Judgment :- M.N. CHANDURKAR, CJ. :— 1.This appeal filed by the Union of India has to be allowed having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramachander v. Union of India 1. Pursuant to an enquiry conducted in respect of certain charges framed against the respondent, the punishment of reduction of pay from Rs. 650 to Rs. 590 in the time scale of Rs. 470 750 for a period of two years from 25-3-1981, was imposed upon him by the appellant No. 4. An appeal was filed against this order. The appellate authority, appellant No. 3, by an order dated 9-9-1982, not only dismissed the appeal, but also enhanced the penalty to one of removal from service with effect from 10-9-1982. This order was further challenged by the respondent in a second appeal which came to be dismissed on 7-3-1983, by the appellant No. 2, under R.22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. The respondent then filed a writ petition in this Court. 2. One of the grievances made in the writ petition was that the respondent was never furnished with a copy of the report of the enquiry officer prior to the passing of the order of penalty by the disciplinary authority. This report of the enquiry officer was made available to him only on 21-9-1982, along with the appellate order. The learned Judge, following the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Chief Commercial Supdt. v. Murugan 2, held that it was the duty of the disciplinary authority to give to the Railway servant every reasonable opportunity to make bis representations and the Railway servant was entitled to make such representation as he may consider fit to the disciplinary authority prior to the passing of an order imposing penalty. Accordingly, it was found that the procedure had not been properly followed, and, on that short ground, the learned Judge set aside the order of dismissal. The Union of India has now filed this appeal against the order of the learned Judge. 3. Accordingly, it was found that the procedure had not been properly followed, and, on that short ground, the learned Judge set aside the order of dismissal. The Union of India has now filed this appeal against the order of the learned Judge. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India, that having regard to the amendment made in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India, the right to make a representation on the proposed penalty has been taken away, and an order of punishment cannot be said to be vitiated on the ground that the delinquent officer has not been furnished with a copy of the findings of the enquiry officer and that the delinquent officer was not heard by the disciplinary authority before the punishment was awarded. 4. Now, it is clear that after the amendment of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India, there is no duty cast on the disciplinary authority to hear a delinquent officer in respect of the punishment. This proposition is now well-settled by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 1. This decision has been referred to in the latest decision of the Supreme Court id Ramchander v. Union of India 2, cited supra, in which the Supreme Court pointed out that after the majority decision in Tulsiram Patels case 1, it can no longer be disputed that the right to make a representation on the proposed penalty which was to be found in clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution having been taken away by the Forty second Amendment, there is no provision of law under which a Government servant can claim this right. Having regard to this position of law, undoubtedly, an infirmity is created in the view taken by the learned Judge. 5. The decision in Murugans case 3, cited supra, relied upon by the learned single Judge is now no longer good law. Having regard to this position of law, undoubtedly, an infirmity is created in the view taken by the learned Judge. 5. The decision in Murugans case 3, cited supra, relied upon by the learned single Judge is now no longer good law. In Mahalingam v. Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs 4, decided on 3-9-1985, a learned single Judge of this Court, relying on the decision in Murugans case 3, had set aside an order of dismissal against the petitioner in that writ petition on the ground that the order of punishment was vitiated for failure to give the delinquent an opportunity to show-cause against the findings by the enquiry officer before its acceptance by the disciplinary authority though such an opportunity need not be given at the stage of actual imposition of punishment. This view of the learned Judge was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in writ appeal filed by the Union of India against the said judgment Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi and others v. K.S. Mahalingam 5, decided on 30-9-1985. The Supreme Court, however, in appeal against the order of the Division Bench, set aside the order of the Division Bench as well as the learned single Judge in C.A. 1279 of 1986 6 holding that the delinquent officer could not claim a second opportunity to show-cause against the punishment either under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution or under R.15(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965. While setting aside the order of the Division Bench and the learned single Judge, the Supreme Court observed as follows— “Both the Division Bench and the learned single Judge of the High Court have completely overlooked the fact that the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976 has deleted from clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the proposed penalty and, further, it has been expressly provided inter alia in the first proviso to clause (2) that ‘it shall not be necessary to give such person an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed.’ After the amendment, the requirement of clause (2) will be satisfied by holding an enquiry in which the Government servant has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.” The Supreme Court then referred to the decision in Tulsiram Patels case 1, and observed as follows:— “In our view, therefore, both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were not justified in holding that the order of dismissal was vitiated as the respondent was not given a second opportunity to make representation against the punishment of dismissal before the same was imposed on him.” Thus, the decision in Murugans case 1 cannot now be relied upon by the delinquent. 6. It also needs to be emphasised that in Ramachanders case 2, the Supreme Court has expressly considered the scope of R.22 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1968, which is the relevant rule in the instant case. The Supreme Court has held in Ramachanders case 2, that the only stage at which a Government servant gets a reasonable opportunity to canvass his innocence and the correctness of the order of the disciplinary authority is the stage of the appeal. The Supreme Court has held in Ramachanders case 2, that the only stage at which a Government servant gets a reasonable opportunity to canvass his innocence and the correctness of the order of the disciplinary authority is the stage of the appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the delinquent employee is entitled to an opportunity to show that he should be exonerated from the charge by showing that the evidence adduced at the enquiry is not worthy of credence or consideration or that the charges proved against him are not of such a character as to merit the extreme penalty of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to have been sufficient in his case only at the stage of hearing of the departmental appeal. Construing R.22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, the Supreme Court, therefore, held that the Appellate authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned, but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised by him in the appeal. It was pointed out that although in the absence of a requirement in the statute or the rules, there is no duty cast on an appellate authority to give reasons where the order is one of affirmance, R.22(2) of the Railway Servants Rules in express terms requires the Railway Board to record its findings on the three aspects stated therein. Construing the word ‘consider’ used in R.22(2) of the Rules in the context in which it appears in that Rule, the Supreme Court took the view that it only means an objective consideration by the Railway Board after due application of mind, which implies the giving of reasons for its decision. It was also pointed out that an objective consideration was possible only if the delinquent is heard and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final order that may be passed in his appeal. The Supreme Court went on to point out that considerations of fair play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given. 7. Having regard to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Ramachanders case 2, it is obvious that the order of removal made by the Appellate Authority without hearing the delinquent will have to be set aside. 7. Having regard to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Ramachanders case 2, it is obvious that the order of removal made by the Appellate Authority without hearing the delinquent will have to be set aside. Consequently, the order passed by the second appellate authority will also have to be set aside. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the learned single Judge. We quash the order of removal made by the first appellate authority dated 9-9-1982 and the further order in second appeal confirming the order dated 9-9-1982. The appeal initially filed by the delinquent is remitted back to the Regional Divisional Railway Manager for consideration on merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made earlier. 7. We have been told that in pursuance of the direction given by the Central Administrative Tribunal, the delinquent has been reinstated in service. He will be entitled to continue to work in the post which he is holding today. The respondent will be entitled to all the incidental benefits on the footing that the order of removal was illegal and uncalled for. The writ appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.