JUDGMENT P. D. Desal, C. J.— This is the second occasion on which the writ petition has come on for prelimidary hearing before this Court. 2. The writ petition was summarily rejected earlier by an order passed on December 29, 1986. The said order reads as follows : "The principal challenge in the petition, which was reiterated at the preliminary bearing, was that the inclusion of Mandir Damtal at Damtal, District Kangra, at Serial No. 10 of Schedule I of the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984, is illegal, invalid and arbitrary, since the temple is neither a Charitable endowment within the meaning of section 2 (a) nor a Hindu Public religious institution within the meaning of section 2 (f) of the said Act. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Panipat Woollen and General Mills Co, Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, (1986) 4 SCC 368, the principle wherein laid down must apply with equal force to the case in hand, the petitioner is relegated to the alternative remedy available to him by way of a civil suit to seek the appropriate relief. Rejected in view of the aforesaid observations” 3. The decision aforesaid was subjected to an appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeal was allowed and the judgment under appeal was set aside and the case has been remanded to be dealt with and disposed of alongwith Civil Suit No. 44 of 1984 unless "it raises a question of title which cannot be determined with out an adjudication of rights on taking of evidence". The determination of this issue upon merits is left to this Court. 4. In light of the observations made in the judgment of the Supreme Court, the question which requires fresh consideration, on merits, is whether the nature and character of the issue(s) raised and required to be decided in the instant proceeding is such that it involves a disputed question of title which depends for its determination upon taking of evidence and upon an adjudication of rights. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, then there would be justification for summary rejection of the petition and for relegating the petitioner to the ordinary remedy of a suit. 5. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, then there would be justification for summary rejection of the petition and for relegating the petitioner to the ordinary remedy of a suit. 5. A suit being Civil Suit No. 44 of 1984, The Advocate-General, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla v. Mahant Bal Dass, Mandir Damtal, and Murti Thakur Ram Gopal, Mandir Damtal, was instituted on April 4, 1984 and it is pending for trial on the original side of this Court. It is a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the reliefs therein prayed are to the following effect :— (a) that a decree for removing defendant No. 1 as Trustee and appointing a new Trustee in his place be passed ; (b) that a further decree vesting the management of the properties of defendant No. 2 in the name of new Trustee, particularly the compensation amount of Rs. 1,21,92,495.61 granted by virtue of award, dated September 22, 1983, be passed in favour of the plaintiff; (c) that a direction be issued in favour of the plaintiff directing defendant No. 1 to deliver possession of the properties to the new Trustee and to render the accounts of»income of property and offerings and to hand over the books of accounts for the efficient management of the temple ; (d) that a scheme may also be framed for the efficient management of the temple Mandir Damtal, and the properties attached there with including the arrangements of worship of the Deity Thakur Ram Gopal, running of the Sanskrit Pathshala and the Langar etc ; and (e) that defendant No. 1 be also permanently restrained from managing the properties of Murti Thakur Ram Gopal Temple Damtal or any other income of the trust properties, 6. The basis of the suit, briefly stated, is that a temple known as Mandir Damtal is situate at Damtal, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra. It was established prior to 1914. The idol of "Thakur Ram Gopal" is installed in the said temple. The temple is open to all sections of the Hindu public, who have free access thereto, and also to other religious persons. It has a large following and numerous worshippers. It was established prior to 1914. The idol of "Thakur Ram Gopal" is installed in the said temple. The temple is open to all sections of the Hindu public, who have free access thereto, and also to other religious persons. It has a large following and numerous worshippers. A lot of offerings are made to the deity installed in the temple and several properties have been dedicated to the deity "Thakur Ram Gopal", all of which constitute a public trust of charitable and religious nature. The trust properties are being managed by a Mohtmim who is the trustee of the temple. The Mohtmim is elected and installed by the Raja of Nurpur and the general public with the consent of worshippers and devotees of the temple. The offerings made in the temple and the income of the properties of the public trust are meant to be used for the up-keep of the temple, running of a Langar and Sanskrit Pathsala and also for other various religious and charitable purposes. Defendant No 1 (the petitioner herein), who is the trustee of the temple, has started committing breaches of trust for sometime past. The properties of the trust are not being looked after properly. He is mis utilising the income derived from the property of the trust and also the offerings made in the temple and has started claiming himself to be the owner of the temple. 