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1987 DIGILAW 75 (MAD)

Thariyatbi v. Fr. George

1987-02-20

BALAKRISHNAN, FATHIMA BEEVI

body1987
JUDGMENT : Balakrishnan J. 1. Crime No. 214 of 1985 was registered against the revision petitioner by the Circle Inspector of Police. Angamali alleging that he had committed offences punishable underSs.143, 147, 379 and 506(1) of the Indian Penal Code read with S.149, I.P.C. A bus having Registration-No. K.R.H. 2856 was seized from the possession of the petitioner and produced before the II Class Magistrate, Alwaye. Both the petitioner and first respondent sought for interim custody of the bus and filed applications for getting custody of the same. The court after taking evidence gave interim custody of the bus to the first respondent. The operative portion of the order passed by the Magistrate is as follows: “I therefore direct that the interim custody of bus K.R.H. 2856 be given to C.P.W.1, (Petitioner in Crl. M.P. 1676 of 1985) on his executing bond for Rs.2,00,000 with two solvent sureties each for like sum over and above the value of the property. The petitioner and sureties shall undertake to keep the vehicle under good repair, shall not alienate or make any charge over the property to entrusted, shall not remove any parts from the vehicle than for the purpose of keeping the vehicle under good repair and also shall undertake to produce the property as and when required by this court.” 2. The Circle Inspector of Police thereafter filed a refer report and the same was accepted by the court on 22-4-1986. The revision petitioner moved M.P.486 of 1986 for passing final order under S.452, Cr.P.C. That application was rejected holding that the order dated 3-12-1985 was passed under S.457, Cr.P.C. and that order was not challenged in appeal before the appropriate forum and the order had become final and therefore the impugned order was not open to review. The learned Magistrate was of the view that the vehicle was produced before the court during the stage of investigation of the crime and therefore S.451 of the Cr.P.C. was not applicable and S.457, CrP.C. alone could be invoked for the disposal of the property. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Joshy v. The State Joshy v. The State (1986) Cr.L.J.263. 3. The relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure are Ss.451, 452, and 457. The police had submitted only the first information report before the Magistrate. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Joshy v. The State Joshy v. The State (1986) Cr.L.J.263. 3. The relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure are Ss.451, 452, and 457. The police had submitted only the first information report before the Magistrate. The vehicle was seized by the police while the case was under investigation. In the decision cited above, Single Bench of this court took the view that the property was seized and produced before the Magistrate during the investigation stage and the Magistrate could not have passed any order under S.451, Cr.P.C. and whatever order passed by Magistrate for disposal of property could have been passed only under S.457, Cr.P.C. This view was taken on the basis that S.451, Cr.P.C. could apply only when a property is produced before the court during any inquiry or trial and the inquiry contemplated under S.451, Cr.P.C. would not cover a situation when the case was under investigation. The relevant portion of S.451 reads as follows: “451. Order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases-When any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial and, if the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court may after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.” (emphasis supplied) The word ‘inquiry’ has been defined in S.2(g) as follows: “(g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court:” It is also relevant to look into the definition of the word ‘investigation’. The word ‘investigation’ has been defined under S.2(h) as follows: (h) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;” 4. At what stage inquiry begins is a vexed question of law. The distinction between inquiry and investigation is evident from their respective definitions given in the Code. At what stage inquiry begins is a vexed question of law. The distinction between inquiry and investigation is evident from their respective definitions given in the Code. An inquiry must be a proceeding by a Magistrate or court while an investigation relates to the steps taken by a police officer or persons other than a Magistrate. Inquiry is meant to include everything done in a case by a Magistrate. The term inquiry has a very wide connotation under the Criminal Procedure Code and includes every step taken by the Magistrate other than the trial conducted under the Code. The definition of inquiry in S.2(g) of the Code is not exhaustive. An earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sk. Muktear v. State Sk. Muktear v. State A.I.R. 1954 Cal.350, and the decision in Joshy v. State Joshy v. State (1986) Crl.L.J. 263 took the view that S.516A of the old Code (which is replaced by S.451 of the new Code) had no application in a case where there was no pending inquiry or trial before the court and the matter continued in the stage of investigation. The same view has been followed in another Calcutta decision in Ambika Roy v. State of West Bengal Ambika Roy v. State of West Bengal (1974) Crl.L.J.1002. That