JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - This is an election petition under S. 81(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951 (briefly 'the Act, 1951') by the petitioner, who was an official candidate of the Indian National Congress from 251, Mariyahun Assembly Constituency to the U.P. Legislative Assembly at the time of the general election, held in March, 1985. The last date for filing the nomination paper was 6-2-1985 and the date of scrutiny was 7-2-1985. Poll took place on 5th March, 1985. 2. Whereas, the petitioner lost the election, the respondent was declared elected. as a Member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly from the aforesaid constituency. 3. The petitioner has challenged the election of the respondent on the grounds (A) and (B), which in substance, are that the nomination paper of the respondent was improperly accepted, inasmuch as he was disqualified under S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951, on the date of filing the nomination paper as well as on the date of poll, for being chosen as a Member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, because he was convicted under S. 302, I.P.C., on 9-2-1982 and under S. 307, I.P.C., on 22-10-1983 besides other sections. The prayer of the petitioner is that the election of the respondent be declared void and the same be set aside. 4. The respondent admitted it his written statement that he was convicted under S. 302, I.P.C., on 9-2-1982 and under S. 307, I.P.C., on 20-10-1983 by the III Additional, Sessions Judge, Jaunpur, in Sessions Trial No. 102 of 1980 and Sessions Trial, No. 78 of 1982 respectively. He, however, contended that he was granted bail for the conviction under S. 302, I.P.C., on 12-5-1982 and for the conviction under S. 307, I.P.C., on 24-10-1983. It is also averred that he has challenged bath the convictions in appeal and that the orders of the trial Court conviction under S 302, I.P.C., as well asunder S. 307, I.P.C., besides other sections, were stayed on 17-2-1986 by the appellate Court. In para 11 of the written statement, it is averred that the conviction "will be deemed to have been not in existence as long as the appeal is pending before this Hon'ble Court." In para 11(c), which was. incorporated by amendment in the written statement, it is averred that both the convictions stood wiped out in view of the stay granted by the appellate Court. 5. incorporated by amendment in the written statement, it is averred that both the convictions stood wiped out in view of the stay granted by the appellate Court. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, two issues were framed on 10-2-1986. On 20-3-1986, two additional issues were framed, which i were numbered as issues Nos. 2 and 3 and issue No. 2, as framed on 10-2-1986, was renumbered as issue No. 4. The final issues are as follows :- 1. Whether the respondent was not disqualified for being chosen for the legislative Assembly under sub-s. (2) of S. 8, Representation of the People Act, 1951, because the order dated 9-2-82 convicting the respondent under S. 302, read with S. 149, Penal Code, and the order dated 22-10-1983 convicting the respondent under Sections 307/148, I.P.C., were appealed against and because he was granted bail before the date of filing of the nomination paper ? 2. Whether the conviction of the returned candidate under judgments and order dated 9-2-1982 and 20-10-1983 passed by the II1 Additional Sessions Judge, Jaunpur, in , Sessions Trial No. 102 of 1980' and Sessions Trial No. 78 of 1982 was wiped out by the two separate. orders dated 17-2-1986, passed by this Court staying the operation of the orders dated 9-2-1982 and 20-10-1983 ? If so, its effect ? 3. Whether the orders dated 17-2-1986 of this Court are retrospective in operation ? 4. To what relief, if any, the petitioner is entitled and its effect ? FINDINGS Issues 1, 2 and 3 6. Involving common points, all these issues are taken up together. The short contention of the petitioner is that the election of the respondent is void., I inasmuch as his nomination paper was improperly accepted, as he was,convicted under S. 302, I.P.C., and under S. 307, I.P.C., before the date of filing the nomination paper. According to the petitioner, the respondent was disqualified from contesting the election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly, as he was a convict on the date of scrutiny of the nomination paper as well as on the date of poll within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951. According to the petitioner, the respondent was disqualified from contesting the election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly, as he was a convict on the date of scrutiny of the nomination paper as well as on the date of poll within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951. The contention of the respondent is that though he was convicted under S. 302 and under S. 307, I.P.C., under two separate orders dated 9-2-1982 and 20-10-1983 respectively by the Sessions Court, but no disqualification arose from such convictions, inasmuch as, the operation of the orders dated 9-2-1982 and 20-10-1983 was stayed by the appellate Court on 17-2-1986 and as the appeals are pending against the convictions. Also, it is contended that he was granted bail for the conviction under S. 302, I.P.C., on 12-5-1982 and for the conviction under S. 307, I.P.C., on 24-10-1983. In short, the contention of the respondent is that the convictions were wiped out by the stay orders dated 17-2-1986 and disqualification j did not operate from such convictions. 