JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. is directed against the order awarding cost in proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C., under section 148 (3) Cr. P.C. by the City Magistrate, Bhilwara by his order dated 30th January, 1980 which has been upheld in criminal revisions. There were two cases bearing No. 16 of 1975 Radha Kishan V/s Ahmed Bux and 17 of 1975 Ibrahim v. Ahmed Bux under Section 145 Cr P. C. The learned City Magistrate by his order dated 13-6 1972 had declared that Ibrahim was in possession of the land in question at the relavant date and possession was ordered to be delivered of the property in question to Ibrahim. It was found that he was in possession through Radha Kishan, who was his tenant. The learned Magistrate awarded Rs. 250/- on account of counsel fee, Rs. 50/- litigation expenses and Rs. 100/- expenses in connection with visiting the Court, in all a sum of Rs. 400/- was awarded. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and learned Public Prosecutor for the State. 3. The only question which has been agitated before me is that the final order in proceeding under section 145 (4) was passed by Shri Chandrasekhar, City Magistrate, Bhilwara on 13.6.72 whereas the order awarding cost has been passed by Shri Swaroop Narain Saxena, the successor in office. Under section 148 (3) the order awarding cost can only be passed by the Magistrate passing the decision under section 145 Cr. P. C. and no other Magistrate is competent to pass the order under section 148 (3) Cr. P.C. Shri Swaroop Narain Saxena was not the Magistrate passing the decision under section 145 Cr. P.C. and as such his order dated 30-1-1980 is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the words 'the Magistrate passing the decision" occurring in Section 148 sub sec. J. He places reliance on some decisions in support of his contention. 4. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner, on the other hand, submits that the words "the Magistrate passing a decision" should not be interpreted to mean the individual officer passing the decision. The word 'Magistrate' should be equated with Court and Whenever presides that Court is competent to pass the order under section 148 (3) Cr. P. C. 5. 4. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner, on the other hand, submits that the words "the Magistrate passing a decision" should not be interpreted to mean the individual officer passing the decision. The word 'Magistrate' should be equated with Court and Whenever presides that Court is competent to pass the order under section 148 (3) Cr. P. C. 5. For the proper appreciation of the controversy in question I read sub-section 3 of Section 148 Cr. P.C.Local inquiry:- Section 148 (1) .................. (2) ...... ............ (3)When any costs have been incurred by any party to a proceeding under Section 145, Section 146 or Section 147, the Magistrate passing decision may direct by whom such costs shall be paid, whether by such party or by any other party to the proceeding and whether in whole or in part or proportion and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of witnesses and of pleaders' fees which the Court may consider reasonable. 6. The question arises as to snow the words "the Magistrate passing a decision" are to be interpreted. Whether these words mean that that Magistrate . ho passes the decision under section 145 Cr. P.C. is alone competent to direct payment of costs under section 148 (3) or even his successor is competent to pass such an order of payment of costs. The jurisdiction under section 145 vests in the Executive Magistrate. In Sec 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 various class of criminal Courts are provided and one of the class of the criminal courts is that of Executive Magistrates. So the proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. can be initiated in the court of an Executive Magistrate under Section 145 sub. sec (1) the other side is required to attend the Court of Executive Magistrate in person or by pleader as mentioned in this provision. Thus it is a court having jurisdiction in the Code of Criminal Procedure and it is the Court which passes the final orders under section 145 as well as under section 148. Even in the last sentence of Section 148 the expression used is the 'Court'. Such costs can be awarded which the Court may consider reasonable. Thus it would mean that that Court is competent to pass an order for awarding costs which has passed the decision under section 145 Cr. P.C. 7. Even in the last sentence of Section 148 the expression used is the 'Court'. Such costs can be awarded which the Court may consider reasonable. Thus it would mean that that Court is competent to pass an order for awarding costs which has passed the decision under section 145 Cr. P.C. 7. It is true that in some cases this view has been taken that successor of the Magistrate who passes