JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The order of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack allowing an application under Order 33. Rule 1. CPC (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") permitting to sue as an indigent person is being challenged in this revision. 2. According to the Plaintiff the court-fee payable on the plaint is Rs. 603/-, and he does not possess sufficient means to pay the same and 'has not got any immovable property except the property which is the subject-matter of the suit. It has also been averred in the application that there has been no disposal of property by him within two months from the date of presentation of the application. 3. This application was resisted by Defendant No. 1 on the ground that it is barred by principles of res judicata and further that the application -is not maintainable. It was also averred that the Plaintiff has extensive moveable properties and his monthly income is more than Rs. 300/-. 4. In course of hearing of that petition before the Subordinate Judge the Plaintiff-Petitioner examined himself and no evidence was led I on behalf of Defendant-opposite party No. 1. On the basis of the evidence led, the Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the Petitioner is an indigent person and has not disposed of any property within three months from the date of presentation of the application under Order 33, Rule 1 of the Code. He has further held that the Petitioner has not entered into any agreement with reference to the subject-matter of the proposed suit and that no person has entered into an agreement with the Petitioner to finance the litigation. On the question of the defence plea that the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata, the learned Subordinate Judge has rejected the said contention and accordingly allowed the application permitting the Plaintiff-Petitioner to sue as an indigent person. 5. The contesting Defendant-opposite party No. 1 is the Petitioner in the present revision. Mr. On the question of the defence plea that the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata, the learned Subordinate Judge has rejected the said contention and accordingly allowed the application permitting the Plaintiff-Petitioner to sue as an indigent person. 5. The contesting Defendant-opposite party No. 1 is the Petitioner in the present revision. Mr. Dey, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, raises only one contention in this revision namely, the Court should have rejected the application for permission to sue as an indigent person under Order 33, Rule 5 of the Code since the allegations made by the applicant in the application show that the suit would be barred by the principles of res judicata and would, therefore, be covered by Clause (f) of Rule 5 of Order 33 of the Code. According to Mr. Dey, the allegation in the present plaint is that Defendant No. 1 filed. Title Suit No. 293 of 1976 for specific performance of contract in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, and got the summons suppressed and ultimately got the suit decreed ex parte on 23-3-1977. An application had been filed to set aside the ex parte decree being Misc. Case No. 294 of 1979, which was dismissed on 29-9-1981 and the present suit has been filed to set aside the ex parte decree that was passed on 23-3-1977 and, therefore, the suit must be held to be barred by the principles of res judicata. In support of his aforesaid contention, he places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijai Pratap Singh etc. v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh and Anr. (1962) S.C. D. 676 and the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Ramrup Goshain v. Mahabir Shah2. In the Supreme Court decision, the provision of Order 33, Rule Sed) was being considered and it has been held that under the said provision, the Court has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the Petitioner to the relief he claims. In the Supreme Court decision, the provision of Order 33, Rule Sed) was being considered and it has been held that under the said provision, the Court has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the Petitioner to the relief he claims. The Supreme Court also has observed that if accepting the allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected and to ascertain whether the petition shows a cause of action, the Court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the Petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the Defendant may raise upon the merits, nor is the Court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. I am not in a position to appreciate as to how the aforesaid decision is of any assistance to the Petitioner's contention in the present case. In the Patna case Ramrup Goshain Vs. Mahabir Shah, on which the learned Counsel places reliance the point which is in issue in the present case directly came up for consideration and it has been held: ...unless the Plaintiff can show that there were other grounds of fraud, apart from the service of processes, I think the suit cannot be allowed to proceed... In other words a latter suit for declaration that a decree passed ex parte is void on account of fraud, is untenable if an earlier application to set aside the decree has been dismissed under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code unless fresh grounds of fraud are mentioned. Therefore, if in the subsequent suit allegations of fraud have been made which could not have .been a subject matter of decision under Order 9, Rule 13, then the dismissal of the application under Order 9. Rule 13 cannot be bar of filing a fresh suit applying the principles of res judicata. This question came up for consideration before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashraf Vs. Rule 13 cannot be bar of filing a fresh suit applying the principles of res judicata. This question came up for consideration before the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashraf Vs. Karim Bux and Another The learned Judge after taking into consideration a number of authorities on the point held: On a consideration of the provision of Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, and of the relevant case law defining the scope of a suit to set aside an ex parte decree I hold that such a suit based on the allegation that the Defendant's claim in the earlier suit was itself a fraud on the Plaintiffs of the later suit and that the contrivance adopted in procuring a false endorsement of service on the summons was only a part of the same fraud, is not barred by res judicata on any point that may have been decided about that service in the miscellaneous proceedings.... This question also came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Girish Chandra Jena v. Kalachand Maity AIR 1957 Cal 212. The learned Judges observed: "It is settled law that where the fraud alleged is of such kind as to attack the suit itself and not merely the regularity or sufficiency of the service or the proceedings, a suit by a person on whom no summons was served, for setting aside the ex parte decree is maintainable. It is also settled law that mere falsity of claim and/or perjured evidence if non-service of summons be not proved will not support the action. The Plaintiff, therefore, in a suit for setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground of fraud when he was unsuccessful in his application for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of non-service of summons must prove some kind of fraud which affects the suit itself and not merely the regularity or sufficiency of the service or the proceedings, in addition to non-service of summons in order to obtain a decree...... This being the true legal position and if the present plaint is examined, in my opinion, the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge to the effect that the Petitioner in the proposed suit has challenged the ex parte decree on the ground that the agreement for sale on which the ex parte decree is founded was obtained from him fraudulently and by misrepresentation of facts, must be sustained. The plaint read as a whole would indicate that the fraud alleged includes even the falsity of the claim which, therefore, attacks the earlier suit itself and is not confined to service of summons in the earlier suit. In the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code; the attack was on the regularity or sufficiency of the service. In this view of the matter, the present suit cannot be said to be barred by the principles of res judicata, so as to throwaway an application for permission to sue as an indigent person under Order 33, Rule 5 (f) of the Code. Consequently, the contention of Mr. Dey for the Petitioner fails and this revision is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed