S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE appellant herein was original petitioner in the Special Civil Application and we will therefore refer the appellant as petitioner for the sake of convenience in the later part of the judgment. The petitioner was at one time officer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission respondent No. 1 herein. He was removed from service on 14th October 1982 and the said removal which is at Annexure I was brought in challenge in the Special Civil Application. Three contentions were canvassed before the learned single Judge for challenging the said order. The first contention was that the finding of the Enquiry Officer and as confirmed by the disciplinary authority that the petitioner had misappropriated 15 tubings of 2 diameter on 23/02/1978 having removed them through false gate pass No. 56034 is based on no evidence and therefore the termination is liable to be quashed. The second contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the charge of misappropriation was a mala fide one. she last contention was that in any case the punishment imposed was far too out of proportion. All these three contentions were examined by the learned single Judge after issuing notice to the respondents and after hearing both the sides. The learned single Judge N. H. Bhatt J. was not inclined to accept any of the contentions and hence by a detailed order dismissed the petition after dealing with all these three contentions. The original petitioner the appellant in the present appeal has brought in challenge the aforesaid order and the findings of the learned single Judge. Mr. N. J. Mehta appearing for the petitioner in the Letters Patent Appeal raised the following contentions for our consideration. 1 That the finding of the Enquiry Officer as confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority and further confirmed by the Appellate Authority is based on no evidence. Therefore the removal is liable to be quashed. 2 The petitioner was charged with having allegedly misappropriated 15 tubings of 2 diameter after removing them on 23/02/1978 under false gate pass No. 56034 but the Enquiry Officer has himself found that 10 tubings were already found utilised in the Heater Treater Plant. However the finding is that these 10 tubings belonged to 30/12/1977 batch. Mr. 2 The petitioner was charged with having allegedly misappropriated 15 tubings of 2 diameter after removing them on 23/02/1978 under false gate pass No. 56034 but the Enquiry Officer has himself found that 10 tubings were already found utilised in the Heater Treater Plant. However the finding is that these 10 tubings belonged to 30/12/1977 batch. Mr. Mehta contended that these findings are absolutely without any basis For the alleged removal of 10 tubings in December 1977 the petitioner was already charged and punished departmentally amongst other charges. For the said charge he was punished with a fine of Rs. 4 0 on the ground that he had misappropriated 10 tubings by removing them on 30/12/1977 under a false gate pass No. 56022. This finding and the punishment on the basis of this finding have become final and therefore it is not open to the department authorities in the present proceedings to go behind the finding and to hold that the 10 tubings utilised in Heater Treater Plant belong to December 1977 batch. That if it is held that the Heater Treater Plant had already utilised 10 tubings which did not belong to 1977 batch an irresistible inference will have to be drawn that they belonged to the present batch of February 1978 and that when the Investigating Officer had found that 5 other tubings were lying near the office of the Heater Treater Plant it could be stated that all tubings removed on 23/02/1978 were duly accounted for and therefore the petitioner deserved to be exonerated from the present charge. 3the appellate order is not a speaking order and at least that order in appeal is required to be set aside and the appeal it required to be remanded to the appellant authority for reconsideration and for passing a speaking order. ( 3 ) MISS Shah appearing for the respondents has raised one preliminary contention regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining this petition. It was submitted by her that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court. Therefore she submitted that this petition could not have been entertained by this Court and it requires to be rejected as falling beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. ( 4 ) BEFORE we deal with the main contentions canvassed by Mr. Therefore she submitted that this petition could not have been entertained by this Court and it requires to be rejected as falling beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. ( 4 ) BEFORE we deal with the main contentions canvassed by Mr. Mehta learned Counsel for the appellant it becomes necessary for us to consider the preliminary objection raised by Miss Shah for the respondents on the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the writ petition. Hence we shall deal with this contention at the outset. It must be kept in view that the said contention was raised in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent Commission before the learned single Judge in response to the notice issued in the writ petition. But it does not appear from the judgment of the learned single Judge that this submission was canvassed before the learned single Judge. It is obvious that if such a contention was canvassed before the learned single Judge he would have considered the same at the outset before embarking upon the enquiry about the merits of the contentions centering around the removal order. It must therefore be held that this contention