JUDGMENT Dr. T. N Singh, J. – 1. This appeal arises out of the suit filed in 1959 for eviction of the defendant-appellant from the suit premises on the basis of the plea contemplated under section 4 (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955, for short, 1955 Act. The suit was dismissed by the trial court upon holding that the plea was not proved and the Court of appeal below having held to in the contrary the tenant-defendant is in this Court. 2. Appellant's counsel, Shri Lahoti, bas fairly conceded that in virtue of the provisions of section 51 (2) of the new enactment of 1961, the new Act, shall have no operation in this case and the lis must be determined with reference to the provisions of section 4 (a) of the 1955 Act, which I quote:- "4 (a) that the tenant has failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from the landlord." 3. There can be no doubt about the object of the two enactments, old and new as also about the provision afore quoted, which reappears in the new erJ3ctment as section 12 (1) (a), with some verbal changes. Even since the creation of the category of statutory tenants in the State with the enactment of the 1955 Act jurisdiction of Courts to pass a decree for eviction of a tenant is restricted in the manner indicated in the statutory provisions of the two enactments. A landlord, whether under the old or under the new enactment, is told about the statutory grounds on which alone he can we a tenant for his eviction. Therefore, any Court seized of a lis under any of the enactments old and new, is required to exercise its jurisdiction within the four-corners of the statutory provision. As and when a landlord is able to make out a case for tenant's evictions in terms strictly of any of the grounds statutorily envisaged, jurisdictional competence will be acquired thereon by a Court to pass a decree for his eviction, not otherwise. As and when a landlord is able to make out a case for tenant's evictions in terms strictly of any of the grounds statutorily envisaged, jurisdictional competence will be acquired thereon by a Court to pass a decree for his eviction, not otherwise. As such, in terms of section 4(a) afore quoted a landlord can invoke a jurisdiction of a Civil Court to pass a decree for tenant's eviction only on pleading and proving that the tenant was in default in payment of rent to the landlord and the landlord had served upon him a written notice of demand asking the tenant to make payment of any "arrears of rent within one month of service upon him" of such a notice. 4. The short question that bas arisen for decision in this appeal is-whether the Court of appeal below had jurisdictional competence to pass the impugned decree against the tenant defendant on reversing the findings of the, trial Court which has taken the view on evidence that the landlord bad failed to prove service on the tenant of the written notice of demand contemplated under section 4 (a). I have been taken through the pleadings as also some part of the relevant and material evidence. In para 6 of the plaint it is stated that the requisite notice of demand was mailed to the tenant by registered post though the contents of that notice are not stated. In para 5 it is stated that on 26-12-1958 the notice was issued asking the plaintiff to make payment of arrears of rent for the period of preceeding six months, upto 3-12-1958. But in para 6 it is further stated until 31-12-1958 the postal acknowledgement receipt was not received back for the notice sent by registered post. Therefore on 1-1-1959, a copy of the said notice was offered to the tenant at his shop in the presence of witnesses but he refused to accept the same. It is further stated in para 6 that the notice sent by registered post was received back unserved on 3-1-1959 because the defendant refused to accept the same. In the written statement the averments made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint are denied. It is further stated in para 6 that the notice sent by registered post was received back unserved on 3-1-1959 because the defendant refused to accept the same. In the written statement the averments made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint are denied. It is averred on the other hand that no rent was due payable and the tenant-defendant was not in arrears and further that no notice in that regard was ever served on the defendant. There is specific denial also of the fact that on 1-1-1959 the copy of the notice was offered to the defendant and on his refusal to accept the same in presence of witnesses it was pasted on the suit premises. Indeed, the plaint averment in that regard was specifically denied and it was also denied that any notice sent to the defendant by registered post and that it was refused by him. In fine service of the notice "as seriously challenged. 5. As respects of service of notice two documents are brought on record Exs. P-7 and P-8. The registered notice which came unserved is Ex. P-8. The Court below took the view that it bears an endorsment of the Postman reading "refused" and, therefore, service could be accepted without the Postman being examined as there was no legal requirement for doing so. It was further held that the Postman was not available and he could not be examined for valid reasons. In so far as Ex. P-7 is concerned the admitted position indeed is that plaintiff did not examine any witness to prove his plaint case that it was served on the defendant in presence of any witnesses in the manner alleged. However, because the defendant examined one Babulal Sharma as D. W. 1 and he having deposed that the endorsment "C to C" on Ex. P-7 was in his hind-writing and his signature thereon was at "D to D" service of the •notice on the defendant was thereby held proved. 6. Before me appellant's counsel has seriously challenged the conclusion of the lower appellate Court as perverse. Shri Lahoti's first contention is that although reliance in this Court is placed by Shri B. S. Agarwal, counsel appearing for the respondent; on Har Charan Singh [1] that decision would not help respond ants in the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. Before me appellant's counsel has seriously challenged the conclusion of the lower appellate Court as perverse. Shri Lahoti's first contention is that although reliance in this Court is placed by Shri B. S. Agarwal, counsel appearing for the respondent; on Har Charan Singh [1] that decision would not help respond ants in the facts and circumstances of this case. Counsels submission is that the presumption contemplated under section 27 of the General Clauses Act and section 114 of the Evidence Act cannot and does Dot arise in this case. Firstly, because section 4 (a) do not contemplate any positive requirement that notice envisaged therein may be or has to be served by registered post. Indeed, it is only when any enactment authorises or requires any document to be served by registered