was a case in which a motor vehicle was seized by the police and kept under police custody and the motor vehicle was suspected to have been stolen from a third party. After the same was produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate the claimant filed an application to return that vehicle. That application was rejected on the ground that S.457(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had no application. The Single Bench of Calcutta High Court reversed the order of the Magistrate and held that if the property is produced in court, when the case was under investigation, it is not S.451 but only S.457(1) was the relevant section for disposal of the property. The Court held: “The words” such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial “merely refer to the stage of investigation and not the stage of inquiry or trial. If the property is produced in the Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, S.451 would apply and not S.457.” 5. The Court held: “The words” such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial “merely refer to the stage of investigation and not the stage of inquiry or trial. If the property is produced in the Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, S.451 would apply and not S.457.” 5. In T.A. Kamaluddin v. N.A. Salim T.A. Kamaluddin v. N.A. Salim (1972) Crl.L.J.1160 this court considered the scope of S.516A of the old Criminal Procedure Code which is corresponding to S.451 of the present Code. That was a case in which a motor vehicle was seized by the police during investigation. A complaint was filed against the accused alleging offences underSs.406, 409, 420, 465,468 and 471, I.P.C The District Magistrate sent the complaint to the Sub Inspector of Police for investigation under S.155(3), Cr.P.C. During the investigation of this case the car was seized by the police. The Magistrate entrusted the vehicle on an interim arrangement under S.516 A of Criminal Procedure Code. The Court held that the case had not reached the stage of enquiry or trial. Therefore the invocation of S.516 A was improper. The scope of the term ‘inquiry’ was not elaborately considered in this case. Moreover, no proceedings were pending before the Magistrate at the time when the motor vehicle was produced before the Magistrate. 6. The scheme of Chapter 34 regarding disposal of property envisages three contingencies. S.451 of the Code is intended to dispose of property on an interim arrangement pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial S.452 of the Code will apply when the trial or inquiry is concluded S.457(1) of the Cr.P.C. is applicable only when the property seized is not produced before the Criminal Court during an enquiry or trial. This has been explained by the Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana (1978) 2 S.C.C.491; (1978) MLJ. (Cri) 655: (1978) 2 S.C.J. 552: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1282 The Supreme Court held: “Chapter 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with disposal of property. There is a trichotomy in the sense that where property has been seized by the police, but not produced before the court, the power to dispose it of is covered by S.457. (Cri) 655: (1978) 2 S.C.J. 552: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1282 The Supreme Court held: “Chapter 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with disposal of property. There is a trichotomy in the sense that where property has been seized by the police, but not produced before the court, the power to dispose it of is covered by S.457. Where property has been seized and/or otherwise produced before the court, the manner to dispose of such property is governed by S.451. If the question of disposal arises after the enquiry or trial in any criminal court is concluded, the disposal of the property involved in the case is governed by S.452.” 7. From a reading of the various provisions in Chapter 34 of the Code regarding disposal of property it would indicate that the court is competent to give interim custody of the property even though the case was in the investigation stage. It is common knowledge that almost all the contraband articles and properties are seized during investigation and produced before the Magistrate even before the final report is filed. S.102(1) of the Code empowers the police officer to seize any property which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. S.102(3) mandates that the police officer acting under sub-S.(1) of S.102 shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the court, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the court as to the disposal of the same. 8. Generally the articles suspected to have been stolen or other contraband articles are seized by the police and produced before the court during investigation stage. If S.451 of the Code does not empower the Magistrate to dispose of such articles on an interim arrangement it would work injustice to the parties. The disposal of property under S.457 is in the nature of final disposal. 9. Therefore the crucial question is whether there was any pending enquiry or trial when the property was produced before court. For the purpose of S.451 of the Code it has to be presumed that the ‘inquiry’ referred to therein only means some pending matter before the Magistrate. 