was not canvassed before the learned single Judge even though the question of territorial jurisdiction was raised in the affidavit-in-reply by the Commission. We therefore do not permit the respondent Commission to take up this contention for the first time anew before us as the same was not pressed before the learned single Judge Even otherwise this contention about the territorial jurisdiction raises a mixed question of law and fact. Article 226 sub-sec. (2) reads a under: (2 ). The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises for the exercise of such power notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Therefore the question of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition would involve consideration of further question whether the cause of action or any part thereof arose within the territorial limits of this Court. This certainly is a question of fact and it will have to be gone into. Therefore the question of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition would involve consideration of further question whether the cause of action or any part thereof arose within the territorial limits of this Court. This certainly is a question of fact and it will have to be gone into. Therefore it must be held that this question of absence of territorial jurisdiction is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. In our view it is not open to the respondents to raise this contention for the first time before us. Mr. Mehta contended in connection with this question that if the respondents had canvassed such a point before the learned single Judge. Learned single Judge would have decided the point of territorial jurisdiction and he would have passed appropriate orders when the petition was disposed of on merits by the learned single Judge in September 1984 itself that is before two and a half years. That if the learned single Judge had found that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of this Court he would have retained the petition for presentation to the proper Court. It is now too late in the day for the respondent to canvass such a point. If it is entertained now an irreparable injury will be caused to the petitioner. He also pressed in service principles underlying sec. 21 CPC. He urged that therefore the respondents should not be permitted for the first time now at this late stage in this Letters Patent Appeal to raise this contention. Mr. Mehta further contended that in any case a part of cause of action did arise within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court as the incident itself had taken place at Cambay in this State. The charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner while he was serving in this State. The entire enquiry was conducted in this State. Even the disciplinary authority to whom the enquiry officers report was submitted issued the final show cause notice to the petitioner in this State. It was served on the petitioner at Cambay. It is only thereafter that petitioner went to Sibsagar in Assam and joined at his transferred place where he was served with the removal order. Even the disciplinary authority to whom the enquiry officers report was submitted issued the final show cause notice to the petitioner in this State. It was served on the petitioner at Cambay. It is only thereafter that petitioner went to Sibsagar in Assam and joined at his transferred place where he was served with the removal order. Therefore it can be said that at least a part of cause of action had arisen in the local territorial limits of this Court. Prima facie there appears to be some substance in the aforesaid Contention raised by Mr. Mehta. However it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion thereon. As discussed above the respondent Commission cannot be permitted to raise this point for the first time before us at this late stage having not pressed the same before the learned single Judge. Therefore the above preliminary objection of Miss Shah learned Counsel for the respondents is rejected as not entertainable. ( 5 ) WE shall now deal with the main contentions raised in support of the appeal. So far as the first contention is concerned learned single Judge was invited to examine this very contention and he has given cogent reasons in para 7 of the judgment showing how the finding reached by the Enquiry Officer and confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority are based on voluminous evidence on record. We entirely concur with the finding the learned single Judge on this issue. However we may also give our own reasons for taking the view that the findings of the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based on evidence whatsoever Mr. Mehta invited our attention to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sidhharth Mohanlal Sharma v. South Gujarat University reported in 1982 (1) 23 GLR page 233. The following observations in the aforesaid decision were strongly relied upon:the findings of fact recorded in the course of a disciplinary inquiry unless they are collateral of jurisdictional are exempt from judicial review and the Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the ultimate decision based on such findings and review it on merits. However there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First the case must not be one where there is no evidence to support the findings. However there are two well-known exceptions to the said rule. First the case must not be one where there is no evidence to support the findings. Secondly the ultimate decision based on such findings must not be preserve or unreasonable. The following further observations on no evidence rule were also pressed in service. They are as under:the no evidence rule has the