post then the provision of section 27 are applicable. In the instant case the statutory requirement is not that. Secondly, counsel contends, the Court below did not at all read the endorsement and failed to construe it on its own term. However, he further contends that the statutory presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act can be invoked only in such a case where facts are dear and not ambiguous while in this case the endorsement is in no manner flawless. Indeed, the impression one gets on looking at it is that it could be very well be interpolated and the word which the Court below read as "refused" can also be read as "returned". His last but most important contention is also that before any presumption can be drawn on the basis of any writing against any person his particular attention to the particular writing bas to be drawn to allow him an opportunity to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, counsel submits, the evidence of the defendant does not show that he was any time confronted with regard to the controvercial "endorsement" aforesaid'. 7. Although it is also contended that the plaintiff having elected to serve personally on the defendant a copy of the notice subsequent to his mailing the notice by registered post he would be debarred from pleading the second, notice as a valid and proper notice served on the defendant under section 4 (a), I do not consider it necessary for the purpose of disposel of this appeal to pursue this contention. I am of the view that the Court below acted arbitrarily in reaching the conclusion that a proper and valied notice contemplated in law was duly served Oil the tenant-defendant to give the Court the jurisdiction to grant the decree for eviction as prayed. Indeed, very surprisingly, the Court below exceeded its jurisdiction to hold both notices to be validly served for reasons earlier alluded, merit less in my view. The law indeed contemplates a single and singular notice as basis for the cause of action raised in terms of the statutory provision because a valuable right is created in favour of the tenant in the said provision allowing him a month's time from the date of service of the said notice to pay up the arrears of rent if be was in default. Unfortunately, the Court below ignored and over looked the statutory requirement and indeed the view taken by it that the service of Ex. P-7 as also P-8 was proved on evidence did not even invest in it jurisdiction to pass decree under section 4 (a) for defendant's eviction. 8. I have looked at Ex. P-8 myself and I feel no hesitation at all to agree with the proposition canvassed by Shri Lahoti that the word in the endorsement thereon which has been read as "refused" can also be read as "returned" because the endorsement if read in its entirety as "returned" to sendar" would make sense, then the endorsement "refused to sender". Shri Agarwal has contended that there is another endorsement on the obverse side of the Inland letter (Ex. P-9) which can be clearly read as "refused to sender" without much ado but this endorsement does not bear any signature and indeed does not remove the ambiguity tainting the intention of the maker. Indeed, the two endorsements make it doubtful as to whether there was in fact refusal by the address of the postal article as the intention of the maker of the endorsement is not clear but is clouded by the over-writing and also by the language of the endorsement itself. May be, somebody interested to benefit by the endorsement has taken care to make doubly sure that the endorsement appears in an advantageous form to serve his interest, otherwise the over-writing and the ambiguity of the language cannot be explained. 9. May be, somebody interested to benefit by the endorsement has taken care to make doubly sure that the endorsement appears in an advantageous form to serve his interest, otherwise the over-writing and the ambiguity of the language cannot be explained. 9. The trial Court, in my opinion, rightly disbelieved service of the 'registered notice, Ex. P.8, and the Court below, according to me, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in taking a contrary view without applying its mind to the endorsement and dispensing with formal proof of service to which no clue was provided by the witnesses in their evidence. The decision in liar Charan Singh (supra) has been rightly distinguished by Shri Lahoti as presumption under section 27 of the General Clause Act evidently is not invokable in this case for submitted as earlier alluded and on facts Ex. P-8 being bearing a doubtful endorsement drawing of presumption under section 113 (f) of the Evidence Act would also be out of question. 10. In so far as service of Ex. P-7 is concerned the least said is the best. Court below having itself taken the view that the plaintiff-landlord failed to produce evidence to substantiate his plea that in presence of witnesses the notice Ex. P-7 was served on the tenant-defendant, the matter should have ended there. I do not see how more proof of endorsement by D.W. 1 can at all bale out the plaintiff despite the fact that the endorsement was to the effect that when the above notice was offered to the addressee and he refused to accept the same it was pasted on his door. The witness was cross-examined by the plaintiff and his evidence in Court is that the endorsement did not relate to this notice. His evidence proved nothing and the endorsement by itself would do nothing as person who made the endorsement gave explanation of its content and purport. It was the bounden duty of the plaintiff to adduce independent evidence to prove that the notice Ex. P-7 was offered to the defendant and he had refused the same. Indeed, much doubt is cast on the genuineness of the endorsement and its relevance because the evidence of offering the notice to the defendant and the same being pasted on his refusal to accept the same is not forthcoming except the endorsement itself. 11. P-7 was offered to the defendant and he had refused the same. Indeed, much doubt is cast on the genuineness of the endorsement and its relevance because the evidence of offering the notice to the defendant and the same being pasted on his refusal to accept the same is not forthcoming except the endorsement itself. 11. For the reasons aforesaid I have no hesitation to hold that the Court below acted illegally and arbitrarily in holding that there ....as a valid and proper service of a proper and valid notice contemplated under section 4 (a) aforesaid and, therefore, the eviction of tenant could be decreed. On the evidence on record I am satisfied that the trial Court took the right view in bolding that the plaintiff failed to prove service of the requisite notice and, therefore, he was not entitled for a decree for defendants eviction. 12. In the result, the appeal suceeds and is allowed. The impugned Judgment and decree are not aside and those of the trial Court are restored. No costs.