JUDGMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—Surinder Singh Sibia and his wife (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 respectively) have filed this revision petition in this Court against the High Court of Himachal Pradesh through its Registrar under section 397 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the order of the District Magistrate, Simla, dated June 25, 1987, in proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The facts alleged by the High Court while initiating the proceedings before the learned District Magistrate are that the premises consisting of main residential building, garage, servant quarters and open court-yard and lawns known as Kenilworth described in para-1 of the petition were requisitioned in favour of the High Court by the competent authority under the Himachal Pradesh Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), vide its order, dated July 30, 1979 and on the same date the physical possecsion thereof was handed over by the Tehsildar concerned to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh through its Registrar. These premises were subsequently declared as official residence of the Judge under section 22-A of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, and was occupied by Shri T. R. Handa who at that time was additional Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and thereafter the High Court started pacing the rent as assessed in respect of the said premises to the tune of Rs. 1799.75 p. per month. the petitioner No. 1 was a consenting party to this all. 3. Shri T. R. Handa, continued in occupation of the said premises till his retirement. Although Shri Handa retired on and with effect from February 28, 19b7, however, he was entitled to continue in occupation of the said premises by virtue of Rule-2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956, till March 31, 1987. He did continue to occupy the said premises even after the date of retirement. The rent in respect of the said premises was paid by the High Court till March 31, 1987 as usual. He did continue to occupy the said premises even after the date of retirement. The rent in respect of the said premises was paid by the High Court till March 31, 1987 as usual. On March 24, 1987 when Shri Handa was still in occupation of these premises, the Registrar of the High Court addressed a letter to him requesting him that as and when he vacates the premises in question, the possession thereof be delivered to the Registrar of the High Court through his agent, the Court Officer, which letter was delivered to Shri Handa on March 25, 1987 and in fact a copy thereof was also delivered to petitioner No. 2 on behalf of her husband, petitioner No. 1, the owner of the said premises on the same day. Shri Handa vacated the said premises on March 25, 1987 and simultaneously with this vacation the High Court entered into physical possession of the said premises when the premises were locked both at the main gate and the main entrance of the building in token of having taken the actual possession of the premises. The furniture, fixtures, Sittings electrical appliances, and telephone etc. belonging to the High Court were still lying in the said premises at the time of the taking over of this possession on behalf of the High Court. 4. The furniture, fixtures, Sittings electrical appliances, and telephone etc. belonging to the High Court were still lying in the said premises at the time of the taking over of this possession on behalf of the High Court. 4. It was the further case of the High Court that thereafter since the petitioners started frequenting the said premises and threatening forcible dispossession of the High Court from the said premises and thus to take the law into their own hands for which purpose they had even hired other persons to prevent the employees of the High Court from entering the premises in question, there was an imminent likelihood of breach of peace and hence the petition with a prayer to the Court to :— (a) initiate proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, against the petitioners; (b) hold the High Court to be in physical possession of the premises in question and its entitlement to remain in such possession till vacated therefrom in due course of law ; (c) forbid the petitioners to cause any disturbance of their possession ; and, (d) alternatively, in case the High Court is found to have been wrongly and forcibly dispossessed from the premises to declare the High Court to be in lawful and actual possession and restore the actual possession to it. There was also a prayer that since the case was of emergency the premises in question be attached to vouchsafe against imminent breach of peace. 5. This petition was filed on behalf of the High Court on March 33, 1987 and on that very day the learned District Magistrate passed an order that in view of the averments in the petition of the High Court, he was satisfied that a dispute interse the parties existed which was likely to cause breach of Pease, qua the possession of premises in question and he, there fore, ordered that the parties should attend his Court in person or through their pleaders on April 10, 1987 and put in written statements of their respective claims with respect to the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. 6. 6. On the very next day the petitioner No. 2 filed an application under section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before the learned District Magistrate wherein it was averred that the petitioners were in actual possession of the premises in question which possession was delivered onto them by Sh. T. R. Handa when he vacated the same on March 25, 1987 and that in these circumstances no order under section \¥ of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the attachment of the property be issued without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to contest the claim of the High Court in this behalf and that meanwhile a local enquiry be ordered by the appointment of a Local Commissioner to ascertain the actual facts on the spot with regard to the possession. 7. Then on the same day another application was moved by the learned Counsel for the petitioners before the same Court wherein it was also additionally pleaded that petitioner No. 1 had gone to Delhi to move the Honble Supreme Court of India for obtaining appropriate reliefs qua these very proceedings and, therefore, no ex-parte orders be passed against the petitioners qua the premises in question under section 146 of the Criminals Procedure Code. 8. The petitioners did not file their written statement on April 10, 1987 as directed by the District Magistrate in the preliminary order. They rather on that day moved an application to the effect that since the petitioners have moved the Honble Supreme Court for transfer of the proceedings, the same be adjourned at least for three weeks. On the same day a counter was filed on behalf of the High Court to the application of the petitioners under Sec. 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code denying the assertion of the petitioners that they were lawfully in possession of the premises in question and it was further averred on behalf of the High Court that after its agents and servants had taken the possession of the premises on vacation thereof by Sh. T. R. Handa on March 25, 1987 and locked the main entrance and the gate of the premises, the petitioners and their hired persons, sometime thereafter, broke open those lock which not only showed that the petitioners were bent upon taking forcible possession of the premises in question but also that there was imminent danger of breach of peace. 