7. The question for consideration is as to what is the effect of the stay orders dated 17-2-1986 on the convictions of the respondent under S. 302, I.P.C., and under S. 307, I.P.C. Both the stay orders dated 17-2-1986 are almost identical and, therefore, only one stay order passed by the High Court in criminal appeal, arising out of Sessions Trial No. 102 of 1980, is reproduced below :- "Heard the learned counsel for parties the applicant No. 2 Doodhnath in this application has been granted bail long ago by this Hon'ble Court. It is now alleged that Doodhnath has been elected as an M.L.A. Therefore, the operation of the judgment and order dated 9-2-1982 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Jaunpur in S.T. No. 102 of 1980, so far as Doodhnath is concerned, shall remain stayed meanwhile. Sd. V.P.M. 17-2-1986." To see the effect of the stay orders on the finding of convictions, let us hurriedly refer to certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 365, Cr.P.C., says that in cases tried by the Court of Sessions, inter alia, the Court shall forward a copy of its finding and sentence to the District Magistrate, within whose local jurisdiction the trial was held. Section 365, Cr.P.C., says that in cases tried by the Court of Sessions, inter alia, the Court shall forward a copy of its finding and sentence to the District Magistrate, within whose local jurisdiction the trial was held. Section 386(b), Cr.P.C., empowers the appellate Court in an appeal from a conviction to reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused. These provisions clearly show that the finding and sentence are two different conceptions in the legal jargon. Section 389, Cr.P.C., says that pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of sentence or order appealed against, be suspended and also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond. It is, therefore, clear that only execution of sentence or of order can be suspended by the appellate court pending disposal of the appeal. So far as finding of conviction is concerned, that stands, so long as it is not reversed or set aside by the appellate Court under S. 386(b), Cr.P.C. Suspension of the execution of sentence or of order by the appellate Court pending disposal of the appeal does not tantamount to obliteration of order. The conviction order can be reversed or set aside by the appellate Court only under S. 386(b), Cr.P.C. No such order has yet been passed. 8. The effect of stay *order was seen by a Bench of this Court in Ved Singh Pradhan v. Asst. Sub-Divisional Officer, Budhana, AIR 1965 All 370 . The appellant in this case was a Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha. He was removed by an Assistant Sub-Divisional Officer exercising the State Government's power under S. 95(1)(g)(iii), U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. Under S. 95(2) a person, removed under sub-cl. (iii) of Cl. (g) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 95, shall not be entitled to be re-elected or re-appointed to any office under the Act for a period of five years. The order of removal was passed on 26-5-1959, and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to be re-elected or reappointed to the office of the Pradhan prior to 26-5-1964. In the election, held prior to this date to fill the vacancy, caused by his removal, he again offered himself for election and was elected. The order of removal was passed on 26-5-1959, and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to be re-elected or reappointed to the office of the Pradhan prior to 26-5-1964. In the election, held prior to this date to fill the vacancy, caused by his removal, he again offered himself for election and was elected. An election petition was filed against his election on the ground of the disqualification, mentioned above. His defence was that the disqualification did not operate because of the ad interim order, passed by this Court during the pendency of the petition for the quashing of the removal order, suspending its operation. The election tribunal did not accept the defence and held that the appellant was disqualified and set aside his election. From this order of the tribunal, he filed another petition, which was refused by the High Court, and then the Special Appeal was filed before a Division Bench. Then the Division Bench summarised the legal position on page 371 in para 5 emerging from the stay order as follows:- "...... ..... ..... ..... What was stayed was only operation of the order of removal, the order itself was not deemed not to exist. The ad interim order was prospective, what was further required to be done, or what could further be done, was not to be done. Only what remained to be done was stayed, not the effect of what had already come into existence. The removal was the immediate effect of the order and nothing was required to be done to bring it about. As soon as the order was passed the appellant stood removed and as soon as he was removed he became disqualified. The disqualification was simultaneous with the removal, it was the automatic consequence of the removal His being subject to the disqualification was the effect of law and it was not open to this Court without infringing the law to say that he would not remain subject to the disqualification during the pendency of the writ petition. Actually this Court did not order that he would not remain subject to the disqualification. Consequently he could not contend that by virtue of the stay of the operation of the order the disqualification, which was automatic, also remained suspended .............. Actually this Court did not order that he would not remain subject to the disqualification. Consequently he could not contend that by virtue of the stay of the operation of the order the disqualification, which was automatic, also remained suspended .............. What was really stayed by this Court was execution of the order of removal, the order of removal remained intact but any act to be done on account of the order of removal was prohibited from, being done. The disqualification was not an act to be done at all, it was, as we said above, an automatic legal effect of the order. Therefore, the appellant remained subject to the disqualification in spite of the interim order and could not offer himself for election." 