JUDGMENT 1. - This is a petition under sec. 482 Cr. P.C. seeking relief that the proceedings pending in the Special Criminal case No. 9/78 in the Court of Special Judge for CBI Cases, Jaipur be quashed and the accused petitioner be acquitted. 2. The accused petitioner was working as Income Tax Officer, Sawai Madhopur in the year 1976. The CBI., Jaipur registered a case No. 27/76 against the accused petitioner on Sept. 17, 1976 under Section 5(l)(e) read with Sec. 5/2 of the P.C. Act and thereafter a search of house of the accused petitioner at Sawai Madhopur was conducted. His family house at Jaipur was also searched on September 18, 1976. Some documents were taken into possession during the search. After taking about two years, the sanction for the prosecution against the accused petitioner from the Commissioner Income-tax, Jaipur was taken on August 25, 1976. A charge-sheet was submitted against the accused in the Court of Special Judge on August 31, 1978. Charges were framed against the accused petitioner for the aforesaid offences under the prevention of corruption Act on April 12, 1979 and there-after the case was fixed for recording the evidence for the prosecution. There were as many as 173 witnesses listed on behalf of the prosecution. 3. The main ground on which the above relief has been sought is that the trial of the case has taken almost about 11 years without any result and for no fault of the petitioner. Under Article 21 of the Constitution, it is a fundamental right of the petitioner that there should be speedy trial in a criminal case and because the prosecution has not been able to even examine the witnesses and the trial is still pending, this Court should quash the proceedings. 4. There cannot be any dispute that as the case law has developed the accused has fundamental right of a speedy trial in a criminal case. This right of the accused emerges from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The courts have no right to fix an outer limit in a criminal case and in my opinion it cannot be fixed but within what period the trial should conclude will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case such as the number of witnesses to be examined and as to whether in a given case the trial has been protracted or not. In a given case even a period of three years may be on the higher side for the trial of a criminal case whereas in another case again dependency on the number of witnesses for both the sides, the basis of the criminal, the number of documents to be executed, a period of 5 to 7 years may not be sufficient. 5. Mr. Khandelwal submits for the accused petitioner that the prosecution has yet to examine some witnesses and the accused is likely to examine more than 140 witnesses in defence and because of the delay some of the important witnesses of the defence have expired and, therefore, in the case it may be said that prejudice to the accused is writ at large and, therefore, this court should quash the proceedings and allowing the proceedings to be continued further is nothing but abuse of the process of the Court and contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the following cases : 6. Madhewardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1986 Cr.L.J. 1971 (Full Bench) , Surya Narain Singh and others v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 Patna 219 (Full Bench) . The State v. Maksudan Singh & others, AIR 1986 Patna 38, 1985 Cr.L.J. 1782 (Full Bench) , Bihar State Electricity Board and another v. Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1653 , Sheela Barse and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1773 , State of U.P. v. Kapil Deo Shukla, 1972 C.A.R. 459 (SC) , Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360 again Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1819 and T.V. Vatheeswaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1983 Cr.L.J. 481 to and other cases to which reference need not be made as the law on the subject that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial and this right of the accused is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is well settled. 7. I will take the above cases one by one. 7. I will take the above cases one by one. In the case of Madheshwardhari Singh (supra) a full bench of the Patna High Court was dealing the case which related to the period 1964-65 and the accused at the relevant time with was posted as Assistant Director, Central Poultry Farm, Patna. The successor of the accused petitioner lodged an F.I.R. on 20th November, 1966 in a police station and a case under Sec. 467, 409 and 120-B, I.P.C. was registered. The Police Investigation in the case dragged on, and on 29th September, 1975 i.e. after a period of 9 years of the F.I.R. and a period of about 10 to 11 years of the incident, Madheshwardhari Singh was arrayed as an accused. It was only on 30th January, 1976 that a charge sheet was filed in the case. Despite a decade of investigation, the proceeding in Court again moved with a speed which was remarkable in its tardiness. The charges against the accused were framed on 23rd July, 1977 and thereafter at snails pace the examination of only 40 witnesses was made. The Court had given the last opportunity to the prosecution to produce the witnesses no witnesses was produced and unmindful of its own direction seven more adjournments were granted to the prosecution. Again a direction was given to the prosecution to produce the rest of the witnesses by a certain date but that order was again flouted. Thereafter, a period of one year elapsed without any significant progress and the Court again issued a direction on 24th January, 1984 to produce the rest of the witnesses by 20th March, 1984. On that date, a last opportunity was given to the prosecution to produce the rest of the witnesses by 19th April, 1984 on which date the trial Court was compelled to close the prosecution case. The revision was preferred against that order which was allowed and a direction was issued to the Magistrate to examine the prosecution witnesses but still the prosecution did not examine the prosecution witnesses and the Magistrate again closed the evidence. A revision was again filed and was again allowed. The case was sent back and thereafter only one witness was examined, and, thereafter no other witness was examined and ultimately the evidence was closed and the accused petitioner was examined. Written notes of arguments were filed on behalf of the petitioner. A revision was again filed and was again allowed. The case was sent back and thereafter only one witness was examined, and, thereafter no other witness was examined and ultimately the evidence was closed and the accused petitioner was examined. Written notes of arguments were filed on behalf of the petitioner. The prosecution then took a stand