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Gauhati High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 67 (GAU)

Gopal Chandra Lekharu v. Hira Lekharu

1987-11-16

S.N.PHUKAN

body1987
This first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.3.86 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Gauhati, in Divorce Title Suit No. 16 of 1983. The appeal has been filed by the petitioner as appellant under section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for short, 'the Act, read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. Both the appellant and the respondent got married on 9.5.81 according to Hindu rites and the parties are governed by Dayabhag School of Hindu Law. It was a negotiated marriage. It is alleged that shortly after the marriage, appellant saw the abnormal behaviour of the respondent as she started talking incoherently and picked up quarrels with other members of the family of the appellant and used to come out to the road talking in abusive and filthy languages about the petitioner and other members of the family and she had to be taken back home forcibly. The respondent was medically examined through Psychiatrist who opined that she was suffering from Schizophrenia of incurable type. It is also alleged . That on 28.2,83 the respondent finally left the house of the appellant and never returned. Other allegations against the behaviour of the respondent have been made in the present petition for divorce under section 13 of the Act The petition was duly resisted by the respondent denying all the allegations. It is not disputed that the negotiated marriage was solemnised according to Hindu rites on 9.5.81. It is stated that both the parties were living together at the house of the appellant and their marriage was consummated. It is alleged that the appellant caused miscarriage of the respondent by forcing her to take some tablets which affected her both physically and mentally. It is further alleged that in the Month of October, 1981 both the parties went and stayed in the house of the respon­dent during Durga Puja and the appellant returned home earlier. But when the respondent returned to her husband's house, the appellant and the other members of his family treated her cruelly and rebuked her for not bringing sufficient articles as a dowry and also demanded a plot of land in the name of appellant at Gauhati from the father of the respondent. But when the respondent returned to her husband's house, the appellant and the other members of his family treated her cruelly and rebuked her for not bringing sufficient articles as a dowry and also demanded a plot of land in the name of appellant at Gauhati from the father of the respondent. It is also stated that in the month of June, 1982 the respondent was asked to sign a blank paper for her divorce with the appellant which she refused. She was tortured to such an extent that she was not allowed take bath in the bathroom, not supplied with proper food and sometimes she had to go without meals. She was also not allowed to talk with her brothers and other members of her family when they visited her. It is not disputed that the appellant got the respondent medically examined by three doctors including two Psychiatrist. On 1.3.83 after assaulting her the respondent was sent to her brother's house with the son of the elder brother of the father of the appellant. The respondent on three occasions went to the house of the appellant, but was not allowed to enter the house. It is alleged that there is no ground for divorce or judicial separation. 3. The learned District Judge framed as many as seven issues including the issue namely ; whether the respondent was suffering from Schizophrenia ? The learned trial court after considering the evidence on record came to the finding that the appellant 'failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the respondent was suffering from Schizophrenia and even if she suffered so from October 1981 to February "982 she became alright after that period and there gives no scope for the husband to deny marital life with her'. In view of the above finding the learned trial court dismissed the petition and hence the present appeal. 4. Admittedly, the present petition comes under Clause (Hi) of Sub-section (I) of Section 13 of the Act which is reproduced below:- 13. In view of the above finding the learned trial court dismissed the petition and hence the present appeal. 4. Admittedly, the present petition comes under Clause (Hi) of Sub-section (I) of Section 13 of the Act which is reproduced below:- 13. (iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent, Explanation.-In this clause,- (a) the expression "mental disorder" means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and, includes schizophrenia : (b) the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or)…" 5. From the allegations made in the petition for divorce it appears that only point which has to be determined in this appeal is whether the respondent has been suffering intermittently from mental disorder of schizophrenia to such an extent that the appellant/petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. 6. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has raised serious objection to the finding of the learned trial court that the petitioner/appellant failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that respondent was suffering from schizophrenia (emphasis supplied). 7. In Dr. N. G. Dastane V. Mrs. S. Dastane, A. 1. R. 1975 SC, 1534 their Lordships considered Sections 10 and 23 of the Act and held that proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities and it is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature. It was also held that neither Section 10 nor Section 23 of the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and Section 23 confers on the court the power to r>ass a decree if it is 'satisfied' on matters mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of the section. It was also held that neither Section 10 nor Section 23 of the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and Section 23 confers on the court the power to r>ass a decree if it is 'satisfied' on matters mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of the section. It was further held that proceedings under the Act being essentially of a civil nature, the word 'satisfied' in Section 23 must mean 'satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities' and not 'satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt'. A Division Bench of this Court also in Smt Gauri Dey V. Bidhu Bbusan Dey, A.I. R. 1986 Gau, 22 held that the word 'satisfied' means 'satisfied preponderance of probabilities' and not 'satisfied beyond reasonable doubt'. In view of the above law laid down, the contention of Mr. Choudhury has considerable force. In the present proceeding being of a civil nature the Court has to be satisfied on preponderance of probabilities on the basis of evidence on record whether the petitioner appellant has been able to prove the allegations made in his petition and the petitioner need not prove the said allegations beyond all reasonable doubt. In the instant proceeding the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish his allegations as these has been denied by the respondent. 