place mentioned therein the petitioners are discharging dirty water from the factory on public road/public drainage without purifying the same thereby causing damage to the public health. Moreover it is stated that on 11/11/1986 when the place was visited by the Commi- ssioner himself it was found that by discharging dirty water nuisance was being created. Hence each petitioner has been called upon to prevent the discharge of dirty water without the same being purified within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice and they are also directed to inform the Commissioner regarding compliance. It is further stated that if there is failure to comply with the notice under the powers conferred upon the Municipal Commissioner he shall have to take steps to close the factory with a view to prevent the illegal discharge of dirty water. ( 2 ) THE petitioners contended that they are carrying on the business for last about 20 to 25 years and the industry is providing employment to twenty to thirty thousand families; the proposed action as stated in the notice will have harsh consequences and the petitioners may have to close down their business. Having regard to the very harsh consequence it is submitted that before issuing the notice the respondent-Municipal Commissioner ought to have afforded an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another AIR 1978 SC 597 . Having regard to the very harsh consequence it is submitted that before issuing the notice the respondent-Municipal Commissioner ought to have afforded an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another AIR 1978 SC 597 . The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court occurring in para 32 of the judgment:it is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual which affects the rights of that individual the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the proposed action will have evil consequences inasmuch as the closing down of the factories will adversely affect the petitioners; they will have to close down their business and their right to carry on the business will be adversely affected. Similarly very harsh consequences will follow and therefore the notice annexure-A which has been issued without affording an opportunity of being heard should be held to be illegal and void. ( 3 ) THE aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court will be available to the petitioners only if the petitioners can show that they have a right to carry on the business even in the manner so as to cause nuisance and if the carrying on of the business in the same manner is a health- hazard to the public at large they have unfettered and unregulated right to carry on this business. In the aforesaid paragraph of the judgment of the Supreme Court the underlined part of the sentence which affects the rights of that individual is very important. Before the aforesaid principle laid down by the Supreme Court is made applicable one has to establish his right to carry on business in the manner which is objected to by the respondent-Municipal Commissioner. ( 4 ) IN the aforesaid background the relevant provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) may be examined. Section 2 (40) defines nuisance. ( 4 ) IN the aforesaid background the relevant provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) may be examined. Section 2 (40) defines nuisance. It includes any act omission place or thing which causes or is likely to cause injury danger annoyance or offence to the sense of sight small or hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or property. Thus the definition of nuisance is very wide and certainly the discharge of effluent by the factories on public road and in the public drainage system of the Corporation without the same being purified would he covered within the meaning of nuisance as defined in the Act. Section 376 of the Act occurs in Part 11 of Chapter XXII which deals with trade licence and other licences for keeping animals and certain articles. The relevant portion of sec. 376 reads as follows:376 (1) Except under and in conformity with the terms and condition of a licence granted by the Commissioner no person shall (a) x x x x (b) x x x x (c) x x x x (d) carry on or allow to be carried on in or upon any premises (i) any of the trades or operations connected with any trade specified in the rules; (ii) any trade or operation which in the opinion of the Commissioner is dangerous to life or health or property or likely to create a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which the conditions under which the same is or is proposed to be carried on; (e) x x x x x (2) A person shall be deemed to have known that a trade or operation is in the opinion of the Commissioner dangerous or likely to create a nuisance within the meaning of paragraph (ii) of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) after written notice to the effect signed by the Commissioner has been served on such person or affixed to the premises to which it relates. (3) A person shall be deemed to carry on or to allow to be carried on a trade or operation within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) after written notice to the effect signed by the Commissioner has been served on such person or affixed to the premises to which it relates. (3) A person shall be deemed to carry on or to allow to be carried on a trade or operation within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) if he does any act in furtherance of such trade or is in any W8y engaged or concerned therein whether as principal agent clerk master servant workman handicraftsman or otherwise. (4) When any premises are used in the manner described in clause (c) or (d) of sub-sec. (1) it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that the owner or occupier of such premises or both the owner and occupier have permitted such use. Rest of the provisions of the section is not material for our purpose. The provisions of sub-sec. (1) aims at regulating the carrying on of business by any person. As provided in this part of the section no person shall carry on any trade or operation which in the opinion of the Commissioner is dangerous to life or health or property or is likely to create a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which or the conditions under which the same is or is proposed to be carried on. Sub-section (2) creates a deeming fiction that whenever the Commissioner serves upon a person concerned a written notice that person shall be deemed to have known that the trade or operation is in the opinion of the Commissioner dangerous or likely to create nuisance as provided in the section. Similarly sub-sec. (3) also creates a deeming fiction to the effect that the person concerned shall be deemed to carry on or allow to be carried on a trade or operation within the meaning of clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) if he does any act in furtherance to such trade or is in any way engaged or concerned therein in any capacity either as principal agent clerk master servant workman handicraftsman or otherwise. Sub-section (4) is very important. It creates a statutory presumption to the effect that unless contrary is proved the owner and occupier of such premises or both of them have permitted such user of the premises. ( 5 ) IN the aforesaid statutory background the provisions