P. M. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Miscellaneous Criminal Application under sec. 482 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is filed by the petitioners (original accused) challenging the Order dated 9-11-1984 in M. Enquiry Case No. 31 of 1984 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Surendranagar directing Police Sub-Inspector Wadhwan to investigate the complaint under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code and submit the report. ( 2 ) IT transpires that the learned Magistrate on receiving the complaint had not examined the complaint before him under sec. 200 or 202 of the Code and had not taken the cognizance of the offence on the complaint and directed the Police to investigate under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code. ( 3 ) OPPONENT No. 1 filed the complaint in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Surendranagar against the petitioners contending that petitioner No. 1 opponent No. 1 Prabhashanker Manilal Pandya and Sushilakumari Natvarsinh Parmar were the partners of the business carried on in the name and style of Uchem Laboratory for manufacturing medicines injections etc. since 5-11-1985 and petitioner No. 1 Kanaksinh Hathisinh Jadeja was managing partner and was looking after the business of the firm. Petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 are the relatives of petitioner No. 1. Opponent No. 1 being qualified chemist was supervising the manufacturing process and was paid salary of Rs. 1 0 per month. The firm was served notice by the Dena Bank Surendranagar and therefore opponent No. 1 came to know about the mismanagement of the affairs of the firm and therefore the partners requested petitioner No. 1 to give accounts of the firm but petitioner No. 1 hesitated and removed the valuable articles like Refrigerator distillation plant with heater steel tank fans motor-cycle fiat car etc. from the premises of the firm and locked the premises and then represented to the Dena Bank authorities that all the pledged and hypothecated articles were inside the premises of the firm and relying on his representation the Bank also applied its lock on the premises of the firm. It is also alleged that petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 abetted petitioner No. 1 in removing the said articles and committing illegal acts by petitioner No. 1. According to opponent No. 1 the petitioners committed offences punishable under secs. It is also alleged that petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 abetted petitioner No. 1 in removing the said articles and committing illegal acts by petitioner No. 1. According to opponent No. 1 the petitioners committed offences punishable under secs. 403 406 421 341 477 448 read with sec. 34 Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate on receiving the complaint passed the order under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code directing Police Sub-Inspector Wadhwan to investigate and submit his report. ( 4 ) MR. D. D. Vyas learned Advocate for the petitioners submitted that the learned Magistrate before directing investigation under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code should have recorded the reasons. As the learned Magistrate has not recorded the reasons for directing investigation by the Police the order is vitiated. Mr. Vyas in support of his submission has tried to get support from the judgment of this Court in Ramanlal Chhaganlal Bhavsar v. P. M. Desai 11 (1970) GLR 967 in which it is in terms observed that it is imperative for the Magistrate to give some reasons which indicate application of his mind to the facts of the case in respect of which he considers inquiry necessary before issuing process against him and merely directing a Police Officer to inquire and report under sec. 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 is not enough and cannot be said to have complied with sec 202 (1) of the Code. In that case the learned single Judge referred the provisions of sec. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in which specific provisions were that the Magistrate directing the inquiry or investigation by a Police Officer should record his reasons in writing For postponing the issue of process. In sec. 202 of the Code 1973 the obligations to record the reasons in writing for postponing the issue of process are specifically not included. Under sec. 202 of the repelled Code the Magistrate deciding the postponement of issue of process had to record in writing the reasons for doing so but that provision is not included in the Code of 1973. That was with a specific reason as it was recommended by the Law Commission that it was difficult for the Magistrate at that particular stage to record reasons. That was with a specific reason as it was recommended by the Law Commission that it was difficult for the Magistrate at that particular stage to record reasons. It was also realised that when the Magistrate felt doubtful about the complainants statement and some witnesses produced before him it was some time embarrassing for him to state that fact in writing at the initial stage. The Law Commission also felt that no purpose would be served by expression of the judicial opinion at that initial stage. At the recommendation of the Law Commissioner the words for reasons to be recorded in writing in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 202 of the repealed Code of 1898 are deleted. The Magistrate under the existing provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 202 of the Code is therefore not required to record the reasons for postponing the issue of the process on the person complained against and holding inquiry by himself or direct inquiry by a Police Officer or such other person. In view of the legislative change the observations in Ramanlals case (supra) for recording reasons are no more a good law and therefore merely because the learned Magistrate in the instant case has not recorded the reasons the order does not require to be quashed. ( 5 ) PROVISIONS of sec. 156 of the Code are applicable at the precognizance stage while the provisions of secs. 200 and 202 of the Code are applicable at the post cognizance stage. The Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of the offence on receiving a complaint and he may without taking cognizance direct investigation of the case by the Police under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code (See: Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1541 ). The very fact that the learned Magistrate passed the order for investigation under sub-sec (3) of sec. 156 of the Code without examining the complainant by if self is sufficient to hold that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offences. ( 6 ) SECTION 190 in Chapter XIV of the Code specifies as to when the Magistrate may take the cognizance of offence. 