9. T. R. Handa on March 25, 1987 and locked the main entrance and the gate of the premises, the petitioners and their hired persons, sometime thereafter, broke open those lock which not only showed that the petitioners were bent upon taking forcible possession of the premises in question but also that there was imminent danger of breach of peace. 9. The learned District Magistrate adjourned the proceedings as requested by the petitioners vide application, dated April 10, 1987, to April 18, 1987 on which date the petitioners filed their claim in respect of the fact of actual possession qua the premises in question. In the said written petition the petitioners admitted that the premises in question were requisitioned under the Act vide order, dated July 30, 1979 However, according to them, the premises were not requisitioned for all time to come but only fora limited purpose and duration, that is, for the residence of Honble Mr. Justice T. R. Handa when he was appointed as an additional Judge of the High Court during his tenure as such and in fact he has already in occupation of part of the premises as a tenant under the petitioner No. 1 at the time of this requisition It was further asserted that the Deputy Com missioner, Simla, vide order, dated November 28, 1983. had enhanced the compensation/rent payable qua the said premises from 1799 75 to Rs. 3,600 per month and when the State Government failed to make payment at the revised rates, the petitioner No. 1 filed a Civil Writ Petition No. 198 of 1985 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Simla an April 3, 1985 wherein it was prayed that the State be directed to appoint an Arbitrator in accordance with section 10-B of the Act for determination of the amount of compensation payable to the petitioner No. I qua the premises in question and with further direction that till the final decision of the Arbitrator, the petitioner be paid compensation qua the said premises at the rate of Rs. 3,600 per month. The State of Himachal Pradesh in the Writ Petition then took up the plea that no such relief could be afforded to the petitioner No. 1 since the Act was no longer in force and had lapsed with the efflux of time. 3,600 per month. The State of Himachal Pradesh in the Writ Petition then took up the plea that no such relief could be afforded to the petitioner No. 1 since the Act was no longer in force and had lapsed with the efflux of time. In these circumstances, according to the petitioners, the occupation of the premises in question by Shri T. R Handa was an unauthorised one and no better than that of a trespasser. However, the petitioners allowed Shri Handa to continue in the premises in question till his retirement as Shri Handa had promised to handover the vacant possession of the premises in question to the petitioners on his retirement. Thereafter, according to the petitioners, Shri Handa on March 24, 1987, sent a message to petitioner No. 1 who was at that time at Jind in the State of Haryana, that he was vacating . the premises in question on March 25, 1987 and that petitioner No. I should come immediately to take the possession thereof from him. Petitioner No. 1 then rushed back to Simla on March 25, 1987, took the possession of the premises in question from Shri Handa when the latter also handed over a note in his own writing in this behalf to the petitioner No. I. It was admitted that the furniture and other fittings and fixtures etc. of the High Court were lying in the premises at that time but asserted that Shri Handa, after preparing the inventory thereof, had in the same note asked the petitioner No. 1 to handover the same to the High Court on demand. The petitioner No. 1 also admitted that the compensation/rent in respect of the premises had been paid till March 31, 1987 by the High Court but asserted that this was without his knowledge or consent and that when he came to know of it, a part of this amount which was in excess beyond March 25, 1V87 to the tune of Rs. 406-40 was sent back by him to the High Court. They (petitioners) denied that the High Court through its officials/ officers/agents had taken the actual possession of the premises in question when Shri Handa vacated the same on March 25, 1987 or the premises were locked by them or that they (petitioners) or their agents broke open those locks. 10. 406-40 was sent back by him to the High Court. They (petitioners) denied that the High Court through its officials/ officers/agents had taken the actual possession of the premises in question when Shri Handa vacated the same on March 25, 1987 or the premises were locked by them or that they (petitioners) or their agents broke open those locks. 10. In the rejoinder filed on behalf of the High Court it was denied that the premises in question were requisitioned merely for the purpose of its occupation by Shri Handa as a Judge of the High Court It was rather asserted that these premises were requisitioned by the Government and placed in the possession of the High Court for the purposes of its being used as residence of the Judges of the High Court and thus the premises remained in possession of the High Court through Shri Handa and it also allotted some other accommodation to its subordinate staff through Shri Handa in the out-houses attached to the maim building 11. It was admitted that petitioner No. 1 had filed a writ petition in the High Court claiming enhancement of the rent and appointment of an Arbitrator under the Act, which was opposed by the State on the ground that the Act had lapsed. It was however, denied that due to the fact that the Act had lapsed the possession of High Court or of Shri Handa through it had become unauthorised or illegal and was asserted that even in theses circumstances the High Court could only be evicted from the said premises through a due process of law and the petitioners had no right to take possession of the premises in the manner they had done, that is, of taxing forcible possession of the said premises by resorting to illegal means which did cause apprehension of breach of peace, 12. The learned District Magistrate thereafter heard the arguments of both the sides and passed the impugned order wherein he held that since the requisition of the premises in question had taken place on the motion of the High Court and the High Court was put in possession of the premises after the requisition thereof, the possession of the premises remained that of the High Court when it was in occupation of Shri Handa as a Judge of the High Court and that on his retirement, even if on March 25, 1987 the petitioners took possession of the said premises from Shri Handa on his vacation thereof, it would tantamount to forcible dispossession of the High Court from the premises in question though it has not been proved that the petitioners took physical possession from Shri Handa and the only proper procedure opened to the petitioners was to have recourse of law and not in the manner they have attempted and in the operative portion of the order the learned District Magistrate observed :— "In view of the above, I decide and declare that the High Court through its Registrar is in possession of the premises known as Kenilworth and entitled to retain such possession until ousted by due course of law and do strictly forbid any disturbance of his possession in the meantime." 