GUMAM MAL LODHA, J.—This is a civil revision against the order dated 20.1.82 passed by Civil Judge, Ajmer, in Civil Suit No. 53/81. 2. Mr. Sorals contention is that in a suit under Order 37 Rule 1 and 2 C. P. C, once the court comes to the conclusion that the issues raised by defence were triable and there was no finding of malafide or the defence being frivolous, then the court could not impose the condition of surety for permitting the defendant to defend the case. According to Mr. Soral this principle has been laid down in M/s. Mechalec Engineers & Manufacturers Vs. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation (1). 3. Mr. Rastogi has raised many points. His first contention is that the suit has been decreed and the revision petition has become infructuous. In reply to it is Mr. Soral has referred to the judgment of Delhi High Court in Siri Kirshan Bardwaj Vs. Manohar Lal Gupta (2) in which it has been held that once the earlier order falls then the latter order must also fall and the decree would automatically be set aside. 4. Mr. Rastogis contention is that the trial court has not held that the suit is triable, that the defence raises the triable issues and further that no revision can be entertained. 5. Mr. Rastogi has pointed out that after the passing of the impugned order, decree has been passed and therefore, the impugned order has merged into the decree. Since the decree is appealable this revision petition cannot be entertained nor because it will have effect of, in case of acceptance, setting aside the decree. 6. In support of his contention he further submits even otherwise after amendment of Section 115 C.P.C. new section bars filing of revision because appeal lies in clause (2). In support of this proposition he relied on S. Amrik Singh Vs. S Jagjit Singh (3) and Ramchand Vs. Laxmi Kumar (4). 7. Mr. Soral on the contrary relied upon the decision of Siri Krishan Bardwarj Vs. Manohar Lal Gupta (supra), Fatehlal Vs. Sunder Lal (5), K.S. Minakshi Vs. M. Subbalakshmi (6) and Yakub Ali Vs. Firj Haji Taji Khanji Ibrahimji (7). 8. I have given a very serious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contention of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the relevant record referred by the learned counsel during their arguments. Manohar Lal Gupta (supra), Fatehlal Vs. Sunder Lal (5), K.S. Minakshi Vs. M. Subbalakshmi (6) and Yakub Ali Vs. Firj Haji Taji Khanji Ibrahimji (7). 8. I have given a very serious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contention of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the relevant record referred by the learned counsel during their arguments. In my opinion firstly I must consider and appreciate while directing a party to produce surety or Bank guarantee is whether there are triable issues which arises for adjudication. The following principles have been laid down in M/s. Mcchalec Engineers and Manufacturers vs. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation (supra): "If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to the claim on its merits the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bonafide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defence the plaintiff is not entitled to unconditional leave to defend. If the defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, that is to say, although the affidavit does not positively and immediately make it clear that he has a defence, yet shows such a state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiffs claim, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment and the defendant is entitled to leave to defend but in above case the court may in its discretion impose conditions as to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into court or furnishing security. If the defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. If the defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. If the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment the court may protect the plaintiff by only allowing the defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into court or otherwise secured and give leave to the defendant on such condition, and thereby show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence. 9. It is only when clause (e) applies that conditional order like the present one can be given. 10. Unfortunately in the instant case the impugned order only says that the defendant has not denied the execution of promissory note and taken certain grounds of law. Then it directs for production of security and reasons for giving security is then given. That there is a denial of promissory note and the application of Money Lenders Act will have to be seen because the pronote contained the amount for business and taking a loan for business. In my considered opinion that was required by the lower court to ascertain at this stage was whether the case falls in the category (e) and the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine. Mr. Rastogi pointed out that incase of promissory note Money Lenders Act has got no application. If that is held to be so the defence become illusory because there is no other legal defence taken by the party. 11. That being so, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment suffers from a serious error of jurisdiction because the first and foremost requirement for consideration of directing security or permitting defendant to defend without security depends upon the prima facie adjudication of condition laid down above. It was the duty of the trial court to first decide whether there is a triable issue and the defendant has got reasonable bonofide defence. Grant of leave to defend on condition or unconditional would depend upon the finding whether the case fall in the case of category (a) (b) (c) (d) or (e) of Mechalec. Engineering and Manufacturers Vs. Basic Equipment Corporation (supra judgment). Grant of leave to defend on condition or unconditional would depend upon the finding whether the case fall in the case of category (a) (b) (c) (d) or (e) of Mechalec. Engineering and Manufacturers Vs. Basic Equipment Corporation (supra judgment). That finding having not been given I have get no doubt that the case deserves to be remanded on this short point and the trial court should apply its mind afresh and decide it according the principles laid down in the above case. 12. If the trial court decides that the case falls in category (a) (b) then unconditional leave is to be granted. If it falls in the category (e) then condition as to time or mode of trial only can be imposed. If it falls in category (d) then no defence can be allowed so the leave cannot be granted if it falls in category (e) then leave to defend can be granted on conditions. 13. Mr. Rastogis contention is that in view of clause (2) of the amendment proviso of section 115 C.P.C. since a decree has been passed in the present case and reversal of the judgment would result indirectly reversing the decree or decree against which an appeal lies, no interference can be made now deserves consideration. 