8. To prove that the respondent is suffering from schizophrenia the petitioner has examined Dr Das P. W. 2. who is an Assistant Professor, of Psychiatric, Gauhati Medical Collage. Before considering his evidence on record it is necessary to examine the law regarding appreciation of evidence of an expert. Mr. Sarnia, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance in Mt. Titli V. Alfred Robert Jones. A. I. R. 1934 All., 273 and A S. Mehta V. Bai Vasumati, A. I, R, 1969 Guj, 48. In Mt, Titli (supra) a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the opinion of an expert by itself may be relevant but would carry little weight with a Court unless it is supported by a clear statement of what he noticed and on what he based his opinion. The expert should, if he expects his opinion to be accepted, put before the Court all the materials which induced him to come to his conclusion, so that the Court although not expert, may form its own judgment on those materials. The expert should, if he expects his opinion to be accepted, put before the Court all the materials which induced him to come to his conclusion, so that the Court although not expert, may form its own judgment on those materials. The above law was also followed in A. S. Mehta (supra). I respectfully agree with the above law laid down by the Allahabad and Gujrat High Courts and therefore, I am of the opinion that the expert, namely; Dr. Das, P. W. 2 should put before the Court all the materials which induced him to come to the conclusion that the respon­dent was suffering from schizophrenia so that the Court although not expert, may form its own independent judgment on those materials. 9. According to Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 23rd Indian Edition, schizophrenia means the most common type of psychosis, characterized by a disorder in the thinking processes such as delusions and hallucinations, and extensive withdrawal of the individual's interest from other people and the outside world, and the investment of it in his own. According to the said Dictionary there are following types of schizo­phrenia, namely ; ambulatory, catatonic, latent, hebephrenic, paranoid, process, pseudoneuroti reactive and simple. 10. In Smt. Rita Roy V. Sitesh Chandra Bhadra Roy, A.I.R. 1982 Calcutta, 138, by following an earlier decision of the said Court in Pronab Kumar Ghosh V. Krishna Ghosh, A.I.R. 1978 Cal, 109 it was held that schizophrenia has to be considered on its own merits and is an illness of slow insidious onset developing over years and that there may be report of strange odd inappropriate behaviour. It was further held that there would be progressive deterioration in the level of per­formance at work and socially ; school report, examination results and the employment record will provide objective and usually reliable indices of intellectual performance, its maintenance or decline. 11. In Dr. N.G. Dastane V. Mrs. S.N, Dastane, A.I.R. 1970, Bombay, 312 it was held that the question as to whether a person suffered at any time from schizophrenia is essentially a question of fact. 11. In Dr. N.G. Dastane V. Mrs. S.N, Dastane, A.I.R. 1970, Bombay, 312 it was held that the question as to whether a person suffered at any time from schizophrenia is essentially a question of fact. In Prithvi Pal Singh V Jogender Kaur, 1 (1983) Divorce and Metromonial Cases 457, the Delhi High Court held that to diagnosis schizophrenia simply on the presence of delusions and hallucinations is like making diag­nosis of a coronary disease only on the basis of pain in the chest or the diagnosis of typhoid fever only on the presence of a sustained pyrexia. It is also held that simple symptom should certainly suggest the diag­nosis of conditions in which such symptoms frequently occur. But unless there are specific conclusive tests for the existence of certain disease pro­cesses, a final differential diagnosis must (be based on the whole clinical picture. Mr. Chowdhury has placed before me Davidson's Principles and Practice of Medicine (13th addition low-priced edition) regarding this disease (at page 759). I do not get much assistance from this book wherein the symptom of disease and the treatment have been prescribed. 11. A. Situated thus, I hold that diagnosis of the disease schizophrenia is not simple and the expert must produce all the relevant records before the Court to come to the conclusion that a patient is suffering from the said disease. It must be proved by symptoms and other examinations by the expert that the patient was suffering from mental disorder in the thinking process and extensive withdrawal of interest from other people and the out side world and that the said disease was developing over years. It must also be proved that there was a deterioration in the level of the performance of a patient at work and socially. 