the final order, cannot award costs, Sec. (1) Iklas Kaur Thakuraio v. Raja Raghuraj Bahadur Singh Cr. Law. Journal Reports Vol. 11-335; A.I.R. 1920 Calcutta-320 , (2) Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhari v. Sidhartha Krishna Mozumdar and Bhagwaodas Moopoar V/s Muhammad Gani Bowther, A.I.R. (30) 1943 Madras 478) . But a contrary view has been taken in a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in (3) Chandrama Rai v. Harbans Rai, A.I.R. 1965 Patna 21 . It has been held in that case that the interpretation of Section 148 (3) read with Section 559 (1) would be that even if the Magistrate who bad passed a decision, section 45, had not dealt with the other provision of the Code stands in his way. It was also held that the expression' the Magistrate passing a decision" under section 145 must be equated with the word `court' mentioned in the last sentence of Section 143 (3). it was further observed that "it cannot be held that the interpretation of Sub. sec. (3) of Section 118 should be that only the Magistrate who passed the decision under section 145, could pass an order for costs and his successor in office cannot". There are later decisions of the Patna High Court following the same view. Reference may be made to (4) Baleshwar Prasad Singh v. Narain Prasad Marwari, 1968 Cri L.J. 1255 . Same view has been taken in another decision of the Patna High Court in (5) Khobhari Rai v. Ram Lakhan Rai, 1977 Cri. L.J. 445 in which reference has been made to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in (6) Krishnadeo Prasad v. Mst. Budhni, A.I.R. 1965 Patna 1 . Same view has been taken in another decision of the Patna High Court in (5) Khobhari Rai v. Ram Lakhan Rai, 1977 Cri. L.J. 445 in which reference has been made to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in (6) Krishnadeo Prasad v. Mst. Budhni, A.I.R. 1965 Patna 1 . This contention was negatived in the Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court that the words the Magistrate passing a decision" refers to the Magistrate who had passel the final order under section 145 For consideration of the interpretation of these words in Section 148 (3) the language of Section 204 was taken into consideration where also similar words occur. In Section 204 the words are that. "if, in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding" then the Magistrate shall issue summons for the attendance of the accused. The words "a Magistrate taking cognizance" had been the subject-matter of great controversy. Cognizance can be taken by a Magistrate under section 190 and after taking cognizance by a Magistrate under section 190, the records may be placed before another Magistrate i.e. his successor for passing an order under section 204. The Full Bench of the Patna High Court has held that in such a situation the Magistrate taking cognizance will include the Magistrate who had finally taken cognizance as well as his successor in office. There is another later decision of a Single Judge taking the same view in (7) Kamla Kant Jha v. Kantirba Rai, 1978 B.L.J.R.- 156 . In the commentary on Law of Criminal Procedure by S C. Sarkar, sixth Edition the question has been dealt with as under:- Only the Magistrate passing the final order can award costs (Iklas, 11. Cr.L.J. (C) 335; Kafar, 47 C 924; Manglu, A 1929 P 94) and not his successor (Iklas supra Bhagvandas. A 1943 K 478; Sarju Pd. A 1959 P 151 (obiter). It is submitted with respect that the view in these cases does not appear to be correct. A proceeding under Section 145 being a judicial proceeding, an order under it is a judicial order and the magistrate acts as a court'. It has been held that for brevity the Code generally uses the terms 'court' and 'Magistrate' as convertible terms (Clarks, 39 IA 1663: 39C 953). A proceeding under Section 145 being a judicial proceeding, an order under it is a judicial order and the magistrate acts as a court'. It has been held that for brevity the Code generally uses the terms 'court' and 'Magistrate' as convertible terms (Clarks, 39 IA 1663: 39C 953). Further, the use of the award "Court" in the last sentence of sub-s. (3) of Section 148 is significant, as it unmistakably indicates that the power to award costs is conferred on the 'court' and not on the individual filling the office. It may also be pointed out that the words "to attend his court in person" in sub-s (1) of Section 145 clearly shows that the magistrate acting under Section 145 is a 'court' (Vedappan, 52 M 69 : A 1928 M 1108). It is therefore reasonably clear that when a magistrate passes a final order under 145 in the capacity of a 'court' his successor-in-office, is competent to deal with an application for award of costs, in the same way as necessary subsequent actions in respect of all other orders of a 'court' can be taken under the law by its successor, e.g., the filing of complaint under Section 340 by the successor of the court