B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision under sections 391/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, (for short the Code), is directed against the order dated 13-1-83 passed by the Sessions Judge, Nainital, allowing the revision by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Haldwani, following the application and directing the opposite parties to remove the obstruction in public way in proceedings under sections 133/137 of the Code. ( 2 ) THE short account of events leading to the present revision is that on 19-1-80 an application was moved on behalf of the present applicant that the opposite parties have created an obstruction on public way used by the applicant and by the public in general, hence the opposite party should be directed to remove the said unlawful obstruction. The Tahsildar Haldwani was directed to submit report. In the report submitted by the Tahsildar, Haldwani, it was stated that after taking evidence of the witnesses, in plot No. 394, area 1 biswa there was a public land used for public way and the same was entered as such till 1386 Fasli. But in 1387 Fasli the Lekhpal has expunged the entry of public way, rather he make an entry of Goth (a place for tethering catile) and recommended for removal of obstruction. Relying upon that report and considering the evidence, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by his order date 16-11-81 directed the opposite parries to remove the unlawful obstruction. Against the order a revision was filed by the opposite parties and the same was allowed by order 13. 1. 83 and the proceeding before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered to remain stayed till the right of way made by the present applicant was decided by a competent court as provided under section 137 (2) of the Code. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that the Sub-Divisional Officer has correctly passed the order allowing the application under section 133 of the Code directing the opposite parties to remove the obstruction from public way. It is against this order that the present revision has been filed. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that the Sub-Divisional Officer has correctly passed the order allowing the application under section 133 of the Code directing the opposite parties to remove the obstruction from public way. But the learned Sessions Judge on misconception of the provisions of Section 133, read with Section 137 of the Code, has just cursorily looked into the evidence on behalf of the opposite parties, who had created obstructions and directed the proceedings to remain stayed under Section 133 (2) of the Code till the dispute was decided by a competent court. Sri Harihar Prasad Tripathi Learned counsel for the State and Learned Counsel for opposite parties 1 to 3, on the other hand, urged that the impugned order was perfectly correct and under Section 133 of the Code the Magistrate has been given power to pass a conditional order requiring the person causing such obstruction to the public way, within time to be fixed, to remove such obstruction and a direction may be issued to appear on the date fixed to show cause as to why the order should not be made absolute. Section 137 of the Code enacts the procedure when the existence of public right is denied. The person against whom the order was made was to be put at question by the Magistrate as to whether he denied the existence of public right in respect of the way etc. and if he does so, the Magistrate, before proceeding under section 133 has to enquire into the matter. In view of Section 137 (2) if the Magistrate finds that there is reliable evidence in support of such proceedings, he shall stay the proceeding until the matter of existence of such right has been decided by a competent court, and in case he finds that there is no such evidence he shall proceed as may contain in Section 138 of the Code. In the instant case the evidence led by the opposite parties was reliable which means only prima facie correct. There is nothing to indicate that there was any public way on the plot in dispute. Similarly in Khatauni of 1387 to 1302 F an area of 8 biswa of plot No. 394 was noted as Goth. In the instant case the evidence led by the opposite parties was reliable which means only prima facie correct. There is nothing to indicate that there was any public way on the plot in dispute. Similarly in Khatauni of 1387 to 1302 F an area of 8 biswa of plot No. 394 was noted as Goth. Similarly in Khasra for the years 1374 to 1379 F. 8 biswa of plot No. 394 - A was recorded as Rasta and there was nothing to indicate on record as to how the area recorded as Goth came to be recorded as Rasta. On this evidence led by the opposite parties it has inferred that prima facie they have reliable evidence in support of their claim of existence of Rasta on the plot. Hence the proceedings under section 133 ought to have been stayed under section 137 (2 ). ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, the principal Question for determination is the ambit and scope of the power of Magistrate under section 137 of the Code and scope of meaning of reliable evidence, led by a person against whom the order has been passed. Section 133 occurs in Chapter X-Maintenance of public order and tranquility, which obviously enacts that the provisions under Chapter X including Sections 133, 137 and 138 are in connection with maintenance of public order and tranquility and not in connection with the right, title or possession of a party in the land in dispute. The proceedings under this Chapter are summary in nature and intended to enable the Magistrate to summarily deal with the cases of public nuisance. The object of Section 133 is not to enable an applicant or a complainant to file an. application under section 133 to obtain an order to safeguard his civil rights nor he can obtain any relief in connection with his legal rights, rather the order to be obtained is for the benefit of public at large. It is another matter that the person making the application under section 133 brings the fact to the notice of the Magistrate concerned. In other words Section 133 creates an exceptional jurisdiction keeping in view the urgency in the matter involved. It is another matter that the person making the application under section 133 brings the fact to the notice of the Magistrate concerned. In other words Section 133 creates an exceptional jurisdiction keeping in view the urgency in the matter involved. The previsions of