12. Though Respondent was examined by 3 Doctors, only Doctor Das, P.W. 1 has been examined before the learned trial court. From his evidence I find that the respondent was under his treatment from 30.10.81 to February, 1982. In cross-examination he has stated that he did not keep any record regarding the symptoms which he observed and what questions were put to the respondent at the time of examina­tion and that he was deposing before the learned trial court from his memory. In cross-examination he has stated that he did not keep any record regarding the symptoms which he observed and what questions were put to the respondent at the time of examina­tion and that he was deposing before the learned trial court from his memory. From his evidence I find that though he examined the respon­dent from 30.10.81 to February, 1982 the certificate was issued only on 7.4.83 on the basis of the prescriptions of medicine issued by him. He has admitted that such patients can be rehabilitated after due treatment and according to him such patient can continue the marital life depending on the temperament of the other spouse. Nowhere in his evidence this witness has stated that the condition of the respondent was such that it was impossible . To lead such life with the petitioner/ appellant. So from the evidence of the expert, P.W. 2, it cannot be held that the respondent was suffering disordered in her thinking process, that there was extensive withdrawal of her interest from other people of the outside world and that this illness was developing over years with deterioration in the level of her performance of work. I cannot lose sight of the fact that the respondent passed her B.A. examination and at present the respondent is working as a government servant in the capacity of Female Extension Officer in the Office of the Block Development Officer. D.W. 4 is co-villager of the respondent and he is a teacher of the local High School. The respondent was a student and as such he knows her since her childhood. This witness has categorically stated that he knows the respondent not only as a student but as a co-villager and that she never suffered from any mental disease. I see no reason to disbelieve the School teacher. From what has been stated above, I am of the opinion that the petitioner/appellant has failed to prove that the respondent has been or is suffering from schizophrenia. 13. The petitioner/appellant has examined three more witnesses to prove the abnormal behaviour of the respondent. P.W. 3 who is related to the petitioner/ appellant resides a Silchar and he used to visit his house at the interval of 2/3 months. He has narrated the incident which occurred in the year 1983 to show that the respondent behaved abnormally. 13. The petitioner/appellant has examined three more witnesses to prove the abnormal behaviour of the respondent. P.W. 3 who is related to the petitioner/ appellant resides a Silchar and he used to visit his house at the interval of 2/3 months. He has narrated the incident which occurred in the year 1983 to show that the respondent behaved abnormally. I am unable to accept this statement and also from this incident alone I cannot come to any conclusive finding that the respondent was suffering from the above disease as alleged, P.W. 4 is a Stamp Vendor and he stays one furlong away from the house of the petitioner/appellant. He has also narrated the incident which took place at about 9,30 A.M. and from the evidence I find that he was only a chance witness. He has stated that on that date the respondent became violent and some women of the neighbouring houses came and saw the occurrence, but none has been examined. He also cannot remember the date and month when the occurrence took place but only stated that it was in the year 1983. He has admitted categorically that except that incident he had no knowledge of any abnormal behaviour of the respon­dent on any other occasion. P.W. 5 is another witness who stated that about two years ago Bapdhan, P.W. 3 took the respondent to his house wherein she started having altercation and quarrel with the maternal aunt of the petitioner/appellant and in the midst of the quarrel she became violent. These are the two incidents which the petitioner tried to prove to show that the respondent used to become violent which has been denied. Only from these two incidents I cannot come to the finding that the respondent was suffering from schizophrenia. It may be that there may r-e valid and sufficient reason, for becoming violent on the above two dates which have not been brought out in evidence. 14. Most important thing about a person suffering from schizop­hrenia is her behaviour in the house. Unfortunately the petitioner/ appellant has not examined any inmates of his house and no explanation whatsoever has been given for their non-examination. " 15. 14. Most important thing about a person suffering from schizop­hrenia is her behaviour in the house. Unfortunately the petitioner/ appellant has not examined any inmates of his house and no explanation whatsoever has been given for their non-examination. " 15. From what has been stated above, I hold that the petitioner/ appellant has failed to prove that the respondent has been suffering or is suffering from schizophrenia or that she was behaving abnormally as alleged in the petition, 16. In order to obtain a decree under section 13 of the Act, the appellant in addition to the allegations that the respondent was suffering from mental disorder has also to prove that such disease was of such a kind and to such an extent that the appellant could not reasonably be expected to live with her. As stated earlier, Dr. Das, P.W. 2 has admitted that the respondent can be rehabilitated after due treatment and can continue the mental life. There is also no other convincing evidence to prove this point. So the present appeal is liable to be dismissed, 17. Mr. Choudhury has drawn my attention to Section 13.A. of the Act and submits that even if a decree for divorce is not granted this Court has jurisdiction to pass instead a decree for judicial separation. I8. In Angrez Kaur V. Baldev Singh, A.I.R. 1982" Punjab and Haryana, 339, Section 13.A came up for consideration and it was held that Section 13. A of the Act vests a discretion in the Court only to grant the alternative lesser relief of judicial separation in a petition for divorce provided the requisite ground therefore prescribed by Section 13 of the Act, has been established, I respectfully agree with the above views and lam therefore of the opinion that law maker did not intend by introducing the said Section to the Code a total carte blanche to grant a decree for judicial separation where no ground whatsoever for a decree for divorce has been established. This Section S3.A gives a discretion to the Court only to give alternative lesser relief of judicial separation even when ground for divorce is made out. In the instant proceeding as no ground for divorce has been made out as required under Section 13 of the Act, no decree for judicial separation can be granted under section 13.A of the Act. 19. In the instant proceeding as no ground for divorce has been made out as required under Section 13 of the Act, no decree for judicial separation can be granted under section 13.A of the Act. 19. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that (the present appeal is liable to be dismissed which I hereby do. In the result, appeal is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs Sd/- Judge