K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under O. 43, R. 1 (j) of the Civil P. C. , 1908 (for short 'the Code') is directed against the order dated 13-8-1984 passed by the Additional Judge to the District Judge, Ujjain the Execution Case No. 42-A of 1976 disposing of the judgement-debtor's application, under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that the Bank of Baroda, respondent No. 1, had obtained a money decreed dated 9-12-1976 against one Bhuwanji. He was served with the notice under O. 21, R. 66 of the Code but had made no submissions. Ultimately, in the execution of the decree his agricultural land was sold for Rs. 33,500/- in Court auction. The sale had commenced on 15-7-82 on the spot and was ultimately knocked down on 11-8-82 in the Court premises. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 Sajanbai has been declared to be the purchaser. The highest bid on the spot by one Ganesh was of Rs. 17,000/- only. ( 4 ) BHUWANJI on 26-8-82 filed an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code to set aside the sale. Regarding the grounds which have been pressed in this appeal, it was stated that in the sale proclamation property to be sold was not adequately described and no reference was made that it has a well in it fitted with a diesel pump set. This omission adversely affected, the price. It was also stated that the price of the property was also not mentioned and so also the time of sale. It was further stated that the sale proclamation was not made and published by beat of drum. ( 5 ) DURING the pendency of the aforesaid application Bhuwanji met his death. The appellants and the respondents 3 and 4 who are his married daughters have been brought on record as his legal representatives. ( 6 ) BUT of the aforesaid legal representatives the appellants on 19-6-84 filed another application challenging the sale. ( 7 ) LEARNED lower Court heard the parties and passed the impugned order dismissing the objections. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the order aforesaid, the appellants have preferred this appeal. ( 6 ) BUT of the aforesaid legal representatives the appellants on 19-6-84 filed another application challenging the sale. ( 7 ) LEARNED lower Court heard the parties and passed the impugned order dismissing the objections. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the order aforesaid, the appellants have preferred this appeal. Their contention is that on 19-6-84 they had presented an application to the executing Court for an opportunity, to lead evidence but without giving them any opportunity as prayed, the Court dismissed that application as well by the impugned order. According to them it is only by evidence that they could have proved that they had sustained substantial injury by reason of material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale. ( 9 ) THE contention of the contesting respondents is that the objections not having been raised by Bhuwanji before the commencement of sale as required by law, could not be permitted to be urged after the sale. It has also been contended that the objections raised by the appellants do not constitute ground for setting aside the sale. ( 10 ) THE point for consideration is whether the appeal deserves to be allowed. ( 11 ) IN order to properly appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions in O. 21, R. 90 of the Code as they stand after the Amendment Act of 1976. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of the rule are re-productions of the old R. 1 with its proviso. The old O. 21, R. 90 had no sub-rule (2 ). The provisions in O. 21, R. 90 of the Code run thus :-"90 (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. (2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. (2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. (3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. Explanation : The mere absence of, or defect in, attachment, of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule". The additional proviso added by the M. P. amendment to sub-rule (1) reads thus :- "provided also that no such application for setting aside the sale shall be entertained upon any ground which could have been, but was not put forward by the applicant before the commencement of the sale. " this amendment is designed to discourage false and frivolous application after Court sale resulting in needless protraction of litigation. Objections not falling under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code may fall under S. 47 ibid. ( 12 ) 'irregularity' as used in the provision under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code means not being in conformity with the rules prescribed for regulating execution sale. It is infraction of rules compliance with which could be waived by the party for the benefit of which they are made. Contravention of a provision the compliance of which could not be waived will introduce illegality as distinguished from irregularity. The word 'material' means real, not merely formal or academic. ( 13 ) AS pointed out in the decision in Laikunnisah's case AIR 1980 All 63 there is presumption that price fetched in auction sale is adequate. In Court sale the price that the property may fetch in a regular voluntary sale cannot certainly be hoped for and, therefore, mere inadequacy of price cannot be regarded as substantial injury within the meaning of O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. From a perusal of the provisions in O. 21, R. 90 (2) of the Code extracted above it is clear that in order that sale may be set aside the Court has