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioners in this revision petition before this Court has assailed this order of the learned District Magistrate on mainly three grounds : (i) That the provisions of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in terms casts a duty upon the District Magistrate to have afforded an opportunity to the parties concerned to adduce evidence but in the instant case the learned District Magistrate has failed to comply with this mandatory requirement of law since no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their case. (ii) That the learned Magistrate has only relied upon the affidavits of the parties but those affidavits were not legal or proper as they were got attested by a Magistrate other than the one who was seized of the matter in question and that it was an imperative requirement of law that any such affidavits filed in the proceedings of this nature should have been sworn in the presence of the Magistrate who is in seisin of the matter in question. (iii) "That the learned District Magistrate improperly assumed the jurisdiction under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that as a matter of fact the admitted facts on record did not call for any such proceedings since the petitioners were in actual possession of the premises in question which was delivered in their favour by a competent person and as such there was no question of any apprehension of breach of peace. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent High Court has controverted all these contentions and asserted that the impugned order was free from the taint of any illegality or impropriety since the petitioners, on the admitted facts on record, had tried to take possession of the premises through illegal means which tantamounts to forcible dispossession. 15. Before dealing with these contentions, it would be appropriate at this stage to take note of the relevant provisions of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code which are as follows :— "Section 145.—(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (I), in possession of the subject of dispute : Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed ; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso of sub-section 4 (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction ; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any, document or thing. 16. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any, document or thing. 16. Thus while construing the foregoing provisions, it is clearly brought out that the Magistrate concerned while initiating these proceedings is required under sub-section (1) to satisfy himself after applying his mind to the facts brought before him either through a report of the police officer or upon any private complaint as the one in hand, that a dispute concerning the land or water which includes buildings like premises in question, exists which was likely to cause breach of peace, he has to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and then require the parties concerned to attend his Court either in person or through a pleader on a specific date and to put in written statement(s) of their respective claim as regards actual possession of the subject of dispute. Thereafter when the parties do put in their claims, he is required to consider them, hear the parties, record evidence if produced by them and the n determine as to which of the parties was at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute without reference to the merits of the claim of any of the parties to a right to possess. In short all he is required to determine is as to who was in actual possession of the subject of dispute at the time when he made the order under sub-section (I) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the effect that he was satisfied that a dispute existed in respect of the said subject of dispute between the parties and it was likely to cause breach of peace. 17. 17. Then the proviso to this section further envisages that if it appears to the said Magistrate that any party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which he received the report from the police or private complaint or after that date but before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he is empowered to treat that the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). 18. It is apparent that there is no oral evidence on the record of this case and the impugned order is passed upon the admitted facts and documents. The documents placed on record on behalf of the High Court are as follows :— "Annexure A.—Annexure A is a photo copy of notification under sub-section (2) of section 3 and section 4 of the Act dated July 30, 1979 with regard to the requisition of the premises in question which shows that after the notice to show cause why the premises in question be not requisitioned, was served upon petitioner No. 1, he appeared before the competent authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, and consented in writing that he had no objection to the requisition of the said premises at the assessed rent of Rs. 1,799.75 per month and the relevant portion thereof is :— Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 and section 4 of the said Act, T, K. N. Kashyap, I. A. S., Deputy Commissioner, Sinn la District, Simla, being competent authority under the said Act having been satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, hereby requisition the said property and I hereby order the said Shri Surinder Singh Sibia to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the Tehsildar Simla within thirty days of the service of this notice.” Annexure-B.—Annexure-B is the photo-copy of the letter dated August 3, 1979, from the then Registrar of High Court, Shri H. D Kainthla, to the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, intimating the latter that in pursuance of the notification referred to above, the copy of which was endorsed to the High Court, the High Court had taken over the possession of the premises in question, that is, of the buildings and the compound and area of the Kenilworth building on July 30, 1979, from the Tehsildar, Shimla District, Shimla. Annexure-C—Annexure-C is the copy of the order of the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, dated October 16, 1979, to the effect that since said premises have been duly acquired under the Act and the possession thereof had been taken over by the High Court through h the Registrar on July 30, 1979, the said building was being declared as official residence of the Honble Justice T. R. Handa, Additional Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh under section 22-A of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 as amended in 1976, w. e. f July 30, 1979. Annexure D. —Annexure D is the copy of the letter by the Registrar of the High Court to Justice Handa dated March 24, 1987 wherein it has been stated that when the premises in question were requisitioned under the Act and placed in possession of the High Court on July 30, 1979, it was declared as his official residence, that upon the retirement of Shri Handa on February 28, 1987, he was entitled to occupy the premises in question till March 31, 1987 under the High Court Judges Rules, 1956 and that till then the compensation in respect of the premises stood paid by the High Court to petitioner No. 1 and as and when he would vacate the premises, the possession thereof be handed over to the Court Officer on his behalf and prior intimation in that behalf also be given to the Registrar so that the officer concerned may go in time to take possession of the premises in question. Documents filed by the petitioners. 