ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 3-12-85 determinating the services of the petitioner and the order dated 27-6-86 dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner and also the order dated 10-12-85 directing the petitioner to vacate the accommodation. The petitioner has further prayed for issuing a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere with the petitioner's services and to pay her the salary as and when due and also not to evict her from the accommodation duly allotted to her. 2. The relevant facts emerging from the record are : The petitioner was appointed by the respondents as a clerk-cum-typist on 27-6-1978. In view of the work and conduct of the petitioner being found satisfactory the petitioner was appointed on probation as a Steno-typist with effect from 8-3-1980 and ultimately she was confirmed by the order dated 25-3-81 on the said post. The petitioner has stated that on account of her excellent performance and good conduct she was given honorarium on two occasions and once a special award. While posted at the Headquarters she was transferred to Varanasi Region of respondent 1 and there to the dismay of the petitioner she was informed vide order dated 3-12-85 that her services were no longer required which stood terminated with immediate effect. Thereafter the order dated 10-12-1985 was served on the petitioner to vacate the official quarter and to hand over its charge. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination dated 3-12-85 the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Board of Directors of respondent 1 as provided under the U.P. Financial Corporation Staff Regulations, 1961 (hereinafter called the Regulations). On 27-6-1986 the petitioner was informed about the dismissal of the appeal by the Board of Directors. 4. After the dismissal of the appeal the petitioner, within the postulates of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, as amended, preferred a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the `Tribunal') challenging the validity, legality and propriety of the order of termination as also the validity of Regulation 16-A of the Regulation. 4. After the dismissal of the appeal the petitioner, within the postulates of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, as amended, preferred a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the `Tribunal') challenging the validity, legality and propriety of the order of termination as also the validity of Regulation 16-A of the Regulation. It is stated by the petitioner that an objection was raised on behalf of the respondents before the Tribunal that it had no jurisdiction to strike down the provisions of the Regulation. Consequent to such an objection and acting on the legal advice the claim petition was withdrawn by the petitioner. The Tribunal passed the following order :- "the petition is permitted to be withdrawn. Costs easy". 5. As affidavits were exchanged between the parties and learned counsel for both sides agreed, this petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 6. The petitioner's case is that the impugned order of termination dated 3-12-1985 passed by the Managing Director of respondent 1 is illegal and suffers from a manifest error of law besides being wholly arbitrary having been passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioner. It is submitted that the impugned order, in the circumstances. is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is further alleged that Regulation 16-A of the Regulation confers arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power on respondent 1 to terminate the services of its employees and as such it is violative of the basic requirements of the rule of natural justice. The said power is capable of vicious discrimination and is a naked hire and fire rule as juniors to the petitioner have been retained in service and the post on which the petitioner had been working still exists. The petitioner has also attributed mala fides to the respondents. 7. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. There appears to be a meek denial to the allegation of the petitioner as contained in the petition. Except stating the facts as regards the disposal of the appeal the other allegations of the petitioner have not been replied and have been stated to be matters of record. However, it is strenuously stated that the petitioner had an alternative remedy which was availed of by her. Except stating the facts as regards the disposal of the appeal the other allegations of the petitioner have not been replied and have been stated to be matters of record. However, it is strenuously stated that the petitioner had an alternative remedy which was availed of by her. It is also stated that Regulation 16-A has been framed according to law and in any case its validity could be challenged before the Tribunal. In the supplementary-counter-affidavit it is stressed that the petition before the Tribunal was fully maintainable but it was withdrawn by the petitioner as no stay order could be passed by the Tribunal. It is also denied that any objection as regards the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was taken before it on behalf of the respondents. A rejoinder-affidavit repudiating the contents of the counter-affidavits has also been filed. 8. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length. 9. The main points which arise in this petition are, firstly, whether respondent 1 was competent and acted within jurisdiction when it terminated the services of the petitioner, secondly, whether the appeal preferred by the petitioner was disposed of according to the law, and, thirdly, whether the petitioner had an equally efficacious alternative remedy by means of a claim petition before the Tribunal. 10. It would be appropriate to find the status of respondent 1. Respondent 1 was established in view of S. 3, State Financial Corporations Act. 1951, as amended providing for the establishment of a Financial Corporation for the State. It is enjoined in S. 3 that the State Financial Corporation shall be a body corporate. Thus respondent 1 having been established under the State Financial Corporations Act. 1951, is an instrumentality of the State and would be deemed to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Similarly, the Regulations framed by the L.P. Financial Corporation shall have statutory force. 