same content and meaning in our country as in England. `no evidence does not merely signify total dearth of evidence; evidence which does not reasonably support the conclusion is also comprehended within the meaning of the said expression. In other words cases where there is complete lack of evidence and cases where the evidence if any is incapable of rationally leading to the conclusion reached are both treated on a par so far the applicability of the rule of no evidence is concerned. Mere suspicion even if honestly and bona fide entertained on the basis of apparently cogent circumstances is held to be out of bounds even in domestic inquires where the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished is found to apply as much as it applied to regular criminal trials. In the ultimate analysis the test which must be applied is whether there is some material capable of having any evidential value. If not the case must be held to fall within the mischief of the rule of no evidence. ( 6 ) WE may at this stage also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Shree Rama Rao reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1723:there is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied and if that rule be not applied the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Further important observations are:where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Art. 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. ( 7 ) IN the light of this settled legal position we have to examine the contention canvassed by Mr. Mehta learned Counsel for the appellant that the finding reached by the departmental authorities against the petitioner delinquent are based on no evidence. It must be kept in view that the charge against the petitioner was that on 23-2-78 he got loaded 15 production tubings of 2 dia costing Rs. 8 0 on a private hand cart from the P. T. Y. S. Naika without informing the production section to which the tubings belonged under a false gate pass No. 56034 unauthorisedly and made false entries in the gate pass showing that the said tubings were taken to G. G. S. II for the purpose of use in Heater Treater there. He falsely represented that he was in possession of a `release chit for 15 Nos. of 2 diameter tubing and would hand over the said release chit to Shri Thomi production Operator after the loading vas over. When asked for the release chit after the loading was over he did not hand over the same and instead falsely stated that he had been permitted by the higher authorities to take away these tubings. In act no such permission was granted to him. He caused wrongful loss for the Commission as the aforesaid tubings were neither required at GGS 1 nor were taken there. Those tubings were not used in the work to which they were claimed to have been taken by Shri Panickar (petitioner herein ). In act no such permission was granted to him. He caused wrongful loss for the Commission as the aforesaid tubings were neither required at GGS 1 nor were taken there. Those tubings were not used in the work to which they were claimed to have been taken by Shri Panickar (petitioner herein ). ( 8 ) THE aforesaid charge therefore clearly indicates that the petitioner had illegally removed 15 production tubings on 23-2-78 from the P. T. Y. S. Naika and had misappropriated them and in fact they were not taken to the GGS-II for the purpose of Heater Treater Plant there. So far as this charge is concerned a full-fledged departmental enquiry was conducted and the petitioner was also permitted to have his full say in the matter. Number of witnesses were examined by the department in support of its case and ultimately the enquiry officer after hearing both the sides fully made his report. It is interesting to note that so far as the removal of 15 tubings under false gate pass by the petitioner on 23-12-78 is concerned petitioner himself in his reply dated 26/02/1979 addressed to the Officer on Special Duty Oil and Natural Gas Commission Tel Bhavan Dehradun being Enquiry Officer Annexure C to the petition admitted the fact as under:those 15 Nos. (104 Mts. approximately) were issued to the contractor Shri Shankarbhai (P. W. No. 20) on 23-2-78 vide gate pass No. 56034 and a receipt for these pipes have been obtained from him in my personal diary. ( 9 ) THIS means that the removal of 15 tubings on 23-2-78 under gate pass No. 56034 is admittedly by the petitioner before the enquiry officer. Apart from the admission of the petitioner the enquiry officer has also found in para 5. 1 of his report that there is no denial of the fact that 15 Nos. 2 dia production tubings were taken out of P. T. Y. S. Naika by Shri Panickar on 23-2-78 and this is also documentarily established from gate pass No. 56034 dated 23-2-78 filed at page 13 of ex S. 2 which bears signature of the petitioner both as Store Keeper and an Indentors agent acknowledging the receipt of the material. 2 dia production tubings were taken out of P. T. Y. S. Naika by Shri Panickar on 23-2-78 and this is also documentarily established from gate pass No. 56034 dated 23-2-78 filed at page 13 of ex S. 2 which bears signature of the petitioner both as Store Keeper and an Indentors agent acknowledging the receipt of the material. Now the question remains whether these 15 tubings which were admittedly removed by the petitioner on 23- 8 under gate pass No. 56034 from the production section were actually utilised by him in the Heater Treater Plant or not. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned the enquiry officer relying upon the evidence of Contractor Manjibbai Maljibhai Patel S W. 6 and evidence of his representative Shankarbhai Dhulabhai Patel S. W. 4 has reached the conclusion that no tubings from Navagam were received at Heater Treater Plant after December 1977 and that the work of 2 pipeline for heater treater was completed on 24-2-78 when the last 10 m piece was welded. The enquiry officer has also believed the evidence of these witnesses and concluded that the laying work of 2 pipe line for heater treater at GGS-II was completed by 20-2-78 except 10 metres length for want of gas cylinders even though the pipe/tubings for the remaining length were available with the contractor. This finding is recorded in para 5 3. 2 of the enquiry report annexure D to the petition. This finding his been accepted by the disciplinary authority in the removal order at Annexure I. It becomes obvious therefore that if laying of 2 diameter pipe line in Heater Treater Plant was completed by 20/02/1978 and then only welding work of 10 metres remained the removal of 15 tubings on 23-2-78 by the petitioner could not have been for the purpose of utilising them in the heater treater plant as the work in the plant of laying pipe line of 2 diameter pipe was already over on 20/02/1978 Consequently the only inference which legitimately can be drawn is that under a pretext that is tubings were required to be laid in heater treater plant on 23/02/1978 the petitioner had removed the same from the production depot. Once it remain admitted that the petitioner had removed 15 tubings on 23/02/1978 and the same are not utilised in the Heater Treater Plant the legitimate inference necessarily follows that the petitioner removed 15 tubings on 23-2-1978 and misappropriated them. He has not been able to point out before the enquiry officer that these tubings were utilised by him in Heater Treater plant at any time on 23-2-78 when he removed them from the production depot under the gate pass. Therefore the enquiry officer was justified in reaching a finding that the petitioner had removed 15 tubings on 23/02/1978 under a false pretext from the depot and had misappropriated them. No fault can be found with the disciplinary authority when it confirmed this finding agreeing with the reasoning of the enquiry officer. When such Convincing evidence is on record it cannot be said that the finding reached by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority to the effect that the petitioner has misappropriated 15 tubings on 23/02/1978 was based on no evidence. On the contrary we final this evidence to be of overwhelming nature and was sufficient to bring home the charge to the petitioner. Instead of being a case of no evidence it appears to be a case of complete evidence against the petitioner. Mr. Mehta submitted that the finding reached by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority is based on appreciation of evidence of witnesses Shri Bhagwanbhai Shankerbhai Patel and Shri Shankerbhai Dhulabhai Patel but their evidence is not believable and it does not stand close scrutiny. The enquiry officer has accepted the evidence of Shankerbhai Dhulabhai Patel S. W. 4 whose signature was obtained by the petitioner in his green diary (Ex. 59) for alleged issuance of 15 nos. of tubings to him. He stated in his deposition that the petitioner had taken signature by misrepresenting to him that he was obtaining his acknowledgment for 10 nos. of tubings which he had taken alongwith Bhagwanbhai S. W. 7 in December 1977. He stated that his signature was taken sometime during monsoon of 1978 by the petitioner when SW-4 was working at Cambay and that he was forced to sign despite his protest that he had no authority to receive material and only Bhagwanbhai SW-7 could do it. That witness No. 4 denied having received 15 nos. of tubings on or after 23-2-78. That witness No. 4 denied having received 15 nos. of tubings on or after 23-2-78. This version was accepted by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority. Whether to believe a witness or not is within the realm of appreciation of evidence and when the appropriate authority accepted the evidence of Shri Shankerbhai Dhulabhai Patel we cannot reappreciate and hold that these witnesses are not believable. We cannot reappreciate this evidence and reach a contrary finding in the present proceedings as we are not a Court of appeal against disciplinary authoritys decision. Even otherwise we have not the slightest doubt that we ourselves would have reached the same conclusion on such type of evidence. The first contention canvassed by Mr. Mehta to the effect that the finding is based on no evidence therefore fails and will stand rejected ( 10 ) NOW we shall deal with the second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that in any case when the enquiry officer has found that 10 tubings which were found utilised in the Heater Treater Plant belong to 1977 December batch the petitioner could not have been made to suffer on the basis of that finding as he was already punished for having misappropriated 10 tubings in December 1977 That order had become final and consequently it was not open to the authorities to go behind said finding in the present proceedings. So far as this contention is concerned it must be noted that it was not raised before the learned single Judge in these terms. Therefore strictly speaking such a new contention revolving around a question of fact cannot be permitted to be raised before us in this appeal. However assuming that this contention is covered by the general contention that findings reached by the enquiry officer and as confirmed by the disciplinary authority were based on no evidence and hence we can entertain the same we do not find any substance in the said contention as we will presently show. It is true that the petitioner was earlier chargesheeted for the incident of 30/12/1977 for having unauthorisedly removed 10 Nos. of production tubings