19. Annexure R-l.—The relevant and important document which was placed on recorded of the District Magistrate by the petitioners is the document, Annexure R-l, (at page 55/561 of the file which purports to have been written and signed by Shri T, R. Handa, dated March 25, 1987, which may be reproduced as follows : — "In response to his notice dated 1st March, 1987, I have today delivered vacant possession of the property known as Kenilworth Shimla, alongwith servant quarters and garage etc. which had been in my occupation alongwith the articles of the High Court as per list attached to the owner shri Surrinder Singh Sibia who has under taken to deliver such articles in tact to the High Court Himachal Pradesh on my behalf on their demand." Annexure R-4.— Annexure R-4 is the letter dated July 10, 1979 by the petitioner No. 1 to the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, whereby be has stated that he had no objection to the house being requisitioned and the affixation of its rent at Rs. 1,799.75 paise per month. Annexure R-5.—This annexure is another letter by the petitioner No. i to the Deputy Commissioner, dated December 14, IQ8 2 whereby he has requested for enhancement of rent in respect of the said premises. 1,799.75 paise per month. Annexure R-5.—This annexure is another letter by the petitioner No. i to the Deputy Commissioner, dated December 14, IQ8 2 whereby he has requested for enhancement of rent in respect of the said premises. Annexure R-6.—.Annexure R-6 is the copy of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, dated November 28, 1983, whereby the rent of the premises was enhanced to Rs. 3,600 per month inclusive of all taxes. Annexure R-7.— Annexure R-7 is the copy of the order in Civil Writ Petition No. 198 of 1985 (Surinder Singh Sibia v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and another), dated July 25, 1985, delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh whereby the State Government was directed to consider the prayer of the petitioner No. 1 for enhancement of the rent in view of the fact that the Deputy Commissioner Shimla had ordered this enhancement to the tune of Rs. 3,600 per month. 20. In the backdrop of the foregoing facts and circumstances on record it would be now proper to consider the aforementioned contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners in this revision petition. Point No. 1. 21. While elaborating on this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Cr. P. C. enjoined upon the Magistrate seized of the proceedings of the nature in hand to peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive of such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence if any as he thinks necessary before determining as to which of the parties, at the relevant time, was in actual possession of the subject of dispute. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the mandatory requirement of law is that the learned District Magistrate ought to have afforded an opportunity atleast to the petitioners to adduce their evidence before making the impugned order and since the petitioners were deprived of this right which imperatively vested in them, the entire proceedings are vitiated. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the mandatory requirement of law is that the learned District Magistrate ought to have afforded an opportunity atleast to the petitioners to adduce their evidence before making the impugned order and since the petitioners were deprived of this right which imperatively vested in them, the entire proceedings are vitiated. In support of his contention be has relied upon a judgment of the Calcutta High Court, reported in 1979 Cr LJ 1103, Abhimanyu Kumar Roy v. Nanak Ram Agarwalla and others, which is to the effect that the evidence which can be relied upon in such proceedings can be only by examining witnesses and not by putting affidavits and the affidavits sworn by witnesses in support annexed as part of written statement cannot be looked into. While construing the words receive of such evidence as may be produced, the learned Judge observed : "that though the choice is left to the parties to adduce evidence, yet reasonable opportunities have to be given to the parties to produce their witnesses and documents if any." 22. The next ruling is of the Bombay High Court, reported in 1979 Cr LJ 83, Smt. Flori Rodriques and another v. Maxie Jureme Danial Cabral and others, wherein it has been observed : "Under the new Code a Magistrate cannot dispose of proceedings under section 145 on the basis of affidavits. It is clear from reading both the provisions of sub-sections (I) and (4) of section 145 of the old Code in juxtaposition with sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 145 of the new Code, that the Legislature has deliberately done away with the amendment concerning the affidavits which was made by section 18 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 26 of 1955, thereby dispensing with the affidavits altogether and restoring the provisions to the position which existed prior to the amendment of the Code by Act 26 of 1955. Not only that but the Legislature has specifically provided in sub-section (4) of section lo of the new Code that the Court shall receive all such evidence as may be produced by the parties and take such further evidence if any as it thinks necessary." 23. I have considered this contention but find no substance therein. It is clear that under sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Cr. I have considered this contention but find no substance therein. It is clear that under sub-section (4) of section 145 of the Cr. P. C. the District Magistrate is required to hear the parties and receive all such evidence as may be produce by them meaning thereby that it is the choice of the parties as has also been held in the Calcutta ruling (supra) whether to produce any evidence or not and in case the parties do produce such evidence the Magistrate is duty bound to record the same. Further any of the parties can also apply to the Magistrate concerned in case it requires that any witnesses be issued summons to attend the Court for deposition or to produce any document or thing as provided under sub-section (9) of section 145 of the Act. 24. In the instant case the record shows that the petitioners received notice in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Cr. P. C. from the Court concerned on March 30, 1987, that is, the very day the order under that sub-section was made by the learned District Magistrate and in fact on the very next day, one of the petitioners applied for local enquiry to the said Court under section 148 of the Cr. P. C. Then they filed the written statement on April 18, 1987 and the arguments were heard in the proceedings on May 20, 1987. During this period, however, neither the petitioners voluntarily produced any witnesses for examination in the Court nor did they make any application for summoning any witness under sub-section () of section 14\ Cr. P. C. and even at the time of the arguments, they did not raise their little finger to point out the fact that they intended to adduce any evidence and the opportunity be afforded to them. Not only that but even there after till the pronouncement of the impugned order on June 25, 1987, no such efforts were made by the petitioners to draw the attention of the court concerned that they have not been afforded the opportunity to adduce the evidence. The learned District Magistrate during the course of his judgment has made the following observation : "Apart from the facts mentioned as above, the parties have not stressed to produce any other evidence in support of their claims." 