JUDGMENT R.P. Gupta, Member - The present revision is filed by Bhajan Lal and others challenging the order of the trial court S.D.O. Nababganj, Bareilly dated 22-10-86 and the order of Additional Commissioner, Bareilly dated 10-2-87 by which order they refused to abate under Section 5 (2) (a) of U.P.C.H. Act the suit under Section 176 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act filed by O.Ps. Jhanjan etc. against the revisionist. The revisionist wanted the abatement of the proceedings under Section 5 (2) (a) of U.P.C.H. Act simply on the basis of notification under Section 4A (1) of U.P.C.H. Act, without waiting for the notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act. 2. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued that the entire Tahsil came under consolidation by notification under Section 4A (1) of U.P.C.H. Act and as such there was no need to wait for notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act and the proceedings should be abated. 3. I have considered the above arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionist. Section 4A of U.P.C.H. Act was added by U.P. Act No. 35 of 1976 with effect from 18-11-76 to set at rest the controversy whether area in which consolidation had already taken place can again be brought under consolidation operation. This notification is simply like notification under Section 4 (1) of U.P.C.H. Act with the only change that by notification under Section 4A of the Act, the area already consolidated in the past is again brought under consolidation scheme after a lapse of certain time. There is no provision for abatement of suits proceedings etc. just after notification of Section 4A (1) of the U.P.C.H. Act. Same is the position of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. 4. Section 5 of the Act specifically mentioned that upon publication of the notification under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 in the official gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under Section 52 or sub-section (1) of Section 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 relates. Thus for the application of Section 5 of the Act notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act is necessary and thus pending proceedings suits etc. Thus for the application of Section 5 of the Act notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act is necessary and thus pending proceedings suits etc. cannot be abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of U.P.C.H. Act in the absence of notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act. 5. The ruling of hon'ble High Court Atru v. Gopal reported in 1987 R.D. 62 is brought to my notice in which the second appeal was abated by the hon'ble High Court after the notification under Section 4 (A) of U.P.C.H, Act. In this ruling it is not mentioned whether the notification under Section 4(2) of. U.P.C.H. Act had taken place or not. It is also not specifically mentioned that the second appeal would be abated even in the absence of notification under Section 4 (2) of the Act. If this ruling is interpreted as laying down the law that even in the absence of notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act the proceedings are to be abated simply on publication of notification under Section 4A of U.P.C.H. Act, it will be against the specific provisions of Section 5 of the U.P.C.H. Act, and as such it will become per-incuriam and is not to be followed. In fact this question was not considered at all whether the proceedings, suits etc. are to be abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act just after publication of notification under Section 4A of the Act or they can be abated only after the publication of notification under Section 4 (2) of the Act. 6. The doctrine of `Per Incuriam' has been approved by the Supreme Court in Jai Sri v. Raj Diwan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 83 (at page 88). Salmond has stated that "A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute. As examples of 'per incuriam' judgments, Salmond cited a case where the court knew a statute but did not refer to the precise terms of the statute, as well as to a case where the court knew of the statute but failed to appreciate the relevance to the matter in hand. (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edition page 150). As examples of 'per incuriam' judgments, Salmond cited a case where the court knew a statute but did not refer to the precise terms of the statute, as well as to a case where the court knew of the statute but failed to appreciate the relevance to the matter in hand. (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edition page 150). In Sardari Lal Gupta v. Sri Krishan Agarwal, A.I.R. 1984 P and H 439 a division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a precedent is not binding, if were rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of law. It further observed regarding the application of the rule of 'per incuriam' that the rule applies even though the earlier court knew of the statute in question, it did not refer to and had presented to its mind the precise terms of the statute. In Rajpur Ruda Meha v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1707 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when certain question is neither raised nor argued, a decision by court would not be binding precedent. 7. Thus it is clear that only after the publication of notification under Section 4 (2) of U.P.C.H. Act, the proceedings etc. are to be abated under Section 5 (2) (a) U.P.C.H. Act. There is no force in the present revision which is dismissed.