JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a writ petition preferred by the employee of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation who was working as a Driver in its Service. His services were terminated under regulation 61 of the Bombay State Transport Employees Service Regulations, by paying him two months' pay in lieu of two months' notice as required by the said regulation. The petitioner challenged the said order of termination by preferring a complaint case under section 28 and 30 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, ''the Act'') on various grounds. The respondent justified the order of termination on the ground that it was passed for loss of confidence in the petitioner who had assaulted his co-employee viz. the Traffic Controller of the respondent. 2. The parties led evidence before the Labour Court. The respondent led evidence in regard to the reasons for loss of confidence in the petitioner. The learned Labour Court on the basis of the evidence on record held that it was not a case of retrenchment within the meaning of section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and as such no compliance with the said provision was necessary for the termination of services of the petitioner. It, however, held that the discharge from service of the petitioner under regulation 61 was too excessive considering the fact that the petitioner was provoked by the Traffic Controller himself. He, therefore, held that the respondent has committed an unfair labour practice covered by item No. 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. However, looking to the facts and circumstances and finding that the petitioner was also not free from blemish he directed reinstatement of the petitioner but without any back wages. The respondent as well as the petitioner challenged the above order of the Labour Court by filing revisions under section 44 of the Act before the Industrial Court, Nagpur. The learned Industrial Court held that the termination of services of the petitioner under regulation 61 did not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Industrial Court held that the termination of services of the petitioner under regulation 61 did not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Industrial Court, further, held that the termination of services of the petitioner under regulation 61 was correct and lawful and did not amount to any unfair labour practice under item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act as the termination was for loss of confidence. The learned Industrial Court, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Labour Court thus allowing the revision filed by the respondent. Consequently, the revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. 3. It is clear from the finding of the learned Industrial Court that the learned Industrial Court has treated the instant case as a case of termination of services for loss of confidence and not as a case of termination for any misconduct for which the petitioner was punished. In other words the order of termination was not treated as a punitive order. The case of the respondent as set out in its written statement is also not that the services of petitioner were terminated for any misconduct as such. Para 15 of the written statement filed by the respondent in the instant case clearly shows that the order of termination passed for loss of confidence under regulation 61 although it is pleaded therein that in the past the petitioner had committed certain acts of misconduct for which he was then suitably punished. The learned Industrial Court in upholding the above case further held that although no specific opportunity is claimed by the respondent to justify the order of so called termination by proving the misconduct in the Labour Court the evidence is in fact led by the respondent to prove the reasons for loss of confidence which it was permissible for the respondent to do so as to justify the order of termination passed under regulation 61. 4. It is thus clear that according to the respondent itself the order of termination was not by way of punishment but was an order of simple termination passed under regulation 61 for reasons of loss of confidence which case of the respondent is upheld by the learned Industrial Court. 4. It is thus clear that according to the respondent itself the order of termination was not by way of punishment but was an order of simple termination passed under regulation 61 for reasons of loss of confidence which case of the respondent is upheld by the learned Industrial Court. In my view, once it is held that the order of termination is not by way of punishment the conclusion is inescapable that it would fall within the definition of the word "Retrenchment" given in section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is a preponderance of authority for the above view in the decisions of the Supreme Court and in particular its decision in (Santosh Gupta's case)1, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1219 and also the Division Bench decision of our Court in the case of (Namdeo v. S.I.C. others)2. Special Civil Application No. 781 of 1974, decided on 21-7-1981 which although a case of termination on the ground of loss of confidence has erroneously been distinguished on a flimsy ground that it is not a case of termination under regulation 61 although it is clear that the instant case as well as (Namdeo's case are cases in which the order passed are of simple termination for loss of confidence. A similar view on the question of termination for loss of confidence is taken by this Court in the later decision in the case of (Ramchandra v. Industrial Court, Nagpur)3, 1985 Lab.I.C. 1786 also. 5. I may, however, clarify that if any order of termination passed in the ground of loss of confidence showed that it was for misconduct and