JUDGMENT RAVI S.DHAVAN, J. 1. THIS is a case from the hills of Pauri Garhwal from a small town known as Kotdwara. The issue was simple but began in 1971. Sixteen years have passed and it is yet to be resolved. The petitioner, a lady, is a widow. Her husband died during the period when the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were initiated. By an application under Section 3 under the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947) she sought dispossession of her tenants as she required the premises and the accommodation after demolition for reconstruction. The reconstruction of the accommodation was inextricably linked with her personal need. Dilapidation of the accommodation was consequential. She applied before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in an application under U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947, aforesaid, that she would be in a position to augment her income with better rents and thus a better return from her property, if she were to reconstruct the dilapidated accommodation. The application of the widow before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was dated 26 June, 1971. 2. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer made a personal inspection of the premises and the accommodation. Upon being satisfied that the accommodation was dilapidated and required reconstruction after demolition, which would otherwise be conducive to the petitioners' personal need for better return on the property, permission under the application was granted. The application was allowed it may be mentioned, under the jurisdiction of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972), which had since the pendency of the case, had come into operation. The widow had made suitable amendments in her application and converted it into an application under section 21 of the new Act. 3. AFTER the Prescribed Authority passed his order of 2 May 1977 it was made a subject matter of appeal initially, being Civil Appeals nos. 9 and 10 of 1977 in the Court of the District Judge. Pauri Garhwal; different tenants had filed separate appeals hence different numbers. Subsequent to these appeals, two writ-petitions were filed-which occasioned two further judgments in appeal by the District Judge, upon an order of remand by the High Court. 9 and 10 of 1977 in the Court of the District Judge. Pauri Garhwal; different tenants had filed separate appeals hence different numbers. Subsequent to these appeals, two writ-petitions were filed-which occasioned two further judgments in appeal by the District Judge, upon an order of remand by the High Court. The present writ petition is the third Writ Petition against the third order of the District Judge, upon remand in appeal. 4. THE application of the widow of 26 June 1971, in effect, requiring accommodation for personal need and for reconstructing after demolition is still under consideration. One aspect will thus become very relevant and this is the passage of 16 years since the application had originally been presented by the widow. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight of is whether the factors as may have weighed with the authorities in reference to personal need or the criteria for demolition of structures consequent upon their allegedly being dilapidated, remaining the same with the passage of time. A circumstance which this Court cannot ignore is that no matter can remain static between the space of time and it is only a continuing process of change which is permanent. Implying that if any state of affairs, in reference to the context, regard being had to the accommodation being dilapidated 16 years ago would make it more so since when this litigation has peen pending. Likewise the personal need of the widow would not remain static. This can change also. For this aspect, itself, it had become necessary to summon the record of the two earlier writ petitions. They were writ petition no. 7283 of 1978 : Smt Chandrawati v. District Judge, Pauri and others decided by Hon'ble S. D. Agarwala, J. on 19 July 1979 and writ petition no. 2934 of 1982: Smt. Chandrawati v. District Jude, Pauri Garhwal and others decided by Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. on 13 January 1986. 5. WRIT Petition no. 7283 of 1978 decided on 19 July 1979, by Hon'ble S. D. Agarwala, J. two issues were raised in this writ petition ; issues decided against the petitioner by the District Judge. These were (a) bonafide need (b) need to reconstruct after demolition. In this writ petition Hon'ble S. D. Agarwala, J. held:- "The finding in regard to the bonafide need is, therefore, vitiated in law." "In Champa Kunwar Trust v. Distt. These were (a) bonafide need (b) need to reconstruct after demolition. In this writ petition Hon'ble S. D. Agarwala, J. held:- "The finding in regard to the bonafide need is, therefore, vitiated in law." "In Champa Kunwar Trust v. Distt. Judge, 1976 AWC 200 , K. C. Agarwal, J. considered the effect of both Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the Act. He has held that even if the landlord is not able to make out a case under section 21 (1) (b) the property could be released to the landlord if it was found that the landlord immediately required the building for demolition in order to fulfill his requirement, then he is entitled to get an order of eviction under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The appellate court has not considered this aspect at all as to whether even if the building is not in a dilapidated condition, the petitioner bonafide requires the building in order to demolish it and thereafter fulfill her requirement. This matter needs reconsideration." "In view of the wrong interpretation put by the learned District Judge on the expression 'dilapidated condition' the