Sections 133 and 137 are so urgent in nature as recourse to ordinary law, including a civil suit, for mandatory injunction would not serve the purpose as the litigation may be a prolonged one. Consequently, the matter has been dealt with the same amount of urgency and fairness as the language of Section9 133/137 of the Code require. Section 137 provides, that after receiving information and on taking such evidence as the Sub-Divisional Magistrate thinks fit, if he is of the view that there is unlawful obstruction of public way, he shall make a conditional order requiring the person causing such obstruction to remove the same by the time fixed in the order and to appear before the court and to show cause. Under Section 137, the Magistrate has to put a question to the person concerned as to whether he denies the existence of public right in respect of the way and in case such public right is denieal the Magistrate would direct him to furnish evidence. Whereas Section 137 (2) clearly indicates that the Magistrate would hold an enquiry and not a trial. Section 2 (g) defines enquiry, which means every enquiry other than trial. It means that the interpretation of Section 137 (2) has to be consistent with the language employed by the legislature to express its intention and object. The use of word Tenquiry under section 137 indicates that the Magistrate has to decide prima facie the denial by the person against whom denial order was passed, and further in case detailed scouting is permitted to be made that would go beyond the ambit of power conferred under section 137 (2 ). In other words, that would produce an unreasonable result. It is not for the court to assume that any language would have been employed by the ligature to produce unreasonable result. The observation made by Willmer, Danckwarts and Salmon. L. JJ. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, at page 888 is set out below. In other words, that would produce an unreasonable result. It is not for the court to assume that any language would have been employed by the ligature to produce unreasonable result. The observation made by Willmer, Danckwarts and Salmon. L. JJ. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, at page 888 is set out below. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available, In the present sub-section the result contended for would be quite irrelevant to the mischief which the statutory provision, was intended to meet, namely, the prevention of exploitation of tenants by speculators. The provision cannot have been intended to defeat landlords who have been land lords of the holding for a long period, even if their title has been renewed within the last five years. There is a perfectly reasonable construction available which avoids such an unfortunate resulttt. ( 5 ) A bare reading of Section 137 would indicate that the provisions therein are to prevent the Magistrate from arrogating himself the power of civil court. Further the Magistrate need not hold an elaborate enquiry regarding the rights of the parties. The ambit of the enquiry is to find out if there is some prima facie reliable evidence in support of the denial of public right. The Magistrate is not called upon to weigh the evidence in order to determine the rights and title or truth of the denial. But he has just to be satisfied as to whether there is some evidence which could indicate prima facie that it was possible for a competent court to place reliance upon the same. It does not obviously mean that evidence of such- a character would definitely establish title of the land. Otherwise in that case the legislature would not have used the words just reliable evidence, rather the words used would have been that the, Magistrate would decide on the basis of evidence being led as to whether the person against whom the said order has been passed, has a right in the land to create unlawful obstruction in the public way. The language of Section 137 (2) of the Code is couched in such a way that the reliable evidence would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The language of Section 137 (2) of the Code is couched in such a way that the reliable evidence would depend upon the circumstances of each case. To put it differently, it only connotes where the evidence was such that if un-rebutted, it would prove the non-existence of public right as alleged by the person against whom conditional order was passed. See Lala Bissoomal v. State2. T. N. , Sudhakaran v. Dr. E. M. George3, and Jaswant Singh v. Jagir Singh4. Further the legislature did not use the word evidencet which definitely establishes the right to claim. In other words, reliable evidence can be taken to be a form of evidence, which is not the basis of unreliable or forged evidence. The duty of a Magistrate is merely to see whether the, evidence in support of denial of public right is reliable. ( 6 ) IN the instant case it is better to refer to the evidence led by the opposite parties to prove the denial of public way or the unlawful obstruction created. It was alleged by the opposite parties that plot No. 394 did not contain public way and there was no such entry like public way in plot No. 394 in revenue papers. Similarly in khatauni for 1387 to 1392 F an area of 8 biswa of plot No. 394 was entered as Goth and there was no mention about any public way or Rasta. Similarly extract of Khasra for the years 1374 to 1379 F also mentions the area of 8 biswa of plot. No. 394-A as Goth. There was no mention of any public way or rasta. It was for the applicant to move an application under Section 133 to explain as to how this entry of Goth was converted into rasta. This was the question pertaining to right and title. The aforesaid extracts of Khasra and Khatauni were certainly reliable evidence within the meaning of Section 137 (2) of the Code. On the basis of such evidence the Magistrate ought to have stayed the proceedings until, the matter of existence of such right of public way was decided by a competent court. The Sessions Judge has correctly allowed the revision by the impugned order. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussions made herein; before, there are no, merits in the present revision and the same is accordingly dismissed. The Sessions Judge has correctly allowed the revision by the impugned order. ( 7 ) IN view of the discussions made herein; before, there are no, merits in the present revision and the same is accordingly dismissed. Office is directed to send back the record of the court below immediately. .