to be satisfied upon the facts proved, about the connection between the material irregularity and the substantial injury. From a perusal of the provisions in O. 21, R. 90 (2) of the Code extracted above it is clear that in order that sale may be set aside the Court has to be satisfied upon the facts proved, about the connection between the material irregularity and the substantial injury. Mere proof of material irregularity and inadequacy of price, in other words injury is not sufficient. It has also to be proved from the material on record that there was connection between the inadequacy of price and the material irregularity, in other words that the inadequacy of price was caused by reason of material irregularity. They must be correlated with each other as cause and effect. In this connection the decisions in Ramdesjee Varu's case, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 334 and Radheshyam's case, AIR 1971 SC 2337 may usefully be perused. It may be noticed that even without an express allegation of substantial injury the same may appear to be implicit on the facts and circumstances alleged. In this connection the decision in Putti Kandala's case, AIR 1976 SC 737 is apposite. ( 14 ) THE grounds pressed by the appellants in this appeal may conveniently be crystallised in the following terms : (I) that the property was not specified in the sale proclamation as required by O. 21, R. 66 (2) of the Code and the value of the property was also not mentioned therein; (ii) that the sale proclamation was not affixed on the spot and was not made and published by beat of drum as required by O. 21, R. 67 (1) of the Code; (iii) that the time of auction was not mentioned in the sale proclamation and on the last day of sale it was not continued throughout the day but was closed at 12 noon and (iv) that opportunity to lead evidence as envisaged by O. 21, R. 90 (2) of the Code, was not afforded to the appellants and this is fatal to the sale. ( 15 ) THE appellants' learned counsel contended that the material irregularities catalogued in (i) to (iii) above resulted in the sale fetching highly inadequate price and thus substantial injury has been occasioned. ( 15 ) THE appellants' learned counsel contended that the material irregularities catalogued in (i) to (iii) above resulted in the sale fetching highly inadequate price and thus substantial injury has been occasioned. ( 16 ) IN the decision in Radha Vallabh's case, 1969 Jab LJ (SN) 21 dealing with the M. P. Amendment to O. 21, R. 90 of the Code it has been pointed out that it is in the interest of all concerned that Court sale takes place without any irregularity so that it does not entail setting aside of the sale and starting proceeding de novo for a fresh sale and therefore, the Amendment provides for objections in advance of sale on pain of bar. The decision points out that it is for the Court to determine in its discretion whether the objection should be decided before sale or subsequent to it. If the objection is simple it may conveniently be determined before the sale takes place. ( 17 ) OBJECTIONS under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code for 'setting aside sale' can no doubt be raised only after the sale takes place but as already pointed out, intended objections have to be brought to the notice of the Court before the commencement of sale. As provided by the M. P. Local Amendment unless the party brings such objections to the notice of the Court before sale, it stands debarred from raising them after the sale. ( 18 ) IN the decision in Gangavishan's case 1980 MPLJ 509, it has been pointed out that any objection as to any defect in the notice under O. 21, R. 66 or that there was no beat of drum which could be raised earlier cannot be raised after sale. In the decision in Uma Datt's case, AIR 1970 Delhi 56, it has been pointed out that objections as to non-compliance with Rr. 66, 67 read with Rr. 54 and 68 of O. 21 of the Code are such as could be taken prior to sale. In the decision in Prahlad Vishnoi's case, 1984 MPWN 364 also it has been pointed out that objections which could have been raised earlier before sale proclamation was drawn or even subsequently but prior to sale, could not, having regard to the provision embodied in O. 21, R. 90 (3) of the Code, be entertained. In the decision in Prahlad Vishnoi's case, 1984 MPWN 364 also it has been pointed out that objections which could have been raised earlier before sale proclamation was drawn or even subsequently but prior to sale, could not, having regard to the provision embodied in O. 21, R. 90 (3) of the Code, be entertained. ( 19 ) THE decision in Prahlad Vishnoi's case (supra) further points out that O. 21, R. 90 (2) of the Code envisages that person filing the objection will be given opportunity to substantiate his objection by leading evidence. ( 20 ) IT has to be conceded that right to an opportunity to lead evidence pre-supposes right of the person to canvass the ground which he wants to substantiate by evidence. Order 21, Rule 90 (3) of the Code, as already pointed out, provides that grounds of objection which could be taken before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn cannot be entertained by application under O. 21, R. 90 (1) ibid. Further by the M. P. Amendment similar provision has been incorporated in the Code in respect of grounds which, could be taken before the commencement of sale. Care has to be taken to ensure that the object behind the provisions is not frustrated. ( 21 ) NOW as to the import of the word entertain in the Supreme Court decision in Hindusthan Commercial Bank's