which heard the original case. When the order is of a 'court' the principle is that it maintains the continuity of jurisdiction though the personnel of the office may be changed, unless a contrary inference is permissible form the language of the Code. As to the meaning if the word `passing' in the words the Magistrate passing a decision in sub s (3) of Section 148, Subramanya J. has observed : "The word passing" in sub-s. (3)which follows the term "Magistrate" in the said provision, as I understand it, means no more than the Magistrate, who may award costs, is the officer holding the proceeding under the chapter of his successor entitled to discharge his functions in connection with the matter" (Vythinatha, 29 M 373 : 4 CrLJ 232) The magistrate must be equated with the word `court' in the last sentence of Section 148 (3) (Chandrama A 1965 P 21). The Magistrate passing final order may or may not be one who initiated the proceeding (Vythinatha, sup). The successor of the magistrate who ordered costs. The Magistrate passing final order may or may not be one who initiated the proceeding (Vythinatha, sup). The successor of the magistrate who ordered costs. can assess the cost (Giridhar, 22 C 384; MD Krshad, 23C 37; Bhagvandas, A 1929 M 478; Sarju Pd, A 1959 P 151). 8. The words occurring in Section 148 referred to above if interpreted to mean that these words do not include the successor then it will not advance the cause of justice. It does not appear to be the intent of legislature that teat Magistrate alone is competent who has passed the final order under section 145 Cr.P.C. it is only the manner of expression by the law making body. The Magistrate passing a decision means the court of Magistrate passing a decision and not the individual officer who passes the decision. This appears to be the clear intent of the expression used in Section 148 (3). The order of costs can be passed at the time of passing the final order in proceedings under section 145 or at times it may be passed even thereafter and in the meantime. if the incumbent of the court changes it would mean that for false and frivolous proceedings under section 145 Cr. P.C., no cost can be awarded to the successful party Such cannot be the intent of framers of the law. In several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure the word 'Magistrate' has been used. It would be taken to mean in the context of the provision and the expression can be interpreted as if it refers to the court of a Magistrate Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is analogous to section 559 (1) of the old Code and the words "subject to the other provision of this Code" occurring in Section 35 do not in any way affect the applicability of Section 5 (1) as well, Section 35 (1) provided that subject to other provisions of this code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in his office. The words occurring in Section 148 (3) do not in any way mean to convey a contrary intention of the framers of the Code. Had such been the intention of the framers, the word court would not have occurred at the end of the provision of Section 148 (3). 9. The words occurring in Section 148 (3) do not in any way mean to convey a contrary intention of the framers of the Code. Had such been the intention of the framers, the word court would not have occurred at the end of the provision of Section 148 (3). 9. An interpretation which is possible and which may advance the cause of justice, then in my opinion the provision should be interpreted in that manner. 10. Indeed it is in this area of legislative ambiguities, unfortunately not receding that courts have to fill gaps. clear doubts and mitigate hardships. In the towards of Judge learned Hand "It is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide of their meaning". 11. It is an accepted and well recognised rule of interpretation that plain meaning can not be relied upon where it results in absurdity in justice, hardship and unconstitutionality. The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is not a mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading of mathematical formulae because few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols. It is an intent to discover the intent of the legislature from the language used by it and it must always be remembered that language is at least an imperfect instrument for the expression of human thought and as pointed out by lord Denning. "It would be idle to expect every statutory provision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity". 12. I, therefore, hold that the successor in office in the present case was competent to decide the application of section 148 (3) and the order of the learned Magistrate is not without jurisdiction. 13. No other point has been pressed before me. 14. In the result this petition is devoid of force so it is hereby dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******