B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision under sections 397/40 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the Code) is directed against the order dated 20th February, 1986, allowing the revision and setting aside the order dated 18th April, 1985, passed by the Additional City Magistrate, Aligarh under section 146 of the Code in a proceeding under section 145. The Additional City Magistrate held that as he was unable to decide the possession of either party, hence land in dispute shall remain attached unless the controversy between the parties has been decided by a competent court. ( 2 ) THE sequence of events leading to the present revision is that one Sri Israt Ullah Khan (opposite party No. 2) Assistant Registrar, (the first party) made an application under section 145, alleging that there is apprehension of breach of peace. On the application a report was obtained on 16th January 1984, by the police. The Additional City Magistrate, being satisfied with the said report passed a preliminary order under section 145 (i) of the Code. It was directed that on the land of opposite party No. 2, the present applicants (Iqram etc.) the 2nd party wanted to take forceful possession hence there was apprehension of breach of peace, Consequently a preliminary order was issued and a date was fixed for appearance of both the parties and to lead evidence to prove their respective possession. The present applicants, the second party, filed their objections dt. 3rd April, 1984, alleging that application made, by Iqram Ullah Khan (opposite party No. 2) who was first party, was baseless and the local police was in collusion with him, the land in dispute (plot No. 120/4) belonged to applicant No. 1 which was purchased from one Mohan Singh and since then be was in possession. ( 3 ) THE first party asserted its own possession. To prove their respective possession both parties led oral and documentary evidence. The Additional City Magistrate, was, however, unable to decide as to which party was in possession He passed an order under section 146 (1) directing that the land in dispute shall remain attached till the parties get their rights declared from a competent court. The Revision filed by first party against that order was allowed by the impugned order. Feeling aggrieved, the 2nd party I the present applicants have preferred the present Revision. The Revision filed by first party against that order was allowed by the impugned order. Feeling aggrieved, the 2nd party I the present applicants have preferred the present Revision. ( 4 ) SRI Devendra Swaroop, learned counsel for the applicant urged that the order under section 146 was an interlocutory order hence no revision was maintainable under section 397 (2), and there was no justification for interference in the revisional powers under section 397/40 1 of the Code, as the power of revision was to be exercised within the limits prescribed by section 397, evidence cannot be considered afresh. Reliance was placed on Mahabir and another v. State of U. P. and another1. Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 urged that the Sessions Judge was justified in making interference in the revision against the order of the Additional City Magistrate and to Revisional powers under revision under section 397/40 L were much comprehensive, and even evidence can be appreciated afresh. Reliance was placed On Shree Chand v. Dhundhi Ram Mathuri2, Ram Gopal Ganpati Ruta and another v. State of Bombay3. Sri P. S. Adhikarl learned counsel for the State strenuously urged and argued so many points in support of the impugned order particularly that the Revisional power was quite comprehensive and interference has correctly been made by the Sessions Judge, Aligarh in the order of the Magistrate. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties the principal question centres round the ambit of Revisional powers under section 397 (1) of the Code. In other words as the Magistrate has considered the entire evidence before recording the finding whether there was scope for reappraisal of evidence in Revisional Court without pointing out any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. Section 3910) provides that High Court or any Sessions Court may call for and examine the record of any case before the inferior criminal court, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to correctness, legality or propriety of any finding recorded and as to regularity of any proceeding. The Jurisdiction is confined only to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding and regularity of any proceeding. It was not pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge as to what was the incorrectness or illegality in the finding or what was irregularity in the proceedings. The Jurisdiction is confined only to ascertain the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding and regularity of any proceeding. It was not pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge as to what was the incorrectness or illegality in the finding or what was irregularity in the proceedings. ( 6 ) IN fact in order to have the extent of revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, it is better to read sections 397/399, 400 and 401 of Code together. It is better to consider relevant rules of construction. I am of the view that in much matters the literal meaning of relevant sections has to be ascertained. If there appears to be some ambiguity the object of the legislative intent can also be looked into. In doing so it shall be permissible for a Court making constructions to even ironout the creases. But that must not go against the object of the legislature. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition) Vol. I Paras 36-37, pages 838,839, it has been observed as follows :- "the courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction (See Guise Ppj v. Welling, 524 US 1224, Traders v. Savannch Riverveneer Co. , 202 Sec. 363 ). It. is for the courts to ascertain, neither to add nor substract, delete or distort (See Persky v. Board of Regents, 347 US 442 ). It is the judicial function to apply statutes on the basis of what the legislature has actually written, not what the legislature might have written. (See Flemming v. Floride Citrus Exch, 358 US 153), ( 7 ) APPLYING these rudamentary principles of interpretations to the provisions of sections 386, 389, 390, 391, 391, 399, 400 and 401 and 465 i. e is evident that the object of creating Revisional jurisdiction in favour of the Sessions/judge is to correct miscarriage of justice; emanating from misconception of law and irregularity of proceedings. Sections 397 and 401 are interlinked. Section 397 provides grounds and also cases in respect of which Revisional power could be exercised by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Section 398 enacts a special jurisdiction in respect of further enquiry to be made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or some other Magistrate into any complaint dismissed under section 203 or 204 (4 ). Section 397 provides grounds and also cases in