case, AIR 1970 SC 1384 it has been held that the expression 'entertain' means 'adjudicate upon' or 'proceed to consider on merits'. ( 22 ) IN the instant case a perusal of the grounds (i) to (iii) sought to be urged by the appellants reveals that those objections could certainly be raised anterior to the commencement of sale and, therefore, Bhuwanji having failed to do so, clearly stood precluded by law (paragraphs 19 and 20 above) from making a grievance on those grounds subsequent to the sale. Therefore, as the ground could not be urged there was no question of allowing an opportunity to substantiate the same by evidence. It may also be stated that the record reveals that even prior to the date of commencement of the sale and till the date of final bid, Bhuwan had been filing applications merely for gaining time. Therefore, as the ground could not be urged there was no question of allowing an opportunity to substantiate the same by evidence. It may also be stated that the record reveals that even prior to the date of commencement of the sale and till the date of final bid, Bhuwan had been filing applications merely for gaining time. ( 23 ) APART from what has been stated above it may be pointed out that the sale proclamation specifies the time of sale and when the sale was adjourned to take place in the Court premises, it did imply that it would take place, during Court hours. There was no legal requirement to continue the sale till 5. 00 p. m. In the decision in Yeshwant Maganlal's case, AIR 1964 Guj 126 with reference to O. 21, R. 66 (2) (e) of the Code it has been held that material things to be mentioned in the sale proclamation do not include the estimated value of the property which is something to be judged by the purchaser. In the instant case it has also to be remembered that the sale was not knocked down on the spot on 15-7-82 but was continued for several days thereafter in the Court premises. This, in my view, did make good for any irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. ( 24 ) IN the decision in Narayanan's ease AIR 1967 Ker 163 , it has been held that failure to affix proclamation of sale on the property to be sold and to publish it by beat of drum are only irregularities rendering a sale voidable under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. The expression 'as nearly as may be' employed in O. 21, R. 67 (1) shows that the law requires only substantial compliance with the provision and any violation thereof cannot render the proceedings illegal or without jurisdiction so as to nullify them. ( 25 ) IT may also be pointed out that the legal representatives of Bhuwanji cannot be permitted to canvass grounds not raised by Bhuwanji himself in his application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. In the decision in Munilal's case, AIR 1977 Him Pra 51 it has been pointed out that legal representatives must continue the litigation on the cause of action sued upon and cannot set up new and individual right. In the decision in Munilal's case, AIR 1977 Him Pra 51 it has been pointed out that legal representatives must continue the litigation on the cause of action sued upon and cannot set up new and individual right. They cannot canvass grounds not available to the person whose legal representatives they are. ( 26 ) IN the decision in Ganga Vishan's case (supra) the time at which the sale was to take place was not indicated. It was in the circumstances of that case that it was held to be an illegality resulting in fetching low price. In that case, at one time there was a bid for Rs. 62,000/- but later the bid for Rs. 51,000/- was accepted. It was in the circumstances of that case that the Court held that technical objections could not be permitted to prevail over justice and that the sale could not be upheld as there was clear case of substantial injury to the judgement-debtor. In suitable cases inherent powers under S. 151 of the Code may be invoked for the purpose. ( 27 ) IN the decision in Marudanayagam's case, AIR 1945 CPC 67 sale in favour of the decree-holder had taken place at serious under value occasioned by failure of Court and decree-holder to verify the amount due under prior encumbrance. It was, therefore, held that the judgement-debtor sustained substantial injury by reason of the decree-holder fraud. The abovementioned two cases are clearly distinguishable on facts. ( 28 ) IT is certainly the duty of the Court to safeguard the interest of the judgement-debtor by ensuring that he gets fair price for his property. The learned lower Court was alive to its duty as is clearly indicated by the fact that sale was continued for days together. It appears that Bhuwan rather than taking timely steps to suitably safeguard his own interest unfortunately pinned his hope only in moving an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. This was clearly a futile attempt on his part to postpone the evil day and take a last chance to save the property. In the circumstances the Court can do precious little for his legal representatives. This was clearly a futile attempt on his part to postpone the evil day and take a last chance to save the property. In the circumstances the Court can do precious little for his legal representatives. ( 29 ) ON a careful consideration of the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code was rightly dismissed by the learned lower Court and the impugned order passed by it does not call for interference. ( 30 ) IN the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties shall, however, clear their own costs in this Court as incurred. Appeal dismissed. .