of 2 diameter costing about Rs. 4 0 by getting them loaded in a private hand-cart without informing the production section to whom the tubings belong. It is true that the petitioner was earlier chargesheeted for the incident of 30/12/1977 for having unauthorisedly removed 10 Nos. of production tubings of 2 diameter costing about Rs. 4 0 by getting them loaded in a private hand-cart without informing the production section to whom the tubings belong. He was further charged that he fraudulently despatched the aforesaid tubings from the O N. G. C. Naika by preparing a false gate pass No. 56022 dated 30-12-1977 to show as if he was sending 10 pipeline markers and not the tubings to the low lines for official work and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Commission to the tune of Rs. 4 0 A copy of this earlier chargesheet is produced along with the memo of Letters Patent Appeal. Ms. Shah learned Counsel appearing for the respondents had no objection to looking into the said charge-sheet. It is also not in dispute that in the light of an earlier chargesheet the enquiry was held and by order dated 1-9-1981 the disciplinary authority had decided to impose a penalty of recovery of loss of Rs. 4 0 on the basis of that the charge was proved against the petitioner. A copy of the said order 1-9-1981 is also produced alongwith the memo of LPA. There is no dispute on this aspect. It may be noted that the petitioner had challenged the aforesaid order of the disciplinary authority imposing the penalty of recovery of Rs. 4 0 from the petitioner in connection with the 30-12-1977 incident by filing a Special Civil Application No. 993 of 1982 in this Court. This petition was ordered to be heard alongwith this Letters Patent Appeal. However Mr. Anand learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in the Spl. C. A. on instruction of the petitioner who was present in the Court withdrew the Spl. C. A. Consequently the aforesaid order of penalty imposed against the petitioner for unauthorised removal 10 tubings on 30/12/1977 under false gate pass No. 56022 has become final. In the light of this factual position Mr. Mehta highlighted his second contention. He invited our attention to the report of the enquiry officer in the present case. In report at para 5. 33 the enquiry officer has stated the evidence of contractor Manjibhai Patel witness No. 6. He stated before the enquiry officer that he was issued 153. In the light of this factual position Mr. Mehta highlighted his second contention. He invited our attention to the report of the enquiry officer in the present case. In report at para 5. 33 the enquiry officer has stated the evidence of contractor Manjibhai Patel witness No. 6. He stated before the enquiry officer that he was issued 153. 82 meter of pipes on 23-12-1977 from Ahmedabad store and 10 Nos. of tubings from Navagam store on 30-12-1977 against the 2 pipe line work. He denied any further receipt of 2 tubings. He also stated that he authorised only his representative Shri Bhagwanbhai Shankerbhai Patel SW 7 to draw materials from the department on his behalf and none else. Shri Bhagwanbhai SW 7 after consulting his red small diary confirmed receipt of about 153. 82 m. of 2 pipe on 23-12-1977 from Ahmedabad Store and 10 Nos. of 2 diameter tubings on 30-12-1977 from Naika Navagam Store and no further receipts. ( 11 ) PLACING reliance on this evidence the enquiry officer in para 5. 3 reached the conclusion to the following effect:from the evidence as discussed above only inference that can be drawn is that Shri Panicker removed 10 Nos. of tubings on 30-12-1977 from the PTYS showing those as pipeline markers and issued those to the work of Heater Treater at GGS-II but 15 Nos. of tubes which were removed from PTYS/naika on 23-2-1978 did not reach the site nor those were required for the work at that stage and have apparently been misappropriated. This finding reached by the enquiry officer has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and on that basis the removal order has been passed. Mr. Mehta submitted in this connection that there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioner removed 10 tubings on 30-12-77 from PTYS showing those as pipeline markers any had issued those to the work at Heater Treater Plant and GGS-II. He submitted that the respondents had earlier enquired into the incident of 30-12-77 and reached the conclusion to the effect that the petitioner was guilty for incident of December 1977 meaning thereby he had not utilised those tubings for Heater Treater Plant. He submitted that the respondents had earlier enquired into the incident of 30-12-77 and reached the conclusion to the effect that the petitioner was guilty for incident of December 1977 meaning thereby he had not utilised those tubings for Heater Treater Plant. This finding in the earlier departmental proceedings is binding between the parties and the present finding that the petitioner had removed 10 tubings on 30-12-77 and issued to the work of Heater Treater Plant must be treated as based on no evidence. So far as this objection is concerned it must be stated that the finding as reached by the enquiry officer that 10 tubings were removed on 30 by the petitioner and they were issued for work of Heater Treater Plant by him is found to be based on sufficient evidence in the shape of the oral version of contractor Manjibhai Patel SW-6 and the evidence of Shri Bhagwanbhai SW-7 as shown by us above. Therefore it cannot be said that this finding is based on no evidence as submitted by Mr. Mehta. His objection that such finding cannot be reached by the enquiry officer in the present proceedings and they are bound by the earlier finding inter parties cannot stand for the simple reason that