9. Therefore the crucial question is whether there was any pending enquiry or trial when the property was produced before court. For the purpose of S.451 of the Code it has to be presumed that the ‘inquiry’ referred to therein only means some pending matter before the Magistrate. This Court in Food Inspector v. Venkitachalam Chettiar Food Inspector v. Venkitachalam Chettiar (1979) K.L.T. 750 held. “There can be no doubt that the framers of the Code intended to maintain a distinction between the expression “inquiry” and “trial”. Looking at the definition of “inquiry”, it may not be unreasonable or improper to state that this definition impliedly gives us the meaning of “trial”. It can be said that “inquiry” stops when “trial” begins, or, that every proceeding preceding a” trial” is an “inquiry”: although in the ordinary parlance or in the popular or the general wide sense of the term, “trial” begins or opens as soon as the court takes cognizance of the offence or the accused appears before court. The expression “trial” generally means the determination of issues arising in a particular case. A “trial” can conclude only in a conviction or an acquittal, while at the conclusion of an “enquiry” the accused is either discharged or a charge is framed against him.” 10. The term “inquiry” has been used only to mean a pending proceeding before the Magistrate. This term has to be understood according to the context in which it has been used. The definition of term ‘inquiry’ given in the Code means only some steps taken by Magistrate other than in trial. 11. An extract from the book of Prof. H.L.A. Hart “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” [page 8 of the book “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 30 May 1953 by H.L.A. Hart]. is worthy to be quoted at this juncture. “Long ago Bentham issued a warning that legal words demanded a special method of elucidation and he enunciated a principle that is the beginning of wisdom in this matter though it is not the end. He said we must never take these words alone, but consider whole sentences in which they play their characteristic role. We must take not the word ‘right’ but the sentence ‘You have a right’, not the word ‘State’ but the sentence. ‘He is a member or an official of the State’. He said we must never take these words alone, but consider whole sentences in which they play their characteristic role. We must take not the word ‘right’ but the sentence ‘You have a right’, not the word ‘State’ but the sentence. ‘He is a member or an official of the State’. His warning has largely been disregarded and jurists have continued to hammer away at single words.” It is important to note that there is no other provision in the Code to dispose of properties produced by the police before the Magistrate during investigation state. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana Ram Prakash Sharma v. State of Haryana (1978) 2 S.C.J. 552: (1978) 2 S.C.C. 491 .S.457 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to dispose of the property when the same has not been produced before the Court. 12. If a narrow interpretation is given to S.451 of the Code it would only work injustice to the parties, for example if the property is disposed of by the Magistrate under S.457 of the Code and if it is later found that no offence has been committed in respect of that article, the Magistrate would not be in a position to hand over the article under S.452 of the Code. After the criminal proceedings are dropped the property should ordinarily be returned to the person from whose possession it was taken. The finding on the question whether the possession of such person was dishonest or unlawful is not possible when it was not considered a fit case for prosecuting such person on the basis of the first information report. Very same difficulty has arisen in the present case. The learned Magistrate has passed the first order on 3-12-1985. The order specifically mentions that it is an interim arrangement and the first respondent herein had also executed a bond for Rs.2 lakhs with two solvent sureties and undertook to produce the vehicle as and when demanded by the Court. The Magistrate would have been under bona fide impression that a trial would ensure in this matter and an order of disposal would have to be made under S.452 of the Code after conclusion of the trial. But the police filed a refer report and the court accepted that and the matter ended there. Admittedly the vehicle was seized from the petitioner herein. But the police filed a refer report and the court accepted that and the matter ended there. Admittedly the vehicle was seized from the petitioner herein. The disposal of the property as per order dated 3-12-1985 was in the nature of an interim arrangement. However, the Magistrate by his subsequent order dated 6-5-1986 held that the earlier order was passed under S.457 of the Code and it was not an interim arrangement. Therefore the Magistrate refrained from passing a final order in this matter. We hold that if there was any pending matter before the Court the Magistrate was fully empowered to dispose of the article produced under S.451 of the Code. The enquiry referred to in S.451 of the Code includes all steps taken by the Magistrate before the trial begins. 13. Having considered the scope of S.451 of the Code we hold that the order passed by the Magistrate on 3-12-1985 was only under S.451 of the Code as an interim arrangement and the Magistrate has to pass final order under S.452 of the Code. The matter is remitted to the lower court for passing an appropriate order. Petition allowed.