respect of which Revisional power could be exercised by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Section 398 enacts a special jurisdiction in respect of further enquiry to be made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or some other Magistrate into any complaint dismissed under section 203 or 204 (4 ). Sections 391 and 401 do not create any rights in the litigant but only preserve the power is the court to see that the justice is done in accordance with recognized principles of criminal jurisprudence. This is with a view that the Sub-Ordinate Courts do not abuse their powers vested in them. The High Court or the court of Sessions can interfere in cases of incorrectness, illegality or impropriety of any finding or, irregularity of any proceeding. Once these conditions as pointed out under section 397 are satisfied the Sessions court can pass an appropriate order in the ends of justice. But in case the evidence has been considered and findings of fact have been recorded those findings need not be set aside. By reading sections 397, 401 and 465 together the only irresistable conclusion is that even though there might be some error, omissions or irregularity in the findings of order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but the Sessions Court car not reverse those findings unless he is satisfied that a failure of justice has occasioned thereby. It is thus evident that in case evidence has been considered, and findings of fact have been recorded without committing any procedural mistakes, the finding of fact would be binding on Revisional court it may be Sessions Court or High Court and reappraisal of evidence cannot be made. ( 8 ) IN Pathumma and another v. Muhammad4, the ambit of Revisional jurisdiction has been indicated thus (section 1437 para 6 ). The questions whether the appellant No. 1 was the married wife of respondent and whether the appellant No. 2 was the legitimate or illegitimate child of the respondent, are pre-eminently question of fact. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence as adduced by the parties held that the appellant No. 1 was not wife of the respondent. He further held on the basis of evidence on record that the appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence as adduced by the parties held that the appellant No. 1 was not wife of the respondent. He further held on the basis of evidence on record that the appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. We are afraid the learned judge of the High Court committed an error in making a reassessment of the evidence and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate, who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, the appellant No. 2 was illegitimate child of the respondent. High Court in its Revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate, on a question of fact. ( 9 ) LEARNED Sessions Judge, in his impugned order (paras 11 and 12) observed that he considered arguments of parties, without considering any evidence on record, the Magistrate held that he was unable to decide as to which party was in possession, after aforesaid paragraphs, the learned Sessions Judge, made reference to the arguments of the learned counsel for applicant and the opposite parties and appreciated the evidence afresh. The revisional jurisdiction did not justify the consideration of the entire evidence afresh without pointing out the incorrectness or the illegality in the finding and order or irregularity in the proceedings or any other impropriety. I am of the view that the Sessions Judge was not justified in exercise of its Revisional jurisdiction to substitute its own view for that of the Magistrate on a question of fact. Sri Chand v. Dhundhi Ram Mathuri (supra) relied upon by opposite party No. 2 was a case under old Code, where there was admission of one party that other party was in possession and that other party examined 3 witnesses to prove his case, and there was no evidence led by first party, hence it was held that under the circumstances it cannot be said that the evidence of neither party was such as to lead to a positive conclusion about fact of possession of either party. Similarly Ram Gopal Gangepatri Ruia v. State of Bombay (supra) was also a case under the old Code and arising out of an order of discharge. Similarly Ram Gopal Gangepatri Ruia v. State of Bombay (supra) was also a case under the old Code and arising out of an order of discharge. In respect of Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court it was held that High Court can examine the Correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the subordinate courts and in case, it finds that order is not correct or is illegal or improper, it may exercise any power of the court of appeal. The present case was not against an order of discharge nor any illegality, incorrectness or impropriety was pointed out by Sessions Judge rather evidence was considered afresh and its own findings were substituted for the findings recorded by the Magistrate. Those Cases, Sri Chand v. Dhundhi Ram Mathuri (supra) and Ram Gopal Gangepatri Ruia were on different facts, hence of no assistance. ( 10 ) UNDER similar facts in Mahabir and another v. State of U P. and another (supra) 1981 And Criminal Cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, it was held that in a proceeding under section 145 after considering the evidence that he was unable to decide the factum of possession, or as to which party was in possession since two months prior to the date of preliminary order, the Sessions Judge acts with substantial irregularity in the exercise of his Revisional Jurisdiction under section 397, if he substitutes his own view after appreciating the evidence afresh. ( 11 ) IN the premise aforesaid there is no other alternative but to quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the Sessions Judge, which cannot be maintained. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 submitted that the case may be remanded to the Additional City Magistrate. I am of the view that there is no necessity to remand the case to theadditional City Magistrate, in as much as the material evidence has been considered by him and he has come to the conclusion that he is unable to decide as to which party was in possession hencehe directed that the land in dispute shall remain under attachment. I am now of the view that the land in dispute shall remain under attachment in possession of some supurdar. 12. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dt. 20. 2. I am now of the view that the land in dispute shall remain under attachment in possession of some supurdar. 12. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dt. 20. 2. 86 is set aside and that of the learned Additional City Magistrate dated 18th April 1985 is maintained. A Supurdar may be appointed to supervise the land. Any aggrieved person may file a regular suit before the competent court for declaration of the rights or for injunction as advised. The interim stay dated 27th February 1986 is vacated. The record of the court below be sent back forthwith.