even though in earlier proceedings the petitioner was found to have caused loss of Rs. 4 0 to the management on account of removal of 10 tubings on 30-12-77 on the basis of evidence in the present case which are independent proceedings and which pertain entirely to the incident of 23-2 78 it was perfectly open to the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority to reach their own conclusions on the evidence in the present enquiry. If in the light of the present finding the earlier punishment imposed on the petitioner is found to be vulnerable the remedy of petitioner would lie in challenging the finding reached in the earlier proceedings and to submit that those findings in view of the subsequent findings bad become unsustainable. It is to be kept in view that the petitioner thought it fit to give up his challenge to the earlier order of penalty imposed upon him by the disciplinary authority for having misappropriated 10 tubings on 30-12-77. It is to be kept in view that the petitioner thought it fit to give up his challenge to the earlier order of penalty imposed upon him by the disciplinary authority for having misappropriated 10 tubings on 30-12-77. Now in the present proceedings if it is found that on 30/12/1977 the petitioner had utilised this 10 tubings for the Heater Treater Plant the earlier penalty order may be required to be reviewed or reconsidered. For that purpose the petitioner may have his remedy but he thought it fit to acquiesce in the earlier penalty order. So far as the present proceedings are concerned the finding reached by the disciplinary authority as aforesaid cannot be said to be unauthorised or based on no evidence as submitted by Mr. Mehta. Even otherwise it is also pertinent to note that the finding reached by the enquiry officer at para 5. 3. 8 is not to the effect that the 10 tubings which were removed by the petitioner on 30-12-77 and were issued to work on Heater Treater Plant GGS-II were actually utilized there. Consequently it cannot be held that out of the 15 tubings admittedly removed by the petitioner on 23-2-78 10 tubings were actually utilised on 30-12-77 for the Heater Treater Plant. It is also obvious that such a finding is impossible for the simple reason that tubings removed after about two months could not have been retrospectively utilised for the said plant in December 1977 There is no evidence which can be pointed out to show that these tubings were utilised by the petitioner for Heater Treater Plant at any time after 23-2-78 Consequently it cannot be held even if it is open to Mr. Mehta to so canvass that the enquiry officer would not have reached the finding on the evidence on record that 10 tubings which were found utilised in Heater Treater plant were referable to removal of the tubings on 30-12-77 from the production depot. They had nothing to do with the present 15 tubings removed by the petitioner under a false gate pass on 23-2-78 with which the petitioner was concerned in the present proceedings. Their illegal removal has been found to be proved on overwhelming evidence as seen above. The second contention therefore also fails. ( 12 ) THIS takes us to last contention raised by Mr. Mehta. Their illegal removal has been found to be proved on overwhelming evidence as seen above. The second contention therefore also fails. ( 12 ) THIS takes us to last contention raised by Mr. Mehta. He submitted that in any case the appellate order Annexure L dated 21 is not a speaking order. Therefore it should be quashed. So far as this submission is concerned it must be kept in view that in the petition before the learned single Judge the appellate order was not brought in challenge. The main prayers before the learned single Judge in the Special Civil Application at para 25 (A) and (B) read as under: (A) quashing and setting aside the termination of the petitioner vide order dt. 14-10-1982 (B) declaring that the order dated 14-10-1982 terminating the services of the petitioner is bad in law illegal and unjustified and is set aside and quashed. It is therefore obvious that before the learned single Judge only the order dated 14-10-82 was brought in challenge. From the first line of the judgment of the learned single Judge it is revealed that the actual challenge before him was to the order dated 14-10-82. Consequently it must be held that the challenge to the appellate order on the ground that it is not a speaking order is a new challenge which is sought to to be raised before us for the first time at this stage of Letters Patent Appeal. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the memo of appeal the said contention is stated in the present form. This obviously is a new point which even does not flow from the prayer clause of the petition as seen above. It is therefore not open to the petitioner to canvass such a contention for the first time before us It is also to be kept in view that if such contention would have been canvassed before the learned single Judge the respondents could have pointed out as to whether the appellate order which was communicated to the petitioner a copy produced as Annexure L is the complete order or whether the appellate authority had recorded any detailed reasons in the file while issuing the copy of the order to the petitioner. In short the contention which has been canvassed for the first time before us is not a Pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. As it was not earlier raised before the learned single Judge the respondent naturally could not get any opportunity to point out as to what type of order was recorded by the appellate authority. Consequently such a contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before us. ( 13 ) EVEN on merits there is no substance in this