(1) A quantity of bricks belonging to the appellant was seized and thereafter confiscated by an order of the Collector dated 28/08/1959. And appeal to the Commissioner of Land Revenue and a further appeal to the Board of Revenue were rejected. On a petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High court of Madhya Pradesh by its judgment dated 19/03/1966, quashed the order of confiscation. Thereafter, the appellant filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises to recover the value of the bricks, which had in the meanwhile been sold by auction. The suit was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed by the High court on two grounds. The first ground was that the State of Madhya Pradesh could not be sued for the value of the bricks as the act of the Collector in seizing the bricks was a sovereign act. The second ground was that the suit was barred by limitation as it was not filed within one year from the date of seizure, as contemplated by Article 29 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. We may mention here that no plea regarding limitation was raised by the government in the written statement filed in the trial court. The High court took up the question of limitation of its own motion. We are satisfied that both the grounds given by the High court for reversing the judgment and decree granted by the trial court, are unsustainable. The seizure of the bricks by the Collector and the subsequent confiscation were made pursuant to the powers vested in the Collector under S. 228 clause (7) and clause (8) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954. We are unable to see how the exercise of a statutory power of seizure can possibly be described as a sovereign act. This appears to us to be so patent that further discussion on the question is wholly unnecessary. We also notice that before the High court, two decisions of the Supreme court - Kasturi Lal v. State of U. P. and State of Gujarat v. Memon Mahomed, were cited on behalf of the appellants. This appears to us to be so patent that further discussion on the question is wholly unnecessary. We also notice that before the High court, two decisions of the Supreme court - Kasturi Lal v. State of U. P. and State of Gujarat v. Memon Mahomed, were cited on behalf of the appellants. In the first case it was pointed out that if a tortious act had been committed by the public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. In the second case it was held that there was an obligation to return the property or the price of the property, which had been wrongfully seized in purported exercise of statutory powers. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High court on the first question. As regards the question of limitation, we have pointed out often enough that the plea of limitation is not a proper one to be taken by the State. That was perhaps the reason why the government very properly did not raise the plea of limitation in defence to the action of the appellants. We do not think that the High court was justified in taking up the question suo motu and finding that the suit was barred by limitation. We notice that there was in fact some question whether it was Article 29 or Article 49, which was the appropriate Article to be applied to the facts of the case. We also notice that the suit was filed within one year of the decision of the High court which declared the seizure illegal. In the circumstances we allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the High court and restore that of the trial court.