7. The suit is being resisted by the defendants on the ground, inter alia, that the provisions of section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, that Mandir Damtal is a Gaddi of Shri Rama Nand Vairagi Sampardaya and not a temple as is kaown in ordinarily parlance where the deity is the owner of its properties, that no idol of "Thakur Ram Gopal" is installed in the temple, that it does not have a large following or numerous worshippers and that there is no public trust of charitable and religious nature created with respect to the properties of Mandir Damtal. The plea in terms is that defendant No. 1 is not a trustee but the owner of the Mandir and that as Gaddi Nashin he is the owner of the properties of the Gaddi to the exclusion of the entire world and that no public trust of charitable and religious nature was created or exists in respect of the properties. 8. 8. Issues have been framed in the suit and they are as follows :— "1. Whether the property of Murti Thakur Ram Gopal Mandir Damtal is a trust created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature as alleged and a suit under section 92, C. P. C. is maintainable and defendant No. 1 is its trustee ? OPP 2. Whether there are sufficient grounds to remove defendant No. 1 as a trustee ? OPP 3. Whether new trustees are to be appointed in place of defendant No. 1 ? If so who should be appointed as new trustees and what orders for administration of trust property be passed ? OPP 4. If issues No. 1 and 2 are proved then whether defendant No. 1 is not liable to render accounts ? OPD. 5. Whether the appointment and removal of Mahant of Thakur Ram Gopal Mandir, Damtal or its Gaddi is governed by custom as alleged ? If so what is the custom and with what effect? OPD." 9. After the issues were framed, the parties were directed to produce the documents relied upon by them and the same were ordered to be admitted/denied before the Registrar. The parties were also directed to file their respective list(s) of witnesses. The case has been ordered to be listed for the plaintiffs evidence in due course. 10. A large chunk of land belonging to Mandir Damtal was initially requisitioned m the year 1965 and then acquired in the year 1969 for the construction of a Military Hospital. The dispute relating to compensation was ultimately referred to a statutory arbitrator, who awarded a sum of Rs. 1,21,82,495.61. An appeal preferred but the Union of Indian against the said award is pending in this Court. The awarded amount has been deposited in the said proceeding. 11. The plaintiff (Advocate-General) in the above suit moved an application (O. M. P. No. 63 of 1984) praying that defendand No. 1 (the petitioner) be restrained from receiving the said compensation amount and also from receiving the income and offerings of the temple and for appointment of a Receiver to manage and look after the properties of the temple The application was heard and decided by an order passed by the learned single Judge on June 2.1, 1984. At the hearing of the application the prayer for appointment of a Receiver was not pressed but the right to file an application for the appointment of a Receiver at a later date was reserved. In the course of his order, the learned single Judge has found that in the Khewat of 1868 in respect of the properties, which in fact is a Jamabandi and not Wazib-ularz, there are certain foot-notes recorded at the time of settlement for tracing the history of the land and the rights of ownership and possession. Those entries are subject to adjudication by the Court. In the ownership column of the said Jamabandi, the properties are entered as the Jagir of Mandir Damtal and, prima facie the property appeared to be of Mandir Damtal. The Mohtmim at the relevant time was the Mahant who was the Gaddi Nashin of Mandir Damtal. In the latest Jamabandi for the year 1982-83 the properties are entered in the ownership of “Mandir Thakur Ram Gopal Ji Bahatimam Mahant Ram Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass, resident of Damtal". On the basis of the admission made by the parties, it is found recorded in the order that Mandir Damtal is a religious institution. The contention advanced on behalf of defendant No. 1 that dedication was not proved was found in can able of acceptance since in all the revenue records the ownership of the property was shown in the name of the "Mandir". The learned single Judge proceeded to observe; "At this preliminary stage, it can be inferred that the property belongs to a religious and charitable institution......In fact the defendants have admitted that Langar, Sanskrit Pathshala etc are being run from the income of the properties......In these circumstances, the case is an arguable one. The property can be a trust property created for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature and the status of defendant No. 1 can only be considered to be that of a Mohtmim or Manager of this property. There is also documentary evidence on record to prove that defendant No. 1 was appointed as a Mohtmim for the muafi property by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner. Mahant Ram Dass had also filed application to the revenue authorities in 1974 stating that the property was (of) the ownership of Mandir Thakur Ram Gopal Ji and he was only a Mohtmim’ of Mandir Damtal. Mahant Ram Dass had also filed application to the revenue authorities in 1974 stating that the property was (of) the ownership of Mandir Thakur Ram Gopal Ji and he was only a Mohtmim’ of Mandir Damtal. Hence in my view for the purposes of this application, I think that the present suit is maintainable under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure." As regards the compensation amount of Rs. 1,21,82,495.61 the learned single