JUDGMENT R.R. Misra, J. 1. The plaintiff-appellant has filed a civil suit for partition of the properties mentioned in schedules A and B of the plaint on the allegations that the properties mentioned in schedule A were ancestral properties and the properties mentioned in schedule B were self acquired properties of the father of the appellant. Shop No. 24/43, G. T. Road, Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad, was under the tenancy of the father of the plaintiff and the plaintiff inherited the said tenancy along with his brother Ganga Shanker, who is defendant No. 3 in the suit. Along with the suit the plaintiff had also filed an application for an interim injunction. Aforesaid defendant No. 3 filed an objection in the injunction matter without serving a copy on the plaintiff' or his counsel. The trial court, however, rejected the application for injunction vide order dated 10-9-1986 without giving an opportunity of filing any reply to the objection. The said order passed by the trial court forms subject matter of the First Appeal From Order filed in this Court which has been admitted. The plaintiff had also filed in the trial court an application for appointment of a Commissioner which was allowed. Since no objection was filed to the aforesaid report of the Commissioner the same became final. 2. Ganga Shanker, defendant No. 3, also moved an application before the trial court for eviction of the plaintiff from the shop in dispute. This application was rejected by the trial court vide order dated 18-9-1986. Since the aforesaid defendant No. 3 was threatening to dispossess the plaintiff from the shop in dispute the plaintiff appellant moved an application for stay of dispossession, as aforesaid. Ultimately, on 29-9-1986 a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order :- "Issue Notice. Meanwhile respondents are restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff appellant from the shop No. 24/43, G. T. Road, Chhibramau, District Farrukhabad. Sd/-N. D. Ojha, A.C.J. Sd/-R. P. Singh, J." 3. The contention raised before me by the plaintiff-appellant is that the aforesaid injunction order was duly served on the defendant-respondent No. 3 on 1-10-1986. A certified copy of the said order was also filed in the trial court on 3-10-1986. Sd/-N. D. Ojha, A.C.J. Sd/-R. P. Singh, J." 3. The contention raised before me by the plaintiff-appellant is that the aforesaid injunction order was duly served on the defendant-respondent No. 3 on 1-10-1986. A certified copy of the said order was also filed in the trial court on 3-10-1986. It is, however, submitted that despite the aforesaid injunction order passed against the respondent from dis-possessing the plaintiff from the shop in question on 29-9-1986 the respondent No. 3 and his son Akhileshwar Prasad at about 7 P. M. in the evening attacked the plaintiff-appellant with iron rods, lathis and inflicted heavy blows with the same on the appellant. Thereafter the respondent No. 3 and his son Akhileshwar Prasad took out the keys of the aforesaid shop from the pocket of the appellant and after locking the aforesaid shop ran away from the place of the occurrence, and that the respondent No. 3 is an influential person and is in hand-in-glove with local police. Besides the above, the aforesaid defendant No. 3 lodged a false first information report against the appellant and got the appellant arrested by police. The appellant also tried to lodge a first information report but the same was not registered by the Station Officer of Police Station Chhibramau. The appellant was thereafter released on bail. The appellant, however, made an application dated 31-10-1986 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad stating about the incident that took place and the fact that the Station Officer, police station Chhibramau had refused to register the first information report in question. A true copy of the aforesaid application dated 31-10-1986 has been filed as Annexure I to the affidavit dated 12-12-1986 filed by the appellant. No action was, however, taken on the aforesaid application of the appellant. The appellant has made an application dated 12-12-1986 in this Court praying for a direction for delivering back the possession of the shop in question which was obtained by force by the respondents after the date of grant of injunction order by this Court and for delivery of one set of keys of the aforesaid shop. This prayer for one set of keys has been made because admittedly in the shop in dispute there are two portions-one portion was occupied by the plaintiff and the other portion is occupied by the defendant No. 3. This prayer for one set of keys has been made because admittedly in the shop in dispute there are two portions-one portion was occupied by the plaintiff and the other portion is occupied by the defendant No. 3. The entire shop has got a door and common lock and, therefore, the need arises for re-delivery of one set of keys of the aforesaid shop Sri Akhileshwar Prasad son of defendant No. 3 has filed a counter affidavit in the injunction matter in this Court and an application has also been moved for vacating the aforesaid injunction order. Rejoinder affidavits have been filed in regard to the injunction application as well as the aforesaid application dated 12-12-1986. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The application made by the plaintiff appellant for re-delivery of the keys and possession is sought to be opposed by Sri H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for the respondent on two grounds. The first is that the date of dis-possession is not known and secondly the answering respondent had no knowledge of the injunction order in question granted by the High Court and that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to impute knowledge to the respondent. In support of his submission that in the absence of the knowledge of the injunction order passed by this Court neither any liability can be fastened on the respondent nor any action can be taken against him-reliance is placed on the decision of the case of Mulraj v. Murti Raghunath Maharaj Ji, AIR 1967 SC 1386 . In reply the learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. He submits that from the facts of this case it is amply clear that even on the date of the injunction order passed by this Court the plaintiff-appellant was in possession and has been dispossessed by force by the answering respondent on 29-10-1986, as aforesaid. Hence the plaintiff appellant is entitled for re-delivery of possession. "Secondly the defendant respondent had full knowledge of the injunction order granted by this Court as the same was served on him on 1-10-1986 i. e. long before the date of dispossession. Let me now examine the two rival contentions made by the parties. Hence the plaintiff appellant is entitled for re-delivery of possession. "Secondly the defendant respondent had full knowledge of the injunction order granted by this Court as the same was served on him on 1-10-1986 i. e. long before the date of dispossession. Let me now examine the two rival contentions made by the parties. The first point that requires investigation is as to whether the plaintiff appellant was in possession even upto 29-9-1986 the date of passing of the injunction order by this Court. In this connection a perusal of the order dated 18-9-1986 passed by the trial court on the application moved by the defendant respondent No. 3 is relevant. A copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure VI to the affidavit dated 29-9-1986 filed by the appellant. The said order is reproduced below :- "Heard on 29D, 35C. 29-D has been moved by defendant No. 3 for evicting the plaintiff, and police aid as well. It is admitted fact that the rights of the parties have not finally been adjudicated by this Court. Further, no decree or the judgment has been decided by the court finally giving rights to the defendant to eject the plaintiff from the disputed shop. Besides, the present suit, for partition has been filed by the plaintiff hence if any relief regarding the eviction from the shop is required by the defendant No. 3, he should or can only do this after final adjudication of the rights in the suit or by filing fresh suit not otherwise, because it is admitted case of the defendant No. 3 that the plaintiff is still in the possession, it may be illegal as well. So proper stage will only come after final adjudication of the rights of the parties, therefore, 29-D is not maintainable at this stage. It is hereby rejected." 5. It is thus clear that till 18-9-1986 the plaintiff appellant was in possession and the defendant respondent No. 3 had moved for his eviction from the same through the Court. IT has also been stated in this order that it is admitted case of the defendant No. 3 that the plaintiff is still in possession. As already stated, this application for eviction was rejected by the trial court as there had been yet no final adjudication of the rights of the parties. IT has also been stated in this order that it is admitted case of the defendant No. 3 that the plaintiff is still in possession. As already stated, this application for eviction was rejected by the trial court as there had been yet no final adjudication of the rights of the parties. Besides this a copy of Commissioner's report dated 6-9-1985 has been filed as Annexure III to the aforesaid affidavit dated 29-9-1986. A perusal of the said Commissioner's report also shows that the shop in dispute consisted of two portions and the plaintiff-appellant was in possession of half of the same. No objection to the said Commissioner's report was filed by the answering respondent and the same had become final. These allegations which were stated in paragraphs 6 to 8 of the aforesaid affidavit of the appellant have been denied in the counter affidavit filed by the son of Ganga Shanker who is answering defendant on the ground that he has no knowledge of the same. From a perusal of a copy of the Commissioner's report in question it is clear that on 6-9-1985 the date of inspection the plaintiff was in possession of the shop in dispute. Therefore, in my opinion, from the above facts the plaintiff-appellant has successfully established that he was in possession of the disputed shop till 29-9-1986 when the interim injunction order was passed by this Court and that he was forcibly dis-possessed thereafter on 29-10-1986 as per details mentioned above. To my mind on the basis of above facts alone the plaintiff appellant is entitled to the reliefs claimed by him in his application under reference including the relief for re-delivery of possession. 6. However, now let me examine the second controversy raised by the parties as to whether the defendant No. 3 had any knowledge of the aforesaid injunction order dated 29-9-1986 granted by this Court. A perusal of the counter affidavit dated 20-2-1987 sworn by Akhileshwar Prasad son of Ganga Shanker, defendant No. 3, shows that while replying to the facts relating to dispossession of the plaintiff on 29-10-1986, the respondent has no where stated that before the said date of dis-possession the said respondent did not have any knowledge of the interim order dated 29-9-1986 passed by this Court. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the appellant has also invited my attention to the contempt application No. 653 of 1986 filed by the plaintiff appellant against the respondents in this Court in which notice has been issued for deliberately disobeying the injunction order dated 29-9-1986 passed by this Court. I have sent for the original file of the aforesaid contempt matter. According to the file in the aforesaid contempt case although the respondents have been served but they have not filed any counter affidavit so far. According to the affidavit dated 12-12-1986 filed by the appellant in the said contempt proceedings, the averment made in paragraph 5 of the affidavit is that immediately after passing of the injunction order by this Court staying the dis-possession of the appellant from the shop in question the appellant had filed a copy of the said order in the trial court and had also served a copy of the said order on the respondents including Ganga Shanker, respondent No. 3, on 1-10-1986. It has also been stated in paragraph 14 of the said affidavit that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were also present when the entire incident took place on 29-10-1986, as aforesaid and that the said respondent Nos. 1 and 2 actively assisted the defendant No. 3 at that time. It has also been averred that different sets of locks on the door of the aforesaid shop has now been put up by the defendant-respondent No. 3. In view of the aforesaid facts I am firmly of the view that the defendant respondents had personal knowledge of the aforesaid injunction order dated 29-9-1986 passed by this Court ever since 1-10-1986 and that despite knowledge of the said injunction order dated 29-9-1986 they forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff on 29-10-1986 from the shop in question. 7. In Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 882 at p. 883 it was observed that the Court is not completely stopped from taking notice of events and circumstances which happen subsequently. 8. Now let me consider the following cases to discern the true nature and scope of inherent powers of the Court. 7. In Mahant Ram Das v. Ganga Das, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 882 at p. 883 it was observed that the Court is not completely stopped from taking notice of events and circumstances which happen subsequently. 8. Now let me consider the following cases to discern the true nature and scope of inherent powers of the Court. Explaining on the nature of inherent power of the Court in the case of Manoharlal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 27 the Supreme Court has stated as under :- "The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court but it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it." Stating the scope of inherent powers the Supreme Court in the case of Padma Sai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 218 at p. 219 has set out the scope of the said powers in the following words : - "The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against intentions of the Legislature." 9. Similarly in the case of Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1152 Krishna Iyer, J. quoting from the Theoretical Basis of Inherent Powers Doctrine (Text-Jim Carrigan-published in National College of the State Judiciary U. S. A) observed as follows :- "The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breath is coextensive with the necessity-certainly, we cannot go against any statutory prescription." 10. Commenting on the scope of inherent powers the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1384 at page 1350 has summarised as under :- "The Courts have power in the absence of any express or implied prohibition to pass an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. To hold otherwise would result in quite a number of cases in gross miscarriage of justice." Therefore, in view of the above scope of the inherent powers, I consider it the duty of this Court to take notice of the events subsequent to passing of the order dated 29-9-86 and see that the wrong done by the respondents is undone. After all this Court cannot be a silent spectator to the state of affairs as found in the present case and shut its eyes to it. If the incident that has taken place in the present case and wrong done to the appellant is allowed to continue, public confidence will surely be lost in the working as well as in the orders of this Court. Although in the present case contempt proceedings, as aforesaid, are going on against the respondents yet so far as the present case is concerned, this Court has ample powers under the law and in the interest of justice to restore possession to the plaintiff appellant. In my opinion the said contempt proceedings will neither be a substitute for the wrongs done by the respondents to the appellant nor for reliefs claimed for hereinbefore in this application by the appellant regarding dispossession, loss of business, deprivation of means of livelihood etc. 11. In the result, it is held that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the defendants-respondents have got any force and that the plaintiff appellant is entitled to the reliefs prayed for by him. In the interest of justice, therefore, having regard to the facts of this case that the Station Officer Chhibramau is in collusion with the defendant No. 3 respondent, I direct the Senior Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad, to go to the spot personally and after contacting the parties to the case deliver back possession of half portion of the shop in question to the plaintiff-appellant as well also deliver one set of keys of the aforesaid shop to the appellant. All the parties to this appeal are further directed by this order to be present at the spot immediately the Senior Superintendent of Police asks them to do so. In view of the incident that has taken place, the. All the parties to this appeal are further directed by this order to be present at the spot immediately the Senior Superintendent of Police asks them to do so. In view of the incident that has taken place, the. prayer made by the appellant to allow him to construct a temporary partition of either wood or tin in the aforesaid shop is also allowed and the said Senior Superintendent of Police will see that such a temporary partition is also put up. The Registrar is directed to send necessary requisition to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad, within twenty four hours by a Special Messenger to be delivered personally to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Farrukhabad who is further directed to submit a report of compliance of this order to this Court within a week from the date of this order. The case shall be now listed for passing necessary orders before me on 13th April 1987.