25. The learned District Magistrate during the course of his judgment has made the following observation : "Apart from the facts mentioned as above, the parties have not stressed to produce any other evidence in support of their claims." 25. Thus in view of these facts and circumstances of the case this Court will be justified in presuming that the petitioners did not intend to produce any evidence whatsoever apart from the documents they have placed on record, notice of which has been taken in the earlier part of this order, and this objection has been raised on their behalf just for the sake of an objection. It is rather pertinent to note that as per the observations of the learned District Magistrate in the body of the impugned order it was rather conceded on behalf of the petitioners that they would not produce or adduce any other evidence. The learned counsel for the petitioners denied at the time of the arguments before this Court that any such concession was made on behalf of the petitioners. I am afraid that this nenial cannot be countenanced in the face of the clear law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in AIR 1982 SC 1249, State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and another, wherein it has been observed :—- "The Court is bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. It cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The Principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the appending in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that bad been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an Appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice but he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment.” 26. Keeping in mind the ratio of the judgment cited above and other circumstances on record, as already pointed out, I do not think there is any substance in this objection of the petitioners and the same is over ruled The learned counsel for the petitioners was not able to satisfy this Court even at the time of arguments as to what was the material evidence which the petitioners intended to produce and the non-affording of opportunity for the production whereof, what prejudice has been caused to them. In fact there appears to be no justification for such a plea when the material facts on both sides stand more or less admitted. Point No. 2. 27. The learned counsel has argued that the contents of the petition filed on behalf of the High Court under section (45 of the Cr. P. C have admittedly been verified by the Registrar of the High Court on oath before a Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla, whereas the proceedings were filed before the District Magistrate and as such this affidavit is of no consequence at all. This contention appears to be based upon misconception and therefore, has to be stated to be rejected straightway. It is clear that the petitioners themselves have verified the contents of their written statement by swearing or affirming the correctness thereof before an Oath Commissioner yet they want to find fault with the affidavit sworn on behalf of the High Court before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is clear that the petitioners themselves have verified the contents of their written statement by swearing or affirming the correctness thereof before an Oath Commissioner yet they want to find fault with the affidavit sworn on behalf of the High Court before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In any case this reference to affidavits in the Supreme Court ruling, cited above, is obviously with respect to the affidavits of witnesses which the law enjoined upon the parties to produce before she Court under the law which was introduced by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 26 of 1955 but in the new Code which came into force on 1st day of April, 1974, this procedure has been done away with and the old law as it existed prior to 1955, that is, to record all such evidence as may be produced by the parties or take such further evidence which the Court thinks necessary has been restored. There is not even a passing reference in the provisions of section 145 of the new Code with regard to adducing of any evidence by way of affidavits, Point No. 3. 28. While addressing detailed arguments on this point, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has precisely set out out his case as follows : — "That part of the premises in question were in the possession of Shri Handa before his elevation to the Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and subsequently entire premises which are admittedly owned by petitioner No. 1 was requisitioned exclusively for the residence of Shri Handa as Judge of the High Court under the Act. Thus Shri Handa became possessed of the entire premises under the Act exclusively in his own right and not on behalf of the High Court. Subsequently, when the Act lapsed with the efflux of time which is an admitted fact, the possession of Shri Handa became no better than that of a trespasser. Thus Shri Handa became possessed of the entire premises under the Act exclusively in his own right and not on behalf of the High Court. Subsequently, when the Act lapsed with the efflux of time which is an admitted fact, the possession of Shri Handa became no better than that of a trespasser. Being a Judge of the High Court at that time, however, the petitioner No. 1 did not resort to any proceedings towards dislodging him from the said premises so as to save a Judge of the High Court from discomfiture and embarrassment But when he retired from the judge-ship in the month of February 1987 and was about to vacate the premises in question, the petitioner No 1 called upon him to handover the possession of the premises in question in his favour on his vacating the same to which he agreed and thereafter Shri Handa intimated the petitioner No. 1 when he was out of Shimla, though petitioner No. 2 was here, that he intended to vacate the premises, "thus on March 25, 1987, Shri Handa after vacating the premises in question, put the petitioners in possession thereof and also executed a writing, already referred to above, on the same date in his own hand whereby he categorically stated that as per the notice of petitioner No. 1 dated March 1, 1987, he was handing over the possession of the premises to the petitioner No. 1 and that an inventory of the articles belonging to the High Court lying in the said premises has been prepared and those articles be handed over to the High Court on demand. 