Judge held that to release such a huge amount in favour of defendant No. 1 was likely to put the plaintiff to irreparable loss, in case he succeed in the suit. The balance of convenience for the purpose of issuing an injunction was also held in favour of the plaintiff. In view of the prima facie findings recorded as aforesaid the learned single Judge passed the following orders on the said application: "In view of the above discussion, I order that the amount of compensation awarded on account of acquisition of the properties should remain in deposit with the bank till the disposal of the suit. I further order that defendant No. 1 can receive all the income from the properties of Mandir Damtal and utilize the same for the purpose of maintaining or running different institutions, building properties of Mandir Damtal. Defendant No. 1 shall, however, keep regular accounts and should be able to show these accounts to the Court as and when required to do so. If income of the properties is not sufficient to meet the various expenses, then in that case defendant No. 1 will be at liberty to apply to this Court for release of any other amounts whether principal or the interest from the compensation amount which stands deposited in the bank. It is made clear that the right of the plaintiff to apply for appointment of a Receiver shall remain open and this order shall not mean that the prayer of the plaintiff for appointment of a Receiver has been disallowed. Any observations or remarks made in the aforesaid judgment shall not in any manner affect the merits of the suit." 12. An appeal carried against the said order (F. A. O. No. 111 of 1984) was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on October 16, 1984. 13. Any observations or remarks made in the aforesaid judgment shall not in any manner affect the merits of the suit." 12. An appeal carried against the said order (F. A. O. No. 111 of 1984) was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on October 16, 1984. 13. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), was enacted by the State Legislature "to provide for the better administration of Hindu Public religious institutions and charitable endowments and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such institutions and endowments". Sub section (3) of section 1 of the Act reads as follows :— "(3) It shall apply to all Hindu public religious institutions and charitable endowments mentioned in Schedule-1. Explanation.—-The word Hindu shall mean the persons contemplated under clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955) and the expression Hindu Public Religious Institution and Charitable Endowment shall be construed accordingly." The Act having been reserved for the consideration of the President received assent and was published in the Official Gazette on August 6, 1984. By virtue of sub-section (4) of section 1 of the Act, the said section, that is, section 1, came into force atonce, that is, on and from August 6, 1984. The remaining sections of the Act have been brought into force on and with effect from November 16,1984. The name of Mandir Damtal appears at S. No. 10 in Schedule-I and, accordingly, the various provisions of the Act became applicable to it on and from the concerned days. 14. Section 2 of the Act is the definition section. Clause (a) of the section defines "Charitable endowment" to mean all property given or endowed for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the community or any section thereof for the support or maintenance of objects of utility to the said community or section, such as Sara is, rest-houses, Pathashalas, schools and colleges, houses for feeding the poor and institution for advancement of education, medical relief fund and public health or other objects of like nature and includes the institution concerned. Clause (f) defines "Hindu public religious institution" to mean a math, temple and endowment attached thereto or a specific endowment, established with a religious object for a public purpose and includes (i) all property movable or immovable belonging to or given or endowed for worship in, maintenance or improvement of, additions to, a Math or temple, for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith ; (ii) the idols installed in the Math or temple, clothes, ornaments and things for decoration, etc ; and (iii) religious institution under the direct control of the State Government. Clause (i) defines "temple" to mean a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of public religious worship. Clause (m) defines "trustee" to mean any person or body of persons, by whatever designation known, in whom or in which the administration of a Hindu public religious institution and charitable endowment is vested, and includes any person or body of persons who or which is liable as if such person or body of persons were a trustee. Section 35 of the Act reads as follows :— "35. Certain enactments to cease to apply to Hindu public religious institutions and charitable endowments.—On and from the date on which the provisions of this Act are made applicable to any Hindu public religious institution and charitable and endowment (hereinafter referred as the said date), the provisions of any of the laws specified in Schedule-II which might be applicable to any public religious institution or charitable endowment shall cease to apply thereto : Provided that such cessation shall not in any way affect;— (a) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the said date ; (b) any legal proceeding for any remedy in respect of such right, title, interest, obligation or liability, instituted before the said date ; or (c) anything duly done or suffered before the said date." 15. The present writ petition was instituted on August 30, 1986. The present writ petition was instituted on August 30, 1986. The main prayers herein are as follows :— (a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing Serial No. 10 (Mandir Damtal at Damtal, District Kangra) in Schedule-I to the Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional ; (b) to declare the petitioners property "Mandir Damtal at Damtal, District Kangra", as a private property of the petitioner and that the Act and Schedule-I thereto do not apply to the said property. 