JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. 1. The petitioner by means of the present petition has challenged the order dated 2nd February, 1983 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The present dispute relates to plot nos. 172 and 173 situate in village Ahopur, Pargana Khairgarh, Tappa Manda, District Allahabad. These two plots were recorded as occupancy tenancy of Lokman and others and they mortgaged the same to one Sahtu father of the petitioners and grand father of opposite party no. 4. The erstwhile intermediary ejected the mortgagor and mortgagee and made fresh settlement with Sahtu. Lateron Lokman and others with the amendment in U. P. Tenancy Act, 1947 applied for re-settlement under section 27. The suit was decreed on 28th March, 1949 against the only Zamindar and it was ordered that Sahtu should not be ejected till expiry of three years from the date of this order. Petitioners, before the expiry of three years, approached Lokman the tenant to execute a sale deed in their favour. The case of the petitioners is that the sale deed was executed on 3rd June, 1952 after obtaining the permission and written consent of the Zamindar. The third brother of petitioners did not join hands in the purchase of the disputed plots. It is further the case of the petitioners that inspite of the above transaction, inadvertantly the name of Gurcharan wrongly continued even after the aforesaid sale deed and it led to the filing of the fresh suit under section 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act. Thereafter the Assistant Collector 1st Class dismissed the same while the Commissioner, Allahabad Division in appeal allowed by means of an order dated 2nd August, 1971. It seems that thereafter a second appeal has been preferred but on account of the consolidation operation, the same stood abated. 2. During consolidation operation petitioners filed objection under section 9-A for expunction of the name of Gurcharan from the record on the basis of the aforesaid alleged sale deed. The matter was contested. The objection filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the consolidation officer mainly on the ground that the permission dated 3rd June 1952 had not been proved by the petitioners and since the family remained joint Gurcharan continued in joint possession. In appeal, the learned Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal holding that the said sale deed is not void but voidable. In appeal, the learned Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal holding that the said sale deed is not void but voidable. Finally Gurcharan filed revision and the Deputy Director of Consolidation confirmed the finding of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and dismissed his revision. Aggrieved as against the said judgment a writ petition was filed earlier before this Hon'ble Court. The said writ petition is numbered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 610 of 1974. After hearing the parties this court remanded the case back before the Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide afresh in accordance with law directed therein. It is during the pendency of this case after remand before the Deputy Director of Consolidation the Revenue record room caught fire some time in December 1978. Consequently the entire file of the courts of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as the Deputy Director of Consolidation were reduced into ashes which led into the reconstruction of the file which was done after entertaining objection of the parties concerned. The main thrust of the contention on behalf of the petitioner which has been made even before me is that the copies of the statements of his witnesses filed by the opposite party no. 4 at the time of the reconstruction were after tampering with their statements and, therefore, strongly objected for its being admitted in evidence. The case of the petitioner was that these statements of his four witnesses before the Consolidation Officer were with his counsel who lateron joined in the service and the said file not being transferred, he could not file the same. The objections by the petitioners were rejected by the Joint Director of Consolidation on 31st January, 1981 (Aonexure 9) to petition. Finally the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision which is the impugned order with the finding that the said document of permission by the Zamindar was not filed at the initial stage and the said document had not been proved. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners is that on account of the record being burnt, the reconstruction of the file has not been made in accordance with law laid down by this court and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and thus the finding recorded by the revisional court is not sustainable. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners is that on account of the record being burnt, the reconstruction of the file has not been made in accordance with law laid down by this court and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and thus the finding recorded by the revisional court is not sustainable. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently urged that no error has been committed by the revisional court in reconstruction of the file. Since the question of filing the statement of four witnesses of the petitioner was very much on the petitioner and he having not made proper effort to obtain the same, copies filed by the opposite party no. 4 were justified and on that account it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is further urged on behalf of the respondents that in reconstruction of the file the court has to decide on the facts of each case. In the present case discretion which has been exercised by the revisional court after remand, cannot be said to be such which requires any interference by this court in the present proceeding. 3. It is significant to refer here that in earlier writ petition this court while remanding the case has very clearly directed the Deputy Director of consolidation to decide the revision afresh in the light of the observations made above whether permission obtained from the Zamindar has been proved in accordance with law. Thus it would be seen that one of the essential facts which the revisional authority was to adjudicate was whether the permission was or was not obtained from the zamindar by the petitioner before execution of the aforesaid sale deed. IT seems that on account of no fault of any party the revenue record lying with the revisional court containing the relevant file of the present case including all the documents which formed part of the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation were burnt. It is on account of this calamity the present controversy has arisen raising the very significant point and also the question for determination whether the revisional authority has or has not properly exercised its discretion in reconstruction of the file. 4. It is on account of this calamity the present controversy has arisen raising the very significant point and also the question for determination whether the revisional authority has or has not properly exercised its discretion in reconstruction of the file. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the documents containing the written permission of the Zamindar was filed by him even before the Consolidation Officer and since this court remanded the case back for fresh decision, the only question which was to be adjudicated by the revisional court was whether the petitioner has proved the said document or not pertaining to the written permission of the Zamindar. According to the petitioner he has proved the said document through their witnesses. Respondent filed copies of the statements of these four witnesses of the petitioner before the revisional authority. Petitioner seriously objected as the statement were not as it were made earlier but they were tampered, instead prayed to permit him to lead evidence, since reconstruction of these statements were not possible. It is this application and objection of the petitioner which had led into serious dispute inter see between the parties. Opposite party no. 4 objected to the fresh evidence stating that this would amount to give fresh opportunity to the petitioner to fill up the lacuna which should not be permitted. Accepting this contention the revisional court rejected the petitioners' objection holding that it is against law and justice to allow the party to fill up the lacuna and in case the witnesses are allowed to be examined afresh, it would bring great injustice to the parties. The principle of reconstruction of document whether it is lost, burnt f or misplaced not on account of fault of either parties is clearly covered under the courts' inherent power under section 151 CPC. However, this power has to be exercised with great care and circumvention to see that in reconstruction of file no party is getting favourable gains from the position what it was prior to the reconstructions. One of the principles which is to be kept in mind is that the party should be given fullest opportunity first to file such certified copies which are in their possession of those records which are now not available to the court. One of the principles which is to be kept in mind is that the party should be given fullest opportunity first to file such certified copies which are in their possession of those records which are now not available to the court. In doing so the court need not confine itself to the certified copies but even copies which are not certified if either party did not object and accept the said document, it may be accepted as a part of the record of the then existing document. No fixed principle or criterion could be laid down to the court in deciding as to in what manner the record is to be reconstructed. 5. However it is very significant in the reconstruction of the file, when a document not being certified copy sought to be filed is objected to at the stage, of reconstruction, the principle which normally would have been followed for its admissibility earlier should be adhered to. Some times even statement recorded in the judgment of the various authorities, the certified copy of which is available, will also be strong circumstance to be kept in mind in accepting or rejecting any document which is not a certified copy of the then existing record if such document is contrary to what is recorded therein. There are also rules in the General Rules (Civil Rules) and the circular issued by the High Court from time to time to the courts below for guidance about the reconstruction of the record. 6. It is relevant here to refer to a case of Division Bench of this High Court reported in 1983 Allahabad Civil Journal page 49 (U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Geeta Devi and others). In this case strong reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of Madras High Court reported in Markkarutti v. Veeran Kutti, AIR 1923 Madras 647. In this case also material evidence required to be brought on the record were the statements of two witnesses. Counsel for the parties there were entitled to file the copies of the statements of witnesses. On the fact of that case our Court held that it is apparently clear to give another opportunity to the parties to produce the same before the Claims Tribunal. Counsel for the parties there were entitled to file the copies of the statements of witnesses. On the fact of that case our Court held that it is apparently clear to give another opportunity to the parties to produce the same before the Claims Tribunal. It was further held, in case even after giving fresh opportunity, the parties failed to do the same, then the Tribunal may ask for reproduction of the witnesses for making the statement and in doing so the Tribunal shall afford opportunity to cross examine each of those witnesses. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly urged that in view of these decisions when the statements of his witnesses could not be filed by him and uncertified copy of the statements of his witness filed by the opposite party no. 4 having not been accepted to be the true copis of the said statements, the only option open to the courts was to have allowed the application of the petitioner for the examination of the witnesses. In doing so, it was not giving any fresh opportunity to the party but it was only helping the court in reconstruction of the records which were burnt. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly urged that the main principle for reconstruction of the file has been dealt with in detail in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High court relied by our Court. The main portion on which reliance has been placed is quoted as under: "It is worth observing, that in the appellate court, probably the best evidence of what took place in the Court below will be found in the judgment, if that has been preserved, if the District Munsif or the Subordinate Judge, as the case may be, who heard the case and recorded findings." 8. Learned counsel for the respondents urged in the present case that since the Consolidation Officer clearly recorded a finding that the petitioner has not proved the written consent given by the then Zamindar, that should be taken to be the best evidence available for adjudicating the existing record. The question for decision in the present writ petition is whether the revisional court has exercised its power for reconstruction properly or not. The question for decision in the present writ petition is whether the revisional court has exercised its power for reconstruction properly or not. It seems in the present case the petitioner filed the application on 31st January, 1981 before the revisional court that since the record of the statements of his witnesses were completely burnt and unfortunately the applicant did not have certified or true copies of the statements of his witnesses, he may be permitted to examine the witnesses in this Court. Objections were filed on the same date by opposite party no. 4 that the present application is only to fill up the lacuna of the petitioners' case and in case he is permitted to be examined, it would prejudice him. Finally on the same date the court rejected the application of the petitioner . stating that this Hon'ble Court while remanding has not said about the recording of the fresh evidence and if such procedure is adopted, it will prejudice the interests of other side. It is further urged that the judgments of the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) are available and since the petitioner has not filed the certified copies of the statements, the application of the petitioner was rightly rejected. It has been strongly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the reason for rejection of his application mainly was that the High Court has not directed for recording the fresh evidence and thus it could not be permitted. In the impugned order it was mentioned that the petitioner has filed the document of written consent of the Zamindarfor the first time before the revisional court and the revisional court accepted the argument of other side that he should not be permitted to file this document now after the case has gone upto the High Court after remand itself. It was further held that even if it was filed before the revisional court, the petitioner has failed to prove the said document for which he was duty bound and for that he could not have been permitted to lead evidence for the first time before the court. 