JUDGMENT V.P. Singh, Member - This review application has been filed against the Board's order dated August 29, 1984 in second appeal No. 85(z) of 1976-77 (Devendra Nath and others v. Shree Ram and others) on several grounds. Notice was issued to the O.Ps. before admission of the review application as according to the office report the review application was filed beyond time. The learned counsels for the parties were heard. During the arguments a preliminary objection was raised by the learned counsel for the O.Ps. that the review application was time barred as according to Article 124 of the Limitation Act the period for filing a review application was 30 days and in present case the application for review was filed after 30 days. He referred to Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act and submitted that even if defence for dismissing the application was not taken it should be dismissed as it was moved after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation. He placed reliance in 1979 A.C.J. page 372, A.I.R. 1924 Alld. page 668 and 1973 Supreme Court Cases Vol. II page 52 in support of his contention. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that the delay was only of 4 to 5 days only and it could be condoned even on an oral request of the party or his counsel. He placed reliance on R.D. 1982 page 1 (Hindi Bhag) in support of his submissions. 2. The arguments were heard on September 2, 1986 and the order was reserved. An application for condonation of delay was moved just after the hearing of the arguments by the learned counsel for the applicant in which it was alleged that the applicant received information about the judgment dated August 29, 1984 on August 27, 1984 and he came to Allahabad on August 29, 1984 and applied for a certificate copy of the judgment which was prepared and delivered to his counsel on October 11, 1984 and the review petition was filed on October 15, 1984, hence the delay in filing the review petition was chiefly due to the mistake of the counsel. As regards the period between October 11, 1984 and October 15, 1984 the applicant counsel alleged that due to personal difficulties the review petition could not be filed just after the certified copy of the judgment was made available. As regards the period between October 11, 1984 and October 15, 1984 the applicant counsel alleged that due to personal difficulties the review petition could not be filed just after the certified copy of the judgment was made available. An affidavit was filed by the O.P. in reply to the above mentioned application dated September 2, 1986 in which it has been asserted that after the hearing of the review petition on September 2, 1986 there was no ground to file an application for condonation of delay hence the application for condonation of delay hence the application dated September 2, 1986 which was not presented during the course of arguments and in presence of the counsel for the O.P. was not admissible and there was no justification for filing the said application. It was also averred in the affidavit that the reasons given for the delay were also false and wrong as according to the said contents of the application for condonation of delay the review petition was barred by time by only 4 or 5 days but according to the record the application for review was barred by about 47 days. It was also pointed out in the affidavit that according to the applicant's own version as contained in the application dated September 2, 1986, he came to Allahabad on August 29, 1984 and if this version is taken to be correct the applicant must have been present on the date when the judgment was pronounced and, therefore there was no reason for any delay in filing the review petition. A counter affidavit has been filed by the counsel for the applicant on July 10, 1987 which was the date fixed for arguments. In para 8 of this counter affidavit it has been alleged that due to clerical error the date August 27, 1984 was mentioned instead of the date September 27, 1984 about the applicants receiving of letter and also due to similar clerical error the date August 28, 1984 was mentioned instead of September 28, 1984 about the applicant's reaching Allahabad and, therefore, there was no question of applicant's receiving information about the judgment dated August 29, 1984 on a date prior to the delivery of the judgment. It has also been alleged that the review application was delayed by only 4 or 5 days and that delay was also due to certain disturbance in the family of the counsel for the applicant. 3. The learned counsel for the O.P. has laid great stress on the points that when the application for review was presented for the first time it was not accompanied with any application for condonation of delay and it was on the date of arguments on the point of admission that the learned counsel for the applicant moved an application for condonation of delay and, therefore, in view of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act review petition should be dismissed being time barred even if no defence had been set up on the ground of limitation. He relied upon A.C.J. 1979 page 372 in which the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad has held that it is well settled that expiry of period of limitation prescribed for a suit does not destroy the right in court of law. It cannot, therefore, be said that the terms of the provisions of the Limitation Act prevent an arbitrator from entertaining a claim which if made in a court of law may be barred by limitation. He has also placed reliance on Supreme Court Cases 1973 Vol. II page 53 in which it has been held that no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had been made and no reason had been shown as to why there was a delay in filing those documents. Hence the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. In A.I.R. 1924 Alld. page 668, which has also been relied upon, it has been held that Section 151 is not intended to over-ride the express provision of law. In other words where the law provides a period of limitation for a particular class of application the court cannot ignore the provisions of the law of limitation by appealing to Section 151 of the Code. That section is intended for cases for which the strict letter of the law provides no remedy. 4. In other words where the law provides a period of limitation for a particular class of application the court cannot ignore the provisions of the law of limitation by appealing to Section 151 of the Code. That section is intended for cases for which the strict letter of the law provides no remedy. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant has met the arguments of the learned counsel for the opposite party mainly on the ground that whatever delay there was in filing the review petition it was due to the negligence of the counsel or due to certain disturbances in the house-hold of the counsel and, therefore, the applicant could not be punished for the same. He has placed reliance in 1982 R.D. page 1 Hindi Section in which it has been held that from a perusal of Section 5 of the Limitation Act it does not appear that for getting benefit of Section 5 of the Act a written application is necessary. It is sufficient for the court to see that there are sufficient reasons for condoning the delay. The learned counsel has also referred to A.I.R 1987 S.C. page 1353 in which it has been held that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 5. No doubt it is obvious for the record that the learned counsel for the applicant has handled this matter in a very negligent fashion. Even if there was a delay of one day in filing the review petition there should have been an explanation for the same either in the body of the petition itself or in a separate application for condonation of delay which should have been filed along with the review petition. Even if there was a delay of one day in filing the review petition there should have been an explanation for the same either in the body of the petition itself or in a separate application for condonation of delay which should have been filed along with the review petition. It appears that the learned counsel for the applicant was reminded of this discrepancy at the time of the arguments when the O.P. counsel raised a preliminary objection that the review petition was time barred and thereafter an application was moved by the counsel for the applicant for condonation of delay after the conclusion of the arguments and this application was also full of chronological errors regarding dates which were explained on a much later date by filing a counter-affidavit which I have referred to above. But inspite of all these lapses on the part of the counsel for the applicant the fact remains that the party which was represented by the counsel had nothing to contribute to these lapses and accordingly as has been laid down repeatedly by the superior courts that mistakes on the part of the counsel should not be made a ground for refusing the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act. I am of the view that in this case also the delay of 4 or 5 days as appears from the record was caused not by the negligence of the party and therefore the party should not be punished for the same. In all ruling the rulings referred to by the learned counsel for the opposite party the facts are a little different and in those cases benefit of Section 5 was refused because the delay had not been explained at all. In the present case the review petition did not accompany any application for the condonation of delay but just after the arguments were concluded an application for condonation of delay was moved by the learned counsel for the applicant. Even if this application for condonation is not taken into account at all the benefit could be given if the counsel even orally admitted his mistake and owned the entire responsibility of filing the review petition beyond time. In such a circumstance even an oral request for condonation of delay would be sufficient. 6. Even if this application for condonation is not taken into account at all the benefit could be given if the counsel even orally admitted his mistake and owned the entire responsibility of filing the review petition beyond time. In such a circumstance even an oral request for condonation of delay would be sufficient. 6. On the basis of discussion made above I condoned the delay in filing the review petition under Section of the Limitation Act. 7. Fix for September 24, 1987 for arguments on admission of the review petition inform the counsel for the board decide.