29 The learned Counsel has contended that in these circumstances when the High Court filed the application under section 145 of Cr. P. C. before the District Magistrate, the petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question in a peaceful and valid manner which possession had been delivered to them by Shri Handa who was quite competent to do so and as such the High Court had no locus standi to dispute this possession of the petitioners nor was there any question of the petitioners interfering with the possession of the High Court and that as such the District Magistrate was wrong in assuming this jurisdiction under section 145, Cr. P. C. and it at all he had initially exercised the jurisdiction, when the aforesaid facts were placed before the learned District Magistrate, the only finding he could have arrived at was that no dispute inter-se the parties existed and, therefore, he should have cancelled the order made under sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Cr. P. C, as envisaged by the provisions of Sub-section (5) thereof. 30. The learned Counsel for the High Court on the other hand has controverted these arguments and contended that as a matter of fact the premises were requisitioned by the Government at the instance of the High Court for the purpose of residence of a High Court Judge and that after they were requisitioned the possession thereof was delivered not to Shri Handa but to the High Court through its Registrar and that it was there after that these premises were declared as the official residence of Shri Handa and thus the possession of these premises remained of the High Court and Shri Handa was in possession only through the High Court. Even after this Act lapsed it bad brought no change in the status of Shri Handa or the High Court qua the possession and the possession remained with the High Court Under these circumstances Shri Handa had no right whatsoever to put the petitioners in possession of these premises and that even if it is held that he (Shri Handa) did so, the taking over of the possession by the petitioners from Shri Handa still amounts to forcible dispossession of the High Court from the premises in question by the petitioners and as such the impugned order was rightly passed by the District Magistrate. 31. Now in view of these rival contentions, the first question that arises for determination is whether the premises in question were requisitioned under the Act exclusively for the occupation of Suri Handa as Judge of the High Court during his tenure and whether as such he was in possession of the premises debars or independent of the High Court ? 32. I have no doubt in my mind that the reply to this poser would be in the negative. The notification, Annexure-A, as noticed earlier, nowhere states that the premises in question were being requisitioned under the Act for the occupation of Shri Handa as a Judge of the High Court during his tenure. 32. I have no doubt in my mind that the reply to this poser would be in the negative. The notification, Annexure-A, as noticed earlier, nowhere states that the premises in question were being requisitioned under the Act for the occupation of Shri Handa as a Judge of the High Court during his tenure. In fact in the endorsement thereon with respect to-copies, the Tehsildar, Shimla, has been issued directions that the vacant possession of the premises in question may be handed over by him to the Registrar of the High Court, Shimla. Then the Registrar of the High Court after taking over the possession of the premises from the Tehsildar, has intimated the Deputy Commissioner concerned vide Annexure-B that he has taken over the possession of these premises on behalf of the High Court and it was thereafter that the High Court moved the Government to issue an order to declare the said premises as official residence of Shri Handa at that time Additional Judge of the High Court vide Annexure-C dated October 16. 1979. It was there after that Shri Handa lived in those premises as the same was declared as his official residence when certain furniture belonging to the High Court was also put in the premises for the use of Shri Handa and the High Court started paying the rent thereof regularly to petitioner No 1 Under these circumstances, I do not think it would be proper to say that the premises in question were requisitioned on condition that this requisition would be co-extensive with the tenure of Shri Handa or that the High Court had nothing to do as regards the possession of these premise j as a matter of fact, legally speaking, ever since the possession of these premises was taken by the High Court through its Registrar on July 3, 1979 it was the High Court which was in possession of these premises and Shri Handa had no semblance of right in him qua these premises except the right to use it as his residence and to continue occupying the same during his tenure as a Judge and for one month thereafter after his tenure as a Judge terminated Admittedly, Shri Handa retired on February 28, 1987, and as per the High Court Judges Rules, he had entitlement to continue occupying these premises till March 31, 1987. Obviously, Shri Handa continued occupying these premises even after his retirement during the month of March till 25th and it was under these circumstances that the entire rent for the month of March was paid by the High Court earlier. It is also an admitted fact that when Shri Handa vacated these premises en March 25 1987 the furniture, fittings and fixtures etc. including the telephone belonging to the High Court remained in these premises. Thus it is safe to hold that through out this period the High Court was in constructive possession of the premises m question and Shri Handa had right to occupy them only cm behalf of the High Court and as such he could not under law not the petitioners in possession of these premises. Even if he did so the amounts to forcible dispossession of the High Court by the petitioner, as envisaged under the provisions of section 145 of the Cr. P. C. 33. It is also clear from the record that the High Court was very much conscious of its right to keep the premises in question in its possession and that is why one day prior to the vacation of the premises by Shri Handa he was addressed a letter by the Registrar of the High Court Vide Annexure-D requesting him to intimate the Registrar before-hand as to he time be would vacate the premises in question so that the Court Officer may be directed by the High Court to take the possession of the premises in question. In fact the case of the High Court is that on March 25, 1987 after-seeing off Shri Handa when he vacated the premises and left Shimla he Registrar and other officials visited the premises and after verifying that be furniture was lying intact therein, they locked the maintenance to be building as well as the main gate of entrance to these premises It was, thereafter, according to the High Court, that the petitioner and the persons hired by them broke open the locks and started obstructing the officials of the High Court when they went on the premises for the upkeep thereof by way of cleaning and dusting etc. And it was under these circumstances when apprehending breach of peace, that the High Court approached the District Magistrate for initiation of the proceedings under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, difficult to uphold the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no apprehension of breach of peace. 