14. There is no doubt that no appeal lies from the impugned order is the present case because by this order only leave to defend has been granted and nothing more. Neither the suit has been decreed nor dismissed. Sub clause (2) bars jurisdiction and is to be considered stringently. That being so by indirect process I cannot construe it to mean though the impugned judgment is not appealable yet the effect of it being setting aside the decree passed in a case which is appealable and therefore, sub clause (2) would apply, cannot be accepted. This would be by indirect process and according to well established cannons of interpretation of statutes, provisions like this should be interpreted in its plain sense without resort to any indirect method of interpretation. What would be the consequence of reversal on the decree which has been passed is a different matter and it may be that while we accept the Delhi view and Andhra Pradesh view that decree would also be set aside automatically. 15. What would be the consequence of reversal on the decree which has been passed is a different matter and it may be that while we accept the Delhi view and Andhra Pradesh view that decree would also be set aside automatically. 15. Be that as it may I am convinced that the entertainment of the revision cannot be a bar on account of sub-clause (2) of the amendment section 115 of C.P.C. 16. Now coming to Delhi case Shri Kishan Bhardwaj Vs. Manohar Lal Gupta (supra) the Division Bench consisting of Prakash Narain and Pritam Singh Safeer JJ, have squarely held that section 115 C.P.C. would apply, pare 8 of the above judgment reads as under:- "Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that as order like the one in question is analogous to an order passed under O. 23 R. 3, C.P.C. and, therefore, a revision petition would lie as of right. He further submits that a revision is entertained by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction and just as an appeal is a procedural remedy, so is a revision petition. The contention is that if a statute has provided a remedy it must be correlated to a right. The High Court, it is submitted, has or modify the judgment or decree or order. Similarly, the High Court has power in its revisional jurisdiction to rectify an error, if it falls without Cls. (a) or (b) or (c) of S. 115 (1), C.P.C. Thus, it is the right of a litigant, it is submitted, to bring the error to the notice of the High Court which then exercises its power. In short, the argument is that a litigant has a right to file a revision petition or has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court either by way of an appeal or revision petition and the High Court is under duty to exercise the power conferred upon it and interfere if the circumstances so warrant." 17. In short, the argument is that a litigant has a right to file a revision petition or has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court either by way of an appeal or revision petition and the High Court is under duty to exercise the power conferred upon it and interfere if the circumstances so warrant." 17. The legal position that the decree passed in the present case would automatically set aside the impugned order is clinched in para 15 of the above judgment which reads as under:- "It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that there is one other important reason why it should be held that in a case like the present one a revision is not competent and the petitioners only remedy is to file an appeal against the decree. This remains effective till set aside and so, revising the order by which leave to appear and defend has been refused would be an exercise in futility, because the decree will still subsist. There is a fallacy in this contention. When leave is refused to the defendant to appear and defend a suit-under S. 37, C. P. C, the effect of the refusal of leave to appear and defend is that the allegations in the plaint by a deeming provision, stand admitted. The allegations in the plaint being admitted a decree has to follow. This means that the decree lies order of refusal to grant leave to appear and defend. In my opinion when a subsequent order, even if it be a decree is a consequential order to an earlier order and the earlier order is set aside the latter order must also fall and directions to that effect have to be given. In Rangiah Vs. Peddireddi, AIR 1957 Andhra-Pradesh, 330, Subb Rao, C. J, (as his Lordships then was) following the dicta of the Privy Council in Sharma Parshd Ray Chowdry vs. Hurro Moo Ind App 203 (PC) observed "it is a well settled principle of law that certain orders and decrees which are subordinate and dependent, upon earlier orders and decrees could only remain in force so long as the orders or decrees on which they were dependent are not reversed or superseded". N. Andley, C. J. in the Chamber of Colours and Chemicals (P) Ltd. Delhi V. Trilok Chand Jain, 1973 Delhi LT 510. N. Andley, C. J. in the Chamber of Colours and Chemicals (P) Ltd. Delhi V. Trilok Chand Jain, 1973 Delhi LT 510. His Lordship construing the effect of S. 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, observed that "it cannot be doubted that the appeal when filed was competent if as, it cannot be rendered incompetent merely because a final order has been passed, if the appeal against the order under sub-section (7) of Section 15 which may be described is an interlocutory order or even as a preliminary order succeeds the final order even if passed in the meantime will have to be suitably modified, I, therefore, held that if the impugned order is reversed or modified the consequential order or decree will also have to be modified or directions will have to be given that the same is of no effect. 18. This court has also entertained the revision is Fatehlal vs. Sunder Lal (supra) relying upon the Supreme Court decision of AIR 1977 SC 577 and AIR 1975 Gujarat 76. The Delhi High Court has referred to the decision of Andhra Pradesh in para 15 which has been extracted above. Mr. Rastogi was fair enough to submit that so far as the decisions are concerned Andhra Pradesh view and Delhi view has not been distinguished upon by any judgment of any High Court. In view of the above, I have got no hesitation in holding that the impugned order deserves to be set-aside and that the decree passed in the case would also stand set aside automatically. 19. However according to my adjudication mentioned above no unconditional leave to defend is being granted by this court. 20. It would be for the trial court to now re-hear the case on this aspect and decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree immediately or there should be any unconditional or conditional order to defend or whether conditional order permitting defence is to be granted or whether an unconditional order permitting defence under order 37 C.P.C. is required. 21. Consequently the revision petition is accepted as indicated above. The parties would bear their own costs.