finding recorded that the building was not in a dilapidated condition is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside." 6. THEREAFTER upon remand the District Judge again gave his decision on the two appeals on 18 December 1981. Another writ petition was filed, being writ petition no. 2934 of 1982, and this was decided by Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. In this petition, the finding on the dilapidated condition of the building was not permitted to be made an issue. On the bonafide need of the petitioner, the High Court observed:- "As regards finding regarding bonafide need appellate authority appears to have misdirected itself." The matter was again remanded back to the District Judge, to consider matters which he was required to consider in the judgment of Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. in terms of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, aforesaid. The District Judge was required to examine the personal need and the requirement of the lady to reconstruct the shops and consequently let them out to such of the tenants who occupy the shops today. 7. THE order of remand was not followed by the District Judge, and instead the directions of the High Court were evaded. The District Judge was required to examine the personal need and the requirement of the lady to reconstruct the shops and consequently let them out to such of the tenants who occupy the shops today. 7. THE order of remand was not followed by the District Judge, and instead the directions of the High Court were evaded. This time, the District Judge, as an appellate Court, took yet another irrelevant and extraneous circumstance. THE District Judge says in reference to the petitioner: "She being a 'pardanashin' lady could not on her own start any new business." This is an observation upon which the District Judge had not been required to comment on the two orders of remand passed earlier. A personal need of a woman is not to be examined with an irrelevant considerations of male chauvinism. There is nothing which prohibits a pardanashin lady to carry on a business. 8. THE other aspect of the remand order, that upon reconstruction the petitioner would let out the shops to the existing tenants, was not even examined by the District Judge, as required under section 24 (2) of the Act, aforesaid. It will be a travesty of justice if this third writ petition occasions another order of remand, and the appellate court, attempts to follow it for the third time ; in effect inviting four appellate orders on the same issue. 9. IF the petitioner is willing to let the same accommodation to existing tenants, an issue she has been pressing since sixteen years, then it is difficult to suggest that a better return on capital is not a question of bonafide and personal need. In the context of the present case, the record reveals that the constructions existing are not worth being called buildings. This has reference to the personal inspection made by the trial court on 4 March 1977. The Munsif conducting the inspection refers to the structures made of stone partly, and with tin sheets as roofs, and part of wooden pillars instead of stone and covered with tin sheets and tarpaulin. This is the inspection referred to as Annexure IV in writ petition no. 9283 of 1978. The inspection note was never disputed. 10. RECONSTRUCTION of the building after demolition thus became a personal need. This is the inspection referred to as Annexure IV in writ petition no. 9283 of 1978. The inspection note was never disputed. 10. RECONSTRUCTION of the building after demolition thus became a personal need. Sixteen years elapsed and the respondent were debating on issues of the estimates of the demolition and reconstruction and the financial capacity of the widow to reconstruct. The tenant respondents were resisting demolition and reconstruction. As time flew, inflation was exceeding the cost of demolition and cost of construction to the detriment of the widow and the estimate which she had prepared for the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority were becoming awry for no fault of hers. In between when the first order was passed on 2-5-1977 when the Prescribed Authority/Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted the application of the widow in effect releasing the premises on the property and permitting her to reconstruct, and till today the widow has been embroiled in litigation which has sent her running down from the hills of Pauri Garhwal to this Court on three innings. Two earlier orders and judgments of this court were orders of remand directing the appellate court to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made in the body of judgment delivered on 19 July 1979 and 13 January 1986. The passage of litigation itself places on record that circumstances have not remained the same since the litigation began in 1971. While the application of the widow was pending consideration having been filed under section 3 of the old Act, her husband died. Her children grew up, her needs, thus, became more pressing. The issue now cannot be whether her need was to be examined under clause (a) or (b) of sub-section (1) of section 21, because if the litigation had drawn to a close within a reasonable time, the circumstances could have remained the same but they did not. Time was not mitigating the damages, as construction costs were increasing. Time and inflation run neck to neck, and another remand would ruin the widow. In fact, the best answer in the present case was provided by an earlier judgment of this Court delivered on 13 January 1986 when Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. observed that whether the building may or may not be dilapidated is not an issue. Time and inflation run neck to neck, and another remand would ruin the widow. In fact, the best answer in the present case was provided by an earlier judgment of this Court delivered on 13 January 1986 when Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. observed that whether the building may or may not be dilapidated is not an issue. In effect, what was to be seen was the personal need for a better return on the property by reconstructing and re-letting the accommodations to the existing tenants. In the absence of proof of maintenance, dilapidation is only a degree of deterioration. But this Court will not take the matter for consideration as the needs of the widow are to be examined under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act aforesaid. 