16. The case of the petitioner herein, in substance, is that Mandir Damtal as well as the land appertaining thereto are his private property. The land acquired for the purposes of the construction of the Military Hospital was also not the subject-matter of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature. In view of the judgment rendered by the District Judge, Hosiarpur and Kangra Districts, on January 31, 1940, in Misc. Application No. 4 of 1939 (being an application under section 4 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (Act No. XIV of 1920), the right and title to own use and manage the entire temple property to the exclusion of the general public vested in the petitioner. The said right is saved by section 35 of the Act. A suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, therefore, not competent and maintainable since it is barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the decision rendered in the Misc. Application No. 4 of 1939 abovementioned. The inclusion of the name of Mandir Damtal in Schedule I of the -£ct is ultra vires the Act since temple does not satisfy the definition of the words "charitable endowment" and "Hindu public religious institution" contained in clauses (a) and (f) of section 2 of the Act. It is also violative of the petitioners fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 25 and 26 of the Constitution and is in the nature of a colourable exercise of the legislative powers. 17. The petition is resisted by the respondents, inter alia, on the ground that the Gaddi-Nashin Mahant is only a Mohtmim (Manager) and not the owner of the temple and its properties. 17. The petition is resisted by the respondents, inter alia, on the ground that the Gaddi-Nashin Mahant is only a Mohtmim (Manager) and not the owner of the temple and its properties. The settlement of 1868 and the entries in the revenue records as well as a statement made by the petitioner himself on July 24, 1978, is relied upon in support of this plea. The respondents contend that the decision rendered by the District Judge, Hoshiarpur and Kangra Districts in Misc. Application No. 4 of 1939 cannot be regarded as a decision in rent because it was a case between two private individuals and the Government was not a party. Besides, in the said judgment itself it is recorded that the then Mahant had admitted in the plaint that the large property attached to the -Thakurdwara was for religious and charitable purposes. The Muaffis were to continue till the existence of Thakurdwara subject to the condition of good behaviour of the incumbent(s). The assertion of the petitioner that the temple as well as the property attached thereto are his private properties and that the temple is not a public religious institution is emphatically denied. It is also asserted that a Mohtmim (Manager) cannot claim to be the owner of the property of the temple and that the owner is the temple itself. According to the respondents, the inclusion of the name of the Mandir Damtal in Schedule-I of the Act was done after proper survey and such inclusion is neither ultra vires the Act nor violative of the petitioners fundamental rights. 18. Against the background of the aforesaid controversy in the pending suit and the present writ petition, it is manifest that a question directly and substantially in issue, broadly stated, is whether Mandir Damtal and the properties appertaining thereto are the private property of the petitioner which he is entitled to own, use and manage as he likes to the exclusion of the general public, as alleged by him, or whether the said Mandir and the properties appertaining thereto constitute a trust established and dedicated for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature of which the petitioner is merely a Mohtmim (Manager) in his capacity as the Gaddi-Nashin Mahant for the time being, as alleged by the State/ Advocate-General. Such a seriously disputed question of title, in our considered opinion, is apparently incapable of being decided without evidence being led and without an adjudication of rights based on such evidence. A just and proper determination of the controversy, in our judgment, is not possible without affording to the parties an opportunity to establish their respective case by leading documentary and oral evidence, which can be tested by cross-examination and appreciated in light of all the relevant considerations. 19. It is true that by the inclusion of the name of Mandir Damtal in Schedule I of the Act, there is a legislative determination, as it were, that the said temple is a charitable endowment and/or a Hindu Public Religious Institution and/or a place of public religious worship dedicated to or for the benefit or use as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof, as the case may be. However, such a legislative judgment is neither final nor conclusive. This proposition is incontrovertible. 