of sec. Sub-section (4) is very important. It creates a statutory presumption to the effect that unless contrary is proved the owner and occupier of such premises or both of them have permitted such user of the premises. ( 5 ) IN the aforesaid statutory background the provisions of sec. 376-A under which the impugned notice has been issued by the respondent- Municipal Commissioner are required to be seen. Section 376-A reads as follows:376 Where the Commissioner is of opinion that the use of any premises for any of the purposes specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 376 dangerous to life health or property or is causing a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which or the conditions under which the use is made and such danger or nuisance should be immediately stopped. the commissioner may notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 376 require the owner or occupier of the premises to stop such danger or nuisance within such time specified in such requisition as the Commissioner considers reasonable and in the event of the failure of the owner or occupier to comply with such requisition the Commissioner may himself or by an officer subordinate to him cause such use to be stopped. The language of the section is plain and unambiguous. The exercise of power conferred depends upon subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner. The impugned notice clearly indicates that the Commis- sioner has formed an opinion that from the premises of the petitioners concerned dirty water is being discharged on public road and/or public drainage system without purifying the same and it is dangerous to health. It also indicates that on a particular day when the place was visited by the Commissioner the dirty water was being discharged and it did create nuisance. Therefore the Commissioner has called upon the petitioners to prevent within seven days of the receipt of the notice the discharge of dirty water on public road or in the public drainage system without purifying the same failing which the user of the premises may have to be stopped. ( 6 ) IN the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions can it be said that the petitioners have a right to carry on the business so as to cause nuisance and be a health hazard to the public at large ? ( 6 ) IN the background of the aforesaid statutory provisions can it be said that the petitioners have a right to carry on the business so as to cause nuisance and be a health hazard to the public at large ? Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution confers right upon every citizen to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business. But this fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions which may be placed in the interest of the general public as provided for in sub-clause (6) of Art. 19 itself. No one has a right to carry on business so as to cause nuisance to the society. One cannot carry on the business in the manner by which the business activity becomes a health hazard to the entire society. The fundamental right to carry on trade or business is subject to reasonable restrictions and regulations that may be placed in the interest of the general public. ( 7 ) IT may also be noted that by discharge of effluent water on public road and/or in the public drainage system the entire environment of the locality gets polluted. The provisions regarding fundamental duties of the citizens contained in Art. 51a (g) of the Constitution enjoins upon all the citizens to protect and improve the natural environment. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the petitioners would be protecting the natural environment by discharging the effluent from the factory on public road and/or public drainage system. By the impugned notice the respondent-Municipal Commissioner has simply reminded the petitioners of their fundamental duty. The petitioners cannot assert their right muchless fundamental right to carry on business without any regard to the fundamental duty. In a complex society in which we live today no one can claim absolute freedom without incurring any obligation whatsoever for the general wealbeing. By the impugned notice the respondent-Municipal Commissioner has simply reminded the petitioners of their fundamental duty. The petitioners cannot assert their right muchless fundamental right to carry on business without any regard to the fundamental duty. In a complex society in which we live today no one can claim absolute freedom without incurring any obligation whatsoever for the general wealbeing. The Art. 51-A regarding fundamental duties of citizens has been inserted in the Constitution by Forty Second Amendment and it has come into force with effect from 3/01/1977 Even in absence of the provisions with regard to fundamental duty as enshrined in Art. 51 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has held that such restric- tions placed on the fundamental right to carry on trade or business are in the interest of the general public and constitutionally valid and no citizen can claim absolute right to carry on business without complying with the restrictions placed in this behalf ( 8 ) REFERENCE may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T. B. Ibrahim v. The Regional Transport Authority reported in AIR 1953 SC 79 . In that case the petitioner claimed his right to have a bus-stand at a particular place which he was Using for last many years. The Regional Transport Authority) for the convenience of the travelling public resolved to alter the starting places and termini of all public vehicles and the existing bus-stand owned by the petitioner was ordered to be discontinued. This action of the Regional Transport Authority was challenged by the petitioner. In para 13 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:there is no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business wherever he chooses and his right must be subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by the a executive authority in the interest of public convenience The restriction may have the effect of eliminating the use to which the stand has been put hitherto but the restriction cannot be regarded as being unreasonable if the authority imposing such restriction had the power to do so. Whether the abolition of the stand was conducive to public convenience or not is a matter entirely for the Transport Authority to Judge and it is not open to the Court to substitute its own opinion for the Opinion of the Authority which is in the best position having regard to its knowledge of local conditions to appraise the situation. ( 9 ) IN the case of Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner Ajmer and Others reported in AIR 1954 SC 220 in para 7 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:the right of every citizen to pursue any lawful trade of business is obviously subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safely health case order and morals of the community some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit some by the odours they engender and same by the dangers accompanying them require regulations as to the locality in which they may be conducted. Some by the dangerous character of the article used manufactured or sold require also special qualifications in the parties permitted to use manufacture sell them. ( 10 ) IN the case of