MONORANJAN MALLICK, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition has been filed by the petitioner who is the accused in Case No. 1 of 1974 corresponding to R. C. No. 47/72, dated September 2, 1972 under Section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 being aggrieved by an order, dated January 31, 1986 passed by Learned 2nd Special Judge, Calcutta rejecting the petitioner's prayer for non-examination of the experts for the purpose of testifying the forging of the certain deeds which according to the petitioner, he was compelled to produce under a process issued by the Investigating Officer, during the investigation and which deeds were thus produced from him by way of testimonial compulsion and those deeds cannot, therefore, be used as evidence against him, having been produced by way of testimonial compulsion which is prohibited under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. ( 2 ) THE facts which are relevant for disposing of the matters may be stated briefly as follows: ( 3 ) ON September 2, 1972, Shri A. L. Chowdhury, Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation/special Police Establishment, Calcutta had lodged a First Information Report against the petitioner, under Section 5 (2) read with Sections 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the same was registered as Crime No R. C. 47/72, dated September, 1972. ( 4 ) IT was alleged in the said F. I. R. that the accused petitioner, an officer of Income Tax Department, during his tenure of service had acquired assets worth about Bs. 1 lakh including a plot of land situated at Dag No. 1721 and 3004 of Naba Palli, Purba Barisha in the name of his wife Smt. Rama Bose and a pucca single storied building thereon valued at about Rs. 42,000. It was further alleged that the petitioner has also accepted a gift from a party with whom he had official dealings that the aforesaid assets under the possession of the accused person are disproportionate to his known source of income suggesting the commission of an offence under Section 5 (2) read with Sections 5 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The petitioner submits that all the allegations are false and the F. I. R. has been lodged at the instance some designing and motivated person in collusion with the investigating authority with some oblique purposes. ( 5 ) THE petitioner further states and submits that his father late Sudhir Kumar Bose was a senior practising lawyer of Manickganj, District-Dacca, East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) and had a very lucrative practice there. In view of the disturbed conditions in the East Pakistan the said Sarat Kumar Bose migrated to India on 28th September, 1964 and brought cash money amounting to Rs. 2,80,800. Before coming to India the said Sarat Bose created a trust with a total amount of Rs. 2,80,800. In the said deed of trust the beneficiaries were his sons, daughter-in-law and grand-sons. On 30th November, 1964 the said Sarat Kumar Bose intimated Income Tax Department all about the bringing the said amount being the trust money on. behalf of the beneficiaries of. the said trust. All the trustees of the said trust were local people living in East Pakistan and did not migrate to India. So the said trust deed was amended on August 30,1965. By the said amendment the petitioner was appointed the Chairman of the trust and his other brothers as trustees. On April 4, 1970 the said trust was extinguished upon discharging the obligations attached to it and all the Trust monies were distributed among the beneficiaries. On April 2, 1970 the elder brother of the petitioner had filed the return of the Income of the said Sarat Kumar Trust with the Income Tax Officer, Special Survey Circle VIII, Calcutta, claiming exemption of Income Tax on Rs. 2,80,800 brought from the thin East Pakistan and the Commissioner of Income Tax granted him the necessary exemption. ( 6 ) IN course of daily interview and interrogation of the petitioner in connection with the R. C. No. 47 of 1972 the officers attached, to the Central Bureau of Investigation had started threatening and pressurizing the petitioner to produce the certain documents. Thereafter on August 18, 1973 Sri A. L. Chowdhury had issued a summons under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the petitioner to produce certain documents on August 22, 1073 in connection with Crime No. R. C. 47 of 1972, dated September 2, 1972 wherein the petitioner had been made an accused. Thereafter on August 18, 1973 Sri A. L. Chowdhury had issued a summons under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the petitioner to produce certain documents on August 22, 1073 in connection with Crime No. R. C. 47 of 1972, dated September 2, 1972 wherein the petitioner had been made an accused. In compliance with the said summons the petitioner produced on August 22, 1973 the documents, namely (1) the deed of Sarat Kumar Trust, dated March, 25, 1983; (2) Resolution, dated August, 80, 1965; (3) amended deed of Sarat Kumar Trust, dated August 30, 196k Thereafter on September 25, 197) he produced Notarial Certificate in respect of Sarat Kumar Trust, deed of declaration of Revocation of Sprat Kumar Trust and Sarat Kumar Trust account and the Investigating Officer seized all the aforesaid documents and kept them in his custody. ( 7 ) ON September 27, 1974 after completion of investigation in the aforesaid case Sri A. L. Chowdhury, Inspector of Police Central Bureau of Investigation, had filed a petition of complaint before the Ld. Addl. Judge, Special Court, Calcutta against the petitioner alleging the commission of offence under Section 5 (2) read with Sections 5 (1) (d) and (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and same was registered as Case No. 1 of 1974. ( 8 ) ON October 10, 1975 Sri A. L. Chowdhury, Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation Special Police Establishment, Calcutta, had lodged another F. I. R. giving rise to case No. 50 of 1975 under Section 1208/420/469/465/467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and others alleging that the petitioners, an officer of 1ncome Tax Department, with the object of cheating had entered into a criminal conspiracy with other accused