JUDGMENT V. P. Mathur, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed on 14-2-74 by Mr. Manphool Singh, 1st Additional Civil Judge, Meerut in suit no. 206 of 1973. 2. Briefly stated, the suit had been filed by Kadam Singh against Santosh Kumar and Bhagmal, the two vendees from Kharkoo, and also against Peetam Singh and others, defendants nos. 3 to 7, who were vendees from defendants nos. 1 and 2. Smt. Parshandi, wife of late Bhullan, was defendant no. 8 and she was the heir of Kharkoo in respect of the property in dispute. The prayer was that all the defendants should be called upon to execute the sale deed of the disputed property in favour of the plaintiff and in case they failed to comply, the court may execute the sale deed in plaintiff's favour on their behalf. In the alternative, refund of Rs. 25000/- was also claimed against the estate of Kharkoo in the hands of defendant no. 8. The allegations were that Kharkoo executed a deed of agreement on 10-2-70 (Ext. 2) in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the agricultural land and one residential house in village Daha in the district of Meerut for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. Kharkoo had delivered possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff and received Rs. 25000/- by way of earnest money. It was agreed that Kharkoo shall execute the sale deed of the property in dispute within one month of the decision of the partition suit, which was pending at the time of execution of the agreement. There was also stipulation that the balance amount of Rs. 25000/- was to be paid to Kharkoo at the time of registration of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar and Kharkoo had taken obligation upon himself to inform the plaintiff about conclusion of the partition suit and the plaintiff had a right either to purchase the property in his name or in the name of his nominees. Kharkoo died on 20-1-73 in village Barwala in the district of Muzaffarnagar and the plaintiff came to know that defendants nos. 1 and 2 had obtained a fictitious sale deed for a sum of Rs. 42000/- from Kharkoo on 17-1-73 vide Ext-A 11. It appears that the sale deed was void and the defendants nos. Kharkoo died on 20-1-73 in village Barwala in the district of Muzaffarnagar and the plaintiff came to know that defendants nos. 1 and 2 had obtained a fictitious sale deed for a sum of Rs. 42000/- from Kharkoo on 17-1-73 vide Ext-A 11. It appears that the sale deed was void and the defendants nos. 1 and 2 had conveyed knowledge about the existence of the earlier agreement dated 10-2-70 in favour of the plaintiff. So far as the sale deed Ext-A 11 is concerned, it was further alleged that Kharkoo did not receive the consideration at all and never agreed to transfer the land in favour of defendants nos. 1 and 2, and this deed was only executed with a view to defeat the plaintiff's right and to illegally possess the property although defendants nos. 1 and 2 never came into possession in consequence of the sale-deed. These defendants nos. 1 and 2 had already transferred a substantial portion of the disputed property, after having received fancy price, to different persons. In para 9 of the plaint the details of these transfers were furnished. Lastly, it was contended that defendant no. 8 is legal heir of deceased Kharkoo, being his brother's wife, and she has been impleaded in order to avoid further complications. 3. Only defendants nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit. They pleaded that they were bonafide purchasers of the disputed property for value without any notice of the alleged agreement in plaintiff's favour. They contended that Kharkoo had received Rs. 42000/- from them by way of consideration of the sale deed and the deed was executed on 17-1-72 validly and rightly. According to them, Kharkoo died on 29-1-73 and not on 20-1-73 and had delivered possession of the property to defendants nos. 1 and 2 and had acknowledged receipt of the entire sale consideration of Rs. 42000/- before the Sub-Registrar. The defendants challenged the existence of the alleged agreement Ext 2 at the time of execution of sale deed Ex-A 1 and contended that Kharkoo neither executed the agreement nor put his thumb impression on it. They also pleaded that they had no information of the existence of this deed of agreement, if at all, and hence no relief can be claimed. They also pleaded that they had no information of the existence of this deed of agreement, if at all, and hence no relief can be claimed. They were justified in selling the property, which they had obtained from Kharkoo, to other persons and to enter into agreement to sell in favour of defendants nos. 3 to 6. The plaintiff has never been in possession of the disputed property and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. The learned Civil Judge struck five issues as follows 1. Whether Kharkoo deceased has agreed to sell the property in dispute detailed at the foot of the plaint or any portion thereof for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 10-2-70 to the plaintiff and whether Kharkoo deceased had received a sum of Rs. 25000/- by way of earnest money as alleged by the plaintiff ? If so, effect ? 2. Whether the defendants nos. 1 and 2 are bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the alleged agreement dated 10-2-70 ? If so effect ? 3. Whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform the part of the agreement at all the relevant time ? If so effect ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 25000/- as alleged to have been paid by him to Kharkoo (deceased) by way of earnest money ? 