9. A Division Bench of this Court again considered the effect of the stay order in the case of Ganga Prasad v. Asadullah, AIR 1974 All 396 . The facts of this case are that general election for electing members of the,, Municipal Board took place on 30th May, 1971. In that election, 15 members includingi Sri Nathu Lal, were declared elected as members of the Board. Subsequently in the month of June, 1973, the petitioner, who was an outsider was elected as the President of the Board. The election of Nathu Lal was challenged on the ground that he was not eligible to seek election for a reserved seat. Election petition was allowed and after setting aside the election of Nathu Lal, the Tribunal declared a casual vacancy. Thereupon, Nathu Lal filed a writ petition and obtained an order staying the operation of the order setting aside his election. A meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner was convened for 16th Sept., 1973. On 5-9-1973, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that Nathu Lal be prevented from participating in the meeting, which had been convened for considering the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner, as his election had already been set aside and he was not, competent to act as member of the Board. ' The Court permitted Nathu Lal to participate in the meeting, Scheduled for 16th September, 1973. The question arose whether Nathu Lal was competent to participate in the meeting dated 16th Sept., 1973, and the motion of no- confidence could not in law be carried against the petitioner, because of his vote. ' The Court permitted Nathu Lal to participate in the meeting, Scheduled for 16th September, 1973. The question arose whether Nathu Lal was competent to participate in the meeting dated 16th Sept., 1973, and the motion of no- confidence could not in law be carried against the petitioner, because of his vote. The learned single Judge of this Court held that in view of the interim order dated 16th July, 1973, in the petition of Nathu Lal, the latter was fully competent to participate in the meeting dated 16th Sept., 1973. In para 5 on page 397, the Division Bench formulated the question : "Main question that arises for consideration in this case is about the effect that this Court's interim order dated 16th July, 1973 ........... on Nathu Lal's right to participate in the meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence held on 16th Sept., 1973." 10. Relying on two decisions of Division' Bench of this Court, including' the case of Ved Singh, (supra), the Division Bench held in the case of Ganga Prasad in,para 8 on page 400 as follows "Thus we find that both these Division Benches consistently take the view that if by means of an interim order, this Court stays operation of the impugned order, it merely prohibits something to be done in consequence of that order in future. It does not have effect of doing away with the legal effect which has already flown from it. It may be that if something is done in contravention of the stay order, it may be ignored from consideration. Moreover, such an order if vacated does not stand vacated with retrospective effect and it cannot be deemed as if the order had never been passed." Having so observed, the Division Bench concluded in para 10 on page 400 as follows:- "In the case before us, we find that it cannot be disputed that the effect of the order passed by the Election Tribunal setting aside Nathu Lal's election was that, in law, he ceased to be a member of the Board. In the circumstances, his continued functioning as member of the Board could not be considered to be legal. The interim order passed by this Court, could therefore, could not provide a basis for legalising his action of participating in the Meeting held on 16th Sept., 1937 (Emphasis mine) 11. In the circumstances, his continued functioning as member of the Board could not be considered to be legal. The interim order passed by this Court, could therefore, could not provide a basis for legalising his action of participating in the Meeting held on 16th Sept., 1937 (Emphasis mine) 11. From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear that disqualification, is the immediate effect of the conviction order and nothing more was required to be done to bring it about. As soon as the conviction order dated 12-5-1982 or 24-10-1983 was passed, the respondent became disqualified to contest the election. The only effect of the stay orders is that the execution of sentence awarded under the two conviction orders, remain under suspension. After the conviction the respondent was to suffer the sentence and that part of the order was suspended by the stay order. The authorities clearly show that the stay orders do not make the disqualification arising from conviction orders as non-existent. By the stay orders, the disqualification arising from conviction was not suspended and what was suspended is the execution of the sentence or that part of the order which yet remains to be done in future. The finding of conviction was neither reversed, nor was set aside by the stay orders. That remained intact. 