Judgement JUDGEMENT :- Law is not settled, counsel submits. Different High Courts have expressed divergent opinions on the question mooted for decision in this appeal, it is seriously contended by Shri Arun Mishra, who appears for the plaintiff appellant. In my view the instant lis has a peculiar complexion : the law applicable is not uncertain, but has to be identified still. 2. Indeed when this matter came up before me earlier and it could not be heard for the defendant-respondent being unrepresented by counsel, I directed S.P.C. to issue to him to ensure that he does not suffer in absentia. Unfortunately, despite S.P.C. I am assisted today in this matter by appellant's counsel only. Accordingly, it has become necessary for me to examine the matter more carefully lest the unrepresented respondent suffers. 3. A short question has come up for decision in this appeal - Whether the plaintiff/appellant was entitled to claim in the joint agricultural holding not only her deceased husband's interest but also the interest of her husband's brother, Hariram for the only reason that Hariram was taken in adoption 2 Indeed, what is undisputed is that Hariram's brother Bindraban, Sarjo Bai's husband, died in 1949 and that the adoption of Hariram took place on 20-12-1955. It is also not in dispute that the two brothers, Bindraban and Hariram, survived their father Pershadi, who predeceased them. 4. Fortunately, for the absentee-respondent, very fairly Shri Arun Mishra, appellant's counsel, has submitted that Sarjo Bai's claim was upheld by two Courts below on the footing that she succeeded to the interest of her husband Bindraban on his death by virtue of the provisions of S.253 of Kanoon Mal Gwalior, then applicable to cases of succession to agricultural holding. The Court below having partially decreed her claim to the extent of Bindraban's interest it is not necessary to examine that aspect of the matter as there is no cross-appeal. But the point which still is relevant for decision of this appeal is that succession to the interest of Bindraban's share in the agricultural land which the two brothers owned and possessed took place not under Hindu Succession Act or pre-existing Hindu Law but under Kanoon Mal Gwalior. 5. On the facts aforesaid the legal consequence of Sarjo Bai inheriting Bindraban's interest, in my opinion, would result in disruption of coparcenary of two brothers, Bindraban and Hariram. 5. On the facts aforesaid the legal consequence of Sarjo Bai inheriting Bindraban's interest, in my opinion, would result in disruption of coparcenary of two brothers, Bindraban and Hariram. By operation of law the interest of Bindraban got exclusively vested indefeasibly in his widow Sarjo Bai leaving nothing for Hariram to succeed as the surviving coparcener of Bindraban on later's death. In 1949 when Bindraban died there was evidently severance of status in the coparcenary and Hariram's interest in the property, which he owned with Bindraban as a coparcener, become his self acquired property. That being the legal position in 1949 as also in 1955, adoption of Hariram in 1955 did not bring about any change in the character of his interest in the property which was his self-acquired property on that date, since before adoption. According to me, this position in law cannot be doubtful but if I have to say anything more I have to merely refer to para 494 of Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, 14th Edition, wherein decisions of different High Courts are cited and discussed and the law is distilled. 6. Indeed, the decision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rajah Venkata v. Sri Rajah Rangayya, (1906) ILR 29 Mad 437, to the effect that adoption does not divest any property which has vested in the "adopted son" previous to the adoption was a case governed by Mitakshara School wherein the Court stated categorically the classic law, which has been generally followed by other High Courts. Where the property is coparcenary property and it is vested in the sole surviving coparcener, his subsequent adoption out of the family would not denude him of the rights vested in him in the property, the Court held. In the instant case, not only Hariram became the sole surviving coparcener in 1949 prior to his adoption, which took place in 1955, there was factual vesting of Bindraban's interest in Sarjo Bai in 1949 by operation of law, which effectively brought about severance in status in coparcenary and made Hariram full and exclusive owner of his interest in the property which partook thenceforward the character of his self acquired property of which he could not be divested. 7. 7. Counsel has relied on the decision of this Court in Kaveribai 1966 Jab LJ 279 laying stress on the observation in that case to the effect that "If somebody born in the family of is adopted in the family of B, he is nationally dead for all purposes of the civil law in the first family, and is nationally reborn for the same purposes on the family of adoption. This bald observation evidently does not take letters too far and does not evidently militate against the view I have taken. The general Principle stated in that case does not lend support to the theory that even a separated or sole surviving coparcener, on disruption of the coparcenary, can be divested of his self-acquired property. 8. Three decisions of Bombay High Court are also cited by Shri Arun Mishra but they also do not take the matter any further to the advantage of the appellant. Indeed, in none of the cases any parallel on facts could be traced inasmuch as the question of divesting an "adopted son" taking his share in the coparcenary as his self-acquired property in the manner as it has happened in this case never came up for consideration or determination. In Dattatraya, AIR 1916 Bom 210 the Court took the view that the adopted son shall never take or claim the estate of his natural father. It does not speak anything about divesting the adopted son of what he had got as his self-acquired property. I do not think undue importance has to be attached to the general principles of law stated therein that when a boy is given in adoption he gives up the natural family and everything connected with the family and takes his place in the adoptive family, as if he had been born there. I can only say this much for the day that even this general observation their Lordships took care to qualify by the words "as far as possible" to make it clear that the general statement of law was not meant to be of universal application to all situations when the question of vesting and divesting of interest of an "adopted son" arose. 9. The other two decisions also do not have much relevance to the instant lis in that the same question of facts did not arise in those cases as well. 9. The other two decisions also do not have much relevance to the instant lis in that the same question of facts did not arise in those cases as well. What I find rather in Manikbai, AIR 1925 Bom 363 is indeed interesting and destroys the contention pressed by Shri Arun Mishra. Their Lordships agreed with the view taken by the Court earlier in Mahableshwar v. Subramanya, AIR 1923 Bom 297 to the effect that when the suit. property was not the estate of the natural father within the meaning of the Shastric text cited, the son was not divested of it on adoption. The decision in Kesarba Bai, AIR 1932 Bom 654 is really concerned with widow's power of adoption and does not evidently shed any light on the jural controversy which has surfaced for decision in the instant appeal. On the other hand, it may still be noticed that their Lordships took the view that the fiction of birth in the adoptive family cannot be extended to the extent of holding that the adopted son must be considered not to have and indeed the rule of divesting has its limitation. 10. For all the foregoing reasons I have no hesitation to take the view that the Court below has rightly negated the enlarged claim of the plaintiff to the interest of Hariram and decreed her claim to the extent only of her husband's interest. 11. The appeal, therefore, fails and it is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.