that the sanction order was missing and time must be given to it for searching the same or for the reconstruction thereof in the event of the same being not traceable. Inspite of the objection on behalf of the accused petitioner, the Magistrate still granted time and numerous adjournments followed thereafter. In these circumstances an application was filed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India before the Magistrate that the proceedings should be quashed but the Magistrate dismissed the appeal. The Court in these circumstances referring to the case law held that there is social interest in providing a speedy trial which exists under law. The Court in para No. 12 said that coming nearer home, it would seem that the right of a speedy public trial is a constitutional guarantee is of a some what recent origin in our country. However, by now it is so well settled by precedential mandate of the Final Court itself that the right to a speedy public trial is a part and parcel of the constitutional guarantee under Article 21, that it would be wasteful and unnecessary to examine the issue on principle afresh. Taking into consideration the facts of that case and fastening the liability for the prolongation of trial for a period of nine years for examining the prosecution evidence, the Court allowed the writ petition and criminal proceedings were quashed. In para No. 24 the Court said:- "To conclude on this aspect, both on principle and precedent, it has to be held that the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespectively of their nature. In para No. 24 the Court said:- "To conclude on this aspect, both on principle and precedent, it has to be held that the fundamental right to a speedy public trial extends to all criminal prosecutions for all offences generically, irrespectively of their nature. It is not confined or constricted to either serious or capital ones only." Then dealing with question No. 2 framed in the case, the court said that the core issue is as to what does a speedy public trial in a criminal prosecution truly connote the court said: "Does it include within it the preceding police investigations in the case also or is it confined only to the period of time when the portals of the court are entered in a regular trial? On principle I am clearly of the opinion that in the majestic sweep of the fundamental right of a speedy public trial in the context of a criminal prosecution, initiated at the State's instance, it necessarily connotes all the period from the date of the levelling of the criminal charge to the date of the rendering of the judgment in Court. Unless it is so held, the cherished fundamental right herein would be whittled down to a leasing mirage, where the investigation of the offence itself may protract on for years and thus, rendering the very concept and purpose of a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution herein includes within it both the police investigation of the crime and the later adjudication in Court based thereon." In another full Bench's case of Maksudan Singh and others (supra) the Court said that because the accused has a constitutional right to speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and this is identical to American Constitution. In that case taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case the criminal prosecution had been quashed. It may be stated that the case of Maksudan (supra) preceded the case of Madheshwardhari Singh and the reference in the latter case was made to the earlier case. In that case taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case the criminal prosecution had been quashed. It may be stated that the case of Maksudan (supra) preceded the case of Madheshwardhari Singh and the reference in the latter case was made to the earlier case. It was a case where a Government appeal was filed against the acquittal of the accused in the trial Court, the occurrence having taken place more than 15 years ago on 26th April 1971 and after investigation and trial extending five years the learned trial court acquitted eight persons and one accused was found guilty of the substantive charge of murder under Sec. 302 I.P.C. The remaining accused persons were not found guilty of the various offences but were found guilty and sentenced to fine. The State preferred the appeal. The Court held that the right of speedy trial existed and taking into consideration the delay, the court did not think it in the interest of justice to go into the merits of the appeal. 8. Before a reference is made to the other cases referred to above, it may be proper to make reference to an earlier case of the Supreme Court of Mahonader v. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 792 . The Court said that the Court would not be prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one sided. It has many facets and Court has to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on the Court to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. 9. Coming to the remaining cases cited by Mr. Khandelwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board and another (supra) a complaint was filed against the officer of the Electricity Board with the allegations that there was failure of power supply by the Electricity Board and its officers which resulted in monetary loss to the flour mill, the complaint was filed in the year 1964, the court said that it does not see any reason for continuance of this prosecution any further. It was also observed that the lapse of time is also one additional circumstances and, therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the prosecution launched against the accused petitioner. In the case of Sheela Barse and another (supra) dealing with the case of a child below the age of 16 years for an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than seven years, observed that the investigation should have been completed within a period of three months from the date of the filing of the complaint or lodging the FIR and the same is not completed within this time, the case against the child must be treated as closed. The Court further observed that even if within three months the charge sheet is filed against the child in case of an offence punishable with imprisonment of not more than seven years, the case must be tried and disposed of within a further period of six months at the outside and this period should be inclusive of the time taken up in committal proceedings, if any. In para No. 12, the Court further observed that in order to achieve the goal enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution for speedy trial there is necessity to appoint requisite number of judges. Again the case of Kapil Deo Shukla (supra) the accused had been kept in suspense for a period of 20 years and more and the trial