JUDGMENT 1. 1. This order shall also dispose of D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 107 of 1987. Hari Shanker Bhargava v. M/s Rakyans Jewellers and another . 2. Suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent filed by the respondent was decreed against the appellants on January 20, 1978. First Appeal No. 59 of 1978 was filed against the same by the defendants (appellants). The appeal was shown for hearing in the daily list of June 29. 1987, the date on which the Court re-opened after the summer vacations. The appeal was then taken up the next day on June 30, 1987 The order-sheet says that Shri P. C. Jain appeared for the appellants and stated that the case had become infructuous and accordingly the appeal was dismissed as infructuous. On July 2, 1937 Misc. Application No. 348 of 1987 was filed by the appellants for recalling the order of June 30. 1987 dismissing the appeal as infructuous on the ground that the appeal had in fact not become infructuous and Shri P. C. Jain was not authorised to act on behalf of the appellants so that the appeal could not be dismissed merely on his statement. Affidavit of Shri P C. Jain was also filed in support of the application, wherein he stated th, t be had erroneously stated before the Court on June 30, 1987 under a wrong impression that the appeal had become infructuous. This application was strongly opposed by the other side and it was rejected by order dated July 17, 1987 by the learned Single Judge, who had dismissed the appeal as infructuous on June 30, 190. While rejecting the application, the learned Single Judge granted 18 months' time to the appellants for vacating the suit premises subject to an undertaking specified in the order. 3. This appeal (Special Appeal No. 97 of 1987) by the defendant-tenants is against the aforesaid orders passed by the learned Single Judge on June 30, 1981 and July 17, 1987. The other appeal (Special Appeal No. 107 of 1987) is filed by the plaintiff-respondent against grant of 18 months' time to vacate the premises in the aforesaid order on July 17, 1987. 4. The other appeal (Special Appeal No. 107 of 1987) is filed by the plaintiff-respondent against grant of 18 months' time to vacate the premises in the aforesaid order on July 17, 1987. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection that one appeal cannot be filed against two orders and that the order passed on July 17, 1987 being under Section 151 CPC, it was not appealable. To circumvent this objection, learned counsel for the appellants confined this appeal only against the aforesaid order of June 30,1987 dismissing the appeal as infructuous. Obviously in view of this stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellants, the preliminary objec ion does not survive. The only question, therefore, is whether the order passed on June 30, 1987 dismissing the appeal as infructuous can be upheld. 5. Admittedly no vakalatnama was filed by Shri P. C. Jain in First Appeal No, 59 of 1978 which was dismissed as infructuous merely on his statement by the order passed on June 3 i, 1987 Not only thi,. his affidavit filed later also shows that the statement made by him that the appeal had become infructuous was under an erroneous impression without any such instruction being given to him by the appellants or any one else duly authorised to act on behalf of the appellants. There are other affidavits also on record to support this statement on affidavit made by Shri P. C. Jain. In our opinion the absence of any vakalatnama of Shri P. C. Jain authorising him to act on behalf of the appellants in the appeal coupled with his statement on affidavit that he had not been instructed by any one to make a statement that the appeal had become infructuous, and that the statement so made by him in the Court was under a wrong impression is sufficient to indicate that dismissal of the appal as infructuous on June 30. 1987 merely on the statement of Shri P. C. Jain cannot be sustained Obviously it is only an authorised agent of the appellant. who was empowered to act on behalf of the appellants for making such a statement, whose statement could provide a legal basis for dismissing the appeal as infructuous An Advocate is empowered to act on behalf of his client in the manner stated in the vakilatnama. which is clear from the requirements of Order 3 CPC. who was empowered to act on behalf of the appellants for making such a statement, whose statement could provide a legal basis for dismissing the appeal as infructuous An Advocate is empowered to act on behalf of his client in the manner stated in the vakilatnama. which is clear from the requirements of Order 3 CPC. In the absence of any vakalatnama given by the appellants in favour of Shri P C. lain empowering him to act on behalf of the appellants. a statement made by Shri P. C. Jain alone should not have been acted upon for dismissing the appeal as infructuous. The learned Single Judge has been influenced by the fact that Shri P. C Jain had appeared on several occasions in appeal on behalf of the appellants. It is sufficient to state that the distinction between acting and pleading on behalf of the litig tnt is w 1i known and while an Advocate may appear and plead or argue without a vakalatnama. he cannot act on behalf of a party without a vakalatnami. Making a statement for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it had become infructuous was acting on behalf of the appellants and this Shri P. C. Jain could not do without a vakalatnama. In our opinion, this alone is sufficient to allow this appeal. 6. It is also obvious that the statement made by Shri P. C. Jain of June 30, 1987 that the appeal had become infructuous was factually incorrect. since the subsequent events as well as the tenacity with which the matter is being contested even thereafter clearly shows that there was no compromise between the parties on the basis of which the statement had been made that the appeal has become infructuous. It is for this reason that counsel for the respondent had agreed before the learned Single Judge to give six months' time to vacate the suit premises, but the learned Single Judge made an order granting time of 18 months for this purpose. This incorrect basis for dismissing the appeal as infructuous is also a ground for setting aside that order. 7. Consequently, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated June 30, 1987 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing First Appeal No. 59 of 1978 as infructuous is set aside. That appeal shall be reheard and decided on merits.No costs.Appeal allowed. *******