JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition tiled under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under section 21 of U P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The respondent no. 1, Durgesh Kumar Srivastava filed an application under section 21 of the Act on the ground that the building was required by him for his personal use. The application under section 21 of the Act was contested by the petitioner. This case was initially pending in the court of Sri Amar Singh, Judicial Magistrate Allahabad, who was exercising the powers of the prescribed authority under the Act. Subsequently the case was transferred to the III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the III Additional Civil Judge to decide the application under section 21 of the Act on the ground that the order passed by the District Judge, Allahabad transferring the case to the III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad was not a valid authorisation and as such the III Additional Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case. These objections were decided by the III Additional Civil Judge by his order dated 23rd August, 1986 holding that the authorisation made by the District Judge in his favour was a legal and valid authorisation and as such he has jurisdiction to proceed with the case. The petitioner has now challenged this order by means of the present petition. 2. The only question to be considered in this petition is as to whether the order passed by the District Judge, Allahabad on 12 December, 1985 authorising the III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad to act as the prescribed authority under the Act is a valid order or not. In order to consider this question, it is necessary to quote the various orders passed by the District Judge, Allahabad in this connection. 3. On 8th August, 1983, the District Judge, Allahabad in exercise of the power conferred upon him under clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act authorised Shri Amar Singh, Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad to perform and discharge all the powers and functions of the prescribed authority under the Act in the cases of police circles Kotwali and Colonelganj. 3. On 8th August, 1983, the District Judge, Allahabad in exercise of the power conferred upon him under clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act authorised Shri Amar Singh, Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad to perform and discharge all the powers and functions of the prescribed authority under the Act in the cases of police circles Kotwali and Colonelganj. Thereafter, on 12th June, 1984 another order was passed by the District Judge, Allahabad authorising the petitioner Shri Ajai Verma, Judicial Magistrate III to perform and discharge all the powers and functions of the prescribed authority under the Act in respect of the police circles other than Kotwali and Colonelganj. The effect of these orders was that Shri Amar Singh was to perform the functions of the prescribed authority under the areas of Kotwali and Colonelganj and Shri Ajai Verma was to act as the prescribed authority for police circles other than Kotwali and Colonelganj. The powers of the prescribed authority were consequently divided between two officers, namely, Judicial Magistrate III and Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad. The orders dated 8th August, 1983 and June 12, 1984 are quoted below :- " In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 3 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972) as amended by Act No. 23 of 1976, and in modification of my order dated 8-11-1982 in this regard, I P. N. Roy, District Judge, Allahabad authorise Sri Amar Singh, J. M. IV Allahabad to perform and discharge all the powers and functions of the Prescribed Authority under the aforesaid Act for the cases of Police Circles Kotwali and Colonelganj, Allahabad. This order shall come in force with immediate effect Sd/-P. N. Roy District Judge, Dated 8-8-1983. Allahabad. " In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (e) of Section 3 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972) as amended by Act No. 28 of 1976, and in modification of the order of the District Judge dated 30-6-83 in this regard, I, D. N. Shukla, District Judge, Allahabad authorise Sri Ajai Verma, Judicial Magistrate III, Allahabad to perform and discharge all the powers and functions of the prescribed authority under the aforesaid Act for all the Police Circles except that of Kotwali and Colonelganj. This order shall come in force with effect from 12-6-84. Sd/- District Judge, June 12, 1984. Allahabad." 4. On December 12, 1985 the District Judge, Allahabad withdrew the cases from the Judicial Magistrate III and Judicial Magistrate IV and transferred them to the II Additional Civil Judge and III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad respectively and appointed the II and III Additional Civil Judges as prescribed authorities for the respective areas. The order dated December 12, 1985 is quoted below :- "The IInd and IIIrd Additional Civil Judges, Allahabad are hereby appointed as Prescribed Authorities. Prescribed Authorities cases withdrawn from J. M. Ill and J. M. IV be respectively transferred to Additional Civil Judge II and Addl. Civil Judge III, Allahabad. Sd/-R. C. Awasthy District Judge, Allahabad 12-12-85." The petitioner has now challenged this order dated 12-12-1985 on three grounds. The submission is that the order is invalid firstly because the area over which the prescribed authority will function has not been stated in the order. The second is that by order in question IInd and IIIrd Additional Civil Judges, Allahabad have been appointed and not authorised and as such it is against the provisions of Section 3 (e) of the Act The third ground is that the authorisation should have been by name and not by office and as such the order in question is invalid. 5. I will decide each ground separately. 