156 of the Code without examining the complainant by if self is sufficient to hold that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offences. ( 6 ) SECTION 190 in Chapter XIV of the Code specifies as to when the Magistrate may take the cognizance of offence. Under that section Magistrate may take cognizance of offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute the offence; or upon a police report of Such facts; or upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer. or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. The expression taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not defined in the Code. It all depends upon the circumstances of a particular case including the mode in which the case is instituted and the nature of preliminary action taken by the Magistrate. When on receiving a complaint the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under sec. 200 and succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code he can be said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 190 of the Code. As observed in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1672 if the Magistrate instead of proceeding under Chapter XV of the Code in his judicial exercise of the discretion takes action of some other kind such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation by the Police under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The power to order police investigation under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code is different from the power to direct the investigation conferred by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 202 of the Code. Both of them operate in distinct spheres at different stages The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage white the other at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. The facts of the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) were practically similar to the facts of the instant case. The Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence and therefore also the provisions of sec. 200 and 202 of the Code are not applicable in the instant case. ( 7 ) THE powers of the Magistrate directing investigation under sub-sec. The Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the offence and therefore also the provisions of sec. 200 and 202 of the Code are not applicable in the instant case. ( 7 ) THE powers of the Magistrate directing investigation under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 and receiving the police report under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 173 of the Cede are extensively discussed Lay the Supreme Court in H. S. Bains v. The State AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1883 but considering the facts of the present case that aspect is not of much relevance. ( 8 ) MR. Vyas for the petitioners referred the decision of this Court in Harshadbhai C. Patel v. Indravadan P. Shah 27 (1) Gujarat Law Reporter 643 and submitted that the learned Magistrate should not have directed the investigation by the police and could have passed order issuing process as there was sufficient material on the record for issuing process. The broad proposition canvassed by Mr. Vyas cannot be easily accepted and the ratio of the case in Harshadbhai also does not lay down any such broad proposition. The facts of that case were entirely different and the complainant of that case stated all facts in the complaint and practically there was no scope for further investigation by the Police and therefore the learned single Judge observed that process should have been issued by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Even the learned single Judge Observed that it is difficult to lay down absolute norms in which cases the Court should issue process or hold inquiry under sec. 202 or direct investigation of the matter under sec. 156 (3) of the Code as each case depends upon its own facts. The learned single Judge however expressed the definite views that in those cases in which the immediate arrests and searches or pursuit of the accused or the property is called for then in a private complaint the Court should refer the matter for investigation under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code These observations are against the petitioners and do not support the point tried to be canvassed by Mr. Vyas. In that case grievance was made by the complainant as the process was not issued while in the instant case grievance is sought to be made by the petitioners accused. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code These observations are against the petitioners and do not support the point tried to be canvassed by Mr. Vyas. In that case grievance was made by the complainant as the process was not issued while in the instant case grievance is sought to be made by the petitioners accused. It is clear from the facts of the instant case that clear allegation is that very valuable articles are removed from the factory premises and criminal breach of trust is committed by petitioner No. 1 with the help of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 and therefore it would be necessary to seize such properties and investigate in the offences. ( 9 ) AS the learned Magistrate has directed the investigation under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 156 of the Code the Police should be allowed to exercise the power to investigate the cognizable offences without interference. It is clear from the facts that serious allegations about mis-appropriation of valuable properties are made and therefore it is necessary for the police to investigate into the alleged offences. That being the exclusive field of the executive it is not desirable to prevent the police from investigating in the offence by the High Court in exercise of the inherent powers under sec. 482 of the Code. In Eastern Spinning Mills Shri Virendra Kumar Sharda v. Shri Rajiv Poddar AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1668 the Supreme Court in terms observed that save in exceptional cases where non interference would result in miscarriage of justice the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at any stage of investigation of the offences. In State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna AIR 1980 Supreme Court 326 it is observed that investigation of a cognizable offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the Police Department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government and therefore the power of the Police to investigate into a cognizable offence should ordinarily not be interfered with by the judiciary. ( 10 ) INHERENT power of the High Court under sec. 482 of the Code should normally be exercised if it is necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ( 10 ) INHERENT power of the High Court under sec. 482 of the Code should normally be exercised if it is necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Quashing the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is not necessary either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. On the contrary if the order is quashed effect would be otherwise. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the High Court are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that process of law is being misused. It is also well-settled that at the initial stage Court has to consider the allegations made in the complaint and the documents accompanying thereto. Learned Advocate for the petitioners has referred the decision of this Court in Dharamchand v. State of Gujarat 21 Gujarat Law Reporter 341 in which while reiterating the above referred principles it is observed that in case the first information report lodged with the police shows some ulterior motive just to find a shortcut to civil suit the High Court can interfere under its special jurisdiction. That aspect does pot require consideration in view the facts of the instant case ( 11 ) FROM the facts discussed above it cannot be said that even no prima facie case is made out and the complaint is malicious with a view to harass the petitioners. No illegality or even irregularity is pointed out to warrant interference in the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Petition therefore is accordingly dismissed. Interim relief vacated. Rule discharged. Application dismissed. .