12. The ad interim orders dated 17-2-1986 were prospective and, therefore, they suspended only that course what was further required to be done or what could further be done. The stay orders being prospective in operation did not and could not affect the conviction order, which automatically gave birth to disqualification, as envisaged- by sub- s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, which reads thus . "A person convicted by a Court in India for any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release." The disqualification, which is an automatic effect of conviction, springs up right at the time of pronouncement of conviction, which finding is yet to be reversed or set aside. 13. For the reasons, I do not see any force in the contention of the respondent that conviction orders were wiped out by the stay orders dated 17-2-1986. 13. For the reasons, I do not see any force in the contention of the respondent that conviction orders were wiped out by the stay orders dated 17-2-1986. Then it is to be seen as to what is the effect of bail, granted to the respondent before the date of filing the nomination paper. If no bail is granted and the execution of the sentence is not suspended by the stay orders, then the accused will ramain in jail and the only effect of granting bail is that he is released from the confinement. Grant of bail does not interfere with the finding of conviction and that cannot render the disqualification, automatically emerging from conviction, inoperative. 14. Lastly, I take up the contention of the respondent that conviction within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, is the conviction, which is finally adjudicated upon by the appellate court. This contention revolves round the interpretation of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 and it raises a question which is absolutely virgin in the legal field being wholly uncovered by precedents. The point for consideration is whether the conviction pronounced by the trial court can give rise to disqualification, envisaged by sub-s. (2) of S. 8 and whether the disqualification will arise only when the conviction is confirmed in appeal. The contention, in short, is that no disqualification operates from the trial court's conviction which is appealed against. To support this contention reliance was placed on Divisional Supdt., Northern Rly., Allahabad v. Ram Saran Das, AIR 1961 All 336 and on Kanwar Bahadur v. Union of India AIR 1969 All 414 (FB). In the case of Divisional Supdt. Northern Rly. (supra) the respondent prayed for his reinstatement after his acquittal in a criminal case and in the case of Kunwar Bahadur (supra) the civil servant sought a declaratory decree, after acquittal that it be declared that he continued in the service. The department sought to rely upon sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2). Article 311 affords a solemn protection to all the civil servants. one of the guarantees, as contemplated by cl. (2) of Article 311, is that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank, except after an enquiry made into the charges and a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges is given to him. one of the guarantees, as contemplated by cl. (2) of Article 311, is that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank, except after an enquiry made into the charges and a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges is given to him. There are three exceptions to cl. (2) of Article 311 and they are enumerated in sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso to cl. (2) of Article 311. To appreciate the aforementioned authorities, exceptions given in sub-cls. (b) and (c) are not relevant and only exception as stated in sub-cl. (a) to the proviso, is germane. The second proviso, read with sub-cl. (a) to cl. (2) of Article 311, is as follows : "Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge;" In both the aforementioned authorities, the contention of the State was that since the civil servants were dismissed consequent upon a conviction, they were not entitled to the protection envissaged by cl. (2) of Article 311. The phrase 'led to his conviction' occurring in sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) was interpreted by this court in both the above authorities. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kunwar Bahadur (supra) ruled down in para 18 on page 417 as follows : "But sub-cl. (a) implies that the civil servant's conviction stands. If the conviction is ultimately set aside in appeal or in revision, it cannot be said that the civil servant's misconduct has been established before the criminal court. In such a case the civil servant can properly claim a departmental enquiry under Article 311(2)." In the case of the Divisional Supdt., Northern Rly (supra) a Divisional Bench of this Court explicitly said that phrase 'led to his conviction on a criminal charge' occurring in sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) contemplates conviction by last court and not by the trial court. 15. The question for consideration is whether the view taken in the aforesaid two authorities can be taken while interpreting sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, reproduced hereinabove. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) contemplates conviction by last court and not by the trial court. 15. The question for consideration is whether the view taken in the aforesaid two authorities can be taken while interpreting sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, reproduced hereinabove. In Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Rly., AIR 1964 SC 600 , the Supreme Court interpreting Article 311 held : "The general rule of interpretation which is common to statutory provisions as well as to constitutional provisions is to find out the expressed intention of the makers of the said provisions from the words of the provisions themselves. It is also equally well settled that, without doing violence to the language used, a constitutional provision shall receive a fair, liberal and progressive construction, so that its true object might be promoted. ... ... ... ... As the said Article gives protection and safeguard to a Government servant, who will otherwise by at the mercy of the Government, the said words shall ordinarily be given a liberal or at any rate their natural meaning, unless the said Article or other Articles of the Constitution expressly or by necessary, implication, restrict their meaning. I do not see any indication anywhere in the Constitution which compels the Court to reduce the scope of the protection." Considering the underlying principle. in Article 311(2) the Division Bench and the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Divisionl Supdt., Northern Rly., Allahabad (supra) and in the case of Kunwar Bahadur (supra) took the view that sub-cl. (a) of the proviso would be attracted only when there is conviction by the last court. This view fully conforms with the principles of interpretation as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Moti Ram (supra). The constitutional guarantee as envisaged by Article 311(2) would become otiose or meaningless, if a Government servant is dismissed or removed from the service soon after the conviction by the trial court and his conviction is set aside by the appellate court later. To make the constitutional protection more real and meaningful the view was taken that the phrase 'led to his conviction' occurring in sub-cl. (a) of the proviso, contemplates the conviction, by the last court and not by the trial court. To make the constitutional protection more real and meaningful the view was taken that the phrase 'led to his conviction' occurring in sub-cl. (a) of the proviso, contemplates the conviction, by the last court and not by the trial court. No such protection, as afforded by Article 311, is contemplated by S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951. 16. Let us see, what is the express intention of the makers of S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951. Sub-section (2) of S. 7 renders a person convicted by a court in India for any offence and sentence to imprisonment for not less than two years, as disqualified from the date of such conviction and he shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release. There is no dispute that the underlying idea in sub-s. (2) of S. 8 is to permit only those persons who possess integrity and clean image free from any stigma to join the august body of the law makers. The proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 8 also supports the same view. The proviso says that man convicted by a court in India for the contravention of any law providing for the prevention of hoarding or profiteering or of adulteration of food or drugs and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of five years since his release. Whereas, sub-s. (2) of S. 8 takes within its sweep the convictions for general offences, the proviso refers to the convictions for economic offences. A person convicted under S. 302, I. P. C., and under S. 307, I.P.C., suffers from the greatest stigma and it cannot be said that sub-s. (2) of S. 8 would be applicable to him, only when his conviction is affirmed by the appellate court. Looking to the underlying principle of disqualification, it appears to be more reasonable to take a view that disqualification operates immediately after the conviction by the trial court. 17. Shorn of legal verbiage, it is very plain and patent from the language used in sub- s. (2) of S. 8 that disqualification arises right when the conviction is pronounced by the trial Court. 17. Shorn of legal verbiage, it is very plain and patent from the language used in sub- s. (2) of S. 8 that disqualification arises right when the conviction is pronounced by the trial Court. Following the principle, which is embedded in Article 311 of the Constitution, it cannot be held that the conviction within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 means the conviction finally adjudicated upon. The language employed in sub-s. (2) of S. 8 and in Article 311 and the objects of the statutory provisions and the constitutional provisions are quite different and distinct and, therefore, the view taken with reference to sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) cannot be availed of by the respondent. 