11. It is not disputed between the parties that the services of the petitioner were governed by the Regulation and that she was a permanent employee of respondent 1. The contention on behalf of the respondents, however, was that Regulation 16-A of the Regulation gave ample power to respondent 1 to terminate the services of the petitioner even though she was a permanent employee. The contention on behalf of the respondents, however, was that Regulation 16-A of the Regulation gave ample power to respondent 1 to terminate the services of the petitioner even though she was a permanent employee. Regulation 16-A is reproduced below : "16-A. The services of a permanent employee of the Corporation may be terminated by the Board without assigning any reason by giving 3 months' notice or on payment of substantive pay for 3 months in lieu of notice." It is the mischief of this Regulation 16-A which has been assailed on behalf of the petitioner. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A. K. Sharma has submitted that the above Regulation 16-A gives unbridled and arbitrary power to the employer and is thus a naked principle of hire and fire unheard of in a democratic set up and particularly by a society governed by the rule of law. Such a power may have had some significance in the mediaeval period where monarchy could have disabled a person stripping him of his services, but in our Republic it loses all its significance when it is found to be infused with a power which is arbitrary and reflective of discrimination. It is submitted that Regulation 16-A is wholly vicious and utterly discriminatory. Such a drastic power enabling the employer to dispense with an enquiry before terminating the services of its employee without assigning any reason was nothing but violative of the basic requirements of natural justice. It is expected that a Public Sector Undertaking would exercise its powers in a reasonable way but here ignoring the said principle the Managing Director of respondent 1 terminated the services of the petitioner in an arbitrary manner.What reasons compelled the Board of Directors in their meeting held on 28-11-1985 to terminate the petitioner's services have not been brought on record by the respondents. The impugned order of termination simply states that the petitioner's services were no longer required in compliance of the decision of the Board of Directors taken in their meeting held on 28-11-1985. It is not denied that no opportunity was given to the petitioner. If there was anything against the performance or conduct of the petitioner the rule of natural justice required that the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to explain. It is not denied that no opportunity was given to the petitioner. If there was anything against the performance or conduct of the petitioner the rule of natural justice required that the petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity to explain. It is absolutely clear that the power given under Regulation 16-A has been arbitrarily and viciously exercised by respondent 1 and it is against the established principles of natural justice. This Court and the Supreme Court in various decisions have emphasised that rule of natural justice must be followed but still the functioning of such Public Sector Undertakings are ignorant about it. Regulations which banish the sanctity of the employer-employee relationship cannot be held to be of any avail to the employer, in this case the respondents. The Supreme Court on more than one occasion has frowned upon such Regulations and has struck them down. In West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh, AIR 1985 SC 722 : (1985 Lab IC 885) the Supreme Court held that such Regulations suffer from the vice of enabling discrimination and were arbitrary and liable to be struck down. In that case, the Supreme Court was examining Regulation 34' which is identical to Regulation 16-A in the instant case, and the Supreme Court struck down that Regulation 34. 13. As regards violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution learned counsel for the petitioner referred to para 20 of the petition where it is stated that the post on which the petitioner was working still exists. It is submitted that the respondents have not furnished any material to justify the termination of the petitioner. In para 23(5) of the writ petition it is also stated that persons junior to the petitioner have been retained in service while the petitioner's services have been terminated. In the counter-affidavit the respondents while replying para 20 of the petition have simply stated that the contents of para 20 of the petition are incorrect and are denied and that the termination of the petitioner was made under Regulation 16-A of the Regulation, and hence there was no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is no reply to para 23(5) of the writ petition which contains grounds. There is no reply to para 23(5) of the writ petition which contains grounds. It is thus clear that there is no denial by the respondents of the two main facts that the post on which the petitioner was working still exists and that persons junior to the petitioner have been retained in service. When such a state of affairs exists this Court cannot but hold that the respondents were guilty of not observing the principle of natural justice while passing the impugned order of termination dated 3-12-1985. Such a lapse on the part of an instrumentality of the State renders the said termination order illegal and passed in arbitrary exercise of power under Regulation 16-A. In K.C. Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1046 : (1985 Lab IC 1032), the Supreme Court observed that the contract of service, if any, had to be in tune with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the unilateral power of termination without giving reasons is so abhorrent that it smacks of discrimination and, therefore, violative of Article 14. The Supreme Court further observed that an unbiased Judge and an opportunity to controvert the allegations and to clear one-self were the minimum principles of natural justice. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. B.N. Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (1986 Lab IC 1312), the Supreme Court observed that the Corporation was the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and it was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further observed that the principles of natural justice were well recognised as being part of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. Any violation of the principle of natural justice would result in arbitrariness. Judged from this angle the provisions of Regulation 16-A of the Regulation it has to be held that it is arbitrary and most unreasonable and thus liable to be struck down being violative of the constitutional guarantees conferred under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Such a view was also taken by the Supreme Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Such a view was also taken by the Supreme Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd., (1986) 4 SCC 337 : (1987 Lab IC 25), where it was held that such Rule or Regulation must die so that the fundamental guarantee given by the Constitutional provisions in Articles 14 and 16 remain alive. In O.P. Bhandari's case also the Supreme Court was considering a similar question as in the instant case, namely, whether the action of a Public Sector Undertaking which was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in terminating the services of an employee by giving him notice of the prescribed period or payment of salary for the notice period in lieu of such notice was constitutional. The order of termination dated 3-12-1985 passed in the instant case, therefore, cannot be sustained and is, as already mentioned above, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 14. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the impugned order of termination to the Board of Directors as contemplated under Regulation 41 of the Regulations. By a communication dated 27-6-1986 the petitioner was simply informed that her appeal has been rejected by the Board of Directors in their meeting held on 2-6-1986. No grounds for rejecting the appeal are forthcoming. In Ajantha Industries v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, AIR 1976 SC 437 , the Supreme Court struck down the order of rejection on the ground that reasons were not communicated to the person affected pre-judicially. It cannot be disputed that the order rejecting the appeal of the petitioner was a quasi-judicial order and the authority deciding it had to pass a reasoned order. A cryptic order would not be in conformity with law. In N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd., C.A. No. 245 of 1970 decided on 17-12-1975 : (reported in 1980 Lab IC 1291 : AIR 1980 SC 2124 ) the Supreme Court expressed the same view that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. The dismissal order communicated to the petitioner vide communication dated 27-6-86 does not stand the test of being a reasoned order and has, therefore, to be held illegal. 15. Now comes the question of alternative remedy. The respondents' contention is that this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as the petitioner had an alternative remedy against the impugned order. 15. Now comes the question of alternative remedy. The respondents' contention is that this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as the petitioner had an alternative remedy against the impugned order. Recently in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 , while considering such a question the Supreme Court held that where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law a petition at the instance of persons adversely affected by it would lie to the High Court under Article 226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government. It is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate, alternative remedy. As a matter of fact the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. In the instant case it has been found that the impugned orders are violative of Articles 14 and 16 and thus in view of the Supreme Court decision in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana (supra) the petition cannot be rejected on the ground of alternative remedy where it has also been held that at any rate the jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted. There is yet another circumstance for not relegating the petitioner to alternative remedy. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545 : ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ), the right to livelihood has been recognised as a fundamental right protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. In the case of the petitioner the right to employment would mean his right to livelihood protected by Article 21 of the Constitution. The Tribunal will take its own time if a claim petition is filed by the petitioner before it. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the alternative remedy before the Tribunal would be as efficacious and effective alternative remedy as by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when the impugned order of termination has been found violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the alternative remedy before the Tribunal would be as efficacious and effective alternative remedy as by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly when the impugned order of termination has been found violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner has been out of employment for more than one year and in the circumstances of this case it would be hard to drive her to alternative remedies. This view finds support from the decision in Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla v. Union of India. 1985 UPLBEC 789 : 1986 Lab IC 1516). Pursuant to the above discussion it is held that the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is wholly maintainable and the petitioner cannot be relegated to alternative remedies. 16. The plea raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner has not come with clean hands deserves to be rejected. The petitioner is not guilty of concealment. She has stated in the petition that she filed a claim petition before the Tribunal before coming to this Court but she withdrew it as per legal advice given to her. I have examined Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 All 746 (FB) and Dr. Bool Chand v. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, AIR 1968 SC 292 : (1986 Lab IC 232) cited on behalf of the respondents but in view of the above discussion I find that they are not of any avail to the respondents. 17. Pursuant to what has been said above the petition deserves to succeed. 18. In the result the petition is allowed with costs and the impugned order dated 3-12-85 terminating the services of the petitioner and the order dated 27-6-1986 by which the petitioner was informed of the rejection of her appeal are hereby quashed. The petitioner would be deemed to be in service of respondent 1 with all its benefits accrued till date. It is also made clear that the respondents shall not give effect to the order dated 10-12-1985 directing the petitioner to vacate the official quarter which was passed as a result of the order of termination dated 3-12-1985 and which has been quashed by this Court.