Order: 1. Petitioner and the respondent in both the petitions are the same. In S.T. Nos. 102 & 115 of 1984 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Trivandrum respondent is the complainant and the petitioner is the accused. Respondent who filed the two complaints is the Inspector of Plantations, Nedumangad. Petitioner is the proprietor of Ponmudi Tea Estate. In S.T. 102 of 1984 the offence alleged is violation of the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 and the rules made thereunder in not providing various facilities to the labourers. In S.T.115 of 1984 the offence is violation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948 and the Rules made thereunder in the matter of payment of wages to the labourers. The two petitions are for quashing the proceedings in those two cases in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court. 2. In Crl.M.C.608 of 1985, the petitioner relies on two grounds in support of his prayer, namely, (1) In C.M.A.l 14 of 1982 before this Court he was appointed as receiver to manage the tea estate as per order dated 15-11-1982 and therefore he could be prosecuted only after obtaining leave of the court, and (2) The respondent who filed the complaint is not competent to do so under S.39 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951. In Crl.M.C.610 of 1985 the second ground is not available and the complaint is sought to be quashed only for want of sanction from court. 3. The fact that the petitioner was the sole receiver during the relevant periods is not in dispute. That the prosecutions are for acts or omissions in the discharge of the official duties as receiver appointed by a competent court is also admitted. If so the question is only whether leave of court is necessary for prosecution or in other words prosecution without leave of court is bad. If leave of court is a condition precedent to a valid prosecution, its absence is a matter affecting the jurisdiction of the court to try the case. 4. Whoever be the person appointed as receiver, whether he be a party, an Advocate or a stranger, he becomes an officer or a representative of the court which appointed him the moment he assumes charge of the post. 4. Whoever be the person appointed as receiver, whether he be a party, an Advocate or a stranger, he becomes an officer or a representative of the court which appointed him the moment he assumes charge of the post. When an estate becomes the subject-matter of a suit it is custodia legis and when a receiver is appointed by the court for that estate it assumes possession on behalf of the successful party to whom it will have to be surrendered later. To preserve the estate and its income is the duty of the court. Any action taken by the receiver in relation to the estate in the discharge of his official duty will be traceable only to the appointment made by the court. Any invasion of the right which the court assumed in itself through the receiver will be considered as invasion of the right of the court That will be treated as an abuse of the process of court. Courts always want to uphold its dignity and to safeguard the property and its possession assumed by it. One of the reasons why the courts insist on its permission when the receiver is sought to be proceeded against in any action is this. The institution of any such action against the receiver, whether civil or criminal, without applying for and obtaining the leave of the court, is in the eye of law a contempt of the authority of the court. For that purpose and in order to absolve himself of that charge the person who proceeds against the receiver will have to take the leave of court. 5. Another reason for the insistence on leave is to protect the receiver from frivolous and vexatious suits and prosecutions at the hands of interested parties for actions and omissions in his capacity as receiver. In a given case whether such a protection has to be given or not is for the court which appointed him to decide. That is why it is insisted that the person who wants to intend him to decide. That is why it is insisted that the person who wants to proceed against the receiver will have to move the court stating the facts on which he is going to proceed so that the court will be able to apply its judicial mind to decide whether leave has to be given or not. That is why it is insisted that the person who wants to proceed against the receiver will have to move the court stating the facts on which he is going to proceed so that the court will be able to apply its judicial mind to decide whether leave has to be given or not. Unlike in S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure saves the inherent powers of all the civil courts to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the courts. It is in exercise of this power in order to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of courts that leave is insisted. Normally leave is the rule and refusal is the exception. Leave will be normally refused only when the action is devoid of merits, frivolous or vexatious. Leave may be required only regarding action or omissions of the receiver in connection with the discharge of his official functions; If he commits an act of omission amounting to an offence unconnected with his office no leave may be required. In cases where leave is required a prosecution without such leave will be bad and it will affect the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance. 6. Consideration of public policy is the basis of this rule. It is not based on any statutory provision either in the Code of Criminal Procedure or anywhere else. Even though provisions likeSs.195 and 197 of the Code provide for sanction in some other cases as a prerequisite to taking cognizance no such provision is made regarding prosecutions against receivers. In the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding cognizance of offences also such a restriction is not there. The rule has become part of the law of the land and crystalised into a rule of law by judicial pronouncements. It applies to all actions statutory or otherwise unless there are exceptions recognised in the rule itself or such exemptions are made expressly or impliedly by the Statute in question conferring the particular right to action. The rule has become part of the law of the land and crystalised into a rule of law by judicial pronouncements. It applies to all actions statutory or otherwise unless there are exceptions recognised in the rule itself or such exemptions are made expressly or impliedly by the Statute in question conferring the particular right to action. But for such a rule receiver may not be able to discharge their functions effectively or fearlessly ever when they are acting bona fide in the interest of the estate and thereby the-dignity of the court, the interest of the estate and freedom of the receiver himself will suffer. 