persons and in pursuance of that object prepared forged documents, namely, a deed of Sarat Kumar Trust, a deed of amendment to the trust, fraudulently used those as genuine. In order to cover up his ill-gotten money to be disproportionates to his source, of income. In order to cover up his ill-gotten money to be disproportionates to his source, of income. It was also alleged that the petitioner had also prepared another forged deed of declaration on revocation of Sarat Kumar Trust showing final disbursement of the said trust among its beneficiaries and also used the forged deeds as a genuine to falsely show as if the money was available from Sarat Kumar Trust and same had been actually disbursed amongst its beneficiaries. It was also alleged that the petitioner induced the income tax authorities through his brother Sudhir Kumar Bose to get tax free assessment on the entire amount of Rs. 2,80,800 and thereby cheated the income tax authority and that the stamp paper on which the deed of amendment of trust and declaration of revocation of the said trust were created were printed in the Indian Security Press Nasik at much later date than those shown to have been sold by the stamp vendor and executed before the Notary Public. ( 9 ) BY an order, dated December 19, 1977 the Learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore discharged all the accused persons in R. C. No. 50 of 1975 for non-submission of report by the Investigating Officer. ( 10 ) IN connection with case No. 1 of 1974 the prosecution examined as many as 38 witnesses and various documents were exhibited before charge. The Prosecution further wanted to examine two experts on the question of genuineness of certain documents of Sarat Kumar Trust. The petitioner opposed the said prayer on the ground that as the petitioner was compelled to produce, these documents in compliance with the notice, dated August 18, 1972 under the Section 91 (old Section 94) of the Criminal Procedure Code issued by A. L. Chowdhury, Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation in connection with the investigation of R. C. No. 47 of 1972 production of such documents tentamounted to testimonial compulsion and in contravention of the immunity as provided under Section 20 (3) of the Constitution and is not admissible in evidence against the petitioner. ( 11 ) THE Ld. Judge, Addl. Special Court by his order, dated 17-8-81 allowed the prayer of the prosecution. Being aggrieved the present petitioner moved this Hon'ble Court in revision by filing a criminal revision case No. 2374 of 1981. On January 16, 1985 The Hon'ble Mr. ( 11 ) THE Ld. Judge, Addl. Special Court by his order, dated 17-8-81 allowed the prayer of the prosecution. Being aggrieved the present petitioner moved this Hon'ble Court in revision by filing a criminal revision case No. 2374 of 1981. On January 16, 1985 The Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. G. Chowdhury and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice G. C. Chatterjee set aside the order of the Ld. Judge, Addl. Special Court, Calcutta and sent the matter for re-hearing, directing the Ld. Judge Addl. Special Court, Calcutta to consider the aforesaid case in the light of the observations made in the judgment. By an order, dated January 31, 1986 Sri M. S. Ray Judge 2nd Special Court, Calcutta rejected the petitioner's prayer for non-examination of the alleged experts on testifying the genuineness or falsity of the deeds in question. ( 12 ) BEING aggrieved by the dissatisfied with the said order the present petition of revision has been filed. ( 13 ) IT is contended that the Ld. Judge misread the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 1251 , AIR 1954 SC 300 and AIR 1961 SC 1808 . It is further contended that on a formal accusation having been made by filing a complaint or instituting a FIR a person becomes accused and a compelled testimony from him is hit by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, that there was compulsion on the present petitioner for such producing evidence, that Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to an accused but when it was applied for the production of the documents by him through a summons under Section 91 Cr. P. C. it becomes testimonial compulsion and protection conferred on the petitioner by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution has been contravened. It is also contended that the Ld. Judge should have held that the evidence furnished by the Trust Deed, Deed amending the trust and declaration of Revocation of the Trust are inadmissible in evidence and consequently the Ld. Judge should be refrained from calling the experts to prove documents which are inadmissible in the trial. It is further contended that the Ld. Judge failed to consider that the petitioner was an accused when the documents were produced by testimonial compulsion and the Ld. Judge should be refrained from calling the experts to prove documents which are inadmissible in the trial. It is further contended that the Ld. Judge failed to consider that the petitioner was an accused when the documents were produced by testimonial compulsion and the Ld. Judge has failed to appreciate that Article 20 (3) of the Constitution consists of three components namely, (1) it is a right pertaining to a person accused of an offence; (2) it is a protection against compulsion resulting in his giving evidence against himself and (3) it is a protection against much compulsion remitting it by giving evidence against himself and that the Ld. Judge Special Court illegally held that there was no compulsion on the present petitioner to produce the document. He has also failed to appreciate that guarantee under Article 20 (8) of the Constitution would be available to a person against whom a First Information, Report has been recorded as accused therein and would extend to any compulsion by process for production of any evidentiary documents. ( 14 ) THE revision petition is resisted by the State. Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee Senior Standing Counsel appearing with Mr. A. K. Pal Advocate has urged that the order of the Ld. Judge, Special Court is quite proper, that the documents which were sought by the Investigating Officer to be examined by the Experts though produced by the present petitioner did not attract under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution because the petitioner produced them voluntarily, that no complaint was made against him at the stage when they were produced and that the none of those documents was executed by him and consequently there can be no bar for admitting the said documents into evidence against him at the trial and for examining the genuineness of those documents by the Govt. Experts. ( 15 ) THE main paint for consideration in this revision petition is whether the documents which were produced by the present petitioner on the basis of the summonses issued by the Investigating Officer attracted the prohibition under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution and whether those documents could be tendered as evidence in the trial or not. ( 16 ) ON the basis of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court by the order dated 3. 6-1-85, the Ld. ( 16 ) ON the basis of the directions issued by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court by the order dated 3. 6-1-85, the Ld. Judge Special Court raised the following 5 (five) points for determination - (1) Whether the documents in question which the prosecution wants to put in evidence by examination of Experts are relevant in view of the accusation against the accused person. (2) If relevant, it is necessary to examine the documents to find out if they contain statements made by the accused indicative of a violational act on his part sufficient to incriminate him and if they conveyed his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him. (3) To find out when the documents under consideration were brought into existence and if at that time, the accused stood in the character of an accused person. (4) To consider further whether the documents could said to have been produced under compulsion. (5) To consider finally if production of such documents was barred by the guarantee given under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. ( 17 ) REGARDING the first point the finding of the Special Judge is that the documents in question are relevant in the case in view of the accusation against the accused petitioner. ( 18 ) AS regard this finding, Mr. Roy does not raise any dispute. He does not deny that those documents may be relevant in the trial against the accused petitioner. ( 19 ) AS regard the point No. 2 the finding of the Judge Special Court is that Deed of Trust and Deed of Amendment of the Trust did not contain any statement of the accused petitioner and so far as the Deed of declaration on revocation of Sarat Kumar Trust is concerned, the Deed does not also contain, any statement of the accused petition conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him. ( 20 ) AS the regards the third point the Ld. Judge Special Court has found that the FIR in R. C. Case No. 47 of 1972 was filed on 2-9-72 and the petition of complaint was filed in Court on 13-9-74 and the documents were produced prior to the filing of the petition of complaint and consequently when the documents were produced the present petitioner did not answer the character of an accused. Regarding the fourth point the Ld. Regarding the fourth point the Ld. Judge has held that there was no compulsion of the present petitioner to produce the documents and the petitioner had no obligation under the law to produce the document which he was asked to produce pursuant to the notice under Section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In view of the above the Ld. Judge Special Court has held the production of the documents in question is not barred by the guarantee under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. So he dismissed the petition filed by present petitioner for not allowing the prosecution to examine the expert for examining if the documents in question were forged or not. ( 21 ) MR. Roy has challenged the findings of the point 2 to 5 and has raised 3 points namely (1) as soon as the FIR has been lodged against the petitioner he shall be treated an accused person for the purpose of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, (2) the documents which were produced by the present petitioner on the basis of summonses issued by the investigation officer during the investigation of the case must be held to have been produced under compulsion and therefore, such production is the result of testimonial compulsion, (3) as to whether the petitioner was the author of the documents or not, is not material and as soon as it is found that the document were procured from the accused by compulsion then the protection under Article 29 (3) is attracted and such documents cannot be used in evidence as having been procured by the testimonial compulsion. ( 22 ) MR. Chatterjee appearing or behalf of one State opposed all three points raised by Mr. Roy. ( 23 ) THE first point for decision is whether the petitioner answers the description of the accused in this case because when the investigating officer summoned him to produce the disputed documents and he produced them firstly on August 22, 1978 and then on September 25, 1973 no formal complaint was lodged against him. It is an admitted fact that FIR was lodged against the present petitioner by the investigating officer on September 22, 1972 under Section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and R. C. Case No. 47/72 has been started and the investigating officer started the investigation. It is an admitted fact that FIR was lodged against the present petitioner by the investigating officer on September 22, 1972 under Section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and R. C. Case No. 47/72 has been started and the investigating officer started the investigation. It is in course of investigation the summonses under Section, 94 of the Old Code was issued to produce the three disputed documents along with other documents and they were produced on 22nd August, 1973 and on 25th September, 1973. It is true that a formal complaint was filed before the Ld. Judge Special Court, Calcutta against the petitioner on September 27, 1974 after completion of investigation. But a case in Special Court is started on the