11. THE order of the prescribed authority of 2 May 1971 cannot be ignored even today. This order was occasioned after the Rent Control and Eviction Officer made a personal spot inspection of the property and premises. This was ten years ago. THE District Judge did not undertake any personal inspection so as to make any observation otherwise, to upset what the Rent Control and Eviction Officer may have seen. But, in reference to that let the finding remain whatever it is worth. 12. THE need of the petitioner to demolish the existing structures and reconstruct new buildings is a personal need. THE fact that the appellate court was under the impression that she was a pardanashin cannot negate this need. THE principle u/Sec. 21 read with Sec. 24 of the Act, aforesaid, imply that the landlord may take recourse to, given an occasion and the circumstance existing, arrange his affairs in such a manner that he could have a better return from the real estate which he has leased to the tenants. This is also a personal need. Given the circumstance that the landlord is prepared to let out some accommodation to the same tenants upon reconstruction, such a plea of the landlord ought not to remain pending for 16 years as the bonafides of the landlords' plea can further be tested upon an option of re-entry by the tenants u/Sec. 24 (1). The order of the learned District Judge dated 4 December 1986, Annexure 4 to the writ petition suffers from manifest errors apparent on the face of the record and is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The order of the learned District Judge dated 4 December 1986, Annexure 4 to the writ petition suffers from manifest errors apparent on the face of the record and is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The High Court upon an order of remand made on 13 January 1986 had guided the District Judge to approach the matter on two aspects. Firstly not to be distracted in examining considerations whether the tenants would face inconvenience if they were to move out of the shops upon their being reconstructed. Secondly, examine the circumstance that the petitioner as owner would consequent upon reconstruction let out the shops to the existing tenants. The judgment of the appellate court upon the second order of remand by the High Court, evaded the two issues. 13. IT has been noticed by Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. in his judgment of 13, Jan. 1986 that even the step children of the petitioner have supported her case and her bonafides in reconstruction of the shops after demolition. In the impugned order of the District Judge no cogent reasons have been given as to why the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority of 2 May 1977, Annexure 2 to the writ petition ought to be set aside. The Prescribed Authority/Munsif had made an on the spot inspection of the structures. The District Judge has not held his inspection note as perverse. Reconstruction of buildings which need to be remodelled so that they may return an optimum income on the capital invested is a personal need. Return on the building as reconstructed is also reaped by the tenants who by law have an option of re-entry. 14. THE decision of the District Judge dated 4 December 1986, not being consistent with the directions of the Court in the two orders of remand aforesaid is liable to be quashed. THE directions of this Court were not followed by the District Judge. The petitioner, in effect, is granted release of the buildings and structures upon her bonafide and personal need so that she may have the structures demolished or reconstructed within a reasonable time given by the Court of the Prescribed Authority in case no. 3 of 1977 Smt. Chandrawati v. Brij Mohan. As the monsoons have set in the Prescribed Authority will grant a period of time for demolition of structures existing, after 30 September 1987. 3 of 1977 Smt. Chandrawati v. Brij Mohan. As the monsoons have set in the Prescribed Authority will grant a period of time for demolition of structures existing, after 30 September 1987. The schedule for demolition should be within two months initially. If the petitioner requires more time it may be extended for sufficient cause. Upon reconstruction of the buildings of the premises in dispute, the respondents may make applications to the District Magistrate for seeking allotments in the new buildings so that such of the respondents who do make applications in pursuance of sub-clause (2) of section 24 will have their applications considered for the quantum of rent which would be fixed afresh in accordance with this section. If any of the respondents do not make an application in terms of sub-clause (2) of section 24 within the time required by the District Magistrate, then the building which would be so reconstructed would be exempt from the operation of the Act for periods specified in sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act aforesaid. 15. THE order of the District Judge dated 4 December 1986 having been quashed the writ petition is allowed, with costs. Petition allowed.