JUDGMENT Rajeshwar Singh, J. - The landlord moved an application against the tenant under Section 21 of the Act U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for release of the accommodation in occupation of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement and that the building is in a dilapidated condition required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. The tenant went in appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge. Against that decision of the District Judge the tenant has filed the present writ petition praying that the order passed by the District Judge and Prescribed Authority be quashed and costs of the writ petition be awarded to him. 2. The petitioner-tenant firstly pressed that there was no bona fide need of the landlord and the building was not in a dilapidated condition. Both these are questions of fact on which the learned District Judge has given his finding after taking the evidence into consideration. As regards the bona fide need an affidavit has been filed in this Court saying that one of the daughter of the landlord, who is M.B.B.S. has joined as Lecturer at Aligarh University and one other son of the landlord has also become Lecturer in that University. The daughter who is said to have joined the Muslim University, is already married. She and her brother, who joined as a Lecturer, may be excluded. Even then the landlord, his wife, one son, daughter-in-law and daughter remained members of the family as has been mentioned in Paragraph 4 of copy of land-lord's application for release-annexure 1. The accommodation in this house is only one big room and two small rooms besides verandah and lantrie. The family of the landlord is accused one, most of them are Doctors. Such a family requires drawing-room, separate bed rooms and arrangement for guests. Keeping this into consideration the finding of the Courts below do not become vitiated even if the married daughter and one son have taken up employment in another city. So far as the question of dilapidated condition of the building is concerned, there reports of Engineers from both sides. Keeping this into consideration the finding of the Courts below do not become vitiated even if the married daughter and one son have taken up employment in another city. So far as the question of dilapidated condition of the building is concerned, there reports of Engineers from both sides. The learned District Judge considered these reports, age of the building and reasons given in these reports and he came to the conclusion that the report of the landlord's Expert was entitled to greater weight and the learned Prescribed Authority has rightly accepted it. In coming to these findings of fact no illegality or irregularity appears to have been committed. So they have to be accepted in writ petition and this Court will not re-appreciate the evidence and disturb the finding of fact. From the case of Panneerdas and Co. v. Swadeshmitran Ltd., (1987) 3 SCC 58 , it is clear that findings regarding age and condition of the building is finding of fact and such findings of Appellate Authority are not to be inferred with by High Court. 3. The argument of the tenant's learned Counsel is that Clause (a) of Section 21(1) permit release on the ground of bona fide requirements and Clause (b) permits the same on the ground that the building is in a dipalidated condition and is required for the purpose of demolition and new construction. He proceeds that in case permission is given under Clause (b) the tenant has certain rights under Section 24 of the Act and if some conditions are satisfied the tenant can get possession of the newly constructed accommodation or a part. Since the order is under the both the clauses the tenant will not be able to take advantage of Section 24 and the order passed by the Courts below is bad inasmuch as it does not specify as to under which clause the permission was being given and it appears to give permission under both the clauses. 4. Section 21 permits the landlord to ask for release on one or both the grounds and there is nothing to show that permission can be asked on only one ground. In civil cases plaintiff can raise even alternative pleas which may be inconsistent. Two grounds given in Clauses (a) and (b) are inconsistent and there is no reason why the landlord cannot base his case on both the grounds. In civil cases plaintiff can raise even alternative pleas which may be inconsistent. Two grounds given in Clauses (a) and (b) are inconsistent and there is no reason why the landlord cannot base his case on both the grounds. If the case is based on both the grounds the Court can also consider both the grounds and can give relief on one ground if one ground is proved, and on both the grounds if both grounds are proved. 5. The fact that Court can give relief or has given relief on both the grounds does not prejudice tenant. Sub-section (1) of Section 24 provides for cases where relief is given under Section 21, i.e., under Clause (a) of Section 21 or Clause (b) of Section 21 or both the clauses. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 provides for such relief in case where relief is given under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). In case before us relief has been given under both the clauses of Section 21(1), so obviously sub-section (1) of Section 24 will apply. Subsection 2 (2) of Section 24 applies to those cases, where relief is given only under Clause (b) of Section 21(1). So this sub-section (2) will not apply because in the case before us relief has not been given only under Clause (b) of Section 21 (1), Therefore, the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant has no force and it is rejected. 6. However, there is another point, which is rather more serious and for considering this point first I may give facts of the case. The landlord is possessed of two houses, one in Asharfabad and the other at Gangaprasad Road The house in dispute is at Gangaprasad Road. A part of it is in possession of the tenant-petitioner and the other part is in possession of the landlord. The landlord in Paragraph 10 of his application before the Prescribed Authority described the matter saying that Asharfabad house is meant for Nursing Home. The position was made clear by the tenant in his reply before the Prescribed Authority. In Paragraph 4 of that reply the tenant said that the landlord resided in the well equipped spacious Asharfabad house with all amenities and if it is taken into consideration the need of the landlord for getting the house released will not be there. The position was made clear by the tenant in his reply before the Prescribed Authority. In Paragraph 4 of that reply the tenant said that the landlord resided in the well equipped spacious Asharfabad house with all amenities and if it is taken into consideration the need of the landlord for getting the house released will not be there. Before me during the arguments it has not been disputed that Asharfabad house is there, it is specious one and it can fulfil the needs of the landlord which are in occupation of it. But the argument from the side of the landlord is that it is a family of Doctors, they have right to argument their