9. The revisional court here committed grave error in recording the finding that that document was filed for the first time before it. The fact that the said document did exist initially has been recorded in the order of the Consolidation Officer. 9. The revisional court here committed grave error in recording the finding that that document was filed for the first time before it. The fact that the said document did exist initially has been recorded in the order of the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer has very clearly recorded that the petitioner apart from the sale deed has filed the written permission letter dated 3rd June, 1952 which is available on the record. This shows that this document was already filed before the Consolidation Officer. If this document was already on record, consideration made by the revisional authority contrary to this coupled with the finding that if permitted it would permit him fresh opportunity, cannot be sustained. 10. It cannot be doubted that this court while remanding the case back did not give a fresh line to the petitioner for proving his case afresh by leading fresh evidence. If the petitioner was trying to prove his case by means of document to be filed afresh to prove his case which was not proved earlier, then it would be well within the jurisdiction of the revisional court not to give such opportunity. However, in the present case the question is not of granting fresh opportunity. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he has already proved his document by his four witnesses and since the copies of the statements of these four witnesses were burnt and he could not obtain the copies from his own Counsel as he has left the profession and went in service, the petitioner sought for permission for producing the said witnesses again for helping in the reconstruction of the file. IT is true that the examination of the witnesses afresh should only be done in the rarest of case as there is likelihood of improving the case of the parties. The principle has been well and properly considered in the Full Bench decision of the aforesaid Madras case. IT is laid down that the court should afford best opportunity to the parties for reconstruction of the file which is permitted under law. The principle has been well and properly considered in the Full Bench decision of the aforesaid Madras case. IT is laid down that the court should afford best opportunity to the parties for reconstruction of the file which is permitted under law. It has been laid down in the aforesaid Madras decision and our Division Bench case that the court below should give best opportunity to the parties for reconstruction of the lost record and if inspite of best effort on the facts of each case, the court exercising its inherent power is not able to reconstruct the existing records on the basis of statements filed by the parties, then the court should not hesitate for permitting the witnesses to be examined for reconstruction of the file subject to the condition of the right of cross examination of other side. In the present case I am not going on the merits which has been decided by the revisional court. I find that the revisional court while exercising power of reconstruction of file has not properly appreciated the well settled law laid down by this Court and, therefore, there is likelihood of the parties being prejudiced. I have examined the order dated 31st January, 1981 passed by the revisional court separately and also the reasoning given in the impugned order and I find that the very approach of the revisional court suffers from manifest illegality. The revisional court first committed mistake in recording that the written consent was filed for the first time before it and secondly petitioner in seeking admission of the said document is doing so by leading fresh evidence. If it was so, the revisional court was well within its competence to reject such request. However, I find from the facts of the present case that it is not a case for either filing fresh evidence i. e. permission of Zamindar or trying to prove the document "for the first time. As aforesaid, the Consolidation Officer clearly recorded that such permission was filed before it. Thus it is the duty of the court while making reconstruction of the file to adjudicate on the well settled principles of law which have been laid down and which have been pointed out above. 11. As aforesaid, the Consolidation Officer clearly recorded that such permission was filed before it. Thus it is the duty of the court while making reconstruction of the file to adjudicate on the well settled principles of law which have been laid down and which have been pointed out above. 11. I find in the present case discretion has not been exercised in proper way and in exercise of its jurisdiction the revisional court completely misdirected itself and thus the aforesaid order cannot be sustained. However, it is made clear that even though this order is being set aside, it would be open for the revisional court to decide the question afresh after properly exercising the discretion of reconstruction of the file. Learned counsel for the respondents states that adverse inference should be drawn as against the present petitioner as per aforesaid Madras decision after he failed to file the said evidence which was in his possession as primarily the onus lies on the petitioner. It is for the court exercising discretion of its inherent power to decide whether the fact stated by the petitioner that the record has been lost is not traceable is believable or not. Even the question if the certified copies of statements are not filed whether the same could be permitted or not or whether the statement recorded in the judgment of the Consolidation Officer, if contrary to it is sought to be adduced should be permitted or not, are all questions open for adjudication for the revisional court. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the impugned order dated 2nd February, 1983 (Annexure II to the petition) is hereby quashed. The present case is remanded to the revisional authority to decide afresh and pass proper order in the light of the observations made above regarding the reconstruction of the file specially relating to the statement of four witnesses of the petitioner. It is after passing the proper order and after hearing the counsel for the parties and giving them proper opportunity, the revisional court shall decide the revision afresh in accordance with law. In view of the aforesaid observations the present petition is allowed and the parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.