B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant Daitari and his five sons who figure as the other appellants stand convicted under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (the Code, for short) for having committed the murders of Tankadhar Suna and his son Ghasia Suna (to be described hereinafter as the deceased persons) on May 23, 1981 and Ainalasari in the district of Balangir in prosecution of their common object. They have also been convicted under section 148 of the Code for having formed an unlawful assembly being armed with weapons which were likely to cause death. Each of them has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the first mentioned offence and no separate sentence has been passed in respect of the other offence. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the case of prosecution was that bitter blood was the ruling relationship between the deceased persons on the one hand and the appellants on the other owing to previous land disputes and there had been a number of cases disposed of and pending between the parties prior to the date of occurrence. While the deceased persons were on their land, the appellants went armed, four of them having sharp cutting instruments and two of them having lathis in their possession and all of them assaulted the deceased persons to death on the spot. This occurrence had been witnessed by P. Ws. 3 and 4 who had lands nearby and they informed the co-villagers about what they had seen. ( 3 ) ON the basis of the first information report (Ext. 3) lodged by P. W. 6, investigation was taken up and on its completion, a charge-sheet was placed and the appellants were prosecuted. ( 4 ) THE plea of the appellants was one of denial and false implication. Three of the appellants. namely, Jirel, Kusha and Chamara, had taken a plea of alibi and in its support, had examined DW5. 1 and 2. ( 4 ) THE plea of the appellants was one of denial and false implication. Three of the appellants. namely, Jirel, Kusha and Chamara, had taken a plea of alibi and in its support, had examined DW5. 1 and 2. The case of the appellants Daitari and Iswar was that they were blind and therefore, they could not have taken any part in the occurrence: ( 5 ) ON a consideration of the evidence adduced from both the sides, the trial court has negatived the plea of alibi set up by three of the appellants held that there was no evidence that at the time of occurrence, two of them were blind and accepting the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the occurrence coupled with their immediate statements implicating the appellants as the assailants of the deceased persons which found support in the medical evidence and recoveries of some incriminating articles, has held that the appellants were guilty of the charge of murders which had been committed in furtherance of their common object and had been armed with dealy weapons as members of an unlawful assembly. They have accordingly been convicted and sentenced as indicated above. ( 6 ) WE have heasd the learned counsels for both the sides. The order of conviction recorded against the appellants bas been challenged as unfounded on the evidence on record. ( 7 ) IT is not disputed at the Bar and it is clear from the evidence of the two doctors. namely, P. Ws. 9 and 11, who had conducted the autopsies over the dead bodies of the two deceased persons as per their post mortem reports, Exts. 11 and 16, that the two deceased persons had died homicidal deaths and the injuries sustained by them were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause their deaths. ( 8 ) IN order to substantiate its case, the prosecution has mainly relied on the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4. The learned counsel for the appellants has taken us thought their evidence. Being owners of lands near the spot and having been present at places from which they could see the occurrence, P. Ws. 3 and 4 were natural and competent witnesses. 3 and 4. The learned counsel for the appellants has taken us thought their evidence. Being owners of lands near the spot and having been present at places from which they could see the occurrence, P. Ws. 3 and 4 were natural and competent witnesses. Bach of these two witnesses has given a clear and consistent version that the appellants Chamara and Kusha assaulted the deceased Tankadhar to death by inflicting successive blows by meals of Tangis and that the appellants Iswar and Jirel dealt a number of blows by means of Tangis on the person of the deceased Ghasi which had resulted in his death. Nothing substantial has been brought out in their long cross-examination to discredit their testimony with regard to the assault on the persons of the deceased persons by means of sharp cutting instruments by the above-named four appellants exrept that in their earlier statements made in the course of investigation, they had not specifically stated about the seats of assault. Merely because in their statements at the stage of investigation, P. Ws. 3 and 4 had not given out in details the actual locations of the assaults on the persons of the deceased persons, their evidence is not to be discarded. ( 9 ) THE immediate statements made by these two persons before the co-villagers including the first informant with regard to the complicity of the four appellants, namely, Chamara, Kusha Iswar and Jirel, who had dealt the fatal blows by means of sharp cutting instruments on the two deceased persons and the evidence of the two doctors (P. Ws. 9 and 11) who had noticed a number of incised wounds on the persons of the two deceased persons which could be caused by sharp cutting instruments would lend assurance to evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of these four appellants. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons recorded by the trial court in paragraph 15 of the judgment, it has not accepted the plea of the defence that two of the appellants, namely Daitari and Iswar. were not able to see at the time of the occurrence. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of these four appellants. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons recorded by the trial court in paragraph 15 of the judgment, it has not accepted the plea of the defence that two of the appellants, namely Daitari and Iswar. were not able to see at the time of the occurrence. In this connection reference has been made by the learned trial Judge to the evidence of P. W. 11 and the fact that the doctor who had examined the eyes of these persons subsequent to the occurrence had not been examined at the trial. We do not find any justification to take a view different from the one taken by the trial court in this regard. ( 11 ) THREE of the appellants, namely, Jirel, Kusha and Charama, had taken a plea of alibi and in this connection they have examined two witnesses for their defence. The trial court has rightly concluded that a plea of alibi set up by these three appellants has not been established as the evidence of D. Ws. 1 and 2 is of a vague character and cannot establish such a plea. Reasons have been assigned for this conclusion in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment. ( 12 ) IT is for an accused to establish a plea of alibi. See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sughar Singh and others1 and Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh2. It is not necessary for him to establish this plea beyond reasonable doubt as is to be done by the prosecution to establish its case. But unless the defence brings out materials indicating that the accused could not have been at the place where the prosecution says he was, such a plea cannot be said to have been established. As has been held by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1981 Supreme Court 911 (supra), a plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea can, therefore, succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. The plea can, therefore, succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. The evidence in the instant case would not lead one to a reasonable conclusion in support of the plea of alibi set up by the three appellants. Failure to establish a plea of alibi would not mean that the case of the prosecution has been established. Authority for this proposition would be found in State of Haryana v. Prabhu and others3. But as has already been indicated, there is clear and cogent evidence pointing to the conclusion that the four appellants Chamara, Kusha, Iswar and Jirel, had assaulted the two deceased persons to death by dealing blows by means of heavy sharp cutting instrments. Their conduct preceding, attending and subsequent to the occurrence referred to in the trial courts judgment would show that they had the common intention to cause the deaths of the deceased persons and had, with that intention, caused injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause their deaths. ( 13 ) THE case against the other two appellants, namely, Daitari and Jibardhan, stands on a different footing, As deposed to by P. Ws. 3 and 4, the appellant Daitari had been armed with a four- cornered stick and the appellant Jibardhan had with him a lathi and they had assaulted the two deceased persons with those instruments. Each of these two witnesses had attributed a number of blows having been dealt on the deceased persons by the two appellants by the stick; and lathi they were holding. It is important to keep in mind that P. Ws. 9 and 11, who had conducted the autopsies, had not noticed any injury on the persons of the two deceased persons which could be caused by stick or lathi, They had not noticed any bruise, lacerated injury or contusion. If a number of blows had been dealt on the two deceased persons by the appellants Daitari and Jibardhan by means of stick and lathi, the two deceased persons would have sustained injuries on their persons which could have been noticed by the Investigating Officer at the time of inquest and by the doctors at the time of conducting the autopsies. The Investigating Officer has testified that at the time of inquest, he had noticed no injuries on the two deceased persons, which could be caused by a stick or lathi. Thus, in this case, the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 is negatived by the evidence of the Investigating Officer who had conducted the inquest and the two doctors who had examined the dead bodies. ( 14 ) IT is the duty of the prosecution in a case of this nature to bring out in the evidence of the doctor as to whether the injuries on the person of the murdered could be caused in the manner deposed to by the prosecution witnesses. None of the doctors has testified that any of the injuries could be so caused. No doubt, if direct evidence is satisfactory and reliable, it may not be rejected on hypothetical medical evidence, but if the medical evidence rules out the possibilities of the injuries in the manner deposed to by the prosecution witnesses, ocular testimony cannot be accepted. See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujorat,4 Punjab Singh v. State of Haryana. 5 In the instant case, the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of the appellants Daitari and Jibardhan has been demolished by the evidence of P. Ws. 9 and 11. ( 15 ) IN the course of investigation, a four-cornered stick (M. O. III) and a bamboo lathi (M. O. IV) had been recovered from the house of the appellant Daitari. These recoveries are not of any consequence in view of the highly unsatisfactory evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of the above-named two appellants and because of the fact that neither P. W. 3 nor P. W. 4 has identified M. Os. III and IV as the weapons of attack. ( 16 ) FOR the foregoing reasons we are not prepared to accept the finding recorded by the trial court that the appellants Daitari and Jibardhan had also taken part in assaulting and committing murders of the deceased persons. This view taken by us would not affect the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of the other four appellants. This view taken by us would not affect the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 with regard to the complicity of the other four appellants. The doctrine falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not applied by courts in India arid it is open to the court to accept that part of the evidence of the eye-witnesses which is reliable and trustworthy while rejecting a part of their evidence, as has been done in the instant case by this Court. ( 17 ) THE result would be that the charges under sections 148 and 149 of the Code would fail. The appellants Chamara, Iswar, Kusha and Jirel are, however liable to be convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Code for committing the murders of deceased Tankadhar and Ghasia. ( 18 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The order of conviction recorded against all the appellants under section 148 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside. The appellants Daitari Suna and Jibardhan Suna are acquitted of the charge of murder by the application of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and they be set at liberty forthwith. In lieu of their conviction under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code the appellants Chamara Suna, Kusha Suna. Iswar Suna and Jirel Suna are convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Appeal partly allowed. .