5.To what relief, if any, is plaintiff entitled ? He came to the conclusion that Kharkoo had agreed to sell the property in dispute, detailed at the foot of the plaint, for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 10-2-70 to the plaintiff and had executed a deed of agreement after having received a sum of Rs. 25000/- by way of earnest money. He also came to the conclusion that defendants nos. 1 and 2 were bonafide purchasers for value without notice of the agreement dated 10-2-70, and therefore, they were entitled to legal protection. To the alternative relief of refund of Rs. 25000/-, the plaintiff was found entitled. In this way the suit was decreed for Rs. 25000/-against the estate of Kharkoo in the hands of defendant no. 8 with exparte costs, but it was dismissed against defendants nos. 1 and 2 and 3 to 7, defendants nos. 1 and 2 were directed to bear their own costs. 5. 25000/-, the plaintiff was found entitled. In this way the suit was decreed for Rs. 25000/-against the estate of Kharkoo in the hands of defendant no. 8 with exparte costs, but it was dismissed against defendants nos. 1 and 2 and 3 to 7, defendants nos. 1 and 2 were directed to bear their own costs. 5. The only question that has been agitated before me in this appeal is about the defendants nos. 1 and 2 being the bonafide purchasers of the property in dispute for value without notice because on that ground the suit against them has been dismissed. It has not been argued before me that Kharkoo had not executed a deed of agreement in favour of the plaintiff after obtaining Rs. 25000/- by way of earnest money from him. With that finding the suit for refund of Rs. 25000/- was decreed by the learned Civil Judge against defendant no. 8 to the extent of the assets of Kharkoo in her hands. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the burden of proof in this case will rest upon respondents nos. 1 and 2 and if it is not shown that they had made adequate enquiries before getting the property through the sale deed from Kharkoo, they will not be deemed to have discharged their burden and hence it will have to be held that they were not bonafide purchasers for value without notice. First my attention was drawn to the case Gadde Sattayya v. Gadde Kotayya, AIR 1932 Madras 71. It was a case in which there was a prior agreement to sell and inspite of it the property was actually sold to a third party purchaser and then the man in whose favour there was prior agreement to sell sued for specific performance of the contract. It was held that the burden of proving-(i) that the subsequent purchaser-paid valuable consideration ; (ii) that he acted bonafide ; and (iii) that he had no notice, squarely lay on the purchaser, assuming, of course, that the plaintiff had established the prior agreement to sell alleged in his plaint. 7. Similar observations were made in the case of Kanhaiya Lal v. Devi Das Jagannath, AIR 1931 Lahore 227. 8. 7. Similar observations were made in the case of Kanhaiya Lal v. Devi Das Jagannath, AIR 1931 Lahore 227. 8. In the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Bibi Asghari, AIR 1957 Patna 224 it was held that in the cases where burden of proving of some of the issues lies on the defendant, it is open to the plaintiff, if he so chooses, to reserve his evidence by way of rebuttal on those points. In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale the plaintiff has to establish the contract and once this is done the onus of proving that a third party has subsequently purchased the property bonafide for value without notice is on the party who makes that claim. The onus is obviously negative in nature so far as the point of bonafide and want of notice is concerned and very little evidence, and in certain circumstances the mere denial regarding want of knowledge of the earlier contract would discharge the onus and shift it to the plaintiff. The learned counsel also referred to two more cases, namely, Harendra Chandra Dass v. Nanda Lal Gaur, AIR 1933 Calcutta 98. The facts which were established on record were that defendants nos. 8 to 13 were aware of the fact that negotiations for the sale of the property were in progress between the defendants nos. 1 to 5 and the plaintiffs' agent. On that ground it was held that even this much of evidence should have put the defendants on their guard and they should have made necessary enquiries as to whether any agreement to sell the property had been definitely concluded, and since defendants nos. 8 to 13 did not do so, it cannot be held that they were bonafide purchasers for value without notice. 9. The other case to which the reference was made by the learned counsel is the case of Mohammad Aslam Khan v. Feroze Shah, AIR 1932 PC 228. In this case the transferee was found possessed of the knowledge of certain facts connected with the transferor. These facts were such as would put him to enquiry, which enquiry, if it was prosecuted, would have disclosed a previous agreement. It was held that such a transferee is not a tranferee without notice of the original contract. 10. In this case the transferee was found possessed of the knowledge of certain facts connected with the transferor. These facts were such as would put him to enquiry, which enquiry, if it was prosecuted, would have disclosed a previous agreement. It was held that such a transferee is not a tranferee without notice of the original contract. 10. There can be no dispute as regards the fact that when a plea of being a bonafide purchaser for value without notice is raised, the person who raises that plea is to discharge the initial burden. He has to show that he has actually purchased the property and paid its value to the vendor and he has also to show that his purchase was bonafide and was not with notice of a previous transaction regarding agreement of sale. This burden is discharged in the present case when the two respondents entered into the witness-box. They proved satisfactorily beyond doubt that they had paid Rs. 42000/- to Kharkoo. The evidence in this case has not been controverted. The deed of sale is a registered document (Ext-A 11) and bears an endorsement of Sub-Registrar, according to which, a sum of Rs. 42000/- was paid to Kharkoo in the presence of the Sub-Registrar and the witnesses. Therefore, so far as the purchase for value is concerned, that fact stands established beyond doubt. The learned counsel argued that the value contemplated by the provisions of law is the correct value of the property and if the property has been purchased for an amount which is too low and does not represent the correct price, then it cannot be said to have been purchased for value. What is the correct price of the property involved, has not come on the record. The agreement in favour of the appellant reserved a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as the price. It was open to Kharkoo to sell it subsequently for a lesser amount and in this case Kharkoo had already obtained Rs. 25,000/- as earnest money from the appellant and, therefore, when he sold the property stealthily to respondents nos. 1 and 2 for a sum of Rs. 42000/- he apparently was a gainer. 