contention. It is to be kept in view that the enquiry officer in an elaborate report having considered the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the charge against the petitioner was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The disciplinary authority by its order which is also an elaborate order gave various reasons for accepting the finding of the enquiry officer and then passed the impugned order of the removal. That order is sufficiently speaking. The appellate authority merely confirmed all the findings of the disciplinary authority which had in its turn accepted the findings of the enquiry officer. Therefore the appellate authority was not required to write a detailed order agreeing with the findings reached by the disciplinary authority. The appellate order which is alleged to be non-speaking reads as under: order: the undersinged has carefully considered the appeal dated 1/12/1982 preferred by Shri P. R. S. Panickar Asst. Executive Engineer (C and M) ONGC against the order of punishment of removal from service passed by Member (On shore) vide order dated 14-10-1982 and finds that the charge in regard to misappropriation of 15 Nos. of tubings levelled against him vide Memorandum of even number dated 13/02/1979 stands proved. The charge has been established by the Inquiry Officer after considering the documentary as well as oral evidences adduced during the course of inquiry. Further the evidence clearly establishes that the Production Tubings were used by Production Units and none else. 1 after taking into consideration all facts and circumstances of the case do not find any reason to interfere with the order already passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The appeal is rejected. Further the evidence clearly establishes that the Production Tubings were used by Production Units and none else. 1 after taking into consideration all facts and circumstances of the case do not find any reason to interfere with the order already passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The appeal is rejected. ( 14 ) IT is true that the said order is not an elaborate one but it is order confirming the finding reached by the enquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority. The appellate order cannot be said to be totally laconic or not assigning any reasons whatsoever as submitted by Mr. Mehta learned Counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Mehta in support of his contention invited our attention to a decision of the learned single Judge in this Court reported in GLT 1979 page 281. In the said decision P D. Desai J. by his judgment rendered on 2/08/1979 5/09/1979 allowed the Special Civil Application No. 2214 of 1979 on the ground that the appellate order in that case was not a speaking one and it was completely laconic. ( 15 ) IN our view the said decision rendered on the facts of that case cannot be on any assistance on the facts of the present case. We find that in the present case the appellate order cannot said to be not discussing any reasons whatsoever. It sufficiently speaks and indicates the application of mind by the appellate authority on the controversies between the parties. In this connection we may also profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras v. Srinivasan reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1827. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Gajendragadkar C. J. made the following observations in connection with the question as to how the disciplinary order should speak:in dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory en the State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer it is to be remembered that the disciplinary proceedings against such a deliquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. That inquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. That inquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also it is unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons as to why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable that when the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer it should give reasons as to why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal though even in such a case it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate. ( 16 ) IN another decision the Supreme Court in the case of Tara Chand v. Desai Municipality reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 567 speaking through Jaswant Singh J. made the following observation : While it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations office by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment of the rules made thereunder it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. I cannot also be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. ( 17 ) IN the light of the above settled legal position if the disciplinary authority itself is not required to record any elaborate reasons while agreeing with the report of the enquiry officer it is too much to submit that after disciplinary authority has recorded elaborate reasons while agreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer in appeal against that decision the appellate authority while confirming that order should write a detailed order containing reasoning as a judgment. In the facts of the present case therefore it cannot be said that the order of the appellate authority is vitiated because it is not as elaborate as Mr. In the facts of the present case therefore it cannot be said that the order of the appellate authority is vitiated because it is not as elaborate as Mr. Mehta would like to have it or that it is in any away a non-speaking order. The last contention canvassed by Mr. Mehta fails. Appeal dismissed. .