Judgment :- First respondent is the owner of a storeyed building at Viyyur (Trichur) Different portions of it were occupied by tenants. Though the petitioner says that himself and respondents 2 and 3 are still continuing as tenants, the version of the first respondent is that the petitioner alone is continuing in the building while all others vacated fearing the dangerous condition of the building. 2. Alleging that the building is in such a condition necessitating action under Section 133(1)(d) of the Cr.P.C. the first respondent moved the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for action. After the requisite satisfaction the Magistrate initiated proceedings as M.C. 90/84 and passed a conditional order under Section 133(1)(d) and issued notice. Petitioner entered appearance and filed objection. After taking evidence the Magistrate passed the final order making the conditional order absolute. That order was challenged by the petitioner in Crl.R.P. 38/86 before the Sessions Judge, Trichur. Revision was allowed and the order was set aside. That order was the subject-matter of Crl.R.P. 423/86 before this court filed by the first respondent. The order of the Sessions Judge was set aside and the case was remanded to the Sessions Judge. By the revised order dt. 18-11-1986 the Session Judge dismissed the revision petition. The present petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the final order confirmed by the Sessions Judge as an abuse of the process of law. 3. Advocate Shri P. V. Ayyappan appearing for the petitioner raised the following three contentions before me and elaborated on those three points. They are : (1) Section 133 of the Code cannot be resorted to in order to do away with the vested rights acquired by others, (2) Criminal Procedure Code is a general procedural law and its provisions cannot have the effect of overriding the provisions of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which is a special legislation relating to leases of buildings and (3) S. 133(1)(d) of the Code provides for three alternative remedies, namely, (a) removal, (b) repair or (c) support of the building etc., but the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge without considering the second or third possibilities resorted to the extreme step. 4. 4. Before adverting to these arguments, I think it is advisable to consider the powers of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge in this respect and the limitations within which alone this Court can interfere with the orders in exercise of the inherent powers. Section 133 appears in Chapter X relating to maintenance of public order and tranquility and comes under sub-heading B relating to public nuisances. Though the ambit of 'public nuisances' coming under Chap. X of the Cr.P.C. is not so wide as under the definition in S. 268 of the Indian Penal Code what is enjoined on the Magistrate is a public duty to avert danger to the public. Though danger to a single individual may also be sufficient in some cases what is involved is danger to the public and the provision is not intended to settle private disputes. It is not necessary that anybody in particular should move the Magistrate. When he is satisfied on the basis of a police report or other information and on taking such evidence as he thinks necessary that circumstances justifying action under the provision exist it is his duty to act. On such satisfaction he can pass the conditional order and issue notice and he is bound to do so in public interest. When cause is shown it is his duty to enquire into the matter and pass final orders after taking evidence. Who set the law in motion is not the question. The question is whether the Magistrate acted on sufficient satisfaction based on relevant materials. 5. Here we are concerned only with a building. The records show that the conditional order was issued by the Magistrate on the requisite satisfaction that the building is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and cause injury to persons. The final order also seems to have been passed after satisfaction on taking evidence. All these were within his competence and he was duty bound also. The Sessions Judge was legally competent to entertain a revision against the order and consider its correctness, legality or propriety. He has done so and he did not find any reason for interference. Legislature in its wisdom thought of giving finality to the order passed in revision by the Sessions Judge as against the person who invoked the revisional powers. The Sessions Judge was legally competent to entertain a revision against the order and consider its correctness, legality or propriety. He has done so and he did not find any reason for interference. Legislature in its wisdom thought of giving finality to the order passed in revision by the Sessions Judge as against the person who invoked the revisional powers. In such a situation this Court may be reluctant to interfere with the orders even though the inherent powers are wide and self-restraint is the only limit having regard to the fact that nothing prevents action if it is found necessary to prevent abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice. Inherent powers are not intended to interfere with the pronouncements of competent tribunals unless this court is satisfied that action is necessary to prevent an illegality and the consequent injustice for which no remedy is provided. The learned counsel was not able to convince me that such a situation has arisen. From the records what appearance that the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge acted within their powers and came to conclusions from the materials available before them. In such a situation S. 482 of the Code cannot be used to open another revisional forum. The inherent powers saved under Section 482 are not intended to authories the High Court to go into the correctness or propriety of decisions of competent courts and tribunals where no question of illegality of miscarriage of justice is involved. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate misused his powers under Section 133 on account of the wealth and influence of the 1st respondent and took action at his instance in helping him to achieve his object of evicting tenants, which object, he would not have been able to achieve on account of the restrictions in S. 11 of the Rent Control Act. If this court has reason to conclude that powers under Section 133 were misused and the object of the proceeding was only to get the tenants evicted it may be a good reason for interference. But unfortunately the petitioner was not able to substantiate that argument and the order appears to have been in exercise of the powers bona fide. 7. There is no question of acquiring any vested right under the Rent Control Act. But unfortunately the petitioner was not able to substantiate that argument and the order appears to have been in exercise of the powers bona fide. 7. There is no question of acquiring any vested right under the Rent Control Act. Rent Control Act is a temporary legislation intended to control leases of buildings, eviction of tenants, and rent that could be released. Tenants are not having any immunity from eviction and no fixity of tenure is conferred on them. The Act only says that so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant continues and the provisions of the Act are applicable a landlord can evict his tenant from building only on proof of the existence of ascertain conditions. Those provisions are not intended to give the tenants any vested right not to be evicted or to continue eternally in occupation, but only to place some restrictions on the unfettered right of the landlord under the common law to evict his tenants freely according to his whims and fancies. Restrictions placed on eviction cannot be treated as vested right conferred on the tenants. The Act does not confer any right at all on the tenant. Then how can the petitioner say that he has some vested rights and those rights will be defeated by the action under Section 133 of the Cr.P.C. The Act is applicable only in areas when its provisions are extended and that too only so long as the Act continues to be in force and so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant continues. Even in such cases no tenant is having complete immunity from eviction because so far as eviction is concerned the Act places only restrictions and not a complete prohibition. Even a tenant mainly or solely depending upon income derived from the trade or business conducted in the rented premises for his livelihood is not having complete immunity from eviction. Therefore the plea that there is vested right is a misnomer. 8. The contention that the proceeding under Section 133 of the Code was mala fide and intended only to overcome the provisions of the Rent Control Act was taken up by the petitioner before the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge and it was negatived for valid reasons. Therefore the plea that there is vested right is a misnomer. 8. The contention that the proceeding under Section 133 of the Code was mala fide and intended only to overcome the provisions of the Rent Control Act was taken up by the petitioner before the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge and it was negatived for valid reasons. The Magistrate initiated proceedings not for eviction of the tenants including the petitioner, but only in the discharge of a public duty to avert the public nuisance of danger to the occupants, neighbours or passers-by. When the building is demolished in the discharge of that duty it may have the effect of the tenant vacating and the landlord getting vacant possession. That is only one of the results and not the purpose or object of the action. There is no right for a tenant in occupation of a building to say that whatever be the justification for the action under Section 133 it should not affect his right to continue in the building subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act and that he is prepared to suffer the danger of the building falling down. Even if the landlord and the tenant jointly contend before the Magistrate that the tenant may continue in the building and it should not be demolished, the Magistrate can go ahead with his action if he is satisfied that the building has to be demolished. The object and purpose are not matters for deduction solely from the direct or indirect results that follow. When a landlord moves the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the building is in such a condition that it requires reconstruction, the condition of the building, the necessity for demolition or reconstruction, the question of financial capacity and plan and licence etc., may be matters within the competence of the Rent Control Court to decide. But S. 133 of the Code is unconnected with and independent of the provisions of the Rent Control Act and in a proceeding under Section 133 the Magistrate is the sole authority to decide the conditions of the building and the necessity for its removal in public interest. 9. But S. 133 of the Code is unconnected with and independent of the provisions of the Rent Control Act and in a proceeding under Section 133 the Magistrate is the sole authority to decide the conditions of the building and the necessity for its removal in public interest. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner found fault with the Sessions Judge for having passed two diametrically opposite orders, one allowing the revision and setting aside the order of the Magistrate and the second revised order dismissing the revision and confirming the order, as if he has done something wrong. In the first order the Sessions Judge declined to go into the merits of the case because he was of the opinion that in the matter of a tenanted building coming within the provisions of the Rent Control Act the only authority who could go into the question whether the building requires immediate demolition or not is the Rent Control Court and not the executive Magistrate under Section 133 of the Code. In Crl.R.P. 423/86 from that order this Court reversed the order and remanded the revision with a direction to go into the merits and decide the matter observing that the Rent Control Act and S. 133, Cr.P.C. are operating on entirely different fields and in a proceeding under Section 133, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate alone has to decide the matter. It was accordingly that the Sessions Judge considered the matter again and passed the revised order. I am not able to understand what is the impropriety involved. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner was attempting to support his client's case by referring to portions of the earlier order of the Sessions Judge which was set aside in revision by this Court. In spite of the order being set aside on the whole, the counsel was of the view, that it was not the effect of erasing the order in to and portions of it not specifically mentioned and superseded by the order of this Court could be relied on by him and this Court is bound to consider. I am not able to agree. When an order or judgment is set aside in toto as was done in this case the effect is that the order becomes non est and no portion of it could be relied on. I am not able to agree. When an order or judgment is set aside in toto as was done in this case the effect is that the order becomes non est and no portion of it could be relied on. These are fundamental propositions on which there cannot be two opinions. 10. The second contention is also without any substance. It was argued that the Code of Criminal Procedure is only a general procedural law which must be subject to the special provisions contained in the Rent Control Act which is a special legislation regarding tenancies of buildings. This argument was based on the non obstante clause contained in S. 11 of the Act which says that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Counsel says that this provisions has overriding effect on S. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also. Whatever is contained in S. 11 of the Rent Control Act may be good law so far as eviction of a tenant coming within the purview of the Act, in an area where the Act is applicable, is concerned. Whatever may be the provisions of any other law or contract, eviction of a tenant could be had only under the provisions of the Act subject to the conditions provided therein are applicable. Section 133 of the Code and the provisions of the Rent Control Act are operating on different fields under different contingencies although in some cases as a result of operation of an order under Section 133 of the Code a tenant entitled to protection under the Rent Control Act also may have vacate. But eviction of a tenant is not the object and purpose of S. 133. It is a public purpose and the result eviction, if any, is only one of the results which achieving the public purpose. Such a situation may be inevitable even though the object of the section is not that. 11. Rent Control Act or the non obstante clause in S. 11 cannot have the overriding effect on any provisions of law which is not meant and intended for eviction of tenants. Such a situation may be inevitable even though the object of the section is not that. 11. Rent Control Act or the non obstante clause in S. 11 cannot have the overriding effect on any provisions of law which is not meant and intended for eviction of tenants. If the argument is accepted even the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could be defeated on the basis of the non obstante clause if at least one of the results of the acquisition is that a tenant entitled to protection of the Rent Control Act will have to vacate. So also the same may be the case when action is taken for demolition of a building under the provisions of the Municipalities Act. These are only instances which will eloquently expose the hollowness of the contention. When action is taken in public interest for removal of a building on the ground that it is likely to fall and cause injuries to person living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood or passers-by, can an occupant of the building say that whenever be the consequences to himself and others he could continue in the building and he could be sent out only by recourse to the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The non obstante clause cannot have unrestricted operation in all areas irrespective of all limitations. It can operate only in the intended field where the eviction of a tenant entitled to protection is involved. Otherwise the anomalous position will be that S. 133 of the Cr.P.C. will become inoperative in cases of buildings occupied by tenants irrespective of the question whether action under Section 133 is justified or not. Such a situation was never contemplated by the provisions. Private interest of a tenant must always be subject to the public interest contemplated under Section 133 and S. 133 is not having the restricted operation alone. The Rent Control Act was intended only to regulate leasing of buildings, eviction of tenants and control rent of such buildings in areas where its provisions are made applicable. The applicability of the non obstante clause could only be in such cases. A landlord or a person entitled to eviction could evict only subject to the provisions. But in spheres where the provisions of the Act have no application the non obstante clause and the restrictions are of no avail. The applicability of the non obstante clause could only be in such cases. A landlord or a person entitled to eviction could evict only subject to the provisions. But in spheres where the provisions of the Act have no application the non obstante clause and the restrictions are of no avail. Section 11 of the Rent Control Act or the non obstante clause are not intended as exceptions to S. 133(1)(d), Cr.P.C. what is prohibited is only eviction of the tenant except in accordance with the provisions contained therein. The provisions of the Act do not in any way bar proceeding under the Code. The proceedings under Section 133 of the Code are independent of any civil proceedings also. This is also an aspect on which there is no scope for any controversy. Identical question were decided in Shanmugham v. Paul, (1986) Ker LT 1242 and I am in respectful agreement with all the views expressed therein. That is not only a decision between the same parties but the present petition itself is for quashing the order passed by the Sessions Judge pursuant to that decision. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not make a request before me to place the matter before a Division Bench on the ground that the law was not correctly laid down in that case. 12. The last contention is also equally baseless. It is true that there are there alternatives in abating the public nuisance namely removal, repair or support. If only a support is enough without repair or removal for the purpose of avoiding the nuisance that will suffice. If repair or support will not be sufficient and removal alone could achieve the object that will have to be resorted to. The Magistrate had requisite satisfaction from the evidence in the case that the building will fall down and its removal is the only solution. The Sessions Judge also came to the same conclusion. Can this Court on the basis of the evidence come to a different conclusion. One instance is sufficient to discard the argument as mala fide. While S. 133 proceeding was pending the present petitioner filed a petition under Section 17(2) of the Rent Control Act before the Accommodation Controller praying that the first respondent may be directed to repair the building. Report of the Revenue Inspector was called for. One instance is sufficient to discard the argument as mala fide. While S. 133 proceeding was pending the present petitioner filed a petition under Section 17(2) of the Rent Control Act before the Accommodation Controller praying that the first respondent may be directed to repair the building. Report of the Revenue Inspector was called for. The report showed that the building is in such a dangerous condition that it may fall at any moment and it cannot be repaired. The petition was dismissed accepting the report. Appeal filed by the petitioner before the District Collector was also dismissed. When the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge had the due satisfaction that removal of the building alone could serve the purpose, it is not for this Court exercising the inherent powers to say that support or repair will suffice. The petition has no merit and it is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.