6. So far as the question of area is concerned, one has to read all the three orders dated 8-8-83, 12-6-84 and December 12, 1985. On a reading of these orders it is apparent that the Judicial Magistrate III was directed to function as a prescribed authority for the police circles other than Kotwali and Colonelganj, while the Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad was directed to perform the functions of the prescribed authority for the areas covered by the police circles, Kotwali and Colonelganj. The cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate III have been transferred to the II Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad and the cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad have been transferred to the III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad. It is, therefore, clear that the area for which the prescribed authority will function under the order dated 12-12-85 is absolutely clear. The cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate III have been transferred to the II Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad and the cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate IV, Allahabad have been transferred to the III Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad. It is, therefore, clear that the area for which the prescribed authority will function under the order dated 12-12-85 is absolutely clear. The II Additional Civil Judge will function as a prescribed authority for the area covered by the police circles except that of Kotwali and Colonelganj and the III Additional Civil Judge shall perform the functions of the prescribed authority over the areas covered by the police circles Kotwali and Colonelganj, Allahabad. In the circumstances, by mere not mentioning of the area in the order dated 12-12-1985 does not make the order invalid. The orders dated 3-8-83 and June 12, 1984 have to be read alongwith the order dated 12-12-1985. I do not find any ambiguity as such in the order dated 12-12-1985 and it cannot be said that the order is bad merely because the area has not been mentioned in the said order. In order to consider the second and third grounds of challenge, it is necessary to quote Section 3 (e) of the Act itself, which is in the following terms :- "(e) "prescribed authority" means a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under this Act, and different such officers may be so authorised in respect of different areas or cases or classes of cases, and the District Judge may recall any case from any such officer and may transfer it for disposal to any another such officer." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has urged that the prescribed authority acts as a persona designata and not as a court. He has cited Jullah Siddiqui v. District Judge Mirzapur, 1983 ARC 249 Kalawati Reja v. Addl. Civil Judge, Kanpur, 1983 AWC 365 and M/s. Gur Narain Jagat Narain v. Motor and General Sales Private Limited, 1977 UP RCC 58 to urge that the prescribed authority is a persona designata and not to a court. This proposition is not disputed. It is well settled that the prescribed authority acts as a persona designata and not a court. 8. This proposition is not disputed. It is well settled that the prescribed authority acts as a persona designata and not a court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, urged that if once the prescribed authority in law acts as a persona designata, then the authorisation under Section 3 (e) of the Act has to be by 'name' and not by 'office'. His further case is that the District Judge under the sub-clause (e) has to authorise the officer to perform the functions of a prescribed authority and he has no power to appoint him as a prescribed authority. The counsel has specific objection to the use of the word 'appointment' in the order dated 12-12-1985. The word 'appointment' has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I as follows :- " the action of nominating to, or placing in, an office. " 9. The word 'appointment' can be used in various circumstances. The word 'appointment' can be used when a person is appointed to a particular office. The said word can also be used in a limited way for the purposes of nominating a person to that office. It is not necessary that the word 'appointment' should always mean that it denotes the initial appointment of a person. This argument in my opinion is wholly fallacious. 10. In Abdul Hussain Tayabali v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1968 SC 432 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 3 (c) of the Land Acquisition Act observed as follows :- "In the context of Section 3 (c) when an officer is authorised to perform the functions of the Collector it means that he is appointed to perform those functions. The clause does not contemplate a separate or an additional post. What it means is that some officer who is already in the Government employment is authorised to work as a Collector for the purposes of the Act. In this sense whether he is appointed or authorised to perform the Collector's functions he would be complying with the terms of that clause." The observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in my opinion, fully applies to the present case. It was not necessary for the District Judge to have only used the word 'authorised' and not 'appointed'. If the word 'appointed' is used, it would mean that the officer was authorised to perform the functions so delegated. It was not necessary for the District Judge to have only used the word 'authorised' and not 'appointed'. If the word 'appointed' is used, it would mean that the officer was authorised to perform the functions so delegated. It makes no difference whether the word 'appointed' has been used or the word 'authorised' has been used In the context in which the expression has been used by the District Judge it clearly means that he had authorised the IInd and IIIrd Additional Civil Judges, Allahabad to perform the functions of the prescribed authority. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is wholly without substance. 11. The last contention as I have already observed above, which has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the authorisation should have been made by 'name' and not by 'office'. 12. Section 15 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 is as follows :- "Whether by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment may be made either by name or by virtue of office." From the above section it is clear that where power has been given under any U. P Act to authorise a particular person to perform certain functions, the said authorisation can be made either by name or by virtue of office. In view of this specific provision that an authorisation can be by virtue of office, also the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is wholly without substance. 13. This question has been considered in a few cases which I will hereinafter refer. 14. In Sindhi Lohena Choithram Parasram v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 1532 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider Section 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which is practically in similar terms as Section 15 of the U. P. General Clauses Act quoted above. It opined as follows :- "Section 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 shows that a person may be appointed to execute any function either by name or by virtue of office. It opined as follows :- "Section 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 shows that a person may be appointed to execute any function either by name or by virtue of office. A person may therefore be empowered by name or by virtue of his office of Deputy Superintendent of Police to issue a special search warrant. Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act requires that the Deputy Superintendent of Police must be specially empowered to issue the warrant. In AIR 1943 Sind 107 (supra), the expression specially empowered by name and not by virtue of his office, and an authorisation of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rohri was said to be insufficient for the purposes of Sec. 6. This decision does not lay down the correct test. A person may be specially empowered not only by name but also by virtue of his office. In 49 Bom. LR 798 : AIR 1948 Bom. 156 (supra) it was rightly held that a notification authorising the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Poona city to issue a search warrant under Sec. 6 specially empowered the holder of that office by virtue of his office to issue the warrant. We think that where power is conferred on a person by name or by virtue of his office, the individual designated by name or as the holder of the office for the time being is empowered specially. Judged by this test, the notification dated January 22, 1955, specially empowered Sri Pandya as the holder of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Porbandar, to issue the search warrant under Sec. 6. " From the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparent that an authorisation made by an 4 office 'and not by' name ' is a valid authorisation. The principle laid down in this case fully applies to the present case. 15. In Habib Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, 1953 SC page 287 also it had been argued before Hon'ble Supreme Court that the authorisation should be by ' name '. The Chief Minister in that case issued a notification authorising all Civil Administrators of the districts to exercise, within their respective jurisdiction the powers of the Chief Minister under Section 5 (b) of the Regulation. The Chief Minister in that case issued a notification authorising all Civil Administrators of the districts to exercise, within their respective jurisdiction the powers of the Chief Minister under Section 5 (b) of the Regulation. The Supreme Court repelled the contention and held as follows :- "We do not think there is any substance in this contention. The delegatee can certainly be described by reference to his official designation and the authority may be vested in the holder of a particular office for the time being. This, we think, is quite a proper and convenient way of delegating the powers which are exercisable by the Chief Minister." 16. In accordance with the principles laid down in this case, it is not necessary that the authorisation should be by 'name' only. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had also an occasion to consider this question in New India Insurance Co. v. Molia Devi, AIR 1969 M. P. page 190. It was argued before the High Court that since the Administrative Claims Tribunal was functioning as a persona designata and not as a court, the authorisation by official designation was invalid. The court relying on Section 15 of the General Clauses Act held that there is no bar to the appointment of a persona designata by official designation. 17. In view of the above, I am clearly of the opinion that the authorisation by ' office ' was a valid authorisation and it was not necessary for the District Judge to have given a name of the officer while passing an order under Section 3 (e) of the Act. 18. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of Hyderabad High Court in Aurangabad Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, AIR 1952 Hyderabad page 144. This case is clearly distinguishable on facts. This was a case where the appointment of a Tribunal was made under Section 7 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as follows :- "7 (1) The appropriate Government may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of Industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Act. This case is clearly distinguishable on facts. This was a case where the appointment of a Tribunal was made under Section 7 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as follows :- "7 (1) The appropriate Government may constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of Industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Act. " On a reading of this provision, the court held that it is a person who has to be appointed and as such it is necessary that his name should be mentioned in the order issued under Section 7 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This is not the case here. In any case, if the decision in Aurangabad Mills' case (supra) is taken to mean that the authorisation should be by name ', I respectfully disagree with the same. 19. Since, I do not agree with all the three contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the authorisation made by the District Judge, Allahabad by the order dated December 12, 1985, I do not find any merit in this petition. 20. In the end it may, however, be observed that the Act or Rules do not prescribe any particular form in which an authorisation has to be made by the District Judge under Section 3 (e) of the Act. In a similar matter in Ram Chandra v. Mohan Lal Tewari, 1954 AWR 254 Hon'ble Bhargava, J. (as he then was) had clearly held that Section 2 (d) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 does not require that the authority to perform the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act, should be conferred in any particular form but an order to be valid should be so worded as to indicate that that order had the effect and was intended to authorise the officer to perform the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act. In a case of an authorisation under Section 3 (e) of the present Act also the order would be a valid order if it has the effect of authorising an officer to perform functions of the prescribed authority as no particular form is required by the Act and the Rules for the said purpose. In a case of an authorisation under Section 3 (e) of the present Act also the order would be a valid order if it has the effect of authorising an officer to perform functions of the prescribed authority as no particular form is required by the Act and the Rules for the said purpose. In the instant case, I am clearly of the opinion, that the objection had been taken by the petitioner challenging authorisation simply to delay the proceedings. In the circumstances the petition is dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 3-9-1986 is hereby vacated. The Prescribed Authority is directed to dispose of the application under Section 21 of the Act as expeditiously as possible without any further delay.