was, therefore, by way of punishment, it would not fall within the definition of the word "Retrenchment" within the meeting of section 2(oo) of the industrial Disputes Act as is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Chandulal v. The Management of M/s Pan American World Airways Inc)4, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1128. The view taken by this Court in (Rameshkumar's case)5, 1980 Lab. I.C. 1116 was thus of no assistance to the respondent in the instant case. The view taken by this Court in (Rameshkumar's case)5, 1980 Lab. I.C. 1116 was thus of no assistance to the respondent in the instant case. I may also state here that it was open for the respondent to openly come forth with a case that although the order of termination was passed under regulation 61 it was truly by way of punishment for misconduct alleged against the petitioners and that it should be afforded an opportunity to justify the said order of termination by permitting it to prove the misconduct alleged against the petitioner because no domestic enquiry was held in that regard by the respondent. Such a course would have been raised different considerations and the petitioners would have been put on guard that he has to meet a case of termination for misconduct before the Labour Court. 6. The finding of the learned Industrial Court as well as the finding of the Labour Court which has for other reasons held the termination of services of the petitioner as illegal are liable to be set aside in regard to the question of simple termination of services of the petitioner being not retrenchment as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is held that the termination of services of the petitioners under regulation 61 is retrenchment as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act it follows that the same is illegal and invalid for non-compliance with the provisions of section 25-F if the said Act and is liable to be set aside. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also challenged the validity of regulation 61 in the instant writ petition. It is urged that the termination simpliciter by giving notice without assigning any reason is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Since I have already taken the view that the impugned order of termination is bad for non-compliance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 I do not think it necessary to consider the validity of regulation 61 in the instant writ petition. The question as regards the validity of regulation 61 is, therefore, kept open. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is the question of relief. The question as regards the validity of regulation 61 is, therefore, kept open. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is the question of relief. It is well settled that when the order of termination of services or dismissal is set aside, the normal relief is of reinstatement with back wages and particularly so when the order of termination is void for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is however, urged on behalf of the respondent that the relief of reinstatement should not be granted in the instant case because it is clearly established from the evidence on record in the instant case that the past record of service of the petitioner was not satisfactory and that because of his indisciplined behaviour in pushing the Traffic Controller he has forfeited the confidence of the respondent. 9. In my view, the act of pushing the Traffic Controller may be a misconduct but surely it cannot be an act having bearing on the question of trust or confidence in the employee. I have already pointed out that the respondent is not basing its case upon any alleged act of misconduct being committed by the petitioner. Loss of confidence contemplates that the post in which the employee is working requires some trust or confidence and the act complained of has bearing on that question. The acts complained of in the instant case including those in the past record of service of the petitioner have no bearing on the question of confidence of trust in the discharge of the duties of the petitioner. The contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the relief of reinstatement should not be granted for the above reasons is, therefore, liable to be rejected. No other reason is pointed out why the relief of reinstatement which is a normal relief should not be granted to the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to reinstatement as rightly held by the learned Labour Court. 10. As regards the question of back wages the submission on behalf of the respondent is that since it is held by the learned Labour Court that the petitioner had in fact pushed the Traffic Controller who was at that time standing upon the heap of stones and because of which he had received some injuries no back wages should be granted to the petitioner. It is however, urged on behalf of the petitioner that as held by the learned Labour Court the petitioner was provoked in this act of pushing by the Traffic Controller himself. The learned Labour Court has, however, taken a view that since he has found that the act of the petitioner in pushing the Traffic Controller is illegal, excessive and unwarranted, even if provoked he should be deprived of back wages. In my view the discretion exercised by the learned Labour Court in this regard is sound and cannot be interfered with in my writ jurisdiction. The above order of the learned Labour Court depriving the petitioner of back wages thus deserves to be upheld. 11. In the result, the instant writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order of the learned Industrial Court is set aside and that of the learned Labour Court, although for different reasons, is restored. There would, however be no order as to costs in this writ petition. Petition allowed partly. -----