50,000/- as the price. It was open to Kharkoo to sell it subsequently for a lesser amount and in this case Kharkoo had already obtained Rs. 25,000/- as earnest money from the appellant and, therefore, when he sold the property stealthily to respondents nos. 1 and 2 for a sum of Rs. 42000/- he apparently was a gainer. It is always a matter with the vendor to think what price he should get for his property and unless the price obtained is grossly inadequate, it will not be open to courts to enter into any enquiry in this respect and to hold that since the price paid was not the same price which was mentioned in the agreement earlier executed, hence it was inadequate and, therefore, not the correct value. After this, we come to the point whether it was bonafide purchase without notice of the earlier transaction. The two cases of which reference has been made by me above show that there were circumstances in view of which the purchaser was put to guard and he ought to have made enquiry. In the present case no such circumstances are available. In the deed of agreement earlier executed by Kharkoo there is mention that he had put the plaintiff-appellant into possession of the property. Now this fact, if it was true, would have been sufficient to put the respondents nos. 1 and 2 on guard. But what happened in this case is that admittedly Kharkoo remained in possession of the house all along, almost till the time of his death. Nobody, therefore, can think that, when he was living in the house as before, he would have agreed to transfer it. The position would have been different if he had vacated the house and the appellant had entered into actual physical possession of the same. Then it was necessary for anybody who wanted to purchase the house subsequently to find out as to why this change of possession has taken place. The situation in regard to the agricultural plots is also similar. Irrigation slips and other documents have been placed on record. They all stand in the name of Kharkoo. There is no evidence on record to show that the appellant ever actually cultivated the land in question or irrigated it although he admits that the plots are irrigated. The situation in regard to the agricultural plots is also similar. Irrigation slips and other documents have been placed on record. They all stand in the name of Kharkoo. There is no evidence on record to show that the appellant ever actually cultivated the land in question or irrigated it although he admits that the plots are irrigated. Of course, there is no mutation in his name which may be explained by saying that since it was an agreement for sale and not the sale deed, hence mutation was not got effected, but the irrigation slips are issued to the person who actually irrigates the plots on the spot and whenever Lekhpal visits the spot and finds possession of anybody other than the true owner, he records that fact in the khasra. No such documentary evidence is forth-coming. No witness has been examined to swear that the appellant actually cultivated this land after the execution of the deed of agreement in his favour. Naturally even this circumstance is not available to support the case of the appellant and to place the burden of enquiry upon the respondents nos. 1 and 2. The appellant adduced oral evidence. He said that he had informed respondents nos. 1 and 2 himself about the agreement in his favour. His one witness, who is marginal witness of the deed also, came forward to say that he had told respondents nos. 1 and 2 about the execution of the deed of agreement. The two respondents when they entered the witness-box categorically stated that no such communication was ever made to them by the appellant. No question was put to them that the marginal witness Ziley Singh of the deed had informed them of the execution of the deed. The defendants entered the witness-box after the statements of the plaintiff-appellant and his witnesses had already been recorded and, therefore, it was necessary that the question should have been put to the respondents when they entered into the witness-box as to whether the marginal witness of the agreement ever told them about the date of execution of the deed of agreement in favour of the plaintiff. In short, the evidence on the plaintiff-appellant's side is highly unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted as correct and it is to be held, in view of the entire set of circumstance available on record and the evidence adduced, that respondents nos. In short, the evidence on the plaintiff-appellant's side is highly unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted as correct and it is to be held, in view of the entire set of circumstance available on record and the evidence adduced, that respondents nos. 1 and 2 had no notice of the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff-appellant when they obtained the sale deed from Kharkoo. I agree with the findings of the learned court below in this respect. 11. This being so, the respondents nos. 1 and 2 were bonafide purchasers for value without notice and suit against them was rightly dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents. Appeal dismissed.