7. It could be said that commission of a crime is in excess of the authority of the receiver and dignity of the court will not be involved therein and therefore leave of court may not be required to prosecute a receiver for crimes committed by him. That may be true in many cases. But it is difficult to accept as a broad proposition that an alleged offence must always involve an act committed in excess of the authority of the receiver. That is an aspect to be considered by the court appointing the receiver. There can be instances where an act or omission for the protection of an estate as an integral part of the duties of the receiver may expose him to a criminal prosecution. I am fortified on these positions by the decisions in Corporation of Calcutta v. Sudhamony Bose Corporation of Calcutta v. Sudhamony Bose A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 444 which reviewed various decisions on the point and Parvathi Rudrani v. Lakshmi Yesoda Parvathi Rudrani v. Lakshmi Yesoda 1981 K.L.T. 357. 8. In the present cases the offences attributed against the petitioner are definitely in his capacity as receiver. They are non-compliance of the provisions of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 in the matter of giving statutory benefits and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 in the matter of payment of minimum wages to the employees of the estate. Leave of court is required. Admittedly for both prosecutions leave of court was not applied for and obtained. Therefore both the prosecutions are illegal and this Court will be justified in quashing the prosecutions in exercise of the inherent powers saved under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. Leave of court is required. Admittedly for both prosecutions leave of court was not applied for and obtained. Therefore both the prosecutions are illegal and this Court will be justified in quashing the prosecutions in exercise of the inherent powers saved under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. In S.T.102 of 1984 there is an additional ground that the complainant who is the Inspector of Plantations is not competent to prosecute. Under S.39 of the Plantations Labour Act there is a prohibition against courts from taking cognizance under the Act except on a complaint by, or with the previous sanction in writing of the Chief Inspector of Plantations. The complainant is not having the sanction in writing from the Chief Inspector of Plantations. The learned Public Prosecutor brought to my notice two notifications referred to in the complaint and said that they arc sufficient. S.4 (1) of the Plantations Labour Act authorises the Government to appoint Chief Inspector of Plantations and Inspectors of Plantations. One such notification is the one appointing the complainant as Inspector of Plantations. S.4(2) authorises the Chief Inspector of Plantations, subject to the rules made by the Government, to decide the area or plantations with respect to which each of the Inspectors shall exercise their powers under the Act. The second one is such a notification. It is true that under the second notification the respondent complainant is having jurisdiction over the plantation involved in this case. 10. But that notification cannot be a substitute for the sanction for prosecution in writing from the Chief Inspector of Plantations. The two are entirely different in their colour and operation. The fact that he got jurisdiction over an area by a notification under S.4(2) will not ipso facto give him authority for prosecution. Such authority could come only by a written sanction contemplated under S.39. Legislature in its wisdom made such a restriction in the competency for prosecution in order to avoid frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. A screening by a superior officer namely the Chief Inspector of Plantations was considered necessary in order to avoid indiscriminate prosecutions by his subordinate officers. That cannot be said to be an empty formality. It is also a matter affecting the jurisdiction of courts because there is a total prohibition against courts in taking cognizance except in the manner specified therein. That cannot be said to be an empty formality. It is also a matter affecting the jurisdiction of courts because there is a total prohibition against courts in taking cognizance except in the manner specified therein. When a thing is directed to be done in a particular manner it should be done in that manner itself or not at all. The Chief Inspector before giving sanction will have to get himself posted with the facts and he should apply his mind to decide whether sanction is to be given or not. When he himself is launching the prosecution the question of sanction will not arise because he will be doing so only on the necessary satisfaction. In this case the Chief Inspector had no opportunity to consider the facts and decide whether sanction has to be given or not. Therefore the cognizance without such sanction on the basis of a complaint from an incompetent person is illegal. That is a well recognized principle. The Court can interfere with such an illegal cognizance in exercise of the inherent powers because trial pursuant to such a cogni will be an illegality and an abuse of the process of court Even though general law is that all citizens are entitled to bring offenders to justice, when restrictions are imposed on such persons in public interest, prosecution could only be by competent persons. Otherwise the very purpose of the prosecution itself will be defeated. 11. Both the petitions are therefore allowed and the proceedings in S.T.Nos.102 1984 and 115 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Trivandrum are hereby quashed. Appeal allowed.