18. Sub-section (3) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, beginning with a non obstante clause states that notwithstanding anythig in sub- s. (1) and subs. (2), a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months had elapsed from that date or if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed by the court. This sub-section also furnishes a clue that a person who is convicted in pre- election period, becomes disqualified immediately thereafter from contesting the election under sub-s. (2), but a member of Parliament or of the Legislature of a State becomes disqualified only when a period of three months elapsed or when the appeal or revision filed by him within the period of three months is disposed of. If the word 'conviction' means the conviction finally adjudicated upon, as urged by Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel for the respondent, is accepted, then there would have been no need for the Parliament to make a different provision regarding the operation of disqualification in the post-election period under sub-s. (3) of S. 8. The Parliament made a distinction between the pre-election period and post-election period, so far as the point of time of operation of disqualification arising from the conviction is concerned. The reason is not far to seek. Sub-section (3) of S. 8 is more nearer and akin to sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The Parliament made a distinction between the pre-election period and post-election period, so far as the point of time of operation of disqualification arising from the conviction is concerned. The reason is not far to seek. Sub-section (3) of S. 8 is more nearer and akin to sub-cl. (a) of the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. A member of Parliament or a member of Legislature like a civil servant has acquired a legal status for the enforcement and declaration of which even a civil suit can be brought. Such legal status having been acquired by a member of Parliament or of Legislature or by a civil servant, cannot be cursorily disturbed or infringed. No such legal status is vested in a person, who seeks to file a nomination paper as an ordinary citizen. So there is a clear distinction between the two classes of persons one who seeks to file nomination paper as an ordinary citizen and the other who is a member of Parliament or Legislature. Whereas, no legal status is acquired by the former, but the same is vested in persons of latter category. If a member of Parliament or Legislature is removed from the House soon after a conviction by a trial court and if he is acquitted in appeal, when an irreparable loss will be caused to him and this is why in sub-s. (3) of S. 8, a different provision has been made for the class of persons who have acquired a legal status, that in their case, disqualification from conviction will remain in absence (abeyance?) or under animated suspension for a period of three months and if any appeal or revision is filed within that period, then until the disposal of such proceedings. No such safeguard seems to have been contemplated by the Parliament for the persons, covered by sub-s. (2) of S. 8. 19. The plain test that is if the respondent is called upon to answer today the question whether he is convicted under Sections 302 and 307, I. P. C., then what will be his answer. The obvious reply which he can possibly give is that he has been convicted separately under S. 302 and under S. 307, IPC. If this is the factual position, then the provisions of sub- s. (2) of S. 8 are immediately and clearly attracted. The obvious reply which he can possibly give is that he has been convicted separately under S. 302 and under S. 307, IPC. If this is the factual position, then the provisions of sub- s. (2) of S. 8 are immediately and clearly attracted. When the language is so plain and unambiguous, then the cardinal principle of interpretation is that no foreign words can be imported to interpret a statutory provision. Taking the semantic view, I am constrained to observe that the submission of Sri Jagdish Swarup that conviction within the meaning .of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 means a conviction finally adjudicated upon cannot be accepted. 20. In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 , their Lordships have succinctly stated the limitations and scope of the election right and observed in para 8 on page 986 as follows : "A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law Right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and, therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at Common Law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies". Thus the right to be elected of the respondent will be seen within the four corners of the Act, 1951. 21. The question is whether the respondent was entitled to exercise his right to be elected in the teeth of the disqualification that arose from his conviction under S. 302 and under S. 307, I.P.C. Sub-section (2) of S. 8 deprived him from having exercised such, right. If he has illegally exercised such a right and got elected, then the result flowing from such invalid election, has to be ignored. In the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (supra), the Supreme Court held in para 23 on page 554 that cl. If he has illegally exercised such a right and got elected, then the result flowing from such invalid election, has to be ignored. In the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (supra), the Supreme Court held in para 23 on page 554 that cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) appears to require that the disqualification or lack of qualification of the returned candidate is to be judged with reference to "the date of his election", which date, according to S. 67-A, is "the date on which a candidate is declared by the Returning Officer under the provisions of S. 53 or S. 66, to be elected to a House of Parliament or of the Legislature of State". In para 24 on the same page, the Supreme Court further held : "In contrast with cl. (a), in a