20. In Panipat Woollen and General Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, (1986) 4 SCC 368, a similar question arose for consideration. The Sick Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1972, provides in section 4 (1) that on or before the appointed day, the management of the sick textile undertakings specified in the First Schedule shall vest in the Central Government. The expression "sick textile under taking" is duly defined in the said Act. One of the submissions in support of the challenge to the constitutionality of the said Act was that the Legislature having itself decided the question whether an undertaking is a sick textile undertaking or not, without giving any opportunity to the owner of such undertaking to make a representation, had damaged the basic structure of the Constitution. The submission was repelled in the following words : "By including certain textile undertakings as sick textile undertakings in the First Schedule to the Takeover Act, the legislature has not made any judicial or quasi-judicial determination, nor has the legislature given any judgment, as contended on behalf of the petitioners, although such inclusion is sometimes loosely expressed as legislative judgment. In section 2 (d), the legislature has laid down the criteria for a sick undertaking. The sick textile undertakings have been specified in First Schedule on the basis of the tests laid down in section 2 (d). In section 2 (d), the legislature has laid down the criteria for a sick undertaking. The sick textile undertakings have been specified in First Schedule on the basis of the tests laid down in section 2 (d). In including the sick textile undertakings in the First Schedule, the legislature has not acted arbitrarily, for, it has also laid down the criteria or tests for such inclusion. If any undertaking which has been so specified in the First Schedule does not satisfy the tests under section 2 (d) of the Takeover Act, the owner of it is entitled to challenge such inclusion or takeover in a Court of law although such challenge has to be founded on a strong ground. Thus there is no finality or conclusiveness in the legislative determination of a undertaking as a sick textile undertaking. Such determination is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. Therefore the question of damaging or altering the basic structure of the Constitution, namely, separation of powers among the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary, does not at all arise. 21. In the present case also, for the self-same reasons, the mere inclusion of specification of the name of Mandir Damtal in Schedule I of the Act which purports to specify Hindu Public Religious Institutions or Charitable Endowment, does not attach any finality or conclusiveness to the legislative determination accordingly made. The petitioner is entitled to challenge such inclusion in a court of law (including in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution) on the ground, inter alia, that the temple does not fall within the coverage of the definition of the expression "Charitable endowment" or "Hindu public religious institution" given in section 2 fa) and 2 (f) respectively of the Act. There cannot be any dispute on that point and he has in fact done so in this writ petition. The real question as earlier pointed out, however, is whether having regard to the nature and character of questions raised and required to be determined in the writ petition, the petitioner should, in the exercise of our judicial discretion and in the interest of justice, be relegated to the remedy of canvassing those points in the pending suit, since they require evidence to be led to adjudicate upon a disputed question of title which is already in issue in the said suit. Having given an anxious consideration to the matter from all the relevant angles, we think we should do so on the facts and in the circum stances of the case. Needless to add that having considered all the rival pleas, we are not satisfied also that the matter in controversy is capable of being resolved purely on legal points or issues. We say no more lest any of the parties be prejudiced. 22. There are other reasons also which justify the relegation of the petitioner to the pending suit for the determination of the controversy The Advocate-General, who has instituted the suit, is not a party in the present petition. It is difficult to appreciate how the controversy as to the title herein raised can be determined in his absence since any decision on the issue will have a direct impact on the suit. One of the pleas advanced in the petition is that the suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not competent and not maintainable at all. A plea of that nature can properly be raised only in the suit itself and not in a collateral proceeding and it cannot be decided by any other Court in the absence of the plaintiff. Besides, a petition under Article 226 cannot be used and is not intended to be used as a medium or means to obtain declaratory orders or declaratory reliefs so as to make them a foundation for defeating claims which are pending adjudication in a previously instituted suit in a court of competent jurisdiction, especially when the grant of such reliefs involves the decision of the controversial issues pending adjudication in such a suit. The fact that the suit is pending on the original side of this High Court itself is not a factor which to our mind con solve these problems, even if both are heard together, apart from the other difficulties involved in the process. 23. The fact that the suit is pending on the original side of this High Court itself is not a factor which to our mind con solve these problems, even if both are heard together, apart from the other difficulties involved in the process. 