State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao and Others AIR 1970 SC 1157 the question with regard to right to carry on business in carcass arose and certain provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporations Act (3 of 1888) (as amended by Act 14 of 1961) came up for consideration. In para 12 of the judgment it is inter alia observed that under the Constitution a proper balance is intended to be maintained between the exercise of the right conferred by Arts. 19 and (g) and the interests of a citizen in the exercise of his right to acquire hold or dispose of his property or to carry on occupa- tion trade or business. In striking that balance the danger which may be inherent in permitting unfettered exercise of right in a commodity must of necessity influence the determination of the restrictions which may be placed upon the right of the citizen to the commodity. In striking that balance the danger which may be inherent in permitting unfettered exercise of right in a commodity must of necessity influence the determination of the restrictions which may be placed upon the right of the citizen to the commodity. It is further observed that the law which compels removal to the appointed place and disposal of the carcass under the supervision of the Cor- poration to which is entrusted the power and duty to take steps to maintain the public health cannot also be regarded as arbitrary or excessive merely because the enforcement of the law involves some pecuniary loss to the citizen. ( 11 ) IN the aforesaid background it may be recalled that sec. 63 of the Act marks it incumbent upon the Corporation to make reasonable and adequate provisions by any means or measures which it is lawfully competent to it to use or to take for certain matters which inter alia include-watering scavenging and cleansing of all public streets and places in the city and the removal of all sweepings therefrom;- the collection removal treatment and disposal of sewage offensive matter and cleansing of drains and drainage works;- he regulation and abate- ment of offensive and dangerous trades or practices (See secs. 63 (2) (3) (4) and (10) of the Act ). By issuing the impugned notice the respondent-Municipal Commissioner has acted within his power. He has tried to do something which is the obligatory duty of the Corporation. The Act empowers the Corporation to make reasonable and adequate provisions by any means or measures to regulate and abate offensive and dangerous trade or practice. Therefore if the respondent-Municipal Commissioner has issued notice under the provisions of sec. 376-A so as to perform the obligatory functions of the Municipal Corporation as provided under sec. 63 of the Act the same cannot be held to be in any way illegal or void. The petitioners have failed to show any right whatsoever to carry on the business without complying with the restric- tions and regulations as contemplated under the provisions of secs. 376 and 376-A of the Act. ( 12 ) BY the impugned notice the respective owner or occupier of the premises has been told to abate the nuisance. A reasonable time has been given to each of the petitioners. 376 and 376-A of the Act. ( 12 ) BY the impugned notice the respective owner or occupier of the premises has been told to abate the nuisance. A reasonable time has been given to each of the petitioners. Within the time mentioned in the notice if the owner or occupier of the premise does not abate the nuisance and does not prevent causing of nuisance the health-hazard to the public cannot be allowed to continue. By issuing this notice no right whatsoever of the petitioners has been affected by the respondent Municipal Commissioner. By the impugned notice all that the petitioners are told is that regulate your business do not cause nuisance if you continue to cause nuisance the measures so as to prevent the nuisance will be taken. If the petitioners do not cause nuisance or they have prevented to cause nuisance within the period mentioned in the notice they need not fear. If they have not complied with the requisition made in the notice the consequences may follow. In that situation the petitioners cannot claim any right to carry on business so as to cause nuisance to the public at large. ( 13 ) THE contention that the petitioners are carrying on business for last about 20 to 30 years has also no merit. If the petitioners wish to carry on the business they may have to incur expenditure and they must provide for purification-plant before discharging the effluent water on public road or in the public drainage system. This is the minimum requirement for carrying on the business which they must comply with. If they have to incur expenditure for the purification plant the same be considered as part of the cost of the business The petitioners cannot be allowed to reap profit at the cost of the public health. This is the mandate of the law. This is what the Commissioner has proposed to do by serving the impugned notice upon the petitioners. ( 14 ) THE only ground urged before me is that the notice has been issued without affording an opportunity of being heard and therefore it is violative of the principles of natural justice. As shown hereinabove the petitioners have not been able to show that they have any right muchless a fundamental right to carry on their business without complying with the requirement of the law. As shown hereinabove the petitioners have not been able to show that they have any right muchless a fundamental right to carry on their business without complying with the requirement of the law. Hence there is no substance in this contention. No other contention is raised. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent Municipal Commis- sioner has pointed out from the affidavit-in-reply filed in Special Civil Application No. 6203 of 1986 that four petitioners namely (1) Abhilash Textile (2) Vimal Printers (3) Shri Shanker Dyeing and Printers (4) Shri Kanjibhai Laxamanbhai Bhuva had given undertaking before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Rajkot that they will make necessary arrangements to install waste-water treatment plant in their factory premises. Even so they have not complied with this undertaking. This assertion made by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Municipal Commissioner is controverted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. According to him the undertaking given by the respective petitioners has been complied with. Be that as it may. For the purpose of determination of the sole contention raised in this petition regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice this controversy is not very much material. ( 16 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case it is hoped that before taking any coercive steps the respondent Municipal Commissioner will give some more time to the petitioners to mend their ways and prevent the nuisance. This observation is made with a view to see that several workmen employed by the numerous factories may not be rendered unemployed on account of the fact that the petitioners are carrying on their business in unregulated manner. Subject to the aforesaid observations the petitions are rejected. Notice discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated in such petition. (The rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports ) rule discharged. .