case falling under cl. (d)(i) of S. 100 is en objection is taken before the Returning Gfficer against the nomination of any candidate on the ground of his being not qualified, or being disqualified for being chosen the crucial date as per S. 36(2)(a) with reference to which the existence or non-existence of such disqualification is to be enquired into is the date of scrutiny of the nomination of the candidate". (Emphasis mine)* 22. It has already been held by me that the instant case falls under sub-cls. (i) and (iv) of Cl. (d) of S. 100(1) of the Act, 1951. From the above reproduced material, it therefore, follows that whatever scrutiny is to be made in this case regarding disqualification, that will be restricted to the date of scrutiny of the nomination of the candidate. If this is borne in mind, then the submission of Sri Jagdish Swarup, that the statutory provisions affecting civil right of a citizen should be construed in such a manner so as not to deprive him of the civil right, that is, the right of participating in the House, will have no force. To come to a correct and reasonable conclusion in this case, there is no need to look into the factum of successful election of the respondent. To come to a correct and reasonable conclusion in this case, there is no need to look into the factum of successful election of the respondent. It is argued by him that there is no difference between the respondent and a member of the House, covered by sub-s. (3) of S. 8 and when a disqualification does not operate immediately after conviction in the case of a member, covered by sub-s. (3) of S. 8 and that remains dormant until the decision of appeal, then why should the respondent be given a different treatment. His broad argument is that both the respondent and a member covered by sub-sec. (3) of S. 8, have the right to sit in the House and, therefore, there is no difference between the two. I find it difficult to persuade myself to accept this argument. There is a difference between the respondent and a member covered by sub-s. (3) of S. 8. Whereas, the respondent acquired the right to enter into the House under an invalid election, a member who comes within the ambit of sub-s. (3) of S. 8, acquires that right by virtue of a valid election and, therefore, he is treated diferently by the law, so far as retention of that right is concerned. A right which has illegally accrued and which is ab initio void, will not be protected by law. It is only that right, which was validly acquired, needs to be protected by the law and this is what has been done under sub-s. (3) of S. 8. If the same protection as afforded by sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 is extended to the respondent, then the underlying principle of sub-sec. (2) of S. 8 stands altogether defeated, inasmuch as, the persons whose social life is stigmatised, will seek the entry into the highest and the most prestigious House, comprising the law makers. Also, it was argued by Sri Jagdish Swarup that fortuitous delay in disposal of appeal should not adversely affect the civil right. The argument is that it is a chance that the appeal of the respondent against the convictions is till pending and that the stigma arising from the convictions to the respondent would have disappeared, if the appeals had been decided. This argument postulates that the decision of the appeals pending against the convictions will turn in favour of the respondent. The argument is that it is a chance that the appeal of the respondent against the convictions is till pending and that the stigma arising from the convictions to the respondent would have disappeared, if the appeals had been decided. This argument postulates that the decision of the appeals pending against the convictions will turn in favour of the respondent. Success in the criminal appeals is also a matter of chance. They may or may not be decided in favour of the respondent and, therefore, it cannot be urged that if the appeals were decided before the decision in the instant case, then there would have been no disqualification of the respondent within the meaning of sub-s. (2) of S. 8. The disqualification arising from convictions ordered by the trial Court cannot disappear merely from the decision of the criminal appeals before the decision of the instant case, but that is possible only when the criminal appeals of the respondent are accepted and his convictions are discharged. The acquittal or discharge of the respondent in criminal appeal is equally a fortuitous circumstance. Then the argument was that while interpreting the statutory provisions affecting a civil right, a very rigid construction obviating all uncertainty should be made. The argument proceeds on the footing that S. 8(2) be so construed that the view on disqualification does not fluctuate and that remains the same in both the situations, either the appeal of the respondent was decided before or after the election petition. As already held above, the entire scrutiny in this case has to be restricted to the stage of scrutiny of nomination papers and, therefore, later developments, for example, successful election of the respondent, cannot and should not be permitted to influence the decision. It was also argued that setting aside the election pending the appeal against convictions, is, against equity. No regard for equity or common law can be had in the case of the respondent, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Basu, (supra). 23. Before concluding the case, we must be clear as to under which ground does the instant petition come. A plain reading of S. 100(1) of the Act, 1951, shows that it can be conveniently divided into two parts. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the sub-section fall in the first part and Cl. 23. Before concluding the case, we must be clear as to under which ground does the instant petition come. A plain reading of S. 100(1) of the Act, 1951, shows that it can be conveniently divided into two parts. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the sub-section fall in the first part and Cl. (d) along with its sub- clauses falls in the second part. The distinction between Cis. (a), (b) and (c) in the first part and Cl. (d) in the second part lies in the fact that whereas on proof of any of the grounds mentioned in Cis. (a), (b) and (c), the election has to be declared void, without any further requirement, in a case falling under Cl. (d), the election cannot be declared void, merely on the proof of any of the grounds, mentioned in its sub-clauses, unless it is further proved that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected. The contention of Sri Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the instant case falls under sub-cls. (i) and (iv) of Cl. (d) of S. 100(1) of the Act. 1951. Therefore, the petitioner will have to establish that the result of the election, in so far as the respondent is concerned, was materially affected. Since the nomination paper of the respondent was improperly accepted in view of his being disqualified under sub-s. (2) of S. 8 by virtue of his conviction under S. 302, I.P.C., and under S. 307, I.P.C., the case surely falls under sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (d) of S. 100(1). As the nomination paper was improperly accepted in violation of sub-s. (2) of S. 8 of the Act, 1951, the petition also falls under sub-cl. (iv) of Cl. (d) of S. 100(1). In Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik, AIR 1981 SC 547 , their Lordships observed : "The expression "any nomination" occurring in sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (d) in the second part may include nomination of a returned candidate as well; but in the case of a returned candidate whose nomination has been improperly accepted, the effect on the result of the election so far as it concerns him is obvious. (i) of Cl. (d) in the second part may include nomination of a returned candidate as well; but in the case of a returned candidate whose nomination has been improperly accepted, the effect on the result of the election so far as it concerns him is obvious. However, if the election is challenged on the ground that the nomination of a candidate, other than the returned candidate, has been improperly accepted, the petitioner in order to succeed will be required to prove under Cl. (d)(i), in addition to improper acceptance, the further fact that thereby the result of the election so far as it concerns the returned candidate, has been materially affected." (Emphasis supplied)' It clearly follows from the above reproduced material that the effect of improper acceptance of nomination paper on the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the respondent, is obvious in that the latter was elected on the strength of improperly accepted nomination. Nothing more is to be proved by the petitioner in this case except that the nomination paper of the respondent was improperly accepted. 24. In Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal, AIR 1971 SC 330 , their Lordships held in para 4 on page 332 thus : "It is true that the opinion has to be formed as to whether the successful candidate was disqualified on that date of his election, but this opinion is to be formed by the High Court at the time of pronouncing the judgment in the election petition." Still, the appeals of the respondent against the convictions under S. 302, I.P.C., and under S. 307, I.P.C., are pending in this Court and the position remains that the respondent continues to be a convict within the meaning of S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951, and, therefore, it has to be held that he was clearly disqualified on the date of scrutiny of the nomination paper under sub-s. (2) of S. 8. The position would have been different had the convictions been set aside before the date of pronouncement of the judgment. Then the case would have been covered by the decision in the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (supra). 25. For the foregoing reasons, the finding on the issue 1 is that disqualification operating under S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951, was not saved by bail, stay order or by appeal. Then the case would have been covered by the decision in the case of Vidya Charan Shukla (supra). 25. For the foregoing reasons, the finding on the issue 1 is that disqualification operating under S. 8(2) of the Act, 1951, was not saved by bail, stay order or by appeal. All the issues 1, 2 and 3 are decided against the respondent. Issue No. 4 : 26. The election petitioner is entitled to get the election of the respondent declared as void. 27. In the result, the election petition is allowed and the election of the respondent is hereby declared void on the grounds under S. 100, sub-s. (1), Cls. (d), (i) and (iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the same is set aside. The security deposit of Rs. 2,000/- shall be refunded to the petitioner on presentation of a proper application. 28. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Election Commission and to the Speaker of the U.P. State Legislature. The petitioner shall get costs, assessed at Rs. 200/-.