34. As already stated, the case of the petitioners is that Shri Handa being competent to handover the possession of these premises to the petitioners, had lawfully put them in possession of these premises and also executed a note in his own hand with regard thereto, a photo copy of which is placed on record and to which a reference has already been made in the earlier part of the judgment. It, however, appears, that this document, though doubtlessly written by Shri Handa in his own hand, was a mere eye wash and the petitioners were not put in actual possession of these premises by virtue of the same. This is very clear from the subsequent conduct of the petitioners themselves. Admittedly, on the very next day the petitioner No. 2 came out with the allegations that Shri Handa had carried away a number of their precious articles of furniture which they had kept in the premises in question for his user and even gave a list of as many as 29 such articles. Now if they had taken the vacant possession of these premises from Shri Handa as they claim, it is highly improbable that they would have come to know about the absence or missing of these articles after Shri Handa had left the premises with his luggage The natural behaviour on the part of the petitioners in that case would have been to point out there and then to Shri Handa when he was putting them in possession of these premises that these precious articles were missing. The very fact that they started complaining about this on the next day shows that this obtaining of the possession of the premises by the petitioners was just on paper and as such mere smoke-screen and subterfuge. 35. This again is clearly brought out by the behaviour of petitioner No. 1 during the period prior to March 25, 1987. Admittedly petitioner No. 1 from the very start, when these premises were requisitioned from the High Court in July 1979, was a consenting party to this requisition. 35. This again is clearly brought out by the behaviour of petitioner No. 1 during the period prior to March 25, 1987. Admittedly petitioner No. 1 from the very start, when these premises were requisitioned from the High Court in July 1979, was a consenting party to this requisition. Subsequently his only grouse was that the monthly compensation that he was being paid in respect thereof was inadequate and he, therefore, earlier moved the competent authority namely, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, for enhancement of this compensation and the latter admittedly enhanced it from Rs. 1,799.75 to Rs. 3,600.00 per month. When the Government, however, declined to pay him the enhanced rent, he (petitioner No 1) filed a writ petition in the High Court which is Writ Petition No 198 of 1985 whereby he prayed that the Government be directed to appoint an Arbitrator to determine the amount of compensation qua the premises in question under section 10-B of the Act and till the Arbitrator gives his finding, the Government be further directed to pay him compensation at the rate of Rs. 3<600 per month as determined by the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla. The High Court in that writ petition, vide interim order Annexure-R-7, had directed the Government to consider the writ petition as an application for revision of rent/compensation and to arrive at a just decision, thereof in accordance with law keeping in view the finding recorded by the Deputy Commissioner in this behalf. Meanwhile, the Government was also taking steps to repopulate the Act which had lapsed in order to regularise the matter. This was all happening under the interim orders of the High Court in the writ petition from time to time without any murmur or protest from the side of the petitioner No. 1. In these circumstances this somersault on the part of the petitioner No. 1 to come out with the new case that after the Act had lapsed with the efflux of time the possession of Shri Handa in the premises was that of a trespasser and that as such Shri Handa agreed to handover the possession of these premises to him on his vacation of the said premises and he actually did so on March 25, 1987, smacks of mala fides and underhand means. As already stated this note which purports to have been in the band-writing of Shri Handa, shows that Shri Handa purported to have handed over the premises in question to petitioner No. 1 in response to some notice by the latter. Although no such notice has been placed on record but, if as the learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended, the petitioners gave any notice orally or in writing to Shri Handa, that he was a mere trespasser in the premises in question and as such should handover the possession thereof to the petitioners on his vacating the same and Shri Handa conceded to this position even without bringing it to the notice of the High Court, no fair minded person would congratulate Shri Handa for doing so. The legal position, as I have already stated, is that as a matter of fact the High Court was in constructive possession of the premises in question while Shri Handa was in occupation thereof through the High Court, and as such he had no right whatsoever to put the petitioners in possession of the premises and even if he did so this amounts to forcible dispossession of the High Court from the said premises of its actual possession. In AIR 19 >3 Assam, 31, U. Join Manick Syiem v. Rose Mohan Roy Myntri and others, a Division Bench of Assam High Court has held : "Section 145, Criminal P. C. does not give power to the Magistrate to investigate into the question of right to possession, but there is no bar to the investigation of the question whether a particular party can be said to be in the constructive possession of the disputed land. A constructive possession will be as much a posse ssion9 in the eye of law as the actual physical possession," (underlining supplied). 36. At this stage notice may be taken of the ruling of Punjab High Court on which great reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that is, AIR (36) 1949 East Punjab 389, Sita Ram v. The Crown, in which it has been held : "Under section 145 (4) Criminal P. C., a Magistrate has to decide on enquiry and to give a finding as to whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the property in dispute at the date of the preliminary order. The only exception to this rule is the case where one of the parties has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months of the date of the order in which case the Magistrate is to treat such person as having been in possession at the date of the preliminary order under the proviso to sub-section (4) Except as provided by this proviso, the Magistrate is not concerned with the previous possession or with the question as to how the possession was obtained though he may take these facts into consideration in deciding the question of possession at the date of the preliminary order. Where, therefore, party A is admittedly in actual possession of the property in dispute when the preliminary order is passed and there is no allegation that party B who applied under section 145, Cr. P. C. had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months of the date of the order, the Magistrate has no power to decide who should be in possession of the property in future and the order passed by him dispossessing party A and restoring possession to party B is not sustainable in law." 37. I do not see how this ruling helps the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case on the application of one Mala Ram made on behalf of Sita Ram, the latter was put in possession of a hall and a chaubra, which was a common property of a body known as Shikarpuri Biradari on and from February 23, 1948 to February 25, 1948 for solemnising the marriage of the daughter of said Sita Ram, Said Sita Ram later on delivered the