basis of the complaint instead of submitting a charge-sheet. The petition of complaint was filed before the Ld. Judge Special Court after the documents were produced. But there can be no doubt the investigation was started on the basis of the FIR lodged on September 22, 1972. The Supreme Court has held that a person can be called an accused for the purpose of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution as soon as FIR is lodged against him in respect of the offence before an officer competent to investigate the offence or when the complaint is made before a Magistrate competent to try the case. Reference may be made the following decisions of Supreme Court, namely, Narayanlal v. Naneck Phiroz Mistry AIR 1961 SC 29 and Ramesh v. State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 940 . In R. R. Shaw v. D. K. Guha AIR 1973 SC 1196 the Supreme Court has clarified the position further by holding that the person named in the FIR or petition of complaint would be a person accused of offence even though no summons was issued against him. Thus, I am convinced that when the summonses were issued against the present petitioner for production of the disputed documents, he was a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. Secondly, Mr. Thus, I am convinced that when the summonses were issued against the present petitioner for production of the disputed documents, he was a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. Secondly, Mr. Roy argues that when the Investigating Officer issued summons against the petitioner he could not disobey it because for such disobedience he could be prosecuted before a criminal court and so there was an element of compulsion when the summonses were issued under Section 94 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code. On behalf of the opposite party it is, contended that the accused did not have any ob1igation, to produce the documents because the person 'mentioned' in Section 94 of the old Cr. P. C. corresponding to Section 91 of the New Code has been held by the Supreme Court not to apply to an accused person. It is, therefore, contended by Mr. Chatterjee that when the investigating officer issued the summons the petitioner could have disobeyed it and for such disobedience he could not be prosecuted as the police officer did not have legal authority to ask the petitioner to produce the documents. So according to Mr. Chatterjee the production was voluntary and in that view of the matter Article 20 (3) of the Constitution is not, attracted to voluntary statement of the accused. Reference may be made to the Delhi High Court decision in Chandra Verma v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 1974 Criminal Law Journal page 1474. ( 24 ) IN State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal AIR 1965 SC 1251 The Supreme Court has held that Section 94 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable to an accused person and therefore, Court cannot summon a person accused of an offence to produce a document or a thing in his possession. The police officer also cannot summon a person accused of an offence to produce any document or any other thing. This is principle laid down in the above decision. Therefore, it is clear that when the summons was issued upon present petitioner he could have legitimately refused to obey the summons. The petitioner in the revision petition has pot indicated that at about the time when the summons was issued the investigating police officer used any threat either orally or in writing that if he did not obey the summons he would to be criminally prosecuted. The petitioner in the revision petition has pot indicated that at about the time when the summons was issued the investigating police officer used any threat either orally or in writing that if he did not obey the summons he would to be criminally prosecuted. In paragraph 8 of the revision petition the petitioner has stated that in compliance of the summons dated August 18, 1973 and August 22, 1973 the petitioner produced the disputed documents along with other documents. As to whether there was any compulsion or duress against the petitioner, there is actually no assertion made by the present petitioner, in revision petition except that during oral interrogation alleged put to accused. In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 the Supreme Court has held that it will be question of fact in each case to be determined by the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed as to whether there was any compulsion. However the Supreme Court has described in that decision "compulsion" in the sense of a physical objective act and not the state of mind of the person making the statement except where the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process so as to render the making of the statement involuntary and therefore, extorted. This principle has been laid down while determining as to whether a statement made by the accused in a police custody would be regarded as voluntary statement or statement under compulsion. In Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Bani AIR 1978 SC 1025 , the Supreme Court has attempted to lay down certain criteria by which compulsion can be inferred. V. R. Krishna Iyer J. has held that if there is a mode of pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect, but sufficiently substantial applied by the policemen for obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes compelled testimony in violation in of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. The Ld. Judge has so held that persistent threat of prosecution if there is failure answer may take on the complexion of the undue pressure violating Article 20 (3 ). The Ld. Judge has so held that persistent threat of prosecution if there is failure answer may take on the complexion of the undue pressure violating Article 20 (3 ). But it has been pointed out that legal penalty made by itself would not amount to duress but the manner of mentioning it to the victim of interrogation may introduce an element of tension and tone of command perilously hovering near compulsion. But I have already pointed out that in this revision petitions the petitioner has not alleged that there