income and with that end in view they want to turn the Aharfabad house in a Nursing Home, thereafter there will not be sufficient accommodation with them, so they require Gangaprasad Road accommodation in occupation of the tenant so that they may turn it into their residence. This brings us to the question whether in such cases accommodation in occupation of a tenant can be released on account of bona fide need. Clause (2) of subsection (J)of Section 21 provides for release of accommodation in occupation of the tenant on the ground of bona fide need. The third proviso of sub-section (1) says that no application under Clause (1) shall be entertained in the case of any residential building for occupation for business purposes. It is not disputed in the case before us that the disputed accommodation is being used by the tenant for the purpose of residence. So I hold that it is a residential building Another question may be as to whether opening of a Nursing Home is business or not. Case of Dr. Bashiruddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr, ARC 1978 page 62 was decided by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court. In this reported case the petitioner was a Dental Surgeon and he wanted the residential accommodation in possession of the tenant for carrying on his profession as Dental Surgeon. The Division Bench said that they were firmly of the view that the words "business purposes" within the meaning of Clause (ii) of third proviso to Section 21(1) 4 covers within its range "purposes of any profession trade or calling" occurring in Section 21(1) Clause (a). So Division Bench did not allow eviction of the tenant. The Division Bench said that they were firmly of the view that the words "business purposes" within the meaning of Clause (ii) of third proviso to Section 21(1) 4 covers within its range "purposes of any profession trade or calling" occurring in Section 21(1) Clause (a). So Division Bench did not allow eviction of the tenant. In view of it can safely be inferred that if the landlord required the disputed accommodation for business purposes the landlord could not succeed on account of bona fide need his application for release could not be entertained by the Courts below on this ground. 7. However the argument of the landlord's learned Counsel is that the disputed accommodation is not required for business purposes, the Asharfabad house is required for business purposes and the disputed house is required for residence, so the above referred proviso will not be applicable because it does not say that a tenant cannot be asked to be evicted even if landlord requires accommodation in possession of tenant for residence and this necessity arises because he wants to turn another house, where he is residing, into use for business purposes. 8. The landlord's learned Counsel relied on the case of Mst. Rashid Jahan and others v. Smt. Sirajan and another (1977) ARC page 446, but in the reported case facts were different. In that case the landlord in order to extend his hotel business used one room of his residential house for opening another hotel. This was done in 1967. The things continued as they were till 1972. Then on account of growing family, need arose for further accommodation. It was thereafter that landlord wanted to evict the tenant, who was occupying a part of the house. Then it was held that the landlord was entitled to get the tenant evicted. The present case is different because here Asharfabad house is even now sufficient for residential use of the landlord and perhaps in future the landlord wants to turn the Asharfabad house in a Nursing Home and with that end in view he wants the tenant of Gangaprasad Road house to be evicted from the house. Hence, the ruling relied upon by the learned Counsel cannot help the landlord. 9. Hence, the ruling relied upon by the learned Counsel cannot help the landlord. 9. Now the argument is that the landlord will use Asharfabad house for Nursing Home and the disputed accommodation for residence, so the proviso does not apply because the residential building sought to be released will not be occupied for business purposes, rather another house of Asharfabad will be occupied for business purposes. In this connection it may be pointed out that in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd., (1986) 3 SCC 91 the Supreme Court pointed out that the court must always seek to find out the intention of the legislature. This can be done from the language used in the statute. But court should not always cling to the literalness and should endeavour to avoid unjust or absurd result. The purpose of the Act and the object of a particular section have to be borne in mind. To make sense out of an unhappily worded provision, where purpose is apparent to the judicial eye, 'some' violence to language is permissible. I repeat that some violence to the 3 language is permissible to achieve the object of an Act or fulfil the intention of the legislature. 10. It is well known that there was paucity of residential accommodation in the cites. So the legislature though it fit to protect tenancy from being thrown out of a residential accommodation just to make the same available to landlord for carrying on his business. With this end in view this proviso under Section 21 has been made that application for release will not be entertained in the case of residential buildings for business purposes. If a landlord, having two buildings and residing in one of them, is permitted to turn his residential accommodation into business purpose and to evict the tenant from residential accommodation in his possession the protection given to the tenant will be gone and the landlord will achieve indirectly what he has been forbidden to do directly. This can not be permitted. It will defeat the very object of the Act and the intention of the legislature. This can not be permitted. It will defeat the very object of the Act and the intention of the legislature. So we have to give broad interpretation to the proviso and it has to be held that in order to make business accommodation available to a landlord a tenant should not be evicted fro a residential accommodation irrespective of the fact whether the landlord wants to carry on his business in the accommodation in the occupation of the tenant or he wants to shift his residence to the accommodation in possession of the tenant from another building which he wants to use for business purposes. I agree with this interpretation and so I hold that the application of the landlord on the ground of bona fide need could not be entertained. 11. So the position is that the landlord's application should have been allowed only on the ground on the building being in dilpaidated condition and required for the purposes of demolition and new construction contained in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 and not on the ground of bona fide need contained in clause (a) of the same sub-section. Orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and District Judge are modified accordingly. 12. The tenant petitioner is allowed one month to vacate the house and both the parties shall bear their own costs through out. In other respects the is dismissed.