had not been completed and taking into consideration the facts of that case and that the Government had offered inductment to the accused to pay Rs. 4000/- on an assurance that it will consider not to proceed with the trial and the Government failed to return the amount even after having changed its mind the court interfered. The Court made a reference to its earlier case of Chajuram v. Radhey Shyam, 1971 SCC 774 . The state appeal against the acquittal was dismissed. In the four cases of Hussainara Khatun (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that detention of accused in jail for periods longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced if convicted is illegal being in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The state appeal against the acquittal was dismissed. In the four cases of Hussainara Khatun (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that detention of accused in jail for periods longer than the maximum term for which they could have been sentenced if convicted is illegal being in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It has further been held that it is the constitutional right of every accused person who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on account of reasons such as poverty, indegence or incommunicado situation, to have free legal services provided to him by the State and the State is under a constitutional mandate to provide a lawyer to such accused person if the needs of justice so require. The Court has also said : "We shall examine the position arising from pendency of such a large number of cases for such long periods of time at the next hearing of the writ petition, with a view to considering what directions are necessary to be given to the State Government by way of taking positive action for the purpose of securing enforcement of the fundamental right the accused to speedy trial. We would, however, require for this purpose information from the High Court of Patna as to the norms of disposals fixed by the High Court for the different categories of Magistrate and Sessions Judges in the State of Bihar, since without this information, it would not be possible for us to decide whether the existing strength of courts and Judges in the State of Bihar is adequate for the purpose of ensuring speedy trial to the accused or it is necessary to have additional courts and Judges". In the last case of T.V. Vatheeswaran (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of delay of two years in the execution of a sentence of death and said that it should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. The Court further said that the fiat of Article 21 is that any procedure which deprives a person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies a right to free legal services where he cannot avail them. The Court further said that the fiat of Article 21 is that any procedure which deprives a person of his life or liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. Just, fair and reasonable procedure implies a right to free legal services where he cannot avail them. It implies a right to a speedy trial. 10. There can be no dispute as stated earlier that the accused has a right of speedy trial and this emerges out of the provisions contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The right of the accused for a speedy trial is a fundamental right and even for offences where capital sentence may be awarded the accused has a right of speedy trial. The same can be said of cases under Prevention of Corruption Act. But as already stated earlier it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, such circumstances will include number of witnesses to be examined, number of documents to be exhibited, who is responsible for the delay-the prosecution or the accused-only then it could be said as to whether the fundamental right of accused to speedy trial has been denied to him or not. In a given case, as stated earlier, the delay of three years may be fatal wherein in other cases the delay of five years may not be sufficient looking to the pendency of the criminal case in the states. It is well known that so far as the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act are concerned, they not only depend on oral testimony but mostly depend on the documentary evidence. 11. The question is as to whether in the present case can it be said that the Court has not done anything in trying the case with speedy. The list of witnesses which was filed against the accused contained 173 witnesses. I have been taken through the various order sheets of the Court which have been made available by Mr. Khandelwal and from the perusal of those order-sheets it cannot be denied that from the very beginning the learned trial has made some progress on the most of the dates fixed in the case. Though, the accused is not responsible for the delay but out of 173 witnesses the Court has examined 142 witnesses by now. Khandelwal and from the perusal of those order-sheets it cannot be denied that from the very beginning the learned trial has made some progress on the most of the dates fixed in the case. Though, the accused is not responsible for the delay but out of 173 witnesses the Court has examined 142 witnesses by now. Ten witnesses out of the listed witnesses were left by prosecution and now 21 witnesses out of the listed witnesses remain to be examined. It may also be stated that number of documents to be exhibited is 476. Taking into consideration the number of witnesses, the number of documents and the efforts which have been made by the Court from day to day and as appears from the perusal of the order sheets, as aforesaid, it cannot be said that the court proceed with the trial with a snails pace or left any efforts to conclude the trial of the case. In a case of present nature when the allegations against the accused petitioner are of serious nature the case being of the Income Tax Officer, I am not inclined to quash the proceeding but there must be some time limit for the prosecution to conclude the trial. 12. My Tyagi, learned counsel for the CBI stated that a time of three months may be given to the prosecution to complete its evidence. It may be stated that merely because the defence has to examine about 140 witnesses for which the prosecution cannot be held responsible, it cannot be held that the prosecution be quashed. 13. So far as the merits are concerned, I will not like to go into the merits of the case, more so when 142 witnesses have already been examined. 14. Consequently, I hereby dismiss the application and direct the CBI to complete the prosecution evidence within three months which time Mr. Tyagi claims to produce rest of the witnesses. The Court, if necessary, may take case day to day and try the case expeditiously.Application dismissed. *******