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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 67 (HP)

THE NAHAN FOUNDRY LIMITED v. RAMESHWAR DASS VERMA

1987-10-30

P.D.DESAI

body1987
JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J. — The petitioners are the defendants and the respondent is the plaintiff in a suit filed in the Court of Sub Judge, Nahan, for a declaration to the effect that the order terminating the services of the respondent was wrong, ultra vires, null and void and not binding on the respondent and that he be deemed, therefore, to have continued in the service of the petitioners. The suit was instituted on March 31, 1987, that is, after the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The petitioners raised a preliminary objection that in view of the enforcement of the Act as well as of the issue of a notification under sub-section (2) of section 15 thereof, the Civil Court was not empowered to entertain and try the suit and that the jurisdiction in that regard vested in the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). The trial Court raised an issue as to jurisdiction and tried the same as a preliminary issue. The decision on the preliminary issue having gone against the petitioners, they have moved this Court by way of the present revision petition. 2. It is not in dispute that the Act has been brought into force since before the suit was instituted. It is also not in dispute that a notification under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act issued by the State Government held the field at the material time and that it still holds the field. It is further not in dispute that the suit relates to a service matter. These facts were not in dispute even before the trial Court. The submission on behalf of the respondent, however, was that the first petitioner, which is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not answer the description of any of the entities mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act inasmuch as it is not a local or other authority nor a corporation or a society controlled or owned by the State Government and that, therefore, the civil courts jurisdiction is not ousted, notwithstanding the issue of a notification thereunder. The contention of the petitioners, on the other hand, was that the first petitioner-company, which is a wholly owned Government Company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, is a corporation within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act and that, therefore, the Civil Courts jurisdiction is ousted since a notification under the said sub-section has been duly issued. The trial Court found that the word "corporation" did not take within its sweep a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and that the jurisdiction to try the suit was not ousted by the enforcement of the Act and the issue of the notification under sub-section (2) of section 15 thereof. 3. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides : "Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at he time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain ; or (b) * * * • (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation II.- A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business as its sole or principle office in India, or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." 4. In Hakam Singh v. M/s. Gammon {India) Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 740, the question was whether by reason of the fact that the respondent- Company carried on business in Bombay the Courts at Bombay had jurisdiction to entertain a suit or petition for filing an arbitration agreement. After making a reference to the aforesaid provision, it was held : "Plainly by the terms of section 20 (a) read with Explanation II, the respondent Company was liable to be sued at Bombay where it had its principal place of business. The argument of counsel for the appellant that the expression corporation in Explanation II includes only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act is, in our judgment, without substance. The Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression corporation as meaning a legal person and includes a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The argument of counsel for the appellant that the expression corporation in Explanation II includes only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act is, in our judgment, without substance. The Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression corporation as meaning a legal person and includes a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Order 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with suits by or against a corporation and there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure that a corporation referred to under section 20 means only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act." 5. Section 15, sub-section (2), of the Act uses the same word "corporation" and there is nothing in the subject, object or context which requires a different meaning being given to the said word in the said sub-section than that given to the same in Explanation II of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The word "corporation" in the said sub-section must, therefore, take within its sweep a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 provided, of course, it is shown to be controlled or owned by the State Government. Once a notification under section 15, sub-section (2) is issued, any suit against a company owned or controlled by the State Government in which a service matter is involved will be triable by the Tribunal. 6. One more submission, which was not urged before the trial Court, was advanced for my consideration by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It was urged that a notification under sub-section (2) of section 15 cannot be in general terms and that it must specify the local or other authorities and corporations or societies intended to be covered thereby. The argument has been stated merely to be rejected. The relevant part of the said sub-section will have to be reworded as follows if the submission was to be accepted : "......to such local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government as may be specified.” There is no warrant to read more into the said sub-section than what is stated in it Any notification in general terms covering any of the entities therein mentioned will be covered by the terms of the said subsection. 7. 7. On facts, it is not capable of being disputed that the first petitioner- Company is registered as a Company under the Companies Act, 1956 and that it is a wholly owned Government Company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The material placed on the record of the present revision petition shows inter alia that cent per cent shares of the said company are held by the State Government, that all its Directors are appointed by the Governor and that the whole control over the Company vests in the State Government. The Company, therefore, is a corporation within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 15 and the notification issued thereunder. The suit is, therefore, not entertain- able and triable by a civil court. 8. For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, the trial Court was in error in answering the preliminary issue in favour of the respondent and against the petitioners. Since the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, it is directed to return the plaint to the respondent for presentation to the Tribunal. 9. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.