possession of the hall to the said Biradari but not the possession of Chaubara. During the course of the proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the instance of the Biradari, Sita Ram denied that he had authorised Mela Ram to make an application for the reservation of the hall and Chaubara. He further asserted that chaubara had been in this possession for more than 20 years and, therefore, he could not be rejected from the same. The Magistrate in those proceedings passed preliminary order on April 12, 1948 whereby the said chaubara was attached. He further asserted that chaubara had been in this possession for more than 20 years and, therefore, he could not be rejected from the same. The Magistrate in those proceedings passed preliminary order on April 12, 1948 whereby the said chaubara was attached. During the course of the proceedings it was found that even in the application by Mela Ram purporting to be on behalf of Sita Ram, did not have any mentioned of chaubara nor in the application under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was there any allegation that said Sita Ram had dispossessed the Biradari from the chaubara within two months of the initiation of the proceedings In these circumstances the High Court held that the order under section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code attaching the chaubara in question could not be sustained. Admittedly, in those proceedings, although according to Sita Ram, he was in possession of the chaubara for 20 years prior to the initiation thereof but even otherwise the situation was that the Biradari itself had put said Sita Ram in possession of the chaubara and there was no allegation with regard to forcible dispossession of the part of Biradari. In the instance case the High Court had gone to the District Magistrate with clear allegation that they were in possession of the premises and the petitioners were trying to dispossess them from the said premises and that in case the petitioners are proved to have dispossessed the High Court, the High Court be held in actual possession of the premises and the petitioners be evicted from them and forbidden from causing any interference in future and that such behaviour on the part of the petitioners was likely to cause breach of peace and subsequently it conceded that the petitioners had broken open their locks in the said premises and entered in possession. The facts as set out above, clearly brought out a case of forcible dispossession of the High Court on the part of the petitioners and as such this ruling has no application to the facts of the present case. 38. The next rulling cited by the learned Counsel is the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court, reported in AIR 1928 Cal 610, Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin and another. 38. The next rulling cited by the learned Counsel is the Full Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court, reported in AIR 1928 Cal 610, Agni Kumar Das v. Mantazaddin and another. I have gone through this ruling but it has no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. Rather if properly construed it goes against the petitioners themselves and as such 1 do not think it proper to discuss the same in detail to avoid burdening of the record of the case. 39. The crux of the proceedings under section 145, Cr. P. C. is that they are of summary nature and are resorted to in emergency in case there is apprehension of breach of peace to the satisfaction of the Magistrate concerned and all that he is required to decide is as to which of the parties, if any, was in actual possession of the property in dispute at the time of making the preliminary order under sub-section (1) or by virtue of proviso to sub-section (4) of the said section. Even when the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that a party was forcibly dispossessed from the property in dispute within a period of two months preceding the report of the police officer or by a private party, in this behalf or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1) then also the Magistrate has a discretion to treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1) and he is competent under law to order the restoration of the possession to that party. The Magistrate acting this way does not decide any question of title to possess the subject of dispute for which the parties are relegated to a civil court and the order passed by the Magistrate ceases as soon as the proper civil court gives its findings on that issue. 40. The Magistrate acting this way does not decide any question of title to possess the subject of dispute for which the parties are relegated to a civil court and the order passed by the Magistrate ceases as soon as the proper civil court gives its findings on that issue. 40. Conceding that the petitioners are owners of the premises in question and also conceding that by virtue of the lapse of the Act they had a right to possession of the said premises, once it is held that the High Court was in rightful and legal possession of the premises in question by virtue of the Act since July 30, 1979, it does not lose its right to retain actual possession even on the lapse of the Act unless dispossessed in due course of law and the petitioners could not have obtained the possession in such a surreptitious and improper manner which amounts to clear collusion, as appears to have happened in the instant case and this act on their part in these circumstances, in my opinion, amounts to forcible dispossession of the High Court from the said premises. 41. In these circumstances, there was no question of cancellation of the order by the Magistrate under sub-section {) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 42. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in 1980 Cr LJ 1276, Rajpati v. Bachan and another, ha ye held that in case where contradictory stands are taken by the parties, it clearly shows that there was no question of dispute having ended so as to lead to the cancellation of the order under sub section (5) of section 145, Cr P. C. It was further held that under section 145, Cr. P. C. it is the Magistrate who has to be satisfied regarding the existence of a breach of peace and once he records his satisfaction in the preliminary order the High Court in revision cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the material on the basis of which the satisfaction of the Magistrate is based. 43. Again in AIR 1968 SC 1444, R. H. Bhutani v. Miss Man J. Desai and others, their lordships of the Supreme Court have taken the same view in the following terms : — "The satisfaction under subsection (1) of section 145 is of the Magistrate. 43. Again in AIR 1968 SC 1444, R. H. Bhutani v. Miss Man J. Desai and others, their lordships of the Supreme Court have taken the same view in the following terms : — "The satisfaction under subsection (1) of section 145 is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his satisfaction. The language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or from other information which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate." 44. In the light of the above discussion and the pronouncements of the highest court in the country, I do not find myself satisfied to interfere with the impugned order of the learned District Magistrate in this revision petition, which, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed. Revision petition dismissed.