23. Shri D. R. Gupta urged that the suit is not a remedy at all for the adjudication of the dispute in view of the fact teat by virtue of the legislative determination purported to have been made as aforesaid on account of the inclusion of the temple in Schedule of the Act, the petitioner will not be able to urge that the said temple and the not properties attached thereto are his private property and that they do constitute a trust created for a public purpose of charitable or religious nature. The contention has been advanced merely to be rejected. In the first place, it has already been pointed out above that such a legislative determination or judgment so-called is not final and conclusive and that it is subject to challenge in a court of law. In the next place, there is no reason why the question as to the validity of the inclusion of the name of the temple in Schedule I and the purported legislative determination that it is a Hindu Public religious institution or charitable endowment, as the case may be, cannot be challenged in the pending suit by seeking an amendment in the written statement and why the learned single Judge cannot determine the controversy by going into all the factual and legal aspects on the basis of evidence including the question of title. Be it stated that the learned Advocate- General was specifically asked by the Court as to whether he would oppose any application for amendment of the written statement incorporating the pleas raised in the present petition, if and when moved by the petitioner in the pending suit. He expressly stated that such an application, if and when presented, will not be opposed by him. 24. Shri Gupta placed reliance upon the decision in Ameerunnissa’s v. Mahboob Begum, AIR 1953 SC 91 in support his contention that a just relief was capable of being granted to the petitioner in the instant proceeding and that there was no justification for relegating him to the remedy of raising the points in dispute in the pending suit. 24. Shri Gupta placed reliance upon the decision in Ameerunnissa’s v. Mahboob Begum, AIR 1953 SC 91 in support his contention that a just relief was capable of being granted to the petitioner in the instant proceeding and that there was no justification for relegating him to the remedy of raising the points in dispute in the pending suit. In Ameerunnissas case, the validity of Waliuddowala Succession Act 1950 was challenged, to the extent that it affect ed the rights of the original writ petitioners before the High Court on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 (i) (f) and 31 (1) of the Constitution. The object of the said Act was to put an end to disputes that existed at the time regarding succession to the "Matrooka" or personal estate of Nawab Waliuddowala and what the Act, in substance, provided was to dismiss the claims of succession to the said properties put forward by two of the alleged wives of the late Nawab and their children without any competent court of law having at any time negatived their claim. The High Court substantially accepted the plea and declared the Act void in so far as it affected them The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court substantially on the ground that the legislation denied to those specified individuals aright to enforce their claim in a court of law in accordance with the personal law that governed the community to which they belonged and that they were thus discriminated against from the rest of the community in respect of valuable right which the law secured to all of them. It was held that what the legislation had done, in the garb of putting an end to certain private disputes, was to single out the two ladies and their children out of those who claimed to the related to the late Nawab Waliuddowala and to prevent them from getting any share in the personal property of the latter to which they might be entitled under the general law of the land, without any competent court of law as having yet negatived their claim in that respect, on the basis of an adverse report against them made by the State Legal Adviser. It was further held that the dispute relating to succession to the estate of Nawab being a legal dispute, pure and simple, and there being no determination of the points in issue by a properly constituted judicial Tribunal, a legislation passed purely upon the report of a non-judicial authority and made applicable to specific individuals, who were deprive thereby of valuable rights which are enjoyed by all other persons occupying the same position as themselves, did not meet with the constitutional requirement of Article 14. It is difficult to appreciate the relevance of the decision in the context of the point presently under consideration. The decision is clearly inapplicable, since, as found earlier, by the inclusion of the name of the temple in schedule-I. the petitioner is not deprived of his right to establish in a court of law that the Mandir Damtal and the properties attached thereto are his private properties and that they do not constitute a Hindu public religious institution or charitable endowment and that the entry in the Schedule is ultra vires. The simple question at this stage is whether the proper remedy for him is to agitate these questions in a writ petition or in the pending suit having regard to the disputed question of title involved in the case which cannot be determined without taking evidence. 25. For the foregoing reasons, after having given an anxious consideration to the issue under examination, the writ petition is summarily rejected without entering into the merits of the dispute and subject to the rights of the parties to be regulated in accordance with law and the observations made in the course of this judgment. Petition dismissed.