was any threat given by the investigating officer of prosecution if he failed to produce the documents he would be criminally prosecute Mr. Roy only submits that there was apprehension in this petitioner that if he did not obey the summons, he would be prosecuted. In view of the fact the police officer did not have any legal authority to summon an accused person to produce the documents because of the clear decision of the Supreme Court the petitioner did not even have legal obligation to produce. In such circumstance in the absence of any allegation that any threat of legal penalty was given by the investigating officer to produce the documents, I am of the view that the petitioner has failed to prove that he produced the documents before the investigating officer under compulsion. ( 25 ) NOW I come to the third point raised by Mr. Roy. He has submitted that if the documents were produced by the present petitioner under compulsion, then Article 20 (3) is at once attracted and such documents would be inadmissible in evidence. ( 26 ) I would like to point out that while deciding the second point raised by Mr. Roy. I have already held that the production of the documents by the petitioner on receiving to two summons from the investigating officer was not under any compulsion. So Article 20 (3) was not attracted to such production. However, while deciding the third point I would assume that the documents were produced by the present petitioner under compulsion. Mr. Roy. I have already held that the production of the documents by the petitioner on receiving to two summons from the investigating officer was not under any compulsion. So Article 20 (3) was not attracted to such production. However, while deciding the third point I would assume that the documents were produced by the present petitioner under compulsion. Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the State has urged that the decision of Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 clearly indicates that Article 20 (3) is not attracted in case of furnishing evidence in its wider sense by the accused, that none of the documents was executed by the present petitioner arid therefore, it cannot be stated that any of the documents contains any written statement of the accused which would incriminate him in the trial if admitted in evidence. So according to Mr. Chatterjee Article 20 (3) will not be attracted even, if it be contended that, the petitioner was compelled to produce the documents before the investigating officer. ( 27 ) THE decision of Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 at page 1816 and 1717 contain the relevant portion which will be relevant for the purpose of this case. The findings of the majority judgment, inter alia, may be reproduced below - (I)"to be a witness" is not equivalent to furnishing evidence in its widest significance, that is to say, as including not merely making oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (ii)"to be a witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a state-ment in writing, made or given to Court or otherwise. (iii)"to be a witness" in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in a court of Law. Law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in court or out of court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (iii)"to be a witness" in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in a court of Law. Law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in court or out of court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. ( 28 ) THUS there cannot be any doubt that "to be a witness" for attracting Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, according to Supreme Court, means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts whether orally or by a written statement made or given in court or otherwise. The Supreme Court has also made it clear that to be a witness is not equivalent to furnishing evidence in its widest significance and such furnishing of evidence in its widest sense may include production of documents which may be relevant at a trial. But only by such production of documents of which the accused was not executant, he was not compelled to be witness against him. "to be witness" means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts orally or by a statement in writing. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, only by producing the documents by the accused which were not his own documents but executed by some other person or persons and which documents map be relevant in the trial against him would not attract Article 20 (3) even if those documents were produced by the accused under compulsion. Thus I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roy that once it is proved that the accused was compelled to produce the documents, the documents so produced would be inadmissible in evidence. So the third contention raised by Mr. Roy also fails. ( 29 ) IT is true that the investigating police officer did not have any legal authority to summon the accused to produce the documents under section 94 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code. Even the documents were produced and taken charge of by the Inspecting Officer under seizure lists. The Supreme Court has clearly held in several decisions that only because some evidence was illegally procured that would not be a ground for rejecting that evidence. Reference may be made to the decisions of R. M. Malkan v. State of Maharastra AIR 1973 SC 157 and of Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector AIR 1974 SC 348 . The Supreme Court has clearly held in several decisions that only because some evidence was illegally procured that would not be a ground for rejecting that evidence. Reference may be made to the decisions of R. M. Malkan v. State of Maharastra AIR 1973 SC 157 and of Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector AIR 1974 SC 348 . In the result, in view of my above findings I am convinced that the Judge, Special Court was justified in rejecting the application of the present petitioner for non-examination